"Mission 66": modernism and the national park dilemma in the United States, 1945-1972 by Carr, Ethan
"MISSION 66 ": 
Modernism and the National Park Dilemma 
in the United States, 1945 -1972 
by Ethan Can 
This thesis is submitted to the School of Landscape Architecture 
at the Edinburgh College of Art 
in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
VOLUME I OF II 
May 2006 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that the copyright rests with the author and that no quotation 
from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the prior 
written consent of the author or the University (as may be appropriate). 









Postgraduate Study (tick) PhD I X I MPhil I I MSc 
Thesis Title 
"MISSION 66 ": Modernism and the national park dilemma in the United States, 1945 -1972 
Signature: Date:t)' 1 S 200 C 
kbstract 
"Mission 66" was a National Park Service design and construction program intended 
to revitalize the American national park system through a ten -year program of capital 
investment and land acquisition from 1956 to 1966. The built legacy of the Mission 
66 program includes over one hundred visitor centres (a building type invented by 
Mission 66 planners), hundreds of employee residences (based on standardized plans), 
and innumerable comfort stations, campgrounds, maintenance facilities, road 
improvements, bridges, entrance stations, and service stations. Most of these 
buildings were modernist in design inspiration, contrasting with prewar "rustic" park 
architecture. Utilities and concessioner developments were also built through Mission 
66. Park planning emphasized new park units in coastal areas (national seashores), 
around reservoirs (national recreation areas), and at historic sites (national historical 
parks). During this period National Park Service staff was enlarged, uniforms were 
modernized, and the arrowhead logo (devised in 1951) became the ubiquitous symbol 
of the agency. 
This thesis attempts 1) to give a thorough historical context for this era of American 
national park planning and development, 2) to explore research questions relating to 
assessments of the historical significance of this legacy of buildings and built 
landscapes, 3) to establish how this period of American landscape architecture 
influenced and continues to affect the current situation (or "dilemma ") of the 
American national park system. 
It is argued that this period of national park design and development was significantly 
influenced by contemporary trends in American landscape architecture, architecture, 
and museum ( "visitor centre ") design. It is concluded that national park development 
of the Mission 66 era (1945 -1972) was the last, comprehensive program of its type and 
therefore must be understood in order to better assess park planning, design, and 
management issues today. It is also argued that essential aspects of the visiting 
public's interaction with national parks and historic sites were reforged during the 
Mission 66 era, and that an understanding of the Mission 66 era park design therefore 
also is necessary for a fuller appreciation of the expectations and conceptualizations 
many park visitors bring with them to national parks today. 
Literature review and methodology research at the beginning of this project 
emphasized historical contexts and historical research methodologies and theory. This 
phase of the project led to the formulation of research questions and methods. 
Subsequent research involved the use of primary sources (especially the National 
Archives in College Park, Maryland), site visits (to dozens of parks over a four -year 
period), oral histories, and quantitative analysis of National Park Service budgets and 
other statistics. This study was supported in part by a grant from the (U.S.) National 
Park Service. 
Notes 
1. The Abstract of your thesis which is for Library use should be PRINTED ON TO THIS FORM. 
2. Three copies of the thesis, each with a copy of the Abstract (on this form or on plain A4 paper) bound in to 
precede the 
thesis, must be lodged with the Postgraduate Officer, together with a completed Submission of Thesis form. 
3. 
The Abstract should not normally exceed 200 words and should set forth the main argument and conclusions 
of the 
thesis. The abstract must be typeset and written in English. 
\eca \research \research thesis forms \submission of abstract.doc 
Acknowledgements 
Professors Simon Bell and Catherine Ward -Thompson encouraged, supported, 
and oversaw this research project, and I am indebted to them for their contributions 
and patience. 
Much of the research and travel for this project was supported through a 
National Park Service grant. The results of this work will be part of the National Park 
Service's larger effort to evaluate the historical significance of Mission 66 era 
development, as required by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (as 
amended). A committee of National Park Service officials and historians reviewed 
portions of this work. 
In addition to the National Archives in Washington, DC, many smaller 
archives provided vital primary documents from which this history of Mission 66 has 
been assembled. Individual national parks often conserve many records, images, and 
even transcriptions of oral history projects. The National Park Service's Harpers 
Ferry Center, in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, conserves a particularly vital archive 
of Mission 66 era documents, interviews, images, and publications. Conrad L. 
Wirth's personal papers are conserved at the University of Wyoming, Laramie. 
The University of Massachusetts, in Amherst, Massachusetts, has also 
supported this work by giving me the needed time to complete this research while 
teaching in the Department of Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning. I am 
indebted to the faculty and graduate students who contributed to the ideas in this 
study. 
Submission of Thesis /Dissertation Form 
-hesis Title 
`MISSION 66 ": Modernism and the national park dilemma in the United States, 19454972 
RESEARCH 
Notes 
1) The Completed form must be lodged with the Clerk to the Postgraduate Studies Committee, Postgraduate Office, 
and must be accompanied by three copies of the thesis. Each copy of the thesis must contain an abstract, in the 
same format and presentation as the thesis, setting forth the main arguments and conclusions of the thesis, and 
must be bound in to precede the thesis. An additional copy of the abstract must be submitted for library purposes. 
2) A suitable Abstract of Thesis form for the additional copy of the Abstract is available on request from the 
Postgraduate Office. 
3) The thesis must comply in format, presentation and binding with the appropriate regulations obtainable from the 
Postgraduate Office 







Address Term Address (if 
different) 
Postgraduate Study (tick) PhD I X I MPhil MSc 
Faculty Post Graduate 
Department Landscape Architecture 
Date of First Registration October 2002 
Field of Study Landscape Architecture 
Supervisor(s) Simon Bell, Catherine Ward -Thompson 
6 
Declaration 
In accordance with the appropriate regulations I hereby submit the thesis detailed above for examination and I 
declare: 
a) that the thesis embodies the results of my own work 
b) that it has been composed by myself 
c) that, where appropriate, I have made acknowledgement to the work of others and have made reference to 
work carried 
d) out in collaboration with other persons, and 
I agree that my thesis for the award referred to, deposited in the Heriot -Watt University Library, should be made 
e) available for loan or photocopying, subject to such conditions as the Librarian may require. 
that I understand that as an examination candidate I am required to abide by the Regulations of the 
University and to cocform to its dissidline. 
Signature Date 







Appt of Exam British Library Resub 
Fee 
c:\temp\submission of thesis.doc 
Table of Contents 
Volume I 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 -4 
1.1 "MISSION 66" 
1.2 Gaps in Knowledge 
1.3 Findings in Context of Work in the Field 
Chapter 2: Overview of the Literature 5 -16 
2.1 National Park Narratives: The "National Park Idea" 
2.2 National Park Service History 
2.3 Academic Studies and Administrative Histories 
2.4 Landscape Architecture and Perceptions of Modernism 
2.5 Postwar Geography 
2.6 Environmentalism 
Chapter 3: Methodology 17 -26 
3.1 Sources of Data 
3.2 Narrative Theory 
3.3 Other Approaches to Writing History 
3.4 Issues Regarding Research of the Recent Past 
3.5 Site Visits 
3.6 Research Methods 
Chapter 4: Research Questions 27 -30 
4.1 Origins of Mission 66 Controversy 
4.2 Contemporary Influences on Conrad Wirth and Mission 66 Policy 
4.3 Perceptions of Mission 66 and Attitudes Towards Modernism 
4.4 The Significance of the Mission 66 Prospectus 
4.5 Mission 66 Design and Contemporary Context 
4.6 Changing Perceptions of Nature and History 
4.7 Continued Significance of Mission 66 
Chapter 5: The National Park "Dilemma" 
and the Origins of Controversy 31 -60 
5.1 Early Origins 
5.2 Early Scenic Preservation and Automotive Tourism 
5.3 Automotive Tourism and National Parks 
5.4 The National Park "Dilemma" 
5.5 Hetch Hetchy 
Chapter 6: Conrad Wirth and Postwar "Recreational Planning" 61 -78 
6.1 Conrad Wirth 
6.2 Recreational Planning 
6.3 Landscape Change in the Mid -Twentieth Century 
6.4 Postwar Federal Highways 
Chapter 7: Initial Responses to the Dilemma and to Modernism 79 -99 
7.1 Media Responses to Postwar Conditions 
7.2 Responses to Modernism: Jackson Lake Lodge 
7.3 Park Service Adoption of Modernism 
Chapter 8: Initial Management Priorities and Pilot Studies 100 -135 
8.1 Shifting Political Context 
8.2 Administrative Reorganization 
8.3 Mission 66 Gets Underway 
8.4 Initial Guiding Concepts 
8.5 Vint's Influence on Early Policy 
8.6 Pilot Prospectus for Mount Rainier 
8.7 Other Pilot Prospectuses 
Chapter 9: Final Policies for Mission 66: "Our Heritage" 
9.1 Mission 66 "Precepts" 
9.2 "Our Heritage" 
9.3 Appropriations 




Chapter 11: Mission 66 Architecture 
11.1 The "Visitor Center" 
11.2 Administration Buildings 
11.3 Park Housing 
11.4 Concessioner Lodges 
Chapter 12: Preservation and Interpretation 
12.1 Park Making as Historic Preservation 
12.2 Other Aspects of Historic Preservation 
12.3 Mission 66 Interpretation 
12.4 Training for Interpreters 






Chapter 13: Mission 66 Landscape Architecture 247 -273 
13.1 National Park Service Landscape Architecture 
13.2 Postwar Landscape Architecture 
13.3 Mission 66 as Landscape Architecture 
13.4 The Mission 66 Modernist Park 
Chapter 14: Roads and Controversies 274 -314 
14.1 National Park Roads 
14.2 Tioga Road, Part One 
14.3 Park Roads and Postwar Wilderness 
14.4 The "National Park Wilderness" 
14.5 Tioga Road, Part Two 
14.6 Denali Road 
14.7 Other Mission 66 Roads 
Chapter 15: "Parks for America" 315 -362 
15.1 The ORRRC 
15.2 "PARKS FOR AMERICA" 
15.3 Mission 66 "Frontiers" 
15.4 The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation 
15.5 Park Science and the Leopold Report 
15.6 Wirth Steps Down 
15.7 "The Road to the Future" 
Conclusion 363 -371 
Bibliography 372 -387 
Figures 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 "MISSION 66" 
The developed areas of the American national park system are primarily the result 
of two busy periods of modernization overseen by the National Park Service. While older 
parks, such as Yellowstone, Glacier, and Grand Canyon, boast hotels and other remnants 
from the earlier railroad era, the construction of the modern national park system began in 
the mid -1920s when Congress approved generous appropriations for the development of 
public facilities. This was the "rustic" era of park architecture and landscape design. 
Park Service designers and engineers developed a unique approach to what they described 
as "harmonious" site development. During the 1930s the agency oversaw the expansion 
and development not only of the national park system, but of almost every state park 
system in the United States. World War II, followed by low postwar budgets, caused an 
extended hiatus in federal park sponsorship. When Congress was again ready to ratchet 
up park spending in the mid- 1950s, a second major wave of national park development 
occurred. This postwar era of park development was structured around a ten -year 
program proposed in 1955 by Park Service director Conrad L. Wirth. Characterized by 
Wirth as "MISSION 66," the program was intended to modernize, enlarge, and even 
reinvent the park system by 1966, the fiftieth anniversary of the Park Service. 
1.2 Gaps in Knowledge 
The extensive redevelopment of American national parks that occurred between 
1945 and 1972 -especially between 1956 and 1966 -has been the subject of little serious 
scholarship. Although historians have focused on the prewar, rustic era of architecture 
and American national park development, reactions to postwar modernist design in 
American national parks have always been mixed. Criticism of modernist design in 
national parks began as early as the 1950s and negative perceptions intensified greatly in 
the 1980s. Since then, the Mission 66 era (defined here as 1945 to 1972) has often been 
described as a period in which the Park Service betrayed its own design tradition: an 
aberrant episode that ended once Park Service architects and their consultants once again 
devised rustic façades for new buildings. Critics have also scoffed at the assertion that 
Mission 66 was a preservation program that attempted to achieve its goals through 
development. To many this was a dark and impossible contradiction that sometimes 
resulted in tragic overdevelopment. Mission 66 has been denounced for poor planning - 
visitor centres too close to park "resources," for example -and low quality construction 
materials and techniques that made use of prefabricated elements and standardized 
designs. 
My thesis topic developed from a series of research questions based on the many 
mischaracterizations and extensive misinformation surrounding Mission 66. Why were 
so many people so upset about development in the nation's parks at a time when new 
facilities were desperately needed? Considering that most national park planners and 
many top agency officials were landscape architects during the Mission 66 era, what 
would a more thorough examination of the period reveal about this profession during the 
postwar era, when it was going through great changes in the United States? Even a casual 
familiarity with the American national park system indicates that much of the 
infrastructure (utilities and roads, for example) and many of the public facilities (visitor 
centres, campgrounds, and lodges, for example) date to the Mission 66 era. How do 
current attitudes and perceptions of Mission 66, and modernism generally, affect planning 
and design today? Mission 66 accelerated and helped define the environmental 
movement in the United States by causing widespread concern among conservation 
organizations that national parks were being overdeveloped. How did Mission 66 help 
turn groups like the Sierra Club into modem, environmental activists, and how did the 
changing relationship with these private non -profit groups change the subsequent 
operations of the Park Service? Why did postwar park development look modernist, 
while prewar had been rustic? The two styles look different, but how different were they 
really, in terms of the goals, meaning, and methods of national park development? 
The existing literature provides no ready answers to my research questions. The 
history of Mission 66 has been perceived and discussed largely through the writings (and 
along the biases) of the generation that directly participated in the controversies of the 
day. On the one hand, Conrad Wirth wrote the most thorough history of Mission 66 in 
his 1981 memoirs. On the other, environmental groups denounced Mission 66 for 
decades, mainly through magazine articles. Debates about Mission 66 continue but they 
parrot points of view and (often erroneous) information that has been passed down since 
the 1950s. Objective administrative or design histories of the program do not exist. 
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The lack of a thorough historical understanding of Mission 66 based on primary 
sources reflects a more general paucity of reliable and analytical research on American 
postwar landscape architecture and planning. While mid -century architecture has been 
the subject of extensive historical surveys and monographs by leading architectural 
historians, the story of American landscape architecture and planning during these years 
remains less examined. This was the highpoint of modernist design in the United States, 
and the period when landscape architects attempted to adapt their profession to the new 
spirit and approach of modernism. Landscape architecture has had a unique relationship 
to American park planning ever since Frederick Law Olmsted first coined the name of the 
profession in the 1860s. How did the transformation of the profession in the 1950s affect 
Mission 66, and vice versa? Mission 66 involved a billion dollars spent on construction 
and land acquisition over a ten -year period. The program was conceived and 
implemented by a relatively small cadre of professionals, most prominently landscape 
architects. Why is it that none of the existing histories of postwar landscape architecture 
even mention Mission 66? 
The scholarship on Mission 66 shares many of the deficiencies of contemporary 
literature on the postwar geography of the United States. While suburbanization has been 
studied extensively, the federal highway analogue to Mission 66-the Interstate Highway 
program -has received little attention from scholars. But the connections between 
federal highway and federal park planning in the twentieth century are essential for a 
more comprehensive understanding of Mission 66. 
Finally, the potential effects of Mission 66 on the relationship of the visiting 
public, and the "nature" and "history" they experience, remain to be more closely 
considered and analyzed. By reconceiving and redeveloping the national park system, 
Mission 66 inevitably reinvented relationships between the parks and their public. What 
was the influence of the program, for example, on intensified attitudes towards the 
protection of the environment? This was the period in which the environmental 
movement emerged as a social phenomenon and a political force. Why do histories of 
environmentalism ignore Mission 66, except to roundly condemn it, generally without 
basing conclusions on original research or new information? 
1.3 Findings in Context of Work in the Field 
Discussion about Mission 66 greatly intensified in the late 1990s because many 
buildings and landscapes constructed during the period approached fifty years in age. 
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The Park Service therefore began to consider the potential of Mission 66 buildings, for 
example, as potentially significant historic resources.' Many Mission 66 facilities by that 
time also required renovation or replacement, also causing managers to consider the 
potential eligibility of buildings and landscapes affected for the National Register of 
Historic Places. 
The effort to determine the historical significance of Mission 66 buildings became 
mired in irrelevant debates over the virtues of rustic versus modernist architecture in 
national park settings. Forty years had passed since the program ended, but those charged 
with managing its built legacy -and for planning future public facilities -still relied on 
memoirs and memories to assess potential historical significance. Discussion of the 
historical value of Mission 66 architecture, in other words, relapsed to the same terms and 
positions that had first been formulated during initial controversies about the program in 
the 1960s. It had not yet become history; Mission 66 was still being debated as if it were 
a current event. For historic preservation to occur, a required first step was missing: the 
subjects of preservation themselves needed first to pass into history. 
This thesis attempts to become a major step in the process of developing a 
broader, more comprehensive understanding of Mission 66 and its place in history. By 
addressing the research questions outlined above, the findings of this thesis will raise the 
discussion of the historical significance of the built legacy Mission 66 from polemical 
debates regarding the virtues of rustic design versus modernist design to a historical 
appreciation of the role and place of the program in broader historical trends. The 
existing literature on national park history, the rise of environmentalism, and postwar 
geographic change in the United States have not provided this historical context. Existing 
literature does not critically examine American park design as a major factor in postwar 
culture. This thesis broadens the discussion of modernism in the United States to better 
indicate the wide variety of projects and individuals involved. In doing so, it also sheds 
new light on the origins and development of the environmental movement in the United 
States. Existing literature on environmentalism, although extensive, has not undertaken a 
serious and balanced assessment of the massive redevelopment of the national park 
system in the 1950s and 1960s. 
` This type of survey of potential historic resources is required for American federal agencies under Section 
110 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (as amended). 
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Chapter 2: Overview of the literature 
The available literature on national park history corresponds to scholarship in 
many disciplines, all of which have been essential to the development of my research 
questions. As the following categories illustrate, my research method involved analysis 
of a wide variety of historical sources from several academic fields. This 
interdisciplinary approach allowed me to examine the topic from different perspectives 
over time, and to attempt a less biased evaluation of the Mission 66 program. Sources 
examined within each category include historical narratives, correspondence, office 
records, oral history, and contemporary studies. 
2.1 National Park Narratives: The "National Park Idea" 
The history of the origins of the American "national park idea" is nearly as iconic 
as the parks themselves. Thomas Jefferson, George Catlin, Henry David Thoreau, 
Frederick Law Olmsted, and George Perkins Marsh (among others) have all been 
advanced as originators of a peculiarly American national park concept.2 In 1917, 
Stephen Mather and his assistant, Horace M. Albright, promulgated the official version of 
the "birth of the national park idea," which held that the inspiration arose spontaneously 
as a group of leading citizens and explorers sat around a campfire in Yellowstone country 
in the summer of 1870. The story appealed to Mather and Albright because it implied a 
"broad unselfish, public- spirited" origin for the "splendid patriotic national -park plan. "3 
The Park Service commemorated this version of events as recently as 1972 (for the 
2 See Laura Wood Roper, FLO: A Biography of Frederick Law Olmsted (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973),'282 -287; Hans Huth, Nature and the American: Three Centuries of Changing 
Attitudes [1957] New Edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 135, 148- 149, 169; Roderick 
Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind [1967] Third Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 
100 -107; Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience [1979] Second Edition, Revised 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 11 -15. 
3 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1917 Annual Report, 3 -4. This annual report was 
written by Horace Albright, who used Chittenden and Langford as his sources for the history of 
Yellowstone. See Hiram Martin Chittenden, The Yellowstone National Park: Historical and Descriptive 
[1895] New and Enlarged Edition, Entirely Revised (St. Paul: J. E. Haynes, 1927); Nathaniel Pitt Langford, 
The Discovery of Yellowstone Park [ 1905] Reprint (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972). For a 
more complete account of the creation of Yellowstone, see Aubrey L. Haines, The Yellowstone Story 2 
vols. (Boulder: The Yellowstone Library and Museum Association in cooperation with Colorado 
Associated University Press, 1977), vol. 1, 84 -173. 
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Yellowstone National Park centennial), but by then historians had already suggested that 
the "campfire story" had little factual basis. The establishment of early national parks, 
including Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Sequoia, was a more complex story. The political 
muscle necessary to pass early park legislation in Congress, in fact, was typically 
supplied not by artists or intellectuals, but by railroads and other private corporations, not 
known for their desire to preserve anything unless it somehow served their interests.4 
But if historians have sometimes noted the irony of the fact that Congress acted 
mainly to serve corporate interests, not the greater good, when it created the early national 
parks, they have also been reluctant to fully explain why some of the most powerful 
capitalists of their day saw park making as an appropriate extension of their activities. 
Histories written since World War II treat the national park primarily within the context 
of the idea of "wilderness" in American culture. In his 1957 history, Hans Huth marshals 
examples of pastoral themes from three centuries of American literature, poetry, and 
landscape painting, tracing a progression from Colonial fear and ambivalence towards the 
wild continent, to picturesque tourism and landscape painting in the 1820s, to the reveries 
of Emerson and the activism of Olmsted in the 1850s. The history follows a steadily 
improving and maturing American attitude towards nature, culminating both in the 
expansion of the national park system after World War I, and the "wilderness movement" 
after World War II.5 Roderick Nash describes a similar intellectual progression in 
American thought and literature, from a congenital horror of uncultivated places, to 
"revolutionary" changes in attitude towards "uninhabited land," as demonstrated above 
all in the writing of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, and Aldo Leopold.6 Historians 
have apotheosized the national parks as "wilderness preserved" even while 
acknowledging that most parks established before World War II were not necessarily 
intended to preserve wilderness (at least not in the postwar sense of the word). 
4 See Alfred Runte, "Pragmatic Alliance: Western Railroads and the National Parks," National Park and 
Conservation Association Magazine 48 (April 1974): 14 -21; Haines, The Yellowstone Story, 84 -173; 
William C. Tweed and Lary M. Dilsaver, Challenge of the Big Trees: A Resource History of Sequoia and 
Kings Canyon National Parks (Three Rivers, California: Sequoia Natural History Association, Inc., 1990), 
69 -73. 
5 For Huth, "The ideas of Aldo Leopold, Robert Marshall, and their friends were novel in the 1920s...but 
they were a continuation of the line of thinking expressed in the works of Catlin, Emerson, and Thoreau." 
Huth, Nature and the American, 204. 
6 See Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 44 -83, 96 -121. More recently, Max Oelschlaeger traces 
the "idea of wilderness" from a Palaeolithic Eden through the tumultuous and destructive activities of 
human civilization since the Renaissance. Oelschlaeger also sees Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold as the most 
influential prophets of the post -World War II (or "postmodern") ideal of wilderness. Max Oelschlaeger, 
The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 
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One influential postwar historian of national parks, Alfred Runte, explains the 
origins of national parks almost entirely in terms of "monumentalism" and "cultural 
nationalism." Suffering from a sense of cultural inadequacy, Americans adopted the 
scenic wonders of their country (particularly in western states) as a compensating 
replacement for the ancient history and architecture of Europe. But again, Runte notes 
that if national parks were created to fulfil "cultural rather than environmental needs," the 
idea "evolved" and "became important for wilderness preservation...and purposes closer 
to the concerns of ecologists. "7 The parks only began to assume their true and relevant 
significance, in other words, as manifestations of "wilderness" in the postwar era of 
nascent environmentalism. 
These historians helped redefine the ideal of wilderness at a time when it was 
reaching a zenith of its influence in American society and politics. Congress passed the 
Wilderness Act in 1964, for example, and designated over 90 million acres of wilderness 
on federal lands in the next twenty -five years. And although the national forest system 
contained more legislated wilderness, for many Americans the national parks most 
effectively expressed this postwar ideal of an untrammelled and uninhabited landscape. 
But the specific new meaning of wilderness, as a place "retaining its primeval character 
and influence, without permanent improvements," where "man himself is a visitor who 
does not remain "(as the 1964 Wilderness Act defined it), obviously contrasted with the 
conditions found in the frontcountry areas of most national parks.8 Yosemite Valley, for 
example, had not been a wilderness in this sense for over a century. 
2.2 National Park Service History 
National Park Service histories that treat the postwar period fall into several 
groups, but Roy Appleman's history of the Mission 66 program is unique.9 Appleman 
was a Park Service historian working on Mission 66 planning who took extensive, 
sometimes verbatim notes of meetings and events in 1955 and 1956. Like many Park 
Service employees at the time, he felt that he was part of an effort that was making 
history. He interviewed Conrad Wirth in 1957 and his unpublished history was finished 
the next year. Appleman's detailed account of the planning of Mission 66, along with 
7 Runte, National Parks, xx -xxi, 1 -5, 11 -32. 
s For the wording of the Wilderness Act, see Lary M. Dilsaver, America's National Park System: The 
Critical Documents (Lanham Way, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1994), 277 -286. 
9 Roy E. Appleman, "A History of the National Park Service Mission 66 Program." Unpublished report 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1958). 
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Wirth's memoirs published in 1980, are by far the most detailed accounts of the program 
and have been used extensively by historians.10 Wirth himself acknowledges consulting 
Appleman's report in writing his memoirs. A comparison of these two texts -checked 
against the primary sources (copious official memoranda and correspondence) has been 
an interesting study in points of view. Appleman and Wirth generally agree in content 
and tone. They do omit aspects of the story, however, that were controversial or that 
involved pragmatic compromises. Neither Wirth's decision not to discuss limiting public 
visitation as an option in most parks, for example, nor his decision to build a motel in the 
Everglades appear in these accounts. Nevertheless, these two histories remain essential 
sources. 
The few government reports on the subject of Mission 66 in more recent years all 
rely heavily on Appleman and Wirth. This standard history is the story Wirth and the 
Park Service wanted to tell: the financially strapped agency, unable to cope with postwar 
demands on its facilities, suddenly achieved great success by planning a compelling ten - 
year development proposal that convinced Congress to reverse its postwar policies and 
fund parks generously. This story is largely true, as far as the facts. It is summarized 
most effectively by a government study of Mission 66 visitor centres by Sarah Allaback.11 
Although this report is the most important secondary source on Mission 66, the initial 
administrative history is brief; the bulk of the study gives comprehensive histories of 
individual buildings, three of which were made National Historic Landmarks based on 
her research and findings. 
Most general surveys of national park history, such as Ise and Runte, treat Mission 
66 in a perfunctory manner. This is also true of many administrative histories of 
individual parks, such as Anderson, Bartlett, and Martinson, which broadly characterize 
the Mission 66 era in a rather negative way, without attempting to look further.12 Perhaps 
the most insightful general history of the Park Service, as far as Mission 66 goes, is 
Ronald Foresta, who provides a thoughtful analysis of the program in the context of the 
lo Conrad L. Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1980). 
11 Sarah Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers: The History of a Building Type (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2000). 
12 John Ise, Our National Park Policy: A Critical History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1961); Runte, National Parks, 1987Michael F. Anderson, Polishing the Jewel: An Administrative History of 
Grand Canyon National Park (Grand Canyon, Arizona: Grand Canyon Association, 2000); Richard A. 
Bartlett, Yellowstone: A Wilderness Besieged (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1985); Arthur 
David Martinson, "Mountain in the Sky: A History of Mount Rainier National Park," Washington State 
University, 1966. 
8 
changing politics and structure of the federal government. This survey history of the 
agency, however, does not attempt to provide a detailed treatment of Mission 66.13 
Much of the scholarship on the history of park planning and design has been 
concerned with prewar design and development, which has been championed since the 
1980s as a golden period of American park making. Many historians came to see Mission 
66 design -which is above all modernist not rustic -as a time when the agency lost its 
way, and deviated from more desirable, traditional policy. This is even true of survey 
histories of national park design such as Carr, Harrison, and McClelland.14 These all treat 
Mission 66 essentially as a coda, or conclusion, of the story of Park Service design, 
without examining the period in depth. 
There are numerous Park Service general reference sources that are invaluable for 
many reasons. Long time chief historian Ronald Lee (also an important Mission 66 
planner) wrote several studies of the Park Service, as did one of his successors, Barry 
Mackintosh.15 Olsen and Tolson compiled organizational and legislative data that is very 
useful.16 Only one true critical assessment of Mission 66 planning and design has been 
undertaken, by Zube, et aí.17 Although these landscape architects provide an interesting 
study of visitor centre design, they made no attempt to analyze the history or broader 
policies of Mission 66. 
13 Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington, DC: Resources for the 
Future, Inc., 1984). 
la Ethan Carr, Wilderness By Design: Landscape Architecture and the National Park Service (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Laura Soulliere Harrison, Architecture in the Parks: National Historic 
Landmark Theme Study (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986); Linda Flint McClelland, 
Building the National Parks: Historic Landscape Design and Construction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998). 
15 Ronald F. Lee, Family Tree of the National Park System (Philadelphia: Eastern National Park and 
Monument Association, 1972); idem, The Origin and Evolution of the National Military Park Idea 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1973); idem, Public Use of the 
National Park System: 1872 -2000 (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 
1968); Barry Mackintosh, Interpretation in the National Park Service (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Interior, National Park Service, 1986); idem, National Park Service Administrative History (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1991); idem, The National Parks: Shaping the System (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1991). 
16 Russ Olsen, Administrative History: Organizational Structures of the National Park Service 19171985 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985); Hillory A.Tolson, Historic Listing of National Park 
Service Officials [1964], revised as 75th Anniversary Edition by Harold P. Danz (Denver: Department of 
the Interior, National Park Service, 1991). 
17 Ervin H. Zube, Joseph H. Crystal, and James F. Palmer, Visitor Center Design Evaluation (Denver: 
Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1976). 
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2.3 Academic Studies and Administrative Histories 
Appleman and Wirth are also the main sources for the administrative histories 
given in academic theses by Jofuku, Madrid, Monroe, and Zenzen.18 Some of these 
academic works have interesting insights; but essentially they rely on the sources 
described above, as well as some research on individual case studies. 
Many administrative histories of individual parks have chapters on Mission 66 as 
it relates to their subjects. Most do not make significant contributions to the Mission 66 
literature, but several do. Barringer's work on Yellowstone, in particular, sheds light on 
the complex relationships between parks and concessioners during this period.19 
Bellavia, Belshaw, Bishop, Brown, Calton, Greiff, Pritchard, and Stakley all provide 
histories of individual parks that were developed during the Mission 66 period.20 Their 
administrative histories therefore reveal some information about the program as it was 
applied in specific cases, and they are among the most useful secondary sources available. 
Published literature on Mission 66 is only beginning to appear, but judging by the 
academic work, more is clearly on the way. Some of this published work, especially 
Barringer and Calton gives new interpretation and assessment of Mission 66, based on 
new archival research. Most other general histories, academic theses, and park 
administrative histories, however, repeat a now familiar story, based ultimately on 
Appleman and Wirth. 
la Tracey Lynne Jofuku, "That the Past Shall Live: Conrad Wirth and the National Park Service, 1951- 
1963," Bachelor of Arts Honors History Thesis, Harvard University, 1991; Christine L. Madrid, "The 
Mission 66 Visitor Centers: Early Modern Architecture in the National Park Service, 1956 -1976," Master of 
Architectural History Thesis, University of Virginia, 1998; Jonathan Searle Monroe, "Architecture in the 
National Parks: Cecil Doty and Mission 66," Master of Architecture Thesis, University of Washington, 
1986; Joanne Michele Zenzen, "Promoting National Parks: Images of the West in the American 
Imagination," University of Maryland, College Park, 1997. 
19 Mark Barringer, "Mission Impossible: National Park Development in the 1950s," JOW 38, no. 1 (January 
1999): 22 -26; idem, Selling Yellowstone: Capitalism and the Construction of Nature (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2002). 
20 Regina M. Bellavia, Cultural Landscape Report for Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, St. Louis, 
Missouri (Omaha: Government Printing Office, 1996); Mike Belshaw and Ed Peplow, Jr., Historic 
Resource Study: Lake Mead National Recreation Area, Nevada (Denver: Department of the Interior, 
National Park Service, n.d.); M. Guy Bishop, "Mission 66 in the National Parks of Southern California and 
the Southwest," Southern California Quarterly 80 (Fall 1998): 293 -314; Sharon A. Brown, Administrative 
History: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Historic Site (Department of the Interior, National Park 
Service, 1984); Theodore Catton, Wonderland: An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park 
(Seattle: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1996); Constance M. Greiff, 
Independence: The Creation of a National Park (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987); 
James A. Pritchard, Preserving Yellowstone's Natural Conditions: Science and the Perception of Nature 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999); J. Tracey Stakely, Salt Pond Visitor Center Cultural 
Landscape Report (Boston: National Park Service, Northeast Region, 1999). 
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2.4 Landscape Architecture and Perceptions of Modernism 
The 1950s and 1960s was a rich period in American landscape architecture, but 
one that made many breaks with prewar theory and practice. Landscape architects had 
long been a strong influence in national park planning and design. This influence 
continued under Mission 66, and in fact Wirth, Vint, and other key individuals were 
professional landscape architects. The relationship between the profession and the Park 
Service, however, changed during the postwar period. While the New Deal had seen 
enormous (almost total) participation among landscape architects, by 1945 most leading 
professionals were establishing private practices again. New kinds of clients led to new 
kinds of commissions, from suburban backyards, to massive tract subdivisions, to 
corporate parks and shopping centres. The "country place" era was over, as was the park 
making apogee of the New Deal. America was booming, however, and an altered private 
practice of landscape architecture once again became the most desirable form of practice, 
especially among leading designers. For the rest of the twentieth century, landscape 
architecture would not have the close association with park making and management that 
it had enjoyed in the United States since 1858. 
The term "modern landscape architecture" typically appears in the secondary 
literature in reference to private (or semi -public), modernist- inspired landscape design 
done from the 1920s and the 1970s in Europe and the United States. Christopher Tunnard 
helped establish modernist theory as a basis for new landscape design in the postwar 
period.21 He reiterated contemporary architectural theory, particularly as expressed by 
Hitchcock, Gideon, or Pevsner, for example.22 The practice of landscape architecture that 
emerged during the postwar period abandoned Olmstedian landscape theory in favour of 
modernist architectural theory, and saw landscape architecture (as Hitchcock described it) 
as a "sort of outdoor architecture" that extended modernist principles and appearances 
21 Christopher Tunnard, Gardens in the Modern Landscape (London: The Architectural Press, 1938); idem, 
"Modem Gardens for Modem Houses: Reflections on Current Trends in Landscape Design," Landscape 
Architecture (January 1942): 57 -64. 
22 Henry- Russell Hitchcock, Jr., and Phillip Johnson, The International Style: Architecture Since 1922 
[1932] (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966); Henry- Russell Hitchcock, Jr., Architecture: 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries [1958] (New York: Penguin Books, 1977); Sigfried Giedeon, Space, 
Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition [1941] Fifth Edition, Revised and Enlarged 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Nikolaus Pevsner, Pioneers of Modern Design: From 
William Morris to Walter Gropius [1936] Revised and partly rewritten edition (New York : Peregrine 
Books, 1986); idem, An Outline of European Architecture [1943] (London: Penguin Books, 1988). 
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into the design of gardens and other landscapes. The implications for the relationship of 
landscape architecture to park design were profound, since park planning and design to 
that point (including national parks) had been guided in the United States by essentially 
Olmstedian theory. 
A number of landscape architects active in national park work attempted to 
explain their situation in the 1940s, although without much success. Carnes and Hubbard, 
for example, rely on familiar platitudes to describe the work of landscape architects in 
planning national parks.23 The.momentum of the profession was simply elsewhere at the 
time. More recent histories of significant work of the period make no mention of national 
parks, and in fact park work in general was no longer a leading component of professional 
practice. Rogers, Simo, Tishler, and Treib, for example, do not mention park work as a 
significant factor in the postwar profession of landscape architecture in the United 
States.24 The monographs that exist on postwar landscape architecture, such as 
Birnbaum, Hilldebrand, and Streatfield, all treat other aspects of postwar practice, 
especially garden and corporate park design.25 
The literature on postwar landscape architecture does not reference the earlier 
work of American landscape architects as much as it refers to histories of architectural 
modernism, including Benevolo, Collins, Frampton, Jacobus, Jordy, and Kaufmann.26 
The history of postwar design, generally, in the United States, has been treated as a 
history of modernist design, emphasizing the role of architects. 
23 William G. Carnes, "Landscape Architecture in the National Park Service," Landscape Architecture 41, 
no. 4 (July 1951): 145 -50; Henry V. Hubbard, "The Designer in National Parks: The Preservation and 
Enhancement of Natural Scenery," Landscape Architecture 38, no. 2 (January 1948): 58 -60; idem, 
"Landscape Development Based in Conservation As Practiced in the National Park Service," Landscape 
Architecture 29, no. 3 (April 1939): 105 -21. 
24 Elizabeth Barlow Rogers, Landscape Design: A Cultural and Architectural History (New York : Harry 
N. Abrams, Inc., 2001); Melanie Simo, 100 Years of Landscape Architecture: Some Patterns of a Century 
(Washington, DC: ASLA Press, 1999); idem, The Coalescing of Different Forces and Ideas: A History of 
Landscape Architecture at Harvard, 1900 -1999 (Cambridge: Harvard University graduate School of 
Design, 2000); William H., Tishler, ed., American Landscape Architecture: Designers and Places 
(Washington, DC: The Preservation Press, 1989); Marc Treib, ed., Modern Landscape Architecture: A 
Critical Review (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993). 
25 Charles A., Birnbaum, ed., Preserving Modern Landscape Architecture: Papers From the Wave Hill- - 
National Park Service Conference (Cambridge: Spacemaker Press, 1999); Gary R. Hilderbrand, The Miller 
Garden: Icon of Modernism (Washington, DC: Spacemaker Press, 1999); David C. Streatfield, California 
Gardens: Creating a New Eden (New York: Abbeville Press, 1994). 
26 Leonardo Benevolo, History of Modern Architecture [1960] 2 vols. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977); 
Peter Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965); Kenneth 
Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History. Revised and Enlarged Edition (New York: Thames and 
Hudson, 1985); John Jacobus, Twentieth -Century Architecture: The Middle Years, 1940 -1965 (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); William H. Jordy, The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid -Twentieth 
Century. American Buildings and Their Architects, Volume 5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); 
Edgar Kaufmann, Jr., ed., The Rise of an American Architecture (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970). 
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For Mission 66, the modernist inspiration of the new park architecture has always 
determined much of the response to the entire program. The condemnation of modernism 
became a condemnation of Mission 66 in general, especially among early 
environmentalists. Advocates such as Butcher and Shephard decried the trend to 
modernist design already by the early 1950s, and the pages of Living Wilderness and the 
Sierra Club Bulletin were filled with similar denunciations by mid- decade.27 Articles in 
professional architecture journals, on the other hand, took the opposite stand. 
Architectural Forum showcased work by Park Service consultants, and articles such as 
one by Koehler continued in this vein 28 The Park Service had become a laudable client, 
as far as many contemporary architects were concerned, willing to employ innovative 
design and patronizing the rising stars of their field. 
2.5 Postwar Geography 
The large scale, geographic changes in the North American landscape that 
occurred during this period enormously influenced the situation of the national park 
system. The Interstate Highway system alone may be the most profoundly altering 
landscape project ever undertaken; yet it has received relatively little attention from 
landscape historians and theorists. Postwar "suburbanization," on the other hand, has a 
vast literature. Corporate parks and shopping centres have also begun to receive serious 
scholarly consideration. 
Histories of the Interstate Highway system are limited to Lewis, Rose, and 
Seely.29 While Lewis's history is more idiosyncratic (and the basis of a television 
documentary), Seely's is a semi -official account of the activities of the Bureau of Public 
Roads (an agency with interesting ties to the contemporary Park Service). Rose's account 
combines a comprehensive history with a more thorough and critical examination of the 
political and social forces at work in the 1950s. The story of federal -aid highway 
27 Devereux Butcher, "For a Return to Harmony in Park Architecture," National Parks Magazine 26, no. 
111 (October 1952): 150 -157; Paul A. Shephard, Jr., "Something Amiss in the National Parks," National 
Parks Magazine 27, no. 115 (October 1953- December 1953): 150 -151, 187 -90. 
28 Architectural Forum, eds., Building U.S.A. (New York: McGraw -Hill, 1955); idem, Building, USA: The 
Men and Methods That Influence Architecture in America Today (New York: McGraw -Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1957); Robert E. Koehler, "Our Park Service Serves Architecture Well," AIA Journal 1 
(January 1971). 
29 Tom Lewis, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming American Life (New 
York: Viking Penguin, 1997); Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939 -1989 (Revised 
edition. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1990); Bruce E. Seely, Building the American 
Highway System: Engineers As Policy Makers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). 
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construction, however, remains relatively unexamined, considering the scope and impact 
of its results. 
Postwar "suburbanization," on the other hand, has been written about extensively, 
often by those critical of postwar trends. This tradition began in a literary vein with 
Keats, Whyte, and Wilson, and was continued with more sociological rigor by Donaldson 
and Gans.30 By the 1960s the "suburb" became a favourite subject of academic planners. 
Tunnard and Pushkarev made some of the earliest and most perceptive observations on 
the patterns of postwar urbanization.31 Fishman, Hayden, Jackson, Machor, Relph, 
Weiss, and Stern all contributed to a remarkable surge of scholarship on the origins of the 
American suburb and its apparently mad culmination in the postwar decades.32 Much of 
the interest among scholars in the 1980s resulted from convictions that "sprawling" 
urbanization was destroying many of the last remaining rural and scenic areas in the 
extended metropolitan regions around cities. The academic literature supported the rise 
of New Urbanism, a movement based largely on prewar and Garden City planning 
concepts. This was also a decade in which private land trusts proliferated, a trend that 
acknowledged the limited and unsuccessful roles government had been able to play in 
preserving rural and scenic landscapes in the "exurban" fringes of many metropolitan 
areas. 
Some more recent literature on "suburbanization" has taken a more nuanced, less 
pejorative tone. This has been particularly true in the study of shopping centres and other 
"new building types." L. Cohen, N. Cohen, and Longstreth have established new 
understandings of the origins and significance of shopping centres and the cultural 
30 Scott Donaldson, The Suburban Myth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969; Herbert J. Gans, The 
Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban Community [1967] (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982); John Keats, The Crack in the Picture Window (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 
1956); William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956); Sloan 
Wilson, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). 
31 Christopher Tunnard and Boris Pushkarev, Man -Made America: Chaos or Control? An Inquiry into 
Selected Problems of Design in the Urbanized Landscape (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). 
32 Robert L. Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1987); idem, "American Suburbs/English Suburbs," Journal of Urban History 13, no. 3 (May 1987): 237- 
51; Dolores Hayden, Redesigning the American Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life 
(New York: Norton, 1986); Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United 
States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); James Machor, Pastoral Cities: Urban Ideals and the 
Symbolic Landscape of America (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Edward Relph, The 
Modern Urban Landscape (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Robert A. M. Stern and 
John Montague Massengale, "The Anglo American Suburb," Architectural Design 51, no. 10 /11 (1981); 
Marc A. Weiss, The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land 
Planning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
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significance of the consumerism and mass production of the era.33 The technology and 
economics of housing production have also been subjects of important recent work. 
Albrecht, Baldwin, Goodwin, and Hartman have all looked at the effects of World War II 
and U.S. Army postwar domestic housing programs on the housing industry of the 
1950s.34 "Corporate parks" have also received laudatory attention as important examples 
of modernist planning and design and have also become the subject of more critical 
scholarship, such as Mozingo.35 
In considering national park development the context of contemporary road, 
shopping centre, and subdivision design -all of which directly and indirectly affected 
Mission 66 planning ideas and architectural design - needed to be considered at length. 
2.6 Environmentalism 
In addition to work on Mission 66 itself there are histories of private non -profits 
and the environmental movement that provide vital points of view. Cohen and Miles 
have written histories of the Sierra Club and National Parks Association, respectively.36 
These organizations criticized Mission 66 harshly, and these official histories adopt the 
same tone and repeat many of the same arguments against "overdevelopment" and the 
loss of "wilderness values." 
Most broader histories of postwar environmentalism make either no mention, or 
virtually no mention, of Mission 66. This is true of Hays and Rothman.37 No history of 
33 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New. 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); idem, "From Town Centre to Shopping Centre: The Reconfiguration of 
Community Marketplaces in Postwar America," American Historical Review 101, no. 4 (October 1996): 
1050 -1081; Nancy E. Cohen, America's Marketplace: The History of Shopping Centres (Lyme, 
Connecticut: Greenwich Publishing Group, Inc., 2002); Richard Longstreth, City Centre to Regional Mall: 
Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing in Los Angeles, 1920 -1950 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997); 
idem, The Drive -In, the Supermarket, and the Transformation of Commercial Space in Los Angeles, 1914- 
1941 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999). 
34 Donald Albrecht, ed., World War II and the American Dream: How Wartime Building Changed a Nation 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995; William C. Baldwin, "Wherry and Capehart: Army Family Housing 
Privatization Programs in the 1950s," Engineer (April 1996): 42 -44; R. Christopher Goodwin & Associates, 
Inc., Neighbourhood Design Guidelines for Army Wherry and Capehart Era Family Housing. Draft, 
government report: 2002; Chester Hartman and Robin Drayer, "Military- Family Housing: The Other Public 
Housing Program," Housing and Society 17, no. 3 (1990): 67 -78. 
35 Louise A. Mozingo, "The Corporate Estate in the USA, 1954 -64: `Thoroughly Modern in Concept, 
But...Down to Earth and Rugged, "' Studies in the History of Gardens and Designed Landscapes 20, no. 1 
(January 2000): 25 -56. 
36 Michael P. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 1892 -1970 (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988); 
John C. Miles, Guardians of the Parks: A History of the National Parks and Conservation Association 
(Washington, DC: National Parks and Conservation Association, 1995). 
37 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955- 
1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Hal Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American 
Response to the Environment in the Twentieth Century (New York, Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 2001). 
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the environmental movement examines Mission 66 in any detail; what references there 
are invariably are passing dismissals and denunciations. 
The historical role of environmental science in the management of national parks 
has been analyzed in detail by Sellars.38 This 1997 history -the most important general 
history of American national parks to appear in decades -argues persuasively that 
Mission 66 failed to create what could have been a historic opportunity to establish a 
greater role for science and environmentalist priorities in the Park Service. Even here, 
however, Mission 66 is treated with a broad brush. The policies and intentions of the 
program are dismissed easily because they are never examined closely. 
38 Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Sources of Data 
The sources of data that potentially could be used to address initial research 
questions based on the gaps in knowledge outlined above are very extensive. The 
National Archives in College Park Maryland, alone, contains an entire record group (RG 
79) for the National Park Service. Conrad Wirth's official agency papers became 
available about half way through my project, making this the first study to use these 
records. 
Individual parks are usually the best source for archival records relating to their 
history and development, particularly of the recent past. The Park Service's Harpers 
Ferry Center in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, conserves a unique collection of Mission 
66 era records in its National Park History Collection. The Harpers Ferry Center also 
conserves the central agency photograph archive, with millions of images taken between 
the 1920s and the present. Conrad Wirth's personal papers were donated by his family to 
the University of Wyoming, Laramie. This collection contains his non -official records, 
mostly from his retirement years. This study has been the first of its type to make 
extensive use of these records, as well. 
These archives together represented a rich and thorough documentation of the 
planning, design, and construction associated with Mission 66. Some collections were 
well organized with fording aids that made it possible to quickly target a specific period, 
person, or project. Most, however, were not. The National Archives, for example, had 
only begun to process their postwar documents in this record group. For the rustic 
(prewar) era, extensive help was available to navigate efficiently through thousands of 
boxes of (especially Washington Office) records of the Park Service. Conrad Wirth's 
official papers, which became available in 2003, had no finding aids at all. I had no 
choice except to go through them all, box by box. Individual park archives varied widely 
regarding their state of conservation. Yellowstone and Yosemite had exceptional 
research libraries and archives with vital and unique information regarding Mission 66 in 
these parks. Other parks had records stored under far less organized circumstances. 
Oral history was also an important data source since many of the participants in 
Mission 66 were alive and willing to be interviewed. The oral history project for this 
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thesis included over two dozen interviews with agency staff, family members of agency 
staff (including descendants of Thomas Vint and Conrad Wirth), former National Park 
Service director George Hartzog, and many others. Conrad Wirth, Thomas Vint, and 
other key figures of this story had died before research began. Several important 
transcripted oral history interviews were available, however, at Berkeley's Bancroft 
Library and at the National Park History Collection at Harpers Ferry. 
Government documents and databases -particularly as they have become 
available in digital form -are a rich source of data and quantitative methodologies and 
analysis. More personal sources, such as letters and diaries of park visitors, have been 
elusive, but official correspondence abounds and published memoirs of officials are also 
plentiful. Visual sources, including scripted Park Service audio -visual presentations, 
numerous pamphlets, and other public relations efforts, have been essential sources of 
data. Oral histories -both done for this project and older transcripted projects -have also 
been valuable. Again these sources mainly involved Park Service and other government 
officials, however, not the general public. 
Site visits, made possible by the Park Service sponsorship of this research, would 
themselves prove to be a vital source of information. The landscapes and buildings being 
researched often had no secondary literature describing them. Observations in the field, 
therefore, were an essential means of gaining basic data about the extent, functionality, 
and appearance of many Mission 66 developments. These field trips were recorded 
through thousands of digital photographs (a few of which illustrate this thesis), as well as 
notes. Research in park archives often provided whatever primary documentation, both 
graphic and textural, proved available for buildings and designed landscapes. 
Secondary literature, as discussed in the following literature review, would prove 
to be of limited use in establishing a comprehensive historical context for Mission 66. 
The secondary literature tends to be either memoir or polemic, not history or analysis. 
Similarly park managers and staff, today, often proved less reliable and informed as 
sources of objective information than they would be, typically, for prewar, rustic 
developments. Bias and rumour about Mission 66 are very evident today among Park 
Service officials and others and needed to be understood as such, at times. 
3.2 Narrative Theory 
This thesis has taken the form of a narrative dissertation on the subject of postwar 
national park planning and design in the United States. The project began, however, by 
18 
questioning this approach altogether and by investigating the theory of historical research 
generally and narrative construction specifically. This initial theoretical investigation was 
pursued concurrently with the development of research questions, the investigation of 
potential sources of data, and the consideration of appropriate research methodologies. 
All of these activities mutually influenced the result of the first phase of the thesis project. 
The experience of reading and discussing a wide range of historiographical theory and 
methods led to a more diverse consideration of research questions, historical themes, and 
proposed methodologies. Because the nature of the thesis research seemed to indicate 
that a historical narrative would be desirable or even necessary, the subject of general 
historical theory was important from the outset. 
The debate over the role of narrative in the writing of history developed during the 
1960s and 70s, when scholars such as Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault began to 
explore both the structure of historical narrative and the role of the writer as historian. 
Since then, the study of narrative has developed into a field unto itself, primarily in 
departments of literature. The topic under debate is essentially the extent to which 
historical writings are determined by the narrative, or story- telling form. To what extent 
does the self -conscious act of writing influence and inform historical "facts" and the way 
in which those facts are arranged to make a story? If the narrative form is impossible to 
escape, how can we achieve a more scientific, analytical, and therefore "truer" history? 
Although much of narrative theory focuses on semiotics, linguistics and other 
topics beyond the scope of this project, the groundbreaking work of scholars in such 
fields has been important to the development of research questions shaping this thesis. 
Scholars of the 1980s and 1990s were educated with this awareness of themselves as 
historians having the capacity, and responsibility, to write different versions of history. 
Raymond Martin describes this new self -consciousness in his book, The Past Within Us, 
noting that the "overriding explanatory objective of historians is to show that their 
explanations are better than competing explanations, and they attempt to do this by 
arguing both for their explanations and against competing explanations. "39 The 
development of research questions has involved sorting through competing explanations, 
often offered by competing primary sources, and by making judgements which support 
the most valid conclusions. The narrative itself constructs and supports the notion of 
validity, and so becomes one more polemical discourse, assuming its own role and 
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position, in this case, in the continuing public discourse on the meanings and significance 
of American national park history. 
A survey of the literature on narrative, as introduced by literary theorists and 
philosophers, has helped me to better understand the perspectives of the historians who 
chronicled the early years of Mission 66, as well as the vantage point of contemporary 
critics. From a perspective informed by this critical discourse, I am better able to see the 
limitations of the first historians of Mission 66, Appleman and Wirth, who wrote what 
they and their peers would describe unquestionably as history. It is worth noting here that 
the writing of Park Service history by Park Service employees, and the writing of public 
history in general, has been, to a great extent, sheltered from debates in literary theory and 
philosophy. The lack of critical theory has in some ways simplified my task: the texts of 
writers such as Appleman and Wirth offer a clear view of what was accepted as true and 
important in their day. Over the last decade, historians with less obvious agendas have 
offered more challenging historical narratives. Insight into this more acute awareness of 
writing history is offered by literary critic Hayden White in his famous book, Tropics of 
Discourse. According to White, "those historians who draw a firm line between history 
and philosophy of history fail to recognize that every historical discourse contains within 
it a full- blown, if only implicit, philosophy of history. "40 By reading and comparing work 
by White and other literary theorists, I have developed a more refined sense of my own 
philosophy of history and become better able to identify that of the writers consulted 
throughout my thesis.. White's work has been particularly useful in framing reference 
questions that address my topic from different perspectives and force me to consciously 
recognise -and ultimately both work within and minimise -my own biases. 
Although "narratology" is considered a branch of literary criticism, the role of 
narrative in the writing of history is a subject that historians such as Michael Kammen 
acknowledge as central to their profession. Kammen discusses the role of the "histoire 
problème" in recent historical scholarship, and asks of a prospective research project: 
"How well is it problematized ? "41 What is the historical problem addressed, or is the 
historian simply telling a story (constructing a narrative)? There are a number of ways to 
39 Raymond Martin, The Past Within Us: An Empirical Approach to Philosophy of History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 31. 
4° Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 126 -7. 
41 Michael Kammen, "An Americanist's Reprise: The Pervasive Role of Histoire Problème in Historical 
Scholarship Concerning the United States Since the 1960s," Reviews in American History 26 (March 1998): 
1 -25. 
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"problematize" the subject of postwar national park development in the United States 
through the formation of research questions and hypotheses. For example: How and why 
did the same group of Park Service professionals produce "rustic" development before the 
war and "modern" ( "Mission 66 ") development -at least apparently so very different in 
its inspiration -afterwards? One could hypothesize, in fact, that the differences between 
rustic and modern were relatively superficial, and that the underlying theory and ideology 
of park making had remained constant. 
Another approach might be to ask why was much public reaction to postwar park 
development -much of which was widely perceived to be necessary and needed -so 
negative? One could hypothesize that the reaction to modernism generally (outside park 
boundaries) affected the aesthetic critic of Mission 66. Or again, why were proto- 
environmentalists particularly negative, when in many ways Mission 66 represented a 
more "scientific" approach to park management? One could hypothesize that in fact 
environmentalism involves an emotional or aesthetic response, not a scientific impulse, 
which would explain its embrace of rustic over modernist design. What do public and 
official reactions to Mission 66 tell us about attitudes towards Modernism and 
modernization in general during the period? One could hypothesize that that for 
government officials (as well as other powerful clients of the era) modernism represented 
the centralized, technocratic efficiency and power to which they aspired. Problematizing 
the historical narrative of Mission 66 development in these ways involved addressing 
issues of perception and opinions of postwar Modernism in the United States. Because of 
the unique symbolic position of national parks, reactions to Mission 66 provide a telling 
instance of postwar attitudes towards the rapid and dramatic changes taking place in the 
American landscape. 
While Kammen emphasizes the (mostly French and American) point of view that 
"history is not story telling but problem solving," environmental historian William 
Cronon reminds us that humans are "the story -telling animal" and that all history is 
narrative. Narrative, for Cronon, is simply the way humans think (and write). The point 
is to make sure we write "good" narratives, that make people care about the subject, and 
that include a full consideration of many points of view as well as enough self - 
examination to understand our own.42 
42 William Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative," Journal of American History 18 
(March 1992): 1347 -76. 
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Because of the structure of this thesis, the project provided an excellent 
opportunity to examine the historical narrative form itself, and to expand on it in 
significant ways. The result is still a narrative, of course, which Cronon points out is 
almost completely unavoidable for anyone writing a historical text. The goal becomes the 
creation of an "expanded narrative," however, one that explores more diverse points of 
view, data, and methodologies. 
3.3 Other Approaches to Writing History 
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz uses the notion of "thick description" in his 
ethnographic observations and methodology.43 American historians have used this idea to 
theorize their own activities, particularly since the 1970s (contemporary to the interest in 
semiotic analysis of texts in history and other disciplines). For Geertz every observation 
or description of an event bears endless examination and reveals multiple dimensions of 
meaning, referencing the observer as much as the observed. For historians, the message 
was: "there could be no...disembodied histories of ideas. Instead, there are discourses to 
be understood." "Culture," given the anthropological definition of "patterns of values, 
ideas, and other symbolic -meaningful systems," becomes the proper subject of the 
historian. Ethnographic methods become another tool for the historian to uncover the 
cultural significance of the built environment and social activities. 
"Micro- history," and the entire issue of using the relatively commonplace object 
or biography to extrapolate larger observations and significance, has had particular 
significance to this thesis project. Mission 66 itself - hardly a well known movement 
even among architectural historians -can be considered a microcosm in which 
contemporary ideals of modernization and progress were expressed. The relation of 
"micro" to "macro" is one that shaped research questions. 
David Thelen's discussion of "transnational history" also helped frame research 
questions. History has indeed been the "stepchild of nationalism" in the modern era, and 
this is particularly true of American national park history. Historians have typically 
described the "American national park idea" as a foundation of national identity, without 
recognizing that the landscape park is a transnational idea: its theoretical sources and 
43 Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description," "Deep Play," in Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), 3 -30; 412 -53. 
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design origins crossed national boundaries extensively. Park history, in fact, makes an 
excellent subject for transnational history.44 
Various other historiographical approaches, methods, and sources of data have 
been considered as part of this thesis project. Questions generated by inquiries into the 
material culture of the postwar period, for example, were useful. The postwar period was 
famous for the rise of consumerism, and perhaps excessive materialism in American life. 
The material culture of the 1950s shaped planning and design ideas, as well as public 
expectations of parks, accommodations, and levels of convenience. 
3.4 Issues Regarding Research of the Recent Past 
Many historic preservationists in the United States and elsewhere have become 
increasingly concerned that properties dating to the recent past -less than fifty years 
old -are not adequately protected through existing preservation laws and policies 45 The 
National Register of Historic Places in the United States, for example, requires that a 
property less than fifty years old possess "exceptional significance" in order to be 
considered eligible for listing.46 Advocates for the preservation of Mission 66 
architecture in the national parks (and of mid -century modernism in general) have argued 
that the "fifty -year rule" should be abandoned and that all potential resources should be 
assessed in terms of historical significance regardless of age. But any assessment of the 
significance of the postwar built environment inevitably begins with concern that the 
potential resources involved are not old enough to be historical. The paucity of secondary 
literature on the recent past -certainly the case with Mission 66- reinforces this concern. 
The recent past also demands research methods tailored to suit the type of data 
available and issues that arise in the treatment of that data. Archival sources, for 
example, tend to be less organized or processed for the recent past. While these 
difficulties can and must be overcome, there is no doubt that at least in some cases the use 
of archival data can be seriously compromised by the lack of finding aids. Archivists 
themselves are often less familiar with the records pertaining to the recent past, again 
potentially limiting the effective exploitation of records. Archival records for federal 
as Matti Peltonen, "Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro -Macro Link in Historical Research," History 
and Theory 40 (October 2001): 347 -59; David Thelen, "The Nation and Beyond: Transnational 
Perspectives on United States History," Journal of American History 86 (December 1999): 965 -75. 
45 See, for example, Charles A. Birnbaum, ed., Preserving Modern Landscape Architecture: Papers From 
the Wave Hill -- National Park Service Conference (Cambridge: Spacemaker Press, 1999). 
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agencies in the United States also tend to be more dispersed. The National Archives was 
regionalized in the 1970s, before records of the 1950s began to be accessioned and 
processed. The central archives building (in College Park, Maryland) therefore only 
contains the records of the Washington offices of federal agencies. The records of 
regional offices and individual parks often went (or have yet to go) to the regional offices 
of the National Archives all over the country. 
But if archival research of the recent past is potentially more complicated and less 
fruitful, other avenues of inquiry into the recent past have unique potential. Oral histories 
and interviews obviously are sources of data not available to historians of the more distant 
past. Throughout this thesis project, personal relationships have been developed with 
surviving Mission 66 personnel or their descendants. Mainly through telephone 
conversations, these relationships have provided a vital cross reference on facts and the 
interpretation of facts. Above all personal contacts have helped establish some of the 
atmosphere and feelings of the times. 
The oral history project for this thesis was conducted mainly in 2003 with the help 
of a graduate assistant funded through the University of Massachusetts. Interviews were 
recorded with over two dozen individuals interviewed over the telephone. Protocols 
established by the American Society of Landscape Architects for oral history projects 
were employed.47 The selection of interviewees was limited to those with direct 
experience of Mission 66 planning, design, and construction, and to surviving close 
relatives of people with such experience. 
The use of oral history also demands familiarity with the burgeoning literature on 
the science of memory and its influence on historians (particularly in the United States) 
today.48 Even more importantly, however, the use of personal accounts by individuals 
directly involved in events requires corroboration by textual sources, whenever possible. 
While participants in history may have unique insight and information, the malleable and 
creative nature of memory and fact that individuals also may have a point of view 
demand that interviews be used in close correlation with other, textual sources, as events 
were pieced together. At times, the struggle of certain individuals (whether in interviews 
46 National Register of Historic Places, How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation, Bulletin 
15 (Washington, DC: National Park Service, 2002). 
47 Noel Dorsey Vernon, C. Elizabeth Garvey, and Sherda K. Williams, "Oral History Guidelines for 
Landscape Historians," ASLA Open Committee on Historic Preservation, 1990. 
24 
or through published memoirs) itself became a source of information and inquiry, as 
different motivations revealed new dimensions of original disagreements and controversy. 
3.5 Site Visits 
Extensive field trips and photo documentation were an essential part of the 
research methodology for this thesis. Site visits were made possible through funding by 
the National Park Service, made through a grant to the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst. Site visits combined archival research (in park archives) with field observations 
and interviews with park staff and any other local informants. 
Site visits played a crucial role since so little secondary literature or analysis was 
available on Mission 66. To find out what was built under Mission 66 in a given park, 
there was often no way to be certain other than by looking. Park plans (prospectuses) 
were easily uncovered in archives; but there were often few records for how much of a 
given plan was actually implemented. Similarly there was no way to begin formal 
analysis of architectural and landscape design without visiting the sites and observing 
them. Textual and visual records did not record "as- built" conditions. Similarly there 
were few objective assessments of appearance or functionality of designs, or of 
alterations to them over the last fifty years. 
Site visits were also essential to the collection of data. Many parks conserve - 
under widely variable conditions -the textual and graphic records of local Mission 66 
development. This was particularly the case for construction progress photographs and 
reports, as well as superintendent's reports, often the most vital source for piecing 
together events of the era. 
During four years of research, over forty parks were visited, some repeatedly, for 
the purpose of seeing and assessing Mission 66 era development. Parks were located in 
every region of the United States and represented a full range of types, from small historic 
parks to large natural parks. Specific parks important to the story of Mission 66, 
including Yellowstone, Yosemite, Everglades, and Cape Cod, for example, were visited 
three or more times, as ongoing research demanded. On occasion visits were made at the 
request of park staff in order to make presentations on the progress of research and on the 
role of Mission 66 in a given park. 
48 See, for example, David Thelen, "Memory and American History." The Journal of American History 75, 
no. 4 (March 1989): 1117 -29; David Glassberg, "Public History and the Study of Memory." The Public 
Historian 18, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 7 -23. 
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3.6 Research Methods 
The research methods devised for thesis research combined the theoretical inquiry 
of the literature and the practical considerations of data collection and site visits. The 
essence of the methodological approach was to construct a chronological narrative of 
Mission 66 that would address and hopefully provide answers for the research questions. 
The development of research questions was an ongoing process throughout the 
thesis project, but occurred mostly during the initial stages of methodological research 
and identification of sources of data. The following description of the research questions 
approved for this research during the first year of the project includes some additional 
explanation for how the questions were subsequently addressed in the historical narrative 
written over the following three years. 
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Chapter 4: Research Questions 
4.1 Origins of Mission 66 Controversy 
The "dilemma" of the national parks in the 1940s and the controversies created by 
Mission 66 construction in the 1950s and 1960s were of enormous consequence in the 
formation of the modem environmental movement and in shaping the legislation and 
policies that determined park management to the present day. What were the origins of 
the controversies around Mission 66? Did they begin with the program itself, or are their 
roots deeper? 
This research question was intended lead to explorations of theoretical and 
historical backgrounds for controversies that occurred around the Mission 66 program, It 
was put forward under the hypothesis that reactions to the Mission 66 program indicated 
attitudes that had developed for decades -and even centuries- because at their core they 
were responses not just to Mission 66, but to the larger project of the modernization of the 
North American continent. The roots of these attitudes then should be traceable to the 
mid -eighteenth century, not just the mid -twentieth. In the narrative, these research 
questions led to an explication of early park making in Britain as well as the United 
States. Connections were established that linked mid -twentieth century responses to park 
making and landscape modernization to at least some attitudes evident in the 1790s. 
4.2 Contemporary Influences on Conrad Wirth and Mission 66 Policy 
What were the relationships between Mission 66 and contemporary trends in 
American society and landscape, including the rise of environmentalism and the 
construction of the Interstate Highway system? What individuals, ideas, or trends 
influenced Conrad Wirth in the formulation of his practice of "recreational planning" and 
therefore in the establishment of Mission 66 policy? 
This research question was intended to lead to the elaboration of contemporary 
social and geographic contexts for the Mission 66 program. It was put forward under the 
hypothesis that links would be evident between Mission 66 policy and projects with the 
events and demographic trends of postwar America. In the narrative, this question led to 
a brief professional biography of Wirth, concentrating on his planning theory and 
practice. It also led to a summary of trends affecting the mid- twentieth century American 
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landscape, suggesting that Mission 66 planning ideas in part flowed out of the experience 
and influence of contemporary highway, commercial, and residential development in the 
United States. 
4.3 Perceptions of Mission 66 and Attitudes Towards Modernism 
What can attitudes and perceptions of Mission 66 tell us about broader postwar 
attitudes towards landscape modernization in the United States, generally? What did 
visitors think of Mission 66 and how did it correspond to what officials, planners, and 
professional critics were thinking? Why was modernist design already accepted at the 
Park Service before Mission 66 even began? 
This research question broadened into an inquiry of how the postwar "dilemma" 
in American national parks was perceived and represented, and subsequently how Park 
Service planning and design efforts were perceived and represented. Professional 
organizations (such as the American Institute of Architects and the American Society of 
Landscape Architects) had their own responses, while private advocacy groups, such as 
the Sierra Club, had another group of responses. Individual members of the public and 
government officials also contributed to the perceptions and representations of the 
problem, and the proposed solutions, as Mission 66 was planned. In all cases, attitudes 
shifted as the program moved from planning, to design, to construction. The question 
was presented under the hypothesis that examining attitudes towards modernist design 
generally in the 1950s would provide insights on public reactions to the Mission 66 
program. 
4.4 The Significance of the Mission 66 Prospectus 
What was the significance of the Mission 66 revision of national park master 
planning policy? Postwar park development looked different (modernist), but did it 
function differently and was it supported by new theory? What was essentially new, and 
what continued prewar policy, in the Mission 66 prospectus? 
This research question was put forward under the hypothesis that the modernist 
architecture in national parks in the 1950s both embodied and enabled a profound shift in 
basic park master planning theory and principles. The result of new architectural imagery 
combined with a new planning framework (represented by the Mission 66 prospectus) is 
characterized in this thesis as the Mission 66 modernist park. 
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These research questions required a detailed administrative history of the planning 
of Mission 66 in 1955 and 1956 to begin to appreciate why, ultimately, postwar national 
park development looks modernist rather than rustic, and the degree to which this change 
represented a profound shift in park planning priorities and theory. The individual case 
studies also support the conclusions reached in response to these questions. 
4.5 Mission 66 Design and Contemporary Context 
What were contemporary developments in the professions of architecture and 
landscape architecture? What are the relationships of Mission 66 to contemporary 
professional (planning and design) history, and how does that history help explain 
changes in Park Service policy and design? 
The thesis explores the relationship of Park Service planning and design to 
contemporary work in American architecture and landscape architecture generally. The 
questions are put forward under the hypothesis that contemporary architecture influenced 
Mission 66, although exactly how and why was not clear. The relationship to 
contemporary landscape architecture also needed to be considered. Conrad Wirth and 
many of the most important Mission 66 officials were professional landscape architects. 
While during the prewar years there had been important connections to leading 
professionals in private practice and to the American Society of Landscape Architects 
(ASLA), it was hypothesized that this relationship changed in the postwar period, with 
neither leading private practitioners nor the ASLA participating or advising in Mission 
66. 
4.6 Changing Perceptions of Nature and History 
How did Mission 66 affect the way the visiting public perceived and appreciated 
the nature and history it sought to enjoy? To what degree were these changing 
perceptions related to the rise of the nascent environmental movement in the United 
States? 
These research questions were perhaps the most important considering that a 
central goal of the thesis has been to come to an objective and informed assessment of 
Mission 66 in mid -twentieth century American culture. It was hypothesized that Mission 
66, through a massive redevelopment of the national park system, significantly affected 
and changed the perception of nature and national history for many millions of park 
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visitors. How this was done, and the significance of how it was done, are questions that 
underlie every chapter of the thesis. 
4.7 Continued Significance of Mission 66 
What is the significance of Mission 66 today? To what degree is the national park 
system, the Park Service, and the public's experience of national parks a product of 
Mission 66 planning and design? These research questions required that the entire history 
of Mission 66 -its demise and end as well as its planning and beginning -be presented in 
the thesis. The controversies that Mission 66 caused led to Wirth stepping down as Park 
Service director and in many changes of policy and new legislation in the 1960s. Was 
Mission 66 completed as intended, and what programs and initiatives followed it? Has 
another program of redevelopment followed, or do visitors today essentially visit a park 
system created through Mission 66? These questions were put forward under the 
hypothesis that Mission 66 significantly reinvented the experience of national parks, and 
that many aspects of that reinvention continue to shape the experiences of visitors today. 
This makes Mission 66 particularly significant for those working in planning, 
management, and design today in national parks. Mission 66 developed the landscapes 
and facilities people still use; it also established many basic assumptions about how 
people use their parks. The research questions described in the preceding chapters 
determined the general outline, specific case studies, and overall themes of the following 
narrative history of Mission 66. 
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Chapter 5: The National Park Dilemma and the Origins of Controversy 
5.1 Early Origins 
The first research questions formulated for this thesis reflected the awareness that 
Mission 66, whatever its built legacy, was as significant for the controversy and change it 
incited as much as it was for the development done under the program. Mission 66 
helped precipitate the modern environmental movement and reactions to the program 
shaped the legislation and policies that are the parameters of national park management in 
the United States to this day. Inquiry as to the theoretical and historical origins of 
controversy around and reactions to Mission 66 therefore seemed necessary and 
worthwhile. 
Such inquiries required looking back to the origins of the park idea. If the modern 
national park system is a product of the twentieth century, the controversy that engulfed 
Mission 66 in the early 1960s began centuries earlier. Concern over the destructiveness 
of Mission 66 may have been instigated by ongoing construction in the parks, but it also 
reprised an aesthetic controversy that was as old as the modern era itself. Since the 
eighteenth century, when the modern landscape park first appeared in the countryside of 
Great Britain, it had been disparaged by proponents of a more "wild" or "picturesque" 
landscape ideal, who saw "improved" parkland as overly managed and stripped of its 
natural diversity and visual interest. In various forms, a contest of contrasting landscape 
ideals has been constant ever since. If it began as an esoteric debate among squires and 
landlords, it continued as a fundamental critique of the process of landscape 
modernization generally, and the management of modern scenic reservations in particular. 
Issues of eighteenth -century landscape aesthetics seem removed from those of 
park management in the twentieth century only because the British landscape park is 
rarely seen as a direct antecedent of American national parks. Postwar intellectual 
histories of the "national park idea" typically do not emphasize the history of such park 
development, in part because they analyze the idea primarily through literature and 
poetry. But the story of the physical construction of national parks clarifies historical 
dimensions sometimes obscured by the consideration of national parks strictly as 
wilderness. Connections between national and municipal parks in the United States, for 
example, are more evident in comparisons of how different parks (municipal, regional, 
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and national) were actually developed for public use. From overall planning concepts, to 
the design of park roads, to rustic landscape features and the use of pseudo -vernacular 
architectural themes, the development of national parks was influenced by earlier and 
contemporary municipal and regional park design.49 The wilderness ideal is often 
described as the very antithesis of the urban park; the national park frontcountry 
landscape of roads, trails, picturesque buildings, and scenic views, however, is a close 
relative of many earlier and smaller landscape parks located in or near American cities. 
The direct association between national and municipal park making suggests a 
longer and more involved history for the origins of the national park idea. The theory and 
technology of modern park making, in fact, can be traced to eighteenth -century Great 
Britain, not nineteenth -century Wyoming. And when considered in this way, it is more 
clear that American national parks have never been particularly benign or completely 
altruistic undertakings. The creation of large parks for the purpose of managing and 
appreciating scenery has almost always involved brutal dislocations of people with 
previous claims and rights. From the open -field agriculturists of England, to African 
Americans and Irish in New York, to the native tribal groups of the Rocky Mountains and 
Sierra Nevada, a heavy human price has been paid to create large parks, usually by those 
who could least afford it.50 And great park makers, from Lancelot ( "Capability ") Brown, 
to Frederick Law Olmsted, to Stephen Mather, indeed represented and furthered the most 
powerful economic interests of their respective eras. 
But in the post -World War II era, national parks have usually been defined in 
direct opposition to the process of landscape modernization occurring around them. As 
"wilderness," in the postwar sense, the parks have been considered the opposite of 
modernization and development, not as enabling instruments of "progress." This 
49 Although important distinctions existed between national park work and other types of landscape design, 
the development of rustic architecture and site work in national parks must be seen in the context of the 
American park movement as a whole. National park design in the 1920s was particularly influenced by 
Frederick Law Olmsted, Charles Eliot, and the work of what can be described as the "Fairsted School" of 
earlier municipal and regional park design. See Can, Wilderness by Design, 43 -53, 95 -115; McClelland, 
Building the National Park, 17 -60. 
50 The fate of British villagers in the eighteenth century has been chronicled since Goldsmith's day. For 
overviews, see Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); 
Tom Williamson and Liz Bellamy, Property and Landscape: A Social History of Land Ownership and the 
English Countryside (London: George Phillip, 1987). The story of the depopulation of the Central Park site 
in New York is told in Roy Rosenzweig and Elizabeth Blackmar, The Park and the People: A History of 
Central Park (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 64 -73. Recent scholars have demonstrated that the 
creation of national parks entailed the removal of tribal groups, whose active presence belied the ideal of 
uninhabited, untouched land. See Mark David Spence, Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and 
the Making of the National Parks (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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perspective obscures the common lineage American national parks share with earlier 
urban parks, and even British landscape parks; and these roots are of particular 
significance for understanding American national park development during the postwar 
period. 
The 1950s were an era of extensive modernization of the American landscape. 
The Mission 66 program attempted to adapt national park planning and design to exploit 
and mitigate the extraordinary geographic transformation taking place. Conrad Wirth and 
his colleagues felt obligated to redevelop and expand the park system at a scale 
commensurate to the change taking place around it, and to continue to make sure the 
(ever more numerous) public enjoyed relatively free and meaningful access. But during 
the same era, historians and preservation advocates consecrated the national park as the 
incarnation of wilderness, an ideal characterized above all by the absence of any sign of 
human history or presence. Conflict was inevitable; the new preservation advocates soon 
condemned Mission 66 as a travesty of national park (that is, wilderness) management. 
But in the radically changing American landscape of express highways, shopping centres, 
and vast residential subdivisions, Mission 66 nevertheless asserted a bold vision of how 
national parks could continue to function as public parks, and as integral features of the 
modernizing American landscape. If Mission 66 planners clearly failed to appreciate the 
significance of the wilderness ideal, they nevertheless achieved their intended goal of 
revising and perpetuating a tradition of American national park design during a critical 
period of cultural and landscape change. 
If national parks had indeed preserved wilderness, preservation was the result of 
another project altogether. Until at least the 1930s, Olmstedian theory guided national 
park legislation and management policies: scenic preservation was justified for the sake 
of individual happiness and for the well being of society as a whole, not just for its own 
sake. The design and construction of roads and frontcountry landscapes therefore 
constituted a fundamental mandate for the new National Park Service in 1916. 
Preservation outside the context of public access and enjoyment, even for progressive 
advocates of the day, simply had not yet been fully described as a separate landscape 
ideal. Parks were not yet wilderness. If awareness of the science of ecology and the 
biological significance of the parks was growing at the Park Service by the 1930s, the 
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bureau remained overwhelmingly a park development agency.51 Undeveloped 
backcountry may have been de facto wilderness, but the visiting public was (and often 
still is) more likely to perceive it in aesthetic terms, as the middleground and background 
of vast landscape compositions. In this sense, the park frontcountry was conceived as an 
enabling foreground, providing both physical access (the road corridor) and conceptual 
entry into the scene (comparable to the foreground of a painted landscape). The 
frontcountry was planned as an extended viewing platform that structured the emotional 
appreciation of park scenery. In its details, it was designed to complete perceived 
landscape compositions with appropriately scaled and textured foreground elements. 
This pictorial conception of the place, together with the design and construction of the 
mediating frontcountry landscape itself, was the essence of American national park 
making throughout the rustic era.52 
The debates that Mission 66 inspired in the United States in the 1960s echoed 
controversies that had begun centuries earlier, when the role of the landscape park in the 
historical process of landscape modernization first crystallized. The modern landscape 
park first appeared in Great Britain in the eighteenth century during another period of 
enormous and disorienting landscape change. As industrial and agricultural revolution 
transformed British society, land enclosure, canal and turnpike construction, and 
urbanization reorganized patterns of daily lives and of entire landscapes. Landlords 
invested capital directly in the land, increasing its productivity (and profitability) many 
times over. In thousands of parishes, ancient patterns of "open fields," "commons," and 
"wastes" gave way to a new countryside of "improved" land and modernized, market 
agriculture. The medieval stability of village life was violently replaced by new physical 
and social mobility, amid rapid growth in populations. Massive human migrations were 
set in motion as many villagers were forced off the land and many others were lured by 
the promise of new occupations in rapidly growing industrial centres. Although many of 
these trends had begun centuries earlier, they accelerated and intensified during the 
eighteenth century, transforming entire regions. The unprecedented process fed on its 
51 Richard West Sellars describes the decades -long (and ongoing) struggle to convince the Park Service to 
manage national parks more strictly in accordance with ecological science and less for the facilitation of 
public enjoyment. See Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
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A related metaphor for national park frontcountries might be what another postwar scholar, Leo Marx, 
described (not necessarily in reference to parks) as the "middle landscape ": an American "pastoral 
ideal...located in a middle ground somewhere `between,' yet in a transcendent relation to, the opposing 
(cont.) 
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own profit -making potential, and accelerated in the second half of the century. Nothing 
like the modernization of the British landscape had ever occurred before.53 Perhaps one 
period of landscape change comparable in novelty and intensity, however, occurred in the 
United States after World War II, as American cities turned inside out and exploded along 
the rapidly developing corridors of the Interstate Highway system. 
The transformation of British society and geography in the eighteenth century was 
obviously a complex and diverse phenomenon. Nevertheless, distinctive landscape 
patterns and instruments of landscape change emerged during this period, which together 
can be characterized, in a general way, as elements of a modern topography. The 
enclosure of land for the purposes of "improvement" was one such instrument. Enclosure 
entailed redrawing property lines in entire districts or parishes, in order to assert private 
ownership rights (often over formerly common lands), ultimately with the purpose of 
increasing yields and profits. The configurations of enclosed land varied according to 
local social and topographic conditions, but in many cases ancient "open" fields (typical 
of more communal, village agriculture) were enclosed by fences or hedges, creating a 
quiltwork of smaller, squarish fields. In other cases, ancient wastes, fens, or woods were 
enclosed and put into agricultural production through the application of new methods of 
drainage, soil improvement, and crop rotations. The process accelerated rapidly as 
Parliament, acting on behalf of major landowners, passed thousands of acts of enclosure 
between 1750 and 1815.54 What became known as "parliamentary enclosure" greatly 
advanced the science of surveying, and prefigured the division and subdivision of land 
soon underway in the United States. In North America, however, the territorial claims of 
various tribal groups were even more easily ignored than the traditional usufruct of open 
field farmers. As a result, the redistribution of land for "settlement" (and national park 
forces of civilization and nature." Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral 
Ideal in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 23 -33. 
53 What is generalized here as the process of "landscape modernization" began, in some aspects, long before 
the eighteenth century, and continues, in other aspects, today. The British countryside was not the product 
strictly of the eighteenth century; the enclosure of land, for example, had a long history including medieval 
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making) in the United States was uncomplicated by previous patterns of ownership, and 
proceeded with Cartesian simplicity in the vast rectangular survey of townships and land 
"sections" authorized by Congress in the 1785 Land Ordinance.55 
New transportation corridors, especially roads and canals, were a second 
archetypal characteristic of the modernizing landscape in Great Britain, and soon in 
British North America, as well. Growing cities created markets for agricultural surplus 
(the ultimate reason for the modernization of the countryside), and market agriculture 
demanded cheaper movement of goods. The reorganization of land tenure achieved 
through acts of enclosure made it possible to establish relatively direct rights -of -way, 
especially for new "enclosure roads. "56 In addition, a frenzy of speculative turnpike and 
canal construction in the eighteenth century helped make the modern landscape one of 
unprecedented physical mobility. Engineers devised new systems of impervious road 
surfaces, and manufacturers produced carriages with improved suspensions. Travel 
became more convenient and desirable for some, and an imposed necessity for others. 
Entire populations were on the move, leaving ancestral villages for mushrooming cities 
(or for new land and farms in New England). If the countryside seemed depopulated by 
these trends, a burgeoning, urban middle class soon began a reverse invasion. For them, 
the accessibility of the modem landscape made possible a new and distinctly modem 
form of recreation: touring the countryside in search of scenic beauty.57 
A third instrument of landscape modernization that emerged in Britain at this time 
was the modern landscape park. The word "park" derived from the Middle English word 
for a paled forest enclósure, and the medieval hunting park was a form of royal privilege 
that appropriated game and other forest products to a particular feudal lord. But by the 
seventeenth century, the economic and social purposes of ancient hunting parks had 
changed significantly, altering how these landscapes were perceived and managed. Many 
landowners valued their parks more as estates (particularly as the settings for manor 
houses), than merely as larders of venison and acorn mast. Parkland began to be 
managed, together with more formal grounds around the house, as components of a villa 
landscape, or "landscape garden," that featured views of surrounding forests, as well as 
access to the more "wild" or "natural" landscape of the increasingly managed park. The 
55 See Hildegard Binder Johnson, "Towards a National Landscape," in The Making of the American 
Landscape, Michael P. Conzen, ed. (Boston: Hyman Unwin, 1990), 127 -145. 
56 Hoskins, The Making of the English Landscape, 233 -254. 
57 See Malcolm Andrews, The Search for the Picturesque: Landscape Aesthetics and Tourism in Britain, 
1760 -1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). 
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origins of the English landscape garden have been the subject of intense interest among 
art historians, who emphasize the influence of Classical and Italian Renaissance culture as 
well as a developed taste for seventeenth -century landscape painting.58 Other historians 
have pointed out that England had been almost entirely deforested by the seventeenth 
century, and that there were economic as well as aesthetic and iconographic reasons for 
landowners to become concerned with silviculture and the management of parkland for 
grazing and timber production.59 The intrinsic formal qualities of the ancient park 
landscapes themselves also helped define the "natural" aesthetic of the landscape garden. 
Topography, climate, and indigenous vegetation -combined with generations of 
medieval forest management practices -had formed the canvas of coppices, glades, 
woods, and fish ponds upon which park owners and their gardeners began to delineate 
how modern "nature" should look.6o 
By the mid -eighteenth century, the interest in managing the park landscape itself 
increased to such a point that the older Baroque parterres and knot gardens around the 
house fell into disfavour, often to the point of their complete removal. Stripped of 
ornamental gardens, the house now appeared set in isolation in the park landscape, 
separated from grazing stock only by the deceptive "ha -ha," or sunken fence. The early 
Georgian landscape garden of classical emblems and allusions was often filled with 
temples, grottoes, and statuary. But the true landscape park that emerged at mid -century 
dispensed with many of these more literary devices, yielding to a purer, more expressive 
artistic vision restricted to the essential materials of the earth itself: landform, trees, water, 
light, and space. If its roots went deep, even to Classical pastoralism, the modern 
landscape park was a dramatically new and minimalist art form, one primarily concerned 
ss See, for example, Elizabeth Wheeler Manwaring, Italian Landscape in Eighteenth- Century England: A 
Study Chiefly of the Influence of Claude Lorraine and Salvator Rosa on English Taste, 1700 -1800 [1925] 
(New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1965); B. Sprague Allen, Tides in English Taste, 1619 -1800 [1937] 
(New York: Pageant Books, Inc., 1958), vol. 2, 116 -230; Peter Willis, ed., Furor Hortensis: Essays on the 
History of the English Landscape Garden in Memory of H.F. Clark (Edinburgh: Elysium Press Limited, 
1974); David C. Streatfield, "Art and Nature in the English Landscape Garden: Design Theory and Practice, 
1700 -1818," in David C. Streatfield and Alistair M. Duckworth, Landscape in the Gardens and the 
Literature of Eighteenth - Century England (Los Angeles: University of California, Williams Andrews Clark 
Memorial Library, 1981), 3 -87; John Dixon Hunt, Garden and Grove: The Italian Renaissance Garden in 
the English Imagination, 1600 -1750 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 181 -222; John Dixon 
Hunt and Peter Williss, The Genius of the Place: The English Landscape Garden: 1620 -1820 (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1988), 1-45. 
59 See Douglas Chambers, The Planters of the English Landscape Garden: Botany, Trees, and the 
"Georgics" (New Haven: Published for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art by Yale 
University Press, 1993), 1 -11, 33 -80, 121 -155; Tom Williamson, "The Landscape Park: Economics, Art, 
and Ideology," Journal of Garden History 13, no. 1 (Spring/Summer, 1993): 49 -55. 
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with the expressive power of landscape form, line, and colour rather than emblematic 
references to the poetry of Virgil or Horace.61 The interest in the evocative power of 
form over the intellectual content of allusion eventually indicated a beginning of modern 
aesthetics. The landscape park, composed of meadows, groups of trees, and placid sheets 
of water, indicated a new and distinctly modern sensibility toward the appreciation of 
landscape scenery, one for which literary education meant less than sensibilities 
developed through an appreciation for formal composition. Appreciating land as 
landscape depended on an individual's emotional response to "landscape effects," not 
necessarily on familiarity with the classics. This was true not only in the landscape park 
(where to a certain degree experiences could be contrived) but in the broader and 
increasingly accessible countryside as a whole, which legions of tourists were soon 
combing in search of the picturesque. 
The novelty of the landscape park- arguably the first modern art form - 
corresponds closely to the unprecedented changes taking place in the landscape 
surrounding it. Perhaps the most salient fact of the history of the landscape park in 
Britain is that it flowered precisely as parliamentary enclosure reached its height, roughly 
between 1750 and 1815. As the art historian Ann Bermingham observes, the entire 
awakening to the beauty of the "rustic" countryside, especially on the part of urban 
middle classes, occurred precisely as the rural landscape of village agriculture was being 
replaced by patterns of enclosed land and modern farmsteads. At the same time, amateur 
landscape designers such as Uvedale Price and Richard Payne Knight were transforming 
their estates and formal gardens into extensive, "natural" landscape parks.62 Bermingham 
and others have suggested that the modern landscape park was, above all, defined by its 
contrast to the surrounding, modernizing landscape, and was even an attempt to recreate 
the expansiveness of the pre -modern landscape that was disappearing under networks of 
hawthorn hedges and new roads. But the modern park had as little in common with the 
landscape of open field agriculture as it did with its earlier incarnation as medieval 
hunting preserve. If it was a landscape of sweeping expanses (with rarely so much as a 
fence or stile in sight) its meadows were devoted to grazing animals, not villagers tending 
crops. The landowners who developed landscape parks, in fact, often enclosed open 
60 Williams, The Country and the City, 120 -126; Bermingham, Landscape and Ideology, 9 -14; Susan 
Lasdun, The English Park: Royal, Private, and Public (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1991), 5 -38. 
61 Ronald Paulson, Emblem and Expression: Meaning in English Art of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), 19 -34. 
62 Bermingham, Landscape and Ideology, 10 -14. 
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fields to further expand their parkland. Far from being nostalgic, these park makers 
generally had profited from change, and had enclosed land and modernized farms 
themselves. As a class, they were familiar with the benefits and technology of land 
"improvement," and often shared an optimism regarding the new social and landscape 
organizations they were instigating. 
Many landowners, such as Price and Knight, were talented landscape designers 
and theorists; but many more looked to a new kind of professional "improver" to manage 
their parks and gardens. Preeminent among these was Lancelot Brown, who began his 
career in the 1740s working for another accomplished amateur, Lord Cobham, at Stowe. 
By 1751, Brown had established a growing practice as an independent improver, and 
although he designed Palladian country houses as well as parks, over the next thirty-five 
years he became famous as the most prolific and successful landscape designer of his 
day.63 This prodigious park maker designed and supervised the construction of scores of 
landscapes in the "modem," or "natural," style. His work, including the parks at Milton 
Abbey and Blenheim among many others, revealed and exploited the inherent scenic 
potential of a site by altering it as necessary to conform to compositional rules derived 
ultimately from "nature." The concept and visual appearance of nature itself, of course, 
had been transformed over the previous century through the advance of modem science, 
as well as landscape painting and descriptive poetry. Brown's parks were indeed 
"natural," in the sense that analysis of the natural suitabilities of a site guided their design; 
scientific as well as poetic inventory and observation lay at the heart of the new design 
process. But this in no sense implied that they were not the results of major landscape 
manipulation. Park making involved the same technologies of land drainage, road 
construction, scientific forestry, dam construction, and earth moving that was 
transforming the countryside as a whole. But new lakes created by Brown appeared 
where topography and watersheds provided the best opportunities for dam building, not 
according to the imposed geometries of Baroque architectural planning. New park drives 
curved and followed undulations of land, creating cinemagraphic experiences of shifting 
views, rather that the static, scenographic perspectives typical of straight avenues. 
Irregular clumps and belts of trees framed scenic compositions and concealed boundaries 
in ways that allées of clipped lindens never could, and they were also more efficient 
G3 See Dorothy Stroud, Capability Brown [1950] New Edition (Boston: Faber and Faber Limited, 1975); 
Roger Turner, Capability Brown and the Eighteenth Century English Landscape (New York: Rizzoli, 
1985). 
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timber plantations. The natural style combined the engineering efficiency of modern 
sciences and the flexible aesthetics of the picturesque, and in this sense can be seen as the 
origin of modem land planning. Brown's landscape park was both a quintessentially 
modern art form, and a physical prototype of the modern idea of nature. 
The central theory of modern park making insisted that consultation and analysis 
of the existing character of a landscape should enlighten its management and 
modernization: nature should guide progress. Debates over the direction and even the 
desirability of modem progress have ensued ever since, and these discourses have often 
entailed new or altered concepts of what "nature" actually is or how it should be 
described. Already by the 1760s, William Chambers, a court architect who designed the 
pagoda and other structures for the royal gardens at Kew, condemned Brown's parks for 
their lack of variety and intellectual content. Chambers's Orientalism led him to suggest 
that the original inspiration for the "natural" landscape garden had been Chinese, and he 
therefore advocated a return to Chinese principles (at least as he imagined them) in 
gardening, a direction that involved a more intricate and frankly artificial representation 
of nature.64 Criticism of Brown reached a peak after his death, when a famous 
controversy regarding the true nature of the "picturesque" erupted in the 1790s. Richard 
Payne Knight, in his remarkable poem, The Landscape (1794), denounced "the 
improver's desolating hand," and claimed that the "system of picturesque improvement, 
employed by the late Mr. Brown and his followers, is the very reverse of picturesque." 
Modern park improvers, in other words, were failing to be guided by the truly picturesque 
aesthetic qualities, and therefore left "shaven and defaced" the "goddess" (nature) they 
professed to improve. Knight's polemic was an aesthetic critique, not an 
environmentalist argument; nevertheless he confessed to "preferring the rich and natural 
scenes of Windsor or New Forest to the shaven parks and gardens of either of those 
64 Chambers had been to China, but the sources for his Dissertation on Oriental Gardening (1772) were 
probably accounts and illustrations published by other European travellers. The Orientalist critique of 
modern park making has persisted in various guises (i.e., "le jardin anglo-chinois"), and even continued in 
the post -World War II era in the form of an enthusiasm for Eastern philosophy and garden design among 
American environmentalists (Gary Snyder, for example) and landscape architects (including Garrett Eckbo 
and James Rose). For approachable overviews of eighteenth -century debates regarding landscape and 
aesthetic theory, see Manwaring, Italian Landscape in Eighteenth Century England, 145 -166; Hussey, The 
Picturesque, 128 -185; Allen, Tides in English Taste, 115 -143; Hunt and Willis, The Genius of the Place, 
318 -325, 342 -367; Stephen Daniels, "The Political Iconography of Woodland in Later Georgian England," 
in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds., The Iconography of Landscape. Cambridge Studies in 
Historical Geography 9 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 43 -82. 
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places," and called for a less maintained, more rugged and "natural" landscape.65 His 
Romantic appeal for the wild over the improved, and his condemnation of the "insipid" 
neatness of mowed lawns and placid lakes make his poem a landmark in the development 
of what can be called a wilderness aesthetic. At the heart of the more wild "picturesque" 
he described was a nature that suffered only degradation when actively managed; a nature 
that did not guide progress but was destroyed by it. On the other side of these "paper 
wars," the ideal of the modern park (and the artistic reputation of Lancelot Brown) was 
defended with equal conviction by Humphry Repton, who had inherited Brown's client 
list, and who had refined the profession of "improving" parks into what he called 
"landscape gardening." Other public figures, such as Horace Walpole, also rejected 
criticisms of Brown and the modern style. Walpole was another accomplished amateur 
park designer and a progenitor of the Gothic Revival. He was also the son of Britain's 
first prime minister, and the political implications of revolutionary changes in land 
management (to say nothing of actual revolution in Europe) fuelled the contemporary 
discourse on landscape aesthetics. 
Controversies aside, by the end of the eighteenth century the modern park, as 
defined above all by Lancelot Brown and Humphry Repton, embodied an ideal of modern 
progress implemented by a class of enlightened landlords. Landscape parks formed an 
integral part of the modern topography that was being inscribed over more ancient 
landscape patterns, and they expressed the dominant values of a rapidly industrializing 
society. The pace of private park making, however, slowed in the early nineteenth 
century. The collapse of corn prices and other economic changes at the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars destabilized the economy of market agriculture, and the creation of 
private parks became increasingly difficult and expensive as the industrial economy 
matured and spread further into the countryside. No additional private parks were created 
after an agricultural depression in the 18805.66 
But the modern park only began as a private park; as it evolved it was destined to 
be the "public" park. This transition occurred first in parks near or in growing cities, 
especially London's Royal Parks, some of which were being opened to limited use by the 
public already in the seventeenth century. By the early nineteenth century, these former 
hunting parks had been surrounded by the city and opened to the public, a change that 
65 Richard Payne Knight, The Landscape: A Didactic Poem in Three Books, Second Edition [ 1795] 
(Westmead, Farnborough, Hants.: Gregg International Publishers Limited, 1972), viii, 2, 17 -18, 23,31. 
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was accompanied (at St. James's and Hyde parks, for example) by the redevelopment of 
these landscapes in the "modern," or "natural" style.67 Other European cities also were 
opening formerly private parks and gardens for public recreation, a process greatly 
accelerated in Europe by political upheaval. By the 1840s, municipal governments began 
to acquire property on their own in order to develop them as semi -public arboretums and 
public parks.68 These landscapes, designed by professional landscape gardeners such as 
J. C. Loudon and Joseph Paxton in Britain, or Peter Josef Lenné in Germany, adapted the 
rural art of park design in order to provide "natural" settings that could be accessible and 
convenient for large numbers of visitors. Promenades, carriage drives, and the enjoyment 
of scenery in the landscape park were quickly established as basic amenities of modern, 
urban, middle -class life. And of course most of these public landscapes were variations 
of the natural or English style: reifications of the modern nature that guided progress 
towards an increasingly urban, industrialized, and hopefully healthful and democratic 
future.69 
By the mid -nineteenth century, governments had replaced landlords as the 
principal park makers in Europe, and municipalities laid out new parks, not just to 
provide public amenities, but as a means of controlling the direction and character of 
urban growth. In Paris, Berlin, London, and soon New York, landscape gardeners (called 
landscape architects in the United States) planned urban expansion by employing 
techniques derived from park making. New areas to be urbanized were studied in terms 
of topography, hydrology, and other physical and aesthetic qualities; the various functions 
and infrastructures of the city (particularly new park and boulevard systems) could ideally 
then be sited and developed where suggested by the natural suitabilities of sites. But if 
park making developed into city planning, modern parks, like their medieval forebears, 
were still a means of enclosing and appropriating that is preserving -certain lands and 
their resources from other, perhaps more destructive, uses or activities. And in the 
nineteenth century, the most valuable resources to be preserved in parks were not timber 
or pasture, but landscape scenery and recreational opportunities. And the beneficiaries of 
67 George F. Chadwick, The Park and the Town: Public Landscape in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (London: The Architectural Press, 1966), 19 -52. 
68 Perhaps the first parks developed specifically for such public use were the German "volksgartens," 
particularly the Englischer Garten in Munich, designed by Friedrich Ludwig von Sckell in 1789. Although 
open to the public and designed in the modern (or "English ") style, early German parks were originally a 
form of aristocratic largesse, not municipal undertakings. 
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such preservation, increasingly, were not estate owners, but the expanding public: a term 
usually implying that group of middleclass, mostly urban and suburban, salaried workers 
and businesspeople that had grown up as a function of industrialization. 
In the United States, there had never been a tradition of private park making and 
neither were there royal parks to be opened to the public. A genocidal combination of 
disease and warfare had created an apparently unoccupied, "virgin" land on the Atlantic 
seaboard, ready to be distributed to whoever could "improve" it. Emparking forest 
resources made little sense when rich new lands seemed always available for the taking. 
But by the mid -nineteenth century, American cities had grown large and unhealthy, 
especially in the Northeast. Following the popular success of Central Park in New York, 
designed by Calvert Vaux and Frederick Law Olmsted in 1858, scores of municipalities 
appointed "park commissions" to acquire land and develop it as necessary to create 
modern, public park systems. New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and soon 
Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, and San Francisco and many other cities acquired land for 
developing a range of formal landscape types, including playgrounds, parkways, and of 
course large parks, which were larger reservations specifically devoted to the 
enhancement and enjoyment of "natural" scenery. 
Park commissions were early city planning entities in many American cities, and 
the techniques of park making had an enormous influence on American urbanism.7° But 
the American park movement only began at the municipal level. The potential for parks 
to preserve scenic areas in suburbs and even farther from the city soon produced results 
that were more far reaching than ever would have been possible in Euròpe. By the 1890s, 
what became known as "scenic preservation" was the primary emphasis in the planning 
of large parks, and the sponsorship of such projects rose to the county, state, and federal 
levels of government. The preservation of scenic areas through the establishment of 
large- scale, public parks became a principal instrument of landscape modernization in the 
United States, and a defining characteristic of the modern topography being rapidly 
delineated over more ancient patterns of land use and ownership. 
The relationship of land preservation to modern park making has been 
problematic since Richard Payne Knight's day. Preservation itself is a word that contains 
70 See Albert Fein, ed., Landscape Into Cityscape: Frederick Law Olmsted's Plans for a Greater New York 
City (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1967); David Schuyler, The New Urban Landscape: 
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its own antonym, in the sense that nothing is preserved from change without making 
essential change in what is to be preserved. Early landscape parks in Britain preserved 
landscapes -even while transforming them -since parkland was spared the more 
commercial uses of market agriculture and industrialization. But establishing such a 
reservation implied the active imposition of, at the very least, new values and priorities in 
the management of land, often to the detriment of older uses or perceived values. The 
result was a pervasive reconceptualization of land as landscape, or nature, not a 
perpetuation of pre -modern conditions. Park making also involved some degree of 
physical restructuring of land, whether this meant the extensive improvements of urban 
landscape parks, or the far more limited disturbances in suburban scenic reservations. 
But in either extreme, the natural style of landscape management combined improvement 
and preservation as aspects of the same project. While some areas of park sites were 
changed extensively (lakes were excavated and greenswards were graded, for example), 
many other areas were left untouched (even in urban parks). And the overall organization 
of the park landscape was determined, not by the imposition of "artificial" plan 
geometries, but by a response to the "natural" aesthetic character and physical potentials 
of the site. The development of modem parks, in other words, was a profoundly different 
process than the construction of architectonic gardens had been. Even great municipal 
parks of the nineteenth century (such as Central Park), which were laden with roads, 
paths, reservoirs, and other infrastructure to serve millions of visitors, were not man-made 
landscapes; they were improved landscapes. And whether park designers attempted to 
improve entire views and scenic compositions, or s. imply provided access to an already 
scenic area, improvements were based in a response to the existing character, or genius, 
of a place. The success of modem park making as a means of preservation has always 
depended on adhering to nature as an (ever mutable) aesthetic guide, and on a calculated 
tension between doing and not doing. Preservation demanded change, in other words, but 
that change in turn was modelled on "nature." The modem idea of nature itself developed 
to some degree as a product of landscape preservation; park making not only preserved 
nature, it helped invent it along the way. To some degree, modem nature became 
whatever the results of preservation ended up being.7' 
71 For insightful analysis of the perils and complexities of "preserving nature," see Sellars, Preserving 
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and perpetually maintaining large tracts of land in their `natural condition ' (p. 22) at the time Frederick 
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own (essentially post -World War II) meaning of "natural," as nothing less than unpopulated wilderness. 
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5.2 Early Scenic Preservation and Automotive Tourism 
By the early1890s, the landscape architect Charles Eliot (Olmsted's most 
important protégé) was planning and advocating a system of "scenic reservations" in the 
suburbs around Boston. These reservations were far larger than the municipal parks 
Olmsted had designed for the city of Boston, and they also required far less improvement. 
Eliot identified areas for inclusion in the systems based on their existing landscape 
character. To become landscape parks, they required little more than the addition of 
carriage roads, trails, and shelters for public convenience (basically the treatment Olmsted 
had suggested for the north end of Central Park in 1858, and for Yosemite Valley in 
1865). The system of reservations was also planned on a proto- ecological basis; Eliot 
intended that a range of different landscape types, including riparian, highland, lowland, 
and coastal, should all be represented.72 Little manipulation was required in expansive 
reservations such as Middlesex Fells or Blue Hills, and Eliot did not feel that there would 
ever be "any need of artificially modifying... [the reservations] to any considerable 
degree." Carriage roads and trails would be necessary, he continued, "to make the 
scenery accessible "; but these would be no more than "mere slender threads of graded 
surface winding over and among the huge natural forms of the ground. "73 Improvement, 
however, certainly remained part of the formula for park making. What Eliot called 
"landscape forestry" was a particular concern. Certain views, especially those from 
accessible public overlooks, were kept open, older specimen trees were protected from 
encroaching saplings, and dead wood was removed. "The axe must be used," he insisted, 
"...but the axe must be used with discretion." Above all, Eliot emphasized that "absurd 
traces of formality" be avoided in the grading, planting, and other work necessary in the 
construction of park developed areas. The large park, "in which scenery is the main 
object of pursuit," demanded very different treatment from smaller parks or town 
squares.74 
Early national parks -and even municipal parks -also preserved nature, although a nature defined more in 
visual terms ( "scenic preservation ") than in the terms of the still emerging science of ecology. 
72 Charles W. Eliot, Charles Eliot, Landscape Architect: A Lover of Nature and of His Kind Who Trained 
Himseffor a New Profession, Practised It Happily, and Through It Wrought Much Good [1902] (Freeport, 
NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 420 -451. 
73 Charles Eliot, Vegetation and Scenery in the Metropolitan Reservations of Boston (Boston: Lamson, 
Wolffe and Company, 1898), 7. 
74 Eliot, Charles Eliot, 709 -736. 
45 
As the context for public park making grew more distant from the city, the 
balance between doing and not doing shifted. In scenic reservations around not only 
Boston, but soon New York, Chicago, and other cities, park planners emphasized a desire 
to "interfere with" natural landscapes as little as possible.75 The modern park, as scenic 
reservation, increasingly was seen as a means for governments to preserve large -even 
vast-natural areas for public enjoyment. As long as development was kept to a 
minimum and "harmonized with nature," park making could successfully "preserve" 
landscapes. Frederick Law Olmsted thoroughly described these ideas in his 1865 report 
for Yosemite Valley, and in so doing laid the intellectual foundations for the development 
of a national park system. Other park planners, such as Eliot, understood that the 
improvement of large parks would increasingly be a matter of designing specific 
developed areas or corridors, leaving the great majority of the park as undisturbed as 
possible in most ways (although still "managed" where necessary to maintain 
characteristic features such as open meadows, views, or significant specimen plants). The 
Progressive Era saw a flurry of state and national park proposals, mostly intended to 
preserve outstanding natural features and areas as public parks. From Mount Rainier and 
Rocky Mountain national parks, to Lake Itasca and the Dalles of the St. Croix, to the 
Finger Lakes and the Palisades, "scenic preservationists" succeeded in having both 
Congress and state legislatures set aside large (often threatened) areas as public parks.76 
And when, beginning around 1911, leading advocates such as J. Horace McFarland and 
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., began to press for the creation of a national park commission 
(the National Park Service), this was the tradition of park making that shaped the early 
policies and intended goals of the new federal bureau. For these Progressive Era 
preservationists, preserving places by facilitating public enjoyment of them was not an 
ironic or conflicting mandate; it was, on the contrary, the very premise of the American 
park movement. 
75 Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux, in their original description of the design for Central Park 
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The large scenic reservation became the distinctly American contribution to the 
development of the modern park. In just a few decades, the American park had 
transformed city and regional planning, and established the idea that government at the 
local, state, or federal level could act as an enlightened landlord -that is on behalf of the 
public -and empark land as a means of appropriating and preserving examples of the 
country's most scenic regions. In Great Britain, however, private park making had ended 
completely and the public park never reached the proportions that it did in the United 
States. There were many geographic and perhaps sociological reasons why the 
momentum of modern, public park making shifted decisively to the United States. But 
perhaps the most important factor was that American scenic reservations became primary 
destinations for the legions of modern tourists that were pouring out of cities and suburbs 
by the 1880s. In Great Britain (and most of Europe) domestic tourists were attracted by 
the scenic countryside itself, which generally was privately, not publicly, owned.77 But 
the millions of mostly middle -class tourists in the United States were often headed for 
various regional, state, or national parks. By the 1910s, many of these tourists were 
travelling in new automobiles, and the juggernaut of modem automotive tourism, for 
better or worse, became the economic power behind campaigns to create scenic 
reservations. American park making, even when it "preserved" places from other forms 
of exploitation, served the economic and industrial interests that prospered as tourists 
took to the road in order to get "back to nature." 
Modem tourism has been thoroughly maligned by critics and historians over the 
last fifty years. None have been more harsh than post -World War II wilderness 
advocates, who realized that roads, cars, and tourists could be nearly as destructive to 
previously inaccessible places as loggers, miners, or dam builders would have been.78 
Accompanied by highway construction, roadside commercial development, and the 
degradation of both natural systems and a regional sense of place, the destructive power 
of modern tourism cannot be denied. But the aesthetic appreciation of landscape 
77 The British countryside eventually required preservation efforts, as well. English and Welsh "national 
parks" established after World War II allow residents and property owners to continue their lives and 
activities on the land, although under a new set of regional land -use controls. The goal is to perpetuate 
traditional landscapes while protecting them from postwar urban sprawl and other pressures. This 
arrangement (a non -regulatory version of which is often called a "heritage area" in the United States) may 
be.a successor to the modern landscape park, but obviously differs profoundly from it. 
78 Aldo Leopold identified "mechanized recreation" as a destroyer of wilderness values, and Edward Abbey 
described "Industrial Tourism" in the same terms. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac [ 1949] (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1970), 269 -272; Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness 
[1968] (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 45 -67. 
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scenery -the ultimate reason for so much of modern tourism -has also proved to be an 
emotional experience that few people are willing to live entirely without. Enjoying scenic 
beauty cannot be dismissed as merely a superficial experience. As perhaps the most 
widespread form of recreation in industrial nations, it has constituted a communion with 
the "natural" world that many, including the elder Olmsted, have considered a 
prerequisite to human happiness in the context of modern society. This communion has 
taken many forms, such as intense interest in landscape painting, descriptive poetry, 
natural history, all of which developed (along with the practice of modem park making) 
in the eighteenth century. But the emotional reconnection to what was, from that point 
on, perceived as the "landscape" was above all linked to the phenomenon of tourism. 
Eighteenth -century guidebooks to the picturesque Lake District and ancient forests of 
Britain set the pattern for the appreciation of the Hudson Valley and the White 
Mountains, both of which were destinations for American tourists by the 1820s. Ever 
since, Americans have been indefatigable seekers of scenic beauty. Life in new cities and 
suburbs, while usually more comfortable and less onerous than farm life had been, 
nevertheless created the need to invent and appreciate "nature" and "landscape" to 
rediscover and value. And that reconnection often took the form of an excursion in 
search of scenery, which (at least in the United States) has often been found along the 
roads, trails, and overlooks of public parks. 
To a significant degree, modern tourism is inseparable from any conception we 
have of "landscape," and we all know "nature" essentially as tourists. And despite its 
drawbacks, the popularity of modern automotive tourism and the (admittedly sometimes 
fleeting) appreciation of landscape beauty it made possible were principal reasons for the 
success of scenic preservation in the early twentieth century. The powerful political and 
economic links between automotive tourism and the American park movement helped 
scenic preservationists convince Congress and state legislatures to create and expand park 
systems, and in 1916 establish the National Park Service. 
But if automotive tourism infused scenic preservation with political influence, it 
also inevitably began to erode the effectiveness of parks as a means of preservation. The 
numbers of cars and tourists were manageable at first; but those numbers increased 
exponentially in the coming decades. The art of modern park making, with its careful 
balance of doing and not doing, was challenged to increase the capacity of scenic places 
to provide enjoyment without destroying the scenery and wildlife that were to be enjoyed. 
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5.3 Automotive Tourism and National Parks 
The National Park Service was established specifically to accommodate 
automotive tourism while preserving the scenic landscapes tourists visited. There has 
been much discussion of the "Organic Act" that established the Park Service in 1916, and 
whether it gave priority to "preservation" or "enjoyment. "79 But the act was unequivocal 
in its thoroughly Olmstedian philosophy that the purpose of preservation was for 
enjoyment. Preservation is simply not discussed in the act outside the context of public 
enjoyment. The most often quoted portion of the 1916 Park Service legislation was 
written by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., and states that the fundamental purpose of the 
parks is "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life 
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means 
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. "80 For the 
younger Olmsted, J. Horace McFarland, Horace Albright, and the other drafters of the act, 
this amounted to a mandate to manage national parks as public parks, not as the quasi - 
private resorts they had been up to that point. As long as most park visitors still arrived 
by train, travelled by concessioner livery services, and stayed in hotels run by the 
railroads, the parks could be perceived as privately run businesses, not as truly public 
places. Congress was therefore less likely to be concerned with their preservation or the 
creation of a new federal bureau to manage them. But by 1916, over 14,000 visitors 
arrived at Yosemite Valley by car, slightly more than arrived by railroad that year.81 By 
1919, Mather reported that three quarters of the visitors to Yosemite Valley arrived in 
their own cars, and in 1920 he asserted that the "great bulk of travel" to all the parks was 
by automobile82 Between 1900 and 1920, the number of visits to the national park system 
went up from about 100,000 to over one million. Automobile registrations in the United 
79 It is clear that if such an inference must be made, the act places the first priority on preservation. See 
Donald C. Swain, "The Passage of the National Park Service Act of 1916," Wisconsin Magazine of History 
50, no. 1 (Fall 1966): Ernest Morrison, J. Horace McFarland: A Thorn for Beauty (Harrisburg: 
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1995), 173 -193; 4 -17; Sellars, Preserving Nature, 28- 
46, 298 -299 fn 2; Carr, Wilderness by Design, 322 fn 57, 324 fn 87; Dilsaver, ed., America's National Park 
System, 7 -10, 46 -47. 
80 For the full text see Dilsaver, ed., America's National Park System, 46 -47. 
81 Runte, Yosemite, 121. 
82 Stephen T. Mather, "The Ideals and Policy of the National Park Service Particularly in Relation to 
Yosemite National Park," in Ansel F. Hall, ed., Handbook of Yosemite National Park (New York: G.P. 
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States during the same period rose from about 8,000 to over eight million 83 In the first 
Annual Report of the Park Service in 1917, Horace Albright remarked on "an astonishing 
increase in the number of cars in the national parks" during the previous four summers, 
and reported with satisfaction that national park superintendents had already abandoned 
all restrictions on the use of automobiles.84 
In the nineteenth century, the park visiting public had been defined as those who 
could walk or ride to nearby municipal or regional parks; the twentieth -century national 
park public, however, was defined as those who could own cars and use them to arrive at 
more distant destinations. As automobile ownership increased and became widespread 
among the middle class, automotive tourism transformed the federal scenic reservations 
into true "public" parks, in this sense. This process began before the Park Service had 
been established, and the Park Service Organic Act was both the evidence and the result 
of the transformation. By that time, scores of municipal, county, state, and even interstate 
park commissions were active in the United States, and the precedent of governments 
preserving scenic areas on behalf of the (automotive) public was well established. Once 
Congress understood the national parks were indeed being used by the public at large, the 
creation of a new (in this case federal) park commission was justified and desirable. 
The mandate of "preservation and improvement" (to borrow the language of the 
1864 Yosemite Grant) implicit in the 1916 Park Service legislation suggested that 
Congress wanted to facilitate and enhance the now automotive public's enjoyment of the 
national parks. This also was (and some would say has remained) the principal 
justification for congressional park appropriations. And park appropriations soon 
increased dramatically. Horace Albright, in particular, succeeded in putting funding for 
parks on a par with another category of public landscape improvements that Congress had 
recently decided to subsidize at unprecedented levels: the "federal -aid" highways. In 
1916, the same year Congress created the Park Service, it passed the Federal Aid to 
Highways Act, which authorized $75 million for state highway improvements over the 
next five years, and initiated the commitment to public highway funding that continues to 
83 John B. Rae, The Road and Car in American Life (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), 50; James J. Flink, 
The Automobile Age (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), 37 -39. 
84 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1917 Annual Report, 18 -22. The previous year, 
Stephen Mather had described an "astonishing increase in motor travel" to the parks. Mather, Progress in 
the Development of the National Parks, 5. 
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the present day.85 By 1922, Mather and Albright began lobbying for a similar level of 
commitment to fund roads within national parks. As a result, in 1924 Congress 
authorized $7.5 million for park roads over three years, almost doubling the total Park 
Service budget for 1925 to over $3 million. The situation in the parks had indeed become 
untenable, because improved state highways and national forest roads (built through the 
"federal aid" legislation) had made the parks more accessible than ever to tourists in cars. 
With so many visitors now driving to national parks (and "overcrowding" existing 
facilities), the demand to improve roads, campgrounds, comfort stations, and other 
infrastructure for automotive tourism was inevitable. 
Mather and Albright presented the modernization of the national park system as a 
necessary adjunct to the subsidization of a national highway system, and permanently 
linked federal highways and national parks in terms of the appropriations that would pay 
for them.86 This relationship, if informal, would continue through the twentieth century, 
reaching an apogee in 1956, the year both the Interstate Highway Act, and the Park 
Service's Mission 66 program, were launched. 
5.4 The National Park "Dilemma" 
Criticism of Park Service policy by "purists" had flared almost as soon as the 
agency was created. In the 1920s unprecedented numbers of people in cars crowded 
Yosemite Valley, the south rim of the Grand Canyon, the Paradise Valley area of Mount 
Rainier, and other popular national park destinations. What can be described as the 
modern, organized campaign for "wilderness" began in the 1920s, and it was in large part 
a reaction -as the creation of the Park Service had been -to the vast expansion of 
outdoor recreation and tourism made possible by the automobile.87 For those who 
considered Yosemite Valley already "spoiled," or who condemned the "ballyhoo" at the 
85 Because roads in national parks were non -commercial, they received none of these funds; national forest 
roads, however, did receive about 10% of the total. Bruce E. Seely, Building the American Highway 
System: Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 46 -59. 
86 Mather, "Ideals and Policy of the National Park Service," 81; Department of the Interior, National Park 
Service, 1924 Annual Report, 11 -12; Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Public Lands, 
Construction of Roads, etc. in National Parks and Monuments: Hearings Before the Committee on the 
Public Lands. 68th Cong., 1st Sess., February 7, 8, 12, and 14, 1924; Rettie, Our National Park System, 
250. 
87 See Paul S. Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness 
Movement (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). Sutter demonstrates that the wilderness ideal, 
as it took shape especially in the 1930s, was more a reaction to the effects of increased automotive 
recreation than the result of conflicts over natural resource exploitation: "The modern wilderness idea 
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of the discordant internal politics of outdoor recreation" (p. 20). 
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south rim of the Grand Canyon, the policies of the new Park Service were at least in part 
to blame.88 The subjects of how to define and preserve wilderness were widely discussed 
in the 1920s. By the end of the decade both the Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service 
responded to criticism and made attempts to be better stewards of the remaining 
inaccessible lands under their jurisdiction. The rapid pace of national and state park 
development in the 1930s exacerbated concerns about whether the Park Service could 
preserve wilderness while it developed parks. The initiation of the New Deal transformed 
the agency. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), in particular, undertook a 
tremendous amount of work in the national parks and developed dozens of state park 
systems. All of this CCC park work was under the direction of the Park Service, 
specifically of a young Conrad Wirth, who proved adept at rapidly organizing a large 
bureaucracy, as well as the delicate task of "cooperating" with state authorities while 
maintaining strict control over budgets and design standards.89 
One very powerful "purist" was Harold L. Ickes himself, the cantankerous 
Secretary of the Interior and public works spending tsar under Roosevelt. In the course of 
the 1930s, Ickes often chafed under Park Service policies he felt were perpetuated by 
Park Service officials in Washington, as well as the cadre of superintendents in the 
parks.90 Ickes's harshest conservation battles were fought over new parks brought into 
the system in the 1930s. He demanded a direct role in shaping development policies for 
the new "wilderness parks" (an unofficial designation), such as Everglades 
(Florida,1934), Big Bend (Texas, 1935), Olympic (Washington, 1938), and Kings Canyon 
(California, 1940). For most historians, the first true "wilderness park" was Everglades 
National Park, because in this case the 1934 legislation was shaped by the wilderness 
debates of the time. The extraordinary bird populations of South Florida, and the bloody 
history of their exploitation and attempted protection, were bound to influence any 
88 See Carsten Lien, Olympic Battleground: The Power Politics of Timber Preservation (San Francisco: 
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discussion of a national park in the area. The "river of grass" was an awesome landscape, 
but it lacked specific scenic features or dramatic tourist attractions typical of earlier 
national parks. The character of the landscape and its importance as habitat suggested 
that it become a different kind of park, one left in a "primitive" or "wilderness" condition. 
How exactly park planners would achieve this was a question that would be put off until 
the state of Florida finished the acquisitions of private land in 1947.91 As was the case 
with many of the wilderness parks of the Ickes years, the ultimate disposition and 
physical management of the Everglades would only be resolved -and debated -later, as 
part of the Mission 66 program. 
The term "wilderness park," which became a common if unofficial usage at the 
Park Service by the mid- 1930s, defied precise definition. National parks had always been 
created "for the benefit and enjoyment of the people," as Thomas Vint often pointed out, 
and that mandate implied "improvements" which both enabled and controlled public 
access. But wilderness was defined in the 1930s as an area which would remain roadless 
forever, therefore limiting public access to those willing and able to undertake extended 
hiking or stock trips. While such backcountry users were dedicated preservationists, they 
were also a tiny minority of national park visitors. The need to resolve the potentially 
conflicting programs of the "wilderness park," however, was postponed. World War II 
ended most park construction appropriations in 1942, and budgets continued to be limited 
between 1945 and 1955. Mission 66 funding, however, reawakened expectations for 
expanded visitor facilities in parks. At the same time, organized wilderness advocates of 
the postwar period pressed for greater preservation of wilderness, precisely by foregoing 
such development plans. The Mission 66 program never fully reconciled these competing 
ideas of national park management. It was during the postwar period that it first became 
a commonplace to refer to the paradox of making national parks available for public 
enjoyment, while at the same time preserving them as wilderness. 
For Conrad Wirth and his recreational planners, however, increased capacity for 
public enjoyment could still be accommodated by the park system, as long as facilities 
were well designed and the system was appropriately expanded. While Ickes was 
promoting wilderness parks in the 1930s, Wirth and his army of CCC recruits were 
building entire categories of state and national parks that were unapologetically oriented 
91 Ise, Our National Park Policy, 371 -376. 
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to recreational use.92 National recreation areas, for example, were planned and built 
through an interbureau agreement with the Bureau of Reclamation specifically to develop 
the potential of large reservoirs for boating, camping, and swimming. Lake Mead 
National Recreation Area (Nevada, 1936) behind Hoover Dam set the precedent for a 
national park area conceived almost entirely around the demand for access by 
recreationalists. National seashores were planned for areas that could also expect intense 
levels of recreational use. A 1935 Park Service survey identified at least twelve seashores 
to be added to the national park system in order to assure public access to the last great 
beaches still relatively unaffected by private ownership and resort construction. Cape 
Hatteras National Seashore in North Carolina was the first of its type when it was 
authorized in 1937; but again the state's acquisition of private land was not completed 
until after the war.93 Both new types of recreational parks, national recreation areas and 
national seashores, would become signature parks of the Mission 66 era. Their origins, 
however, lay in the rich recreational planning legacy of the New Deal. 
The roots of important postwar national historical parks also went back to projects 
that were planned or underway by the late 1930s. In 1933 Roosevelt transferred a host of 
Civil War battlefields and other historic sites to the jurisdiction of the Park Service, vastly 
expanding the agency's role as a curator of historic sites. In 1935 Congress passed the 
Historic Sites Act, authorizing the Park Service to undertake a national survey of historic 
sites and structures for possible addition to the national park system. The same year, a 
large portion of the St. Louis waterfront was designated a national historic site under the 
terms of the act, a first step'in the creation of what would become the Jefferson National 
Expansion Memorial. The Salem Maritime National Historic Site in Massachusetts and 
Hopewell Village in Pennsylvania were both designated in 1938. By that time, the Park 
Service was also involved in proposals for a national historical park centred around 
Independence Hall in downtown Philadelphia. In 1948 Congress passed legislation 
creating Independence National Historical Park, which would become the most 
significant of all Mission 66 era historical parks. 
By 1940, the national park system had increased greatly in size, but even more so 
in complexity. That year Newton B. Drury (fig. 1) became the director of the Park 
92 For the role of Franklin Roosevelt and Harold Ickes in 1930s wilderness protection efforts at Olympic 
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Service. Despite his personal and biographical closeness to Mather and Albright, many 
people believed Drury represented a very different philosophy from these earlier 
directors. His reputation as a preservationist was such that when David R. Brower (later 
executive director of the Sierra Club) heard of his appointment, he "wept for joy," 
believing that it was "the beginning of a new era" in national park management.94 But 
from the beginning of his time in Washington, the reality of managing the national park 
system clearly tempered Drury's "purist" tendencies. 
Drury proved to be a director well suited for the special conditions of wartime. In 
1942, as park visitation plummeted, the agency was reduced to a skeleton staff both in 
parks and in regional offices. The Washington Office (including the director) was 
removed to Chicago to free up office space for more vital war purposes. Drury was kept 
busy, nevertheless, because his talents as a preservation advocate were soon badly 
needed. Timber, stock, and mining interests exploited patriotic sentiments and tried to 
force open national parks to commercial uses. Ickes and Drury were able to turn aside 
much of the attempted profiteering, with some exceptions. For Drury these were a 
familiar kind of preservation battle. His preservationist attitude, as well as an inherently 
conservative style, proved to be a combination well suited to the emotional debates of a 
nation at war. 
When the war ended in 1945, however, he and his agency was immediately 
plunged into an increasingly unfamiliar world, in which the dynamics of Progressive Era 
controversies -such as "utilitarian" use of resources versus the preservation of 
"aesthetic" values -were swept away by a new generation of pressures and threats. In 
1946 an already perplexed Drury reported that following the lifting of travel restrictions 
in August, "the floodgates of travel opened immediately. For months thereafter all 
previous monthly records for numbers of visitors were broken. "95 
Drury became acutely aware of what he would soon describe as the "dilemma of 
our parks," which resulted from of a number of postwar factors and trends. The end of 
the CCC in 1942, for example, meant that thousands of maintenance workers would not 
be returning to work, even after the postwar labour shortage abated. All the maintenance 
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work done by CCC recruits before the war could not possibly be accomplished by the 
much smaller number of regular Park Service employees returning from the war, who 
now also enjoyed a forty -hour work week, down from forty -eight before the war. New 
Deal spending programs, such as the PWA, had funded many park improvements, 
including roads, buildings, campgrounds, and museums. The CCC had not only provided 
construction labour, but often maintenance personnel for completed facilities.96 In 1946 it 
was doubtful the conservative 80th Congress would continue to invest in parks, or even 
sustain the investments already made. Labour, housing, and construction materials were 
all in short supply, in any case, not only in the parks but nationally. At the same time, the 
"floodgates" had opened: after 1945 parks across the system began breaking their 
visitation records every year. Understaffed and underfunded, the parks nevertheless 
entered an era of unprecedented use, taking on an even more prominent place in the 
individual lives and collective imaginations of the American public. In the five years 
since Drury had taken on the job, the social, political, and economic realities of managing 
the national park system had changed forever. 
In 1947 Drury observed that "never have the inadequacies of the development of 
the National Park System been so highlighted." He estimated that $110 million was 
needed for road modernizations, as was another $120 million to complete the Blue Ridge 
and other parkway projects already underway. Another $110 million would need to be 
invested directly by the government in concessioner facilities. Drury estimated that it 
would take an additional $45 million dollars every year for seven years to address the 
situation. Despite Drury's repeated calls for a "comprehensive program of development 
and improvement," construction budgets during those years totalled less than a third even 
of his conservative proposal. In 1949 Drury estimated the development backlog at almost 
$500 million; Congress appropriated a little more than $14 million for park construction 
that year. Legislators were understandably preoccupied with the costs of the Cold War, 
the Korean War, and the reconstruction of Europe. Drury's calls for multi -year 
construction authorizations -essentially the basis of Mission 66 seven years later -were 
ignored. While other domestic public works projects were funded, they reflected 
congressional priorities for housing, highways, and dam construction, which were 
spending categories the Truman administration perceived to be more direct forms of 
96 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1946 Annual Report, 308. 
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economic stimulus.97 Drury may have been a "purist," but the only reason he did not 
initiate a major modernization of the parks himself was that he never got the funding he 
requested. Throughout his tenure as Park Service director, he made it clear that he 
believed that national parks were to be preserved for the enjoyment of the public, and that 
his agency had to assure that people had meaningful experiences of the parks even under 
increasingly difficult circumstances. 
Despite Drury's best efforts to describe the overwhelming conditions his park 
managers faced, he never managed to raise the concern for national parks above the other, 
admittedly dramatic events and issues of the day. In 1949 Drury published an article 
titled "The Dilemma of Our Parks," in which he summarized many of his frustrations. 
Drury felt the parks were "still victims of the war...overcrowded and understaffed." 
More funds were needed for their "protection and development," two priorities he saw as 
mutually supportive, not in conflict. "Whether we like it or not," he continued, the 
"enjoyment of ̀ the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife' in the 
national parks...is in large degree dependent on the `physical plant' we provide." Drury 
repeatedly argued for the "modernized and enlarged utilities" that were required for 
visitor safety and the protection of park landscapes and resources. Congress, he 
concluded, must increase appropriations, since New Deal spending had ended but public 
use had increased to unimagined levels.98 These were essentially the arguments that 
would be made for Mission 66; but in the 1940s they went unheeded by both Congress 
and the Truman administration. 
5.5 Hetch Hetchy 
The controversy that ended Drury's Park Service career, however, did not involve 
angry concessioners, unprecedented numbers of visitors, lack of staff, inadequate budgets, 
or the other elements of the "dilemma of our parks." Drury's return to California in 1951 
(to run California's state parks for the next eight years) was instead caused by one of the 
oldest types of threats to national parks: a dam building controversy. Dam construction 
was one aspect of the New Deal that Truman and postwar Democrats in Congress 
continued enthusiastically. Drury successfully turned aside most of the dam proposals 
97 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1947 Annual Report, 327 -328; idem, 1948 Annual 
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that would have affected national parks in the 1940s, but one project in particular became 
a source of controversy. The events and issues that swirled around this project led to 
Drury's departure from the Park Service, and helped shape the immediate political 
context for the planning and initiation of Mission 66. 
The Bureau of Reclamation's massive Colorado River Storage Project, a system 
of dams in the upper Colorado watershed, had at its centre a large reservoir in Echo Park, 
a particularly scenic area of Dinosaur National Monument. Although Dinosaur was 
technically a monument and not a park, and although most park and wilderness advocates 
had never visited this remote region on the Utah- Colorado border at the confluence of the 
Green and the Yampa rivers, the incursion of a dam into a unit of the national park system 
could not be allowed if the integrity of system as a whole was to be protected. Several 
recent histories establish that the struggle over the proposed Echo Park dam influenced 
and even instigated the postwar environmental movement. Wilderness advocates, non- 
profit outdoors clubs, scientists, magazine editors, and a broad range of other concerned 
individuals all rallied around the threatened Echo Park, and in the process they 
permanently changed the politics of preservation.99 
The relationship of the Park Service to this nascent environmental movement was 
troubled from the outset. In this case the trouble began by 1941, when a Colorado River 
Basin study by Conrad Wirth and Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., had first been authorized 
through an interbureau agreement with the Bureau of Reclamation (a sister agency in the 
Department of the Interior responsible for building dams). When the study was finished 
in 1946, the authors recommended against transforming Echo Park into a reservoir and 
recreation area, stating the plans would "deplorably alter...the wilderness qualities" of 
Dinosaur National Monument. They noted that the first duty of the Park Service was to 
make "the protection of the natural and archaeological values of the area the controlling 
factors in administering it." But the report also allowed that the dam could be justified if 
it were "clearly shown...that it would be of greater benefit to the whole nation to develop 
the area for water storage and power than to retain it in a natural state," at least leaving a 
door open for future debate likely to occur in Congress. They also suggested that if the 
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wilderness character of the monument would suffer on the one hand, "on the other 
hand...[the dam] would undoubtedly produce other recreational opportunities. "l°° 
The idea of accepting the construction of the dam (and effectively redesignating 
Dinosaur National Monument as a national recreation area) had been at least discussed by 
Park Service officials in the 1930s, leading Bureau of Reclamation engineers to develop 
surveys and plans during the 1940s under an assumption that the Park Service could be 
made to go along with their plans.'°' As partners in the planning for recreational land 
uses in the Colorado River Basin, Drury and Wirth had allowed the investigations for the 
Echo Park project to proceed. This proved to be a tactical error. During the postwar 
period attitudes among wilderness advocates hardened against the dam, and the Park 
Service scrambled to revise its own stand on the issue. Drury and Wirth spoke out 
repeatedly against the dam in the late 1940s, but the plans had been allowed to go too far 
and the project had built up strong political support. In 1950 Truman and Secretary of the 
Interior Oscar Chapman officially endorsed it. Drury was in a position not of shaping 
Park Service policy, but of attempting to deal with the consequences of decisions made 
higher up in the Department of the Interior. In this case, the resulting friction with 
Secretary Chapman led to his resignation in 1951.1°2 
The Echo Park dam proposal ultimately failed, but when it did it was because of 
the opposition of the public and of private non -profit environmental groups the National 
Parks Association, the Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society -not that of the Park 
Service. Drury's opposition to the Echo Park dam came too late and meant too little to 
the activists on the front lines. Wilderness advocates learned to do without the Park 
Service in the Echo Park fight. The lesson carried over to their struggle for federal 
wilderness legislation, which the Park Service also did not support. The Echo Park dam 
was defeated in 1956, the same year many of the same coalition of preservation groups 
introduced the first "wilderness bill" in Congress, later to become the 1964 Wilderness 
Act. It was also the same year that Conrad Wirth launched Mission 66, a radically 
loo Conrad L. Wirth and Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., A Survey of the Recreational Resources of the 
Colorado River Basin [1946] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 199. Apparently the 
1941 interagency memorandum that authorized the study specifically allowed for the consideration of a new 
reservoir and recreation area in Dinosaur National Monument. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness, 31 -32. 
101 See Susan Rhoades Neel, "Irreconcilable Differences: Reclamation, Preservation, and the Origins of the 
Echo Park Controversy," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1990. 
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different response to the postwar pressures on public lands. Non -profit environmental 
groups and the Park Service both launched eras of increased strength and great expansion 
in 1956. They were, however, headed on very different courses. 
Newton Drury was the first Park Service director to encounter the complex 
postwar issues that to some degree have occupied park managers ever since. The vastly 
increased use of the park system, for example, and the reduced influence and function of 
the Park Service within the federal bureaucracy both continued to challenge Drury's 
successors. Negotiations to renew concessioner contracts and secure new private 
investment for concession improvements became ever more difficult. Wilderness 
advocates and early environmentalists, while supportive of the general goals of the Park 
Service, often differed on key assumptions about the purposes of preservation, and 
therefore on specific policies for managing parks. The postwar social and demographic 
trends that precipitated many of these issues -such as population growth, automobile 
ownership, and low density urbanization -only intensified in the 1950s. After Drury's 
departure for California in 1951, the "dilemma of our parks" he described did not 
dissipate, but grew more ominous and intractable. This was the backdrop against which 
Conrad Wirth would organize and conduct Mission 66. 
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Chapter 6: Conrad Wirth and Postwar "Recreational Planning" 
6.1 Conrad Wirth 
In April 1951, Secretary of the Interior Chapman appointed Arthur E. Demaray, a 
long time Park Service employee now near retirement, director of the National Park 
Service (fig. 2). Demaray's appointment recognized his contributions as an assistant to 
every director since Stephen Mather. The choice also allowed Chapman to minimize the 
controversy caused by Newton Drury's departure. Opponents of the Echo Park dam 
seized upon Drury's resignation as an indication that Chapman was forcing the Park 
Service further into recreational development at the expense of its mandate to protect 
inviolate wilderness.1o3 By abetting the transformation of Dinosaur National Monument 
into a national recreation area (or its equivalent), the Park Service would be allowing a 
pristine wilderness under its care to be destroyed by dam construction. Chapman 
probably already had Conrad Wirth in mind as Drury's replacement; but replacing Drury 
directly with Wirth -who was in charge of recreational planning -would have been a 
further incitement to opponents of the Echo Park dam. In any case, Demaray retired that 
December, and Chapman then replaced him with Wirth as the sixth director of the 
National Park Service. 
But if Chapman or any one else thought Wirth would be amenable to the sacrifice 
of Dinosaur, they misconstrued not only Wirth's position on the Echo Park controversy, 
but his entire background and philosophy of park planning. Conrad Louis Wirth, known 
as "Connie" by his colleagues, was another Park Service stalwart. He had been hired by 
Horace Albright in 1931 and spent his early career working in the Washington office, 
which then consisted of about twenty -five employees, including many "Mather men," 
such as Albright, Thomas Vint, Arno Cammerer, and Arthur Demaray. Wirth also knew 
many leading park planners and advocates through his father Theodore, who was a well 
known figure in the American park movement. Theodore Wirth was born in Switzerland 
in 1863 and emigrated to the United States in his twenties after studying landscape design 
and horticulture in Paris and London. In the 1880s he worked for Calvert Vaux as a 
gardener and arbourist in Central Park, and later was supervisor of Riverside Park, also in 
103 Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness, 104 -105; Foresta, America's National Parks, 52. 
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New York. In 1894, he moved to Frederick Law Olmsted's hometown, Hartford, 
Connecticut, to run the municipal parks department there. He established his reputation 
as the "dean" of American park superintendents, however, in Minneapolis, where he 
oversaw the management and expansion of the municipal park system from 1906 to 1935. 
Minneapolis was favoured with a remarkable park system begun in the 1880s under the 
landscape architect Horace W. S. Cleveland, who died in 1900. For almost thirty years, 
Theodore Wirth oversaw the realization of what remains today one of the finest park 
systems in the country. Conrad Wirth, who was born in the superintendent's residence in 
Hartford's Elizabeth Park in 1899, grew up in the superintendent's residence in Lyndale 
Park, Minneapolis.104 
As an adolescent, Wirth attended military school in Wisconsin. From there he 
went on to study landscape architecture with his "father's choice of teachers," Frank A. 
Waugh, a landscape architect from Wisconsin who had established a landscape degree 
program at the Massachusetts Agricultural College (later the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst) in 1903. Wirth was a below average student, but continued a strong interest in 
sports and other extracurricular activities he had developed in military school. He 
graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Landscape Architecture in 1923 and moved to 
San Francisco, where he went to work for nurseryman Donald McLaren, the son of John 
McLaren, the Scottish designer of Golden Gate Park and another close friend of his 
father. After two years of this apprenticeship, Wirth moved to New Orleans and started 
his own landscape architecture firm with a partner. The new business did well at first, 
mainly through the design of subdivisions for land developers; but the development boom 
soon turned to bust on the Gulf Coast and elsewhere, and by 1927 Wirth was out of 
business. At that point, he again relied on his father's connections and moved to 
Washington, DC, where Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., secured him a job with the National 
Capital Park and Planning Commission in 1928. In 1931 Horace Albright offered him a 
transfer to the National Park Service's Washington office, where Wirth became assistant 
director in charge of the Branch of Lands, or "chief land planner," in 1931.10' 
Wirth remained in the Park Service Washington office for the next thirty-three 
years, finally running the agency from 1951 until 1964, the longest of any director before 
1°4 Theodore Wirth, Minneapolis Park System, 1883 -1944 (Minneapolis: Board of Park Commissioners, 
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Maintenance (January 1952): 5 -7; "Conrad Louis Wirth, Former NPS Director, Dies at 93," National Park 
Service Courier (Summer 1993): 22 -23; Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 4 -10. 
t°s Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 11 -15. 
62 
or since. But it was his first decade in Washington that shaped many of his future 
attitudes and policy decisions. Wirth was only one of what would soon be hundreds of 
landscape architects idled by the Depression who would come to work with the Park 
Service. The transformation of the agency began in the spring of 1933, when Franklin 
Roosevelt introduced his idea for the mobilization of a "peacetime army." Roosevelt 
conceived of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to conserve the human and natural 
resources of the nation, at a time when unemployment among young men, and natural 
disasters such as the Dust Bowl, seemed to imperil both. The CCC was quickly 
organized with the War Department, the Department of Labour, and other agencies all 
taking part and sharing the enormous costs. The conservation work itself was to be 
directed in national forests by the U.S. Forest Service, and in national, state, and some 
county and municipal parks by the National Park Service. 
In his position as chief land planner, Wirth had been in charge of investigating 
possible additions to the national park system for the previous two years. He now became 
the principal liaison to dozens of state governments, many of which had virtually no state 
parks, but which were rapidly acquiring land (at Depression prices) in order to take 
advantage of the federal government's offer to develop them with CCC labour and funds. 
With the assistance of Herbert Evison, formerly the executive director of the National 
Conference on State Parks, Wirth oversaw and reviewed all planning, design, and 
construction undertaken by the Park Service CCC state park program with the 
"cooperating" local park agencies. Wirth maintained strong, centralized control over the 
quality and design standards of the park developments rapidly undertaken all over 
country. Park designers and construction superintendents -whether they were working 
for local agencies, the CCC, or directly for the Park Service -had their work reviewed by 
travelling Park Service inspectors, and ultimately by Wirth himself in Washington. Local 
agencies that did not meet the standards set by Wirth risked not having CCC camps and 
associated funding assigned to them. Hundreds of architects, engineers, and landscape 
architects worked in state park CCC camps as designers, supervisors, and foremen. By 
1941 over 560 state, county, and municipal parks had been created or redeveloped by 
Wirth's program, in partnership with over 140 state and local park agencies.'°6 
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The New Deal catapulted the Park Service into a national recreational planning 
and park development agency, one that was to a considerable degree run by Conrad 
Wirth. The rapid expansion of budgets and activities required a regionalization of the 
agency. By 1935 there were eight state park "regions" within the Park Service, headed by 
regional directors who were mostly former state park officials.i °7 In 1936 Arno 
Cammerer consolidated his agency's CCC programs, bringing together Wirth's state park 
program and the national park CCC camps all under Wirth's control. That year Congress 
also passed the Park, Parkway, and Recreation -Area Study Act (drafted under Wirth's 
direction) which expanded and legitimized the Park Service's role in national recreational 
planning in cooperation with state agencies. The act also authorized the Park Service to 
assemble a national plan for the recreational use of public lands in every state, using CCC 
funds and labour. This project culminated in 1941, when Wirth published A Study of the 
Park and Recreation Problem of the United States, the first national plan for the 
recreational uses of public lands.108 By 1940, when Newton Drury arrived in 
Washington, Wirth had demonstrated remarkable ability as a bureaucrat and a chief 
executive. To a considerable degree, he had personally transformed the Park Service into 
a regionalized, national planning agency, working with government partners in every 
state to coordinate the recreational use of federal and state lands. There had never been 
such a recreational land use planning organization before in the United States; neither has 
there been one since. By 1942 Wirth was a seasoned and effective bureaucrat, with a 
personal reputation for strong leadership, political savvy, and an ability to impart idealism 
and enthusiasm among his agency's employees. 
In the meantime, Thomas Vint, who was only five years older than Wirth and had 
been the Chief Landscape Architect of the Park Service since 1927, remained the 
agency's overall chief of planning and design (fig. 3). Vint remained more involved in 
landscape and architectural design, which had always been his strengths, rather than 
administration. Nevertheless in 1933 he moved from San Francisco to Washington to 
head up a centralized Branch of Plans and Designs that oversaw the Depression -era work 
being done in the national parks themselves. Vint's former San Francisco "field office" 
became the "western division" of his design branch, under the supervision of his assistant, 
107 In 1936 the number of CCC state park regions was reduced back to four. Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the 
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landscape architect William G. ( "Bill ") Carnes. An "eastern division" was headed by 
another close friend of Vint's, architect Charles E. Peterson, who moved from 
Philadelphia to Washington.'°9 
For those concerned that the Park Service was abandoning its mandate to preserve 
wilderness in favour of increased national park development (as well as the design of 
state parks, national seashores, and national recreation areas) the regionalization, 
expansion, and diversification of the bureaucracy in the mid -1930s were ominous signs. 
It was at this time that the National Parks Association, together with the newly organized 
Wilderness Society and other groups, proposed the creation of the "National Primeval 
Park System," made up of the larger, western parks that they feared would be 
overdeveloped as a result of the CCC program and the Park Service's bureaucratic 
transformation. The controversy that might have resulted from New Deal park 
development, however, was cut short by American entry into World War II. Following 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress rapidly terminated the "emergency spending" 
measures that had been the basis of public works and conservation programs. Debates 
over the stewardship of park wilderness and the limits of recreational development would 
only be rekindled in earnest when Congress once again approved major national park 
appropriations, almost fifteen years later, under the banner of Mission 66. 
6.2 Recreational Planning 
In 1950, after Truman and Oscar Chapman endorsed the Echo Park dam, Drury 
decided it would be better to lose his job rather than preside over what promised to be 
largest violation of the national park system since 1913. But under the circumstances, it 
was even more imperative for Conrad Wirth to find a way to oppose the dam as 
vigorously as he possibly could. After all, he had overseen the plans for dozens of 
recreation areas around new reservoirs going back to the 1930s, and especially since 
1941. The activists now fighting the Bureau of Reclamation's plans for Dinosaur could 
have easily perceived him as a collaborator, who had undermined his own agency's duty 
to protect the integrity of the national park system. If for no other reason, Wirth's astute 
political sensibilities would have led him to oppose the Echo Park proposal. There were 
other more personal reasons to demonstrate his opposition, as well. Wirth needed to 
109 See Thomas C. Vint and J. R. Thrower, eds., Report on the Building Program from Allotments of the 
Public Works Administration, Eastern Division, 1933 -1937 (Washington, DC: National Park Service, n.d. 
[1937]), 1; Unrau and Williss, Expansion of the National Park Service in the 1930s, 249. 
65 
show that he understood the difference between appropriate recreational development, 
and development that was out of place -in fact "deplorable" -when it inappropriately 
altered the character of a scenic or wilderness area. Wirth's entire philosophy of 
recreational planning depended on the ability to make such distinctions. He had 
summarized his methodology as early as 1935, when his state park CCC operations (and 
criticism of them) were beginning to reach a peak. Parks should be considered in two 
categories, Wirth suggested, "conservation" and "recreation." The two types of parks 
might be separate or linked, or "one might even completely surround the other, forming a 
multiple -use area "; but the two types of landscape needed to be separate and distinct, 
since inappropriate recreational development would destroy the value of an area set aside 
for conservation. To know where recreational developments were needed and 
appropriate, extensive statistical, demographic, and natural resource information (of the 
type that filled his river basin plans) needed to be gathered, analyzed, and used as the 
basis for informed decisions.1 ° 
Since the mid- 1930s, wilderness advocates had attacked Wirth's recreational 
planning as no more than "overdevelopment," or indiscriminate destruction of the pristine 
character of scenic areas. They insisted that the Park Service could not both develop 
recreation areas and be an adequate steward of wilderness. If Wirth were to abet in the 
destruction of Echo Park, it would be impossible to refute such claims. The credibility of 
his entire approach to park planning and management was at stake. Since the publication 
of his and Olmsted's 1946 report on the Colorado River Basin, Wirth had maintained that 
Dinosaur National Monument was not appropriate for development as a recreation area. 
When he became Park Service director in December 1951, he continued to be an 
outspoken opponent of the dam, in numerous published articles and at public meetings. 
He did not shrink from travelling to Vernal, Utah, and to other communities in the area 
that fiercely supported the dam and were outraged at his opposition. The new director 
was criticized in Utah and by the project's backers in Congress; but he was not fired. In 
fact, Secretary Chapman was already reconsidering his 1950 decision to support the dam, 
in part because of the strong negative response it had generated from an increasingly 
broad coalition. Wirth's opposition to the dam was longstanding and the result of deeply 
held convictions, but his timing was also fortuitous. As the newly appointed Park Service 
Ito Conrad L. Wirth, "Parks and Their Uses," in American Planning and Civic Annual, Harlean James, ed. 
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director, he was able to reinforce his credibility with conservation groups at a critical 
moment, without suffering consequences at the Department of the Interior." 
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., was another influential opponent of the Echo Park 
dam proposal, perhaps for some of the same reasons: the 1946 report he and Wirth wrote 
could be seen as one source of the problem. But Olmsted's credentials as a scenic 
preservationist were impressively unique. Born in 1870, the younger Olmsted had grown 
up in his famous father's office and home in Brookline, Massachusetts, and had 
participated in major landscape design and park planning projects at an early age. He had 
been an influential opponent of the Hetch Hetchy reservoir proposal in 1913, citing his 
father's 1865 plan for Yosemite Valley in defence of the irreplaceable value of such 
scenery. At the 1950 congressional hearings on the fate of Echo Park, he condemned the 
dam project, and was one of only two opponents testifying who had actually visited the 
remote site (which he had done twice in the 1940s while in his seventies) and could speak 
with authority on the superlative character of the scenery.112 The relationship between 
Olmsted and Wirth was clearly important to both. Wirth owed his career to the elder 
landscape architect, and like Thomas Vint and others at the Park Service, often looked to 
him as a direct link to Olmstedian tradition, and as an unimpeachable authority on park 
management. For his part, Olmsted had a profound interest in the Park Service, going 
back to 1916 when he had drafted the key portions of the legislation that created the 
agency. Through his work as a frequent consultant, as a member of the Yosemite Board 
of Expert Advisors, and as a mentor to both Vint and Wirth, he continued to influence the 
practice of Park Service landscape architecture and park planning until his death in 
1957.113 
When Wirth's father, Theodore, died in 1949, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., wrote a 
letter of condolence that Wirth later felt best expressed the philosophy of park making to 
which he had dedicated himself and his agency. Both of their fathers, Olmsted began, 
shared "a deep- seated, constant and compelling interest in and sympathy with, the people 
using the parks." Park work involved understanding how people derived pleasure from a 
particular park, and in "guiding them by every available means to get the best values from 
their use of it." Without this interest for and in "the people who use the parks," and how 
11 See "Director Wirth on Park Policy," National Parks Magazine 26, no. 110 (July- September, 1952): 
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they could be "induced to use them with greater benefit to themselves," park management 
was an "academic and sterile" exercise. This was the most important idea, Olmsted 
concluded, to be learned from "your father's life work, and that of my father. "114 
Olmsted's letter of condolence and encouragement to his accomplished young 
protégé was written at a time when the Echo Park controversy was reaching a crucial 
point. The letter emphasized that parks were set aside and preserved for a purpose: to 
allow public enjoyment without allowing any use that would compromise scenery or 
wildlife. At Echo Park they were faced with a classic "impairment" of a national park (to 
quote Olmsted's contribution to the 1916 Park Service legislation): a vast reservoir that 
would destroy the dramatic landscape of desert canyons and unusual geologic features. 
While a recreation area could be developed around such a reservoir, by far the more 
appropriate alternative for a unit of the national park system would be to leave the park in 
its "natural condition" by devising a "master plan" for public use. Such park 
development might include carefully sited roads, trails, campgrounds, administrative 
facilities, and possibly overnight accommodations; but it would not necessarily constitute 
an impairment if the facilities were properly designed and limited to specific areas. In 
fact, development as a park would be the best assurance that any proposals for true 
impairments (private residential or resort development, dam construction, mining, 
logging, or grazing, for example) would be condemned by the public, and therefore by 
Congress. Park development could preserve places "unimpaired," in other words, "for 
the people." 
This overall philosophy of what constituted an "impairment" of a park landscape 
and what it meant to "preserve" landscapes for "public enjoyment" can be characterized 
as Olmstedian theory. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., reiterated this ideology of public park 
making which was first described by his father in his 1865 recommendations for 
Yosemite Valley. This was the professional theory that guided Conrad Wirth throughout 
his career, including his tenure as Park Service director. But neither Olmsted nor Wirth 
recognized at the time that extractive industries and dam construction -Echo Park 
notwithstanding -would not continue to be considered the primary threats of impairment 
to national parks in the context of postwar American society. Because as the numbers of 
114 Emphasis in the original. A transcript of Olmsted's letter is in Conrad Wirth's personal papers at the 
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visitors to national parks continued to climb, the presence of the public would itself 
increasingly be perceived as a devastating form of impairment. As the public use of parks 
came to be considered one of the greatest threats to them, the idea of preservation for the 
sake of public enjoyment became, for many, a sinister paradox. The theoretical basis of 
the American park movement was shifting in the 1950s. The results of this change were 
evident by the early 1960s, as a new generation of advocates and politicians ushered in an 
era of "new conservation" and legislation such as the 1964 Wilderness Act and the 1966 
Historic Preservation Act. If this change had been underway to some degree since the 
1920s, its most dramatic moments coincided, and often conflicted, with the 
implementation of Conrad Wirth's Mission 66 program. 
6.3 Landscape Change in the Mid -Twentieth Century 
To understand either the influence of what would soon be described as the 
"environmental movement" on the one hand, and the contrasting philosophical basis of 
the Mission 66 program and postwar national recreational planning on the other, both 
must be seen in the context of the dramatic changes occurring in the American landscape 
and society at the time. Between 1940 and 1960, the country grew from 132 million to 
180 million people, with virtually the entire increase in cities and especially postwar 
"suburbs." Growth was particularly evident in California and the other ten western states, 
where the total population doubled from 14 million to 28 million. During the same 
period, individual average annual earnings rose nationally from $1,300 to $4,700. A 
larger, more affluent, and more urban population indulged an unrelenting appetite for 
outdoor recreation and new automobiles, often in combination. Americans spent almost 
$4 billion dollars on recreation in 1940, but over $14 billion in 1955; passenger car 
registrations rose from 27 million to 52 million during the same years.115 Leisure time 
steadily increased and the five -day work week became standard, while the proportion of 
income spent on housing and other necessities decreased from 33% in 1947 to 23% in 
1967.116 As the opportunities for discretionary travel and recreation increased even 
beyond the growth in population, enormous new pressures on any areas that could be 
used for vacation or resort purposes -rural scenic areas, mountains, beaches, lakes, and 
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rivers -were inevitable. The demographic trends of the postwar period would have 
meant great change for the national park system whether the Mission 66 program had 
been put forward or not. 
The fate of the national parks, as public parks, was linked to the size, character, 
and habits of the public that used them and (hopefully) supported congressional policies 
and budgets that kept them viable. But the parks also formed an integral part of a larger 
and distinctly modern American landscape that was, as a whole, also changing rapidly. 
Again, national parks could not have escaped change during this period, as sprawling 
urbanization and the Interstate Highway system, for example, produced entire new 
geographical contexts for them. Better roads, faster cars, and growing cities in the 
Southwest, the Rocky Mountains, and on the West Coast made many western national 
parks almost as easy to reach as eastern parks; postwar patterns of urbanization and 
transportation made the entire national park system far more accessible than it had ever 
been. National park development constituted a part-as did tracts of residential 
development, shopping centres, and highway construction -of an overall, modern 
landscape that was beginning to reach its ultimate development across the entire continent 
during the postwar decades. In this sense, the history of the modernization of national 
park landscapes must be seen in the context of the modernization of the American 
landscape generally, including contemporary trends in housing subdivisions, commercial 
and corporate "centres," and Interstate Highway engineering. 
Several recent histories analyze the most salient aspect of postwar American 
landscape history: the "suburbanization" of the nation.l 7 The vast expansion of cities 
during this period assumed low density patterns that quickly took them into surrounding 
towns, counties, and unincorporated areas. Ubiquitous, sometimes vast subdivisions of 
detached, single -family "tract housing" covered entire regions. The resulting 
communities were politically and physically decentralized, and they perplexed planners, 
who coined neologisms -conurbation, megalopolis, sprawl, metro city -for this 
expanded form of the American metropolis. Low density patterns of urbanization were 
hardly new in the United States, but the postwar "suburb" reached an entirely new scale. 
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Housing demand had built up during the years of the Depression and World War II, and 
returning veterans and their families created an insatiable market. Builders responded, 
and the great majority of the new houses built were outside the political limits of major 
cities, from New York to San Francisco, two cities that (like most) actually lost 
population between 1950 and 1960, while their "standard metropolitan statistical areas" 
(or SMSA, another new coinage) gained 12% and 24% respectively." 8 
The historic postwar housing boom was fuelled by the intense postwar housing 
shortage. Twenty years of low housing production, 15 million returning veterans, and an 
increase in marriage and birth rates resulted in many families "doubled up" in houses or 
apartments, or living with relatives. For those who remained in the military (now a much 
larger peacetime force than before the war) finding housing could be as difficult as it was 
for other returning veterans. In 1949 Life magazine documented "scandalous" 
substandard and overcrowded living conditions for families on military bases. That year 
Congress acted with unprecedented legislation that created a partnership with private 
industry to build housing on or around military bases all over the country. Under the 
terms of the 1949 Wherry Act, private developers built housing on land leased to them by 
the government and then managed the properties and rented them to military personnel. 
The government was to acquire ownership of the houses through amortization, but they 
were bought out ahead of schedule in 1955 and thereafter managed directly by the 
military. The Wherry program was also replaced in 1955 under the Capehart Act, in 
which developers again built housing financed by the FHA, but with the government 
assuming ownership and management respònsibilities directly. During the 1950s, these 
programs made the military a major force in the housing industry: between 1949 and 
1964 nearly 250,000 units of housing were built under the two acts. With FHA standards 
(but no single set of standardized plans) in place, private developers produced 
communities, that like other subdivisions of the period, were intensely uniform and self 
contained, set off from surrounding neighbourhoods, and characterized by curvilinear 
streets, cul -de -sacs, front and back yards, attached garages, and generally low profile 
buildings. Multiple dwellings of up to eight units were built in addition to far more 
numerous single -family houses. Although they were comparable to the contemporary 
housing tracts many of the sane builders produced elsewhere, due to their special 
situation as rental housing associated with military bases, the Cape and Wherry 
118 House & Home, Housing Facts and Trends (New York: McGraw Hill/Dodge Publication, 1965), 21. 
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neighbourhoods have changed less than many other tract developments of the 1950s and 
today retain much of their original, homogeneous character.119 
A shortage of staff housing figured prominently in the postwar "crisis" in the 
national parks, as well. As Mission 66 got underway, Congress proved willing to make 
direct appropriations for park housing (as it did for military housing as well, after the 
Capehart program ended), and Conrad Wirth finally was able to address the longstanding 
dearth of housing for park staff and their families. The design and construction of 
Mission 66 houses in national parks would be determined -much as it had for the 
military -by federal requirements, and by the capabilities and economics of the postwar 
building industry itself Not surprisingly, Park Service architects turned to standard plans 
for two and three- bedroom ranch houses, built with materials and construction technology 
readily available to local builders. The combination of standard plans, flexibility in 
materials, and use of streamlined construction techniques (such as prefabricated 
components) were absolutely necessary if national park housing was to be built within a 
set cost per unit, as Congress required. The Park Service adopted the ranch house for 
many of the same reasons it had earlier used the bungalow type: it represented an 
achievable and efficient standard for housing, and it embodied what many future 
occupants were likely to perceive as a desirable image and floor plan for the conduct of 
modern family life. But while the bungalow of the 1920s fit in with the rustic imagery of 
Thomas Vint's master plans, the Mission 66 ranch house of the 1950s announced a new 
approach to park planning intended to respond to the changing social and geographic 
contexts of the parks. 
Other aspects of postwar "suburbanization" affected Mission 66 and national 
recreational planning and design as much as the proliferation of tract subdivisions and 
changes in the residential construction industry. As people abandoned older cities for 
new communities on the urban periphery, they did not leave the city behind as much as 
they brought it with them. While earlier suburbs had been residential enclaves populated 
I19 Congressional Quarterly Service, Housing a Nation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1966), 21; Chester Hartman and Robin Drayer, "Military- Family Housing: The Other Public Housing 
Program," Housing and Society 17, no. 3 (1990): 67 -78; William C. Baldwin, "Wherry and Capehart: Army 
Family Housing Privatization programs in the 1950s," Engineer (April 1996): 42 -44. Such a large amount 
of housing produced in a short period has resulted in management concerns as the properties all approach 
fifty years of age at once. The U.S. Army has determined that the existing 58,000 units of Cape and 
Wherry housing built on or near its bases should be considered eligible for the National Register of Historic 
Places. See R. Christopher Goodwin & Associates, Inc., Neighbourhood Design Guidelines for Army 
Wherry and Capehart Era Family Housing. Draft, government report (U.S. Army: Fort Detrick, Maryland, 
2002). 
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mainly by a professional or business class that commuted to a central city, postwar 
patterns of urbanization dispersed not only residential neighbourhoods, but entire 
industries, corporate headquarters, and vast retail complexes. The result was not an 
enclave from the city but an extension of it: postwar "suburbs" included places to live, 
work, shop, and enjoy leisure activities -the components of a city -set in urbanized 
landscapes that covered entire regions. 
As migrating Americans turned their cities inside out, one of the first requirements 
for their new way of life was the establishment of retail and commercial centres that 
could serve a dispersed population. By the early 1950s, planners and developers were 
building hundreds of what the architect Victor Gruen called "the new building 
type... shopping centres. "120 While a few early examples of suburban retail complexes 
had been built since the 1920s (and even earlier), in 1950 there were still only around 100 
mostly small shopping centres in the United States. But as retailers followed their 
customers out to their new tract house communities, over 7,500 shopping centres were 
built between 1950 and 1965. During that time, shopping centres diversified and grew 
from neighbourhood centres anchored by a single supermarket, to regional centres with 
dozens of stores. The proliferation of shopping centres resulted, again, in part because of 
FHA guidelines, which in this case required shopping centres for some larger 
subdivisions. But retailers and builders did not need the federal government to explain 
the potential of this merchandising phenomenon. Coordinated groups of businesses 
located on the urbanizing edges of cities -if designed with easy automotive access and 
large parking lots -quickly made dramatic profits for their backers. The success of early 
examples (such as the Broadway- Crenshaw Centre in Los Angeles, Northgate near 
Seattle, Northland outside Detroit, or Shoppers World in the Boston area) rapidly brought 
the attention of developers and investors eager to participate in what became a bonanza of 
profitable construction and retailing.121 
The dramatic commercial success of shopping centres and the decision by many 
corporations to relocate to the outer city significantly influenced American architectural 
and landscape design in the 1950s. Planners, designers, and others in the construction 
business were inevitably drawn to where so much new development was occurring: the 
120 Victor Gruen and Lawrence P. Smith, "Shopping Centres: The New Building Type," Progressive 
Architecture (June 1952): 66 -109. 
121 Nancy E. Cohen, America's Marketplace: A History of Shopping Centres (Lyme, Connecticut: 
Greenwich Publishing Group, Inc., 2002), 28, 52, 55. 
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"suburban" edges of metropolitan areas. New commissions, programs, and clients, as 
well as new construction materials, techniques, and economics all were bound to change 
American architectural and landscape design. At the National Park Service, professional 
staff could not ignore these trends and remain effective, or even competent; like any other 
design office, they worked within the social, economic, and technical contexts of their 
day. The proliferation of the automobile, the expansion of "suburban" cities, and the 
availability of labour saving construction technology all affected proposed development 
in national parks as much as construction anywhere else. Mission 66 needed to be 
planned within the parameters of what would be possible and affordable working with 
available architectural consultants and construction contractors, as well as what would be 
affordable and acceptable in the eyes of Congress and the public. It could hardly be 
surprising that the centrepiece of Mission 66 would be a major new type of park facility: a 
large, centralized building, modernist in its architectural inspiration, with easy highway 
access, generous parking, and "one- stop" convenience. The new idea had many names at 
first, reflecting its complex, unified program; but in 1956, Conrad Wirth personally 
insisted on the description he felt captured its essential purpose, and it became known as 
the "visitor center. "122 
6.4 Postwar Federal Highways 
No element of the postwar landscape more directly indicated the connections 
between national parks and the rest of the rapidly modernizing American landscape than 
the development of automotive highways. No aspect of the postwar landscape more 
directly influenced the condition and fate of national parks, or the priorities and structure 
of Conrad Wirth's Mission 66 program. Parks and roads, together, already had a long and 
intertwined history of federal policy and funding, as noted earlier. Throughout the 
twentieth century, the federal government developed both highways and parks in tandem, 
as the two principal components of a modern, national public landscape. Just as the Park 
Service was created in 1916 to oversee the redevelopment of the parks for automotive 
tourism, the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) was established in 1918 (through a 
reorganization of the old Office of Public Roads), and subsequently set the engineering 
standards and most of the policy for how the federal -aid highway program was 
implemented. By the mid -1930s the New Deal had poured hundreds of millions of 
122 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 17 -18. 
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dollars into highway construction and the BPR, in partnership with state highway 
agencies, had overseen the construction of a numbered system of "primary" roads across 
the country. These were the roads that brought unprecedented millions of automotive 
tourists to the newly expanded and redeveloped national park system. 
But the BPR also began to encounter criticism, much as did the Park Service at 
about this time. In the case of the nation's highways, however, some critics felt the BPR 
had done too little, not too much, to accommodate the automobile. The increased speed 
and number of automobiles on the road were already making even the federal -aid system 
obsolete. Two -lane highways engineered for thirty miles per hour, without limited access 
(meaning that cars could enter and exit at many curb cuts along the road) were unsafe for 
larger numbers of heavier vehicles that could travel at fifty to seventy miles per hour. In 
urban areas, the national system had done little to ameliorate traffic congestion, which 
was chronic and worsening almost everywhere as car and truck registrations continued to 
increase. By the late 1930s, many planners and elected officials favoured a range of 
dramatic proposals for urban expressways and interstate toll roads that effectively 
bypassed the BPR. 
Several states began their own plans for toll financed superhighways, the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike (first section opened 1940) being the first, and the New York 
State Throughway (first section opened 1948) the most ambitious.123 The popularity and 
economic success of the first turnpikes and throughways suggested that a national system 
of such roads would be heavily used, as well. In 1944 Congress held hearings which 
historian Bruce Seely calls "the most comprehensive discussion on roads in this country 
to that date. "124 The result was the Federal -Aid Highway Act of 1944, which authorized 
the construction of a 40,000 -mile "national system of interstate highways" to be financed 
half by the federal government and half by the states. The proposed locations of the 
interstate system were described by 1947, and other significant federal highway 
appropriations were made in the following years. But the exact means of funding and 
constructing a new superhighway system remained elusive, and little progress was made. 
In the meantime, phenomenal numbers of new cars and trucks were being put on 
the road. By the late 1940s American highways -like American national parks -were 
generally perceived as critically overcrowded and in need of dramatic expansion and 
improvement. Highways and parks were overcrowded for the same reasons: more 
123 Seely, Building the American Highway System, 141 -149. 
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Americans than ever could afford to buy cars and did, and more Americans also chose to 
live in a manner that made the use of automobiles essential for daily living. By 1955 over 
60 million motor vehicles were registered in the United States, double the number that 
had been in 1945.125 But the capacity of the nation's roads (including national park 
roads) had not doubled, or even increased significantly in many areas. Not only were 
more roads needed, but they would also need to be built with thicker pavements and 
wider lanes to match the engineering of newer cars and trucks. But other priorities in the 
Truman administration, particularly military involvement in Korea beginning in 1950, 
delayed the massive federal commitment that would be needed to complete a limited 
access, superhighway system. A national consensus for highway improvement existed by 
the early 1950s, but it was far from clear exactly what to do about 4.126 
The truce in Korea, a postwar downturn in the economy, and persistently rising 
numbers of trucks and automobiles on American roads made the reorganization of the 
federal -aid highway program a high priority for Dwight D. Eisenhower when he assumed 
office in 1953. As a former general, Eisenhower understood first hand the power of 
modern highways to move people and goods. He also strongly believed that improved 
transportation -specifically the construction of a new interstate highway system -would 
be the very foundation of stable economic growth and widespread prosperity in the 
United States for decades to come. But the cost would be high, and the congressional 
politics surrounding highway legislation were complex and easily misjudged. In 1954 
Eisenhower asked an old friend and colleague, former general Lucius D. Clay, to head an 
advisory committee to make recommendations on how to shape highway policy. In 
January of 1955 Clay's committee reported to Congress that a "national highway 
program" of limited access superhighways would require a $25 billion commitment by 
Congress in order to cover a 90% share of construction costs over the next ten years. 
Clay urged that the federal share of the bill be financed through the sale of bonds, to be 
liquidated by the proceeds of the federal gasoline tax. But other highway planners and 
advocates lobbied for a system financed by tolls, and many different funding and highway 
planning strategies were considered in Congress over the next year and a half In its 1956 
124 Seely, Building the American Highway System, 187. 
125 Kurian, Datapedia, 267. 
126 Historian Tom Lewis describes the general consensus behind highway improvements at the time in terms 
of support from elected officials, unions, private trade groups, lobbyists, and newspaper editorialists. Tom 
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federal -aid highway legislation, Congress finally decided to create a "highway trust 
fund," separate from the rest of the federal budget, financed by an increased gasoline tax 
set aside solely for that purpose. The Federal -Aid Highway Act of 1956 also abandoned 
the typical pattern of annual or biennial highway authorizations, and instead authorized 
$25 billion over the next ten years to cover 90% of construction costs of what it described 
as the National System of Interstate and Defence Highways.127 
The Interstate Highway legislation of 1956 initiated what is often characterized as 
the largest and most expensive public works projects in history. No federal policy or law 
since the 1785 Federal Land Ordinance would have as great an impact on the American 
landscape. As the Interstate Highways were built, mostly in the next two decades, the 
cost of the undertaking rose and the impacts exceeded what all but the most prescient had 
anticipated. The Interstate Highway system required taking more land by eminent 
domain than had been taken in the history of road building in the United States; the 
40,000 -mile system was the equivalent of hundreds of new throughways and turnpikes.128 
Rural regions of the country became less isolated, and the nation became more 
integrated -some would say homogenized -than ever in its history. In cities, entire 
neighbourhoods were demolished as "expressways" were routed directly through them, 
facilitating "slum clearance" and "urban renewal" programs, while hastening the already 
unbridled movement of people and businesses to the "suburbs. "129 The Interstates 
changed the overall demographics of the entire nation, as California and the sunbelt cities 
of the south and southwest grew around the framework of the new highways. They 
resulted in the economic stimulus Eisenhower wanted, and a great deal more. As moving 
goods by truck became cheaper and more flexible, freight costs declined, and businesses 
127 Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939 -1989. Revised edition (Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 70 -93; Tom Lewis, Divided Highways, 98 -122. 
128 Lewis, Divided Highways, 128. 
129 It is important to note the differences between postwar Interstates and prewar automotive "parkways." 
In the nineteenth century municipal park and parkway systems had shaped urban growth in almost every 
major American city; because of their status as parkland, parkways could be designed as limited access 
roadways, providing express routes that were also usually restricted to noncommercial traffic. Early 
noncommercial, automotive parkways, such as the Bronx River Parkway (1923) in Westchester County, 
New York, were planned as parts of regional park systems, and opened up corridors adjacent to large cities 
for residential development. The postwar Interstate system incorporated some of the design features of 
parkways (such as limited access and elimination of intersections) but was more inspired by European 
superhighways. Above all the Interstates were designed for commercial as well as noncommercial traffic. 
In order to handle large trucks, the new superhighways would be heavily engineered, with the widest curves 
and flattest gradients possible, resulting in highways that little resembled prewar automotive parkways. The 
impacts on surrounding land use and "sprawling" urbanization also could be profound: commercial 
superhighways dispersed not only residential populations but industries and businesses of all types, as well. 
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were able to shift to more advantageous locations, whether just out of town, or across the 
country. Few aspects of American life and landscape would be unaffected by the 
combination of widespread automobile ownership and a national system of 
superhighways on which to drive them. 
If parks and roads were two related aspects of the modern topography taking 
shape across the continent, it followed that national parks, in particular, were affected by 
the unprecedented federal road building. Park Service officials, including Conrad Wirth 
and Thomas Vint, knew first hand how federal -aid highway modernizations had affected 
the park system in the 1920s and 1930s; they could not have missed the significance, for 
their own efforts, of the debates leading up to the 1956 highway legislation. The 
Interstate Highway plans that took shape between 1954 and 1956 demanded that Wirth 
and the Park Service react, just as Horace Albright had responded in 1924 to the original 
federal -aid program. To a significant degree, Mission 66 was that new response. Even 
the overall concept and bureaucratic structure of Mission 66 was influenced by the 
Interstate Highway debate. In his memoirs, Conrad Wirth describes how "one weekend 
in February 1955" he was trying to imagine "what Congress wanted to hear" in order to 
break the cycle of inadequate annual appropriations.13o Lucius Clay's report, entitled A 
Ten -Year Highway Program, had been made to Congress the month before.131 Although 
Wirth does not mention Clay's proposal or Interstate Highways, the essence of the 
Mission 66 proposal was also to present a massive, ten -year modernization program that 
would be conceived outside the traditional scope of annual budget authorizations. In the 
case of Mission 66, however, Wirth would not attempt to prepare legislation to be debated 
in Congress, but would simply describe a policy initiative to be approved administratively 
by the Secretary of the Interior, and ultimately by Eisenhower himself. 
The result was a far broader economic stimulus, and a far greater encouragement to low density 
urbanization and development. 
130 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 238 -239. In a 1958 in -house history of the Mission 66 program, 
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Chapter 7: Responses to the Dilemma and to Modernism 
7.1 Media Responses to Postwar Conditions 
Mission 66 was not just a response to the emerging Federal -Aid Highway Act of 
1956, although the proposals that led to that legislation influenced the timing and 
structure of Conrad Wirth's initiative. As Wirth considered the postwar "dilemma" of the 
parks and their changing geographic setting, he also faced strident and widespread 
dissatisfaction with what many considered the degenerating quality of the national park 
experience. By 1955 public anger with the conditions found in national parks had 
reached a crescendo. An entire journalistic genre had emerged, as dozens of reporters and 
editorialists decried the "shocking truth" about the national parks. The postwar criticism 
of national park conditions really began as a continuation of some of the "purist" 
assertions of the 1930s: the parks were being destroyed by overuse and automotive 
tourism. But in the early 1950s this criticism was often supported, not denied, by Park 
Service officials. Articles such as "Yosemite's Beauty Fast Disappearing," by Los 
Angeles Times writer Martin Litton (who was also a board member of the National Parks 
Association) appeared in large circulation magazines and newspapers and quickly found a 
receptive public. Litton wrote in his 1952 article that "Yosemite can't take it any more," 
and quoted the park's superintendent, Carl P. Russell, suggesting that "the natural appeal 
of the valley...will be gone in another fifty years" as a result of increasing numbers of 
tourists.132 Another National Parks Association Member, Paul Shepherd, Jr., insisted 
"something was amiss" in the way the public was using parks. Shepherd bemoaned the 
commercialization and rapid pace of park visits, and felt that "a large majority of visitors 
[were] unaware of the peculiar meaning...of the parks." The increasingly affluent 
"American tourist," in constant search for novelty and leisure activities, was described in 
terms previously reserved for dam builders and loggers, as a powerful and destructive 
threat. Shepherd did not feel more money for parks was the answer: "More money to 
handle more people" would only mean "greater pressure" on park resources. "Time has 
132 Russell went on to describe his solution, in which all park development would be removed to the Big 
Meadows area, and only day use would be allowed in Yosemite Valley. Martin Litton, "Yosemite's Beauty 
Fast Disappearing," National Parks Magazine 26, no. 111 (October 1952- December 1952): 164 -68. 
(Reprinted from September 1 edition of The Los Angeles Times.) 
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shown our parks to have a maximum carrying capacity and intrinsic qualities which 
render an indiscriminate recreational policy obsolete. "133 
But the "purist" opinions urging more "discriminating" park policies, typical of 
articles appearing in National Parks Magazine, and the Living Wilderness (published by 
the National Parks Association and the Wilderness Society respectively) were soon 
drowned out by publications with far greater readership. And for commentators such as 
Bernard DeVoto, more money definitely was needed as part of the solution for the 
postwar dilemma of the parks. A western historian, novelist, and one of the most 
influential columnists of his day, DeVoto was originally from Ogden, Utah. As a leading 
opponent of the Echo Park dam he had become a national voice on western conservation 
issues. His essay, "Let's Close the National Parks," appeared in his Harper's Magazine 
column, "The Easy Chair," in 1953 and incited outrage among a large and diverse group 
of readers. Following much of reasoning Newton Drury had described four years earlier, 
DeVoto insisted that "a lack of money has now brought our national park system to the 
verge of crisis." Perhaps less concerned with whether the increasingly disaffected and 
angry public fully appreciated the "peculiar meaning" of the parks, he noted that 
campgrounds were "slums," roads and trails dangerous, and staff housing "antiques or 
shacks" that would "produce an egg shortage if you kept chickens in them." Congress 
had asked the Park Service to operate "a big plant on a hot -dog -stand budget," and as a 
result the parks were "beginning to erode away." DeVoto was sure Congress would not 
appropriate what he considered adequate funds ($250 million over five years) to address 
the crisis, and therefore there was only orie alternative: "The national park system must be 
temporarily reduced to a size for which Congress is willing to pay." He urged that 
Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, and Rocky Mountain national parks be closed, 
and that the Army patrol them until they could safely be reopened. Perhaps then an 
outraged public would finally bring the "nationally disgraceful situation to the really 
serious attention of the Congress which is responsible for it. "134 
Over the next two years, other major magazines such as The Saturday Evening 
Post and Reader 's Digest investigated conditions in national parks and published feature 
articles that stressed overcrowding and inadequate facilities in the parks. But the articles 
133 Paul Shephard, Jr., "Something Amiss in the National Parks," National Parks Magazine 27, no. 115 
(October- December 1953): 150 -151, 187 -190. 
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49 -52. 
80 
did not blame the Park Service; in fact they almost always described the unselfish 
dedication of park staff attempting to work under impossible conditions. Unlike "purist" 
critiques, which were aimed at Park Service policy, the press that followed DeVoto's 
column blamed Congress for not giving the agency enough funds to do its job. Park 
superintendents -or often Wirth himself -were interviewed and provided much of the 
information for these articles, and it was clear that the Park Service did not regret this 
kind of negative publicity. But a decidedly different popular image of the national parks 
took shape in the years that immediately preceded Mission 66. "Make sure you are 
prepared for almost anything in the way of personal discomfort, annoyance, and even 
danger," warned Travel magazine, which suggested $500 million would be needed over 
five years to bring the parks out of their "slum -like depths. "135 The Saturday Evening 
Post suggested that "the people are wearing out the scenery," while Reader 's Digest 
described a "perversion" of the national park idea in Yosemite Valley. 
The popular media had never described the national parks in such harsh terms. 
The overcrowding and deterioration of developed areas were also presented as an 
indicator of the condition of the parks overall; the poor condition of the frontcountry, in 
other words, was usually not considered separately from the ecological health (or lack of 
it) of the backcountry. The biological condition of the parks rarely caught the attention of 
journalists in the early 1950s. When they described the parks as "eroding away," they 
described dangerous roads and trails, slum -like campgrounds, and overcrowded 
restaurants and hotels. In fact in many parks, which had yet to experience the effects of 
the "backpack boom's of the next decade, the backcountry was probably not as devastated 
as the frontcountry experience perhaps suggested. Magazine articles appearing in 1954 
and 1955, however, claimed that "human erosion" caused by rising numbers of visitors 
and low Park Service budgets was "destroying the parks," without making such a 
distinction. In almost every case, the articles suggested massive park budget increases 
should be made to pay for road repairs, campground development, and other construction 
to better accommodate larger numbers of people and cars. The estimates for the total 
cost of such a modernization of the system steadily rose from DeVoto's $250 million, to 
135 Jerome B. Wood, "National Parks: Tomorrow's Slums ?" Travel 101, no. 4 (April 1954): 14 -16. 
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$600 million, which was estimated as the "backlog" of needed park development by 
1954.136 
Some authors also suggested, however, that a complete reorientation of Park 
Service policy should accompany increased appropriations for modernization and 
construction. Reader's Digest argued for the elimination of "resort activities," including 
many overnight accommodations, and getting back to the "traditional policy and 
functions" of the Park Service, which implied fewer "amusements" and better preserved 
opportunities for more reflective, direct appreciation of scenery away from roads and 
hotels. The Saturday Evening Post stressed the reform of concession contracts and 
conditions as a big part of the answer, noting that Wirth had already secured better terms 
and increased capital investments from concessioners since he became director in 1951.137 
For both of these articles, Conrad Wirth clearly was supplying estimates of the "backlog" 
of capital investment, and ideas for policy initiatives such as concession reform, as well. 
Wirth was quoted extensively in these and other articles, and The Saturday Evening Post 
included a short biography of Wirth and a description of his efforts to keep the system 
together despite congressional indifference. Wirth himself popularized certain 
characterizations of the situation -such as the parks being "loved to death " -to describe 
a "seemingly hopeless situation. "138 
Wirth may not have personally orchestrated the media interest in national parks 
between 1953 and 1955, but he successfully used it to shape the public debate on the 
condition of the parks. Most authors disturbed about the future of the system wondered 
why Congress would not make larger appropriations, not whether some sort of limits 
should be imposed on the number of visitors to the parks. A 1955 article titled "Crisis in 
Our Parks," for example, followed a familiar formula of deploring the overuse and 
crowded condition of public facilities, and then laying the blame with Congress for failing 
to pay for more development. Conrad Wirth's 1953 testimony to the House 
appropriations subcommittee was quoted at length: "It is hard for me...to understand why 
during times of prosperity; times of great advancement in our economic conditions; times 
of advancement in our standard of living, yes, in times when individuals are getting so 
much social and economic benefit out of their great scenic and historic treasures, we are 
136 Charles Stevenson, "The Shocking Truth About Our National Parks," The Reader's Digest 66, no. 393 
(January 1955): 45 -50; Robert M. Yoder, "Twenty -Four Million Acres of Trouble," Saturday Evening Post 
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unable to get even the bare necessities to protect these treasures. Treasures that in 
themselves play an important part in our progress as a nation. "139 In his first years as 
director, Wirth succeeded in depicting the postwar crisis in the national park system 
largely as one of inadequate funding, not too many visitors. In the process he also 
enhanced his own image as a dedicated and disinterested public servant fighting against 
congressional apathy. The magazine articles that followed Bernard DeVoto's lead might 
have found reason to condemn the Park Service leadership, but ended up depicting a 
dedicated agency facing imposing challenges with too few resources. 
7.2 Responses to Modernism: Jackson Lake Lodge 
When Mission 66 was unveiled in 1956, it would represent both continuity and 
change for the national park system. But it would be the change that many people would 
notice first. Certainly the rhetoric of the day encouraged this perception. "Old traditions 
seemed to have determined standards far beyond their time," Wirth told his planners, and 
therefore "nothing was to be sacred except the ultimate purpose to be served. "140 In one 
important example, a dramatic new approach to park architecture was already taking 
shape in the early 1950s at Grand Teton National Park in Wyoming, where events had 
their own momentum thanks to the philanthropic interest of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. 
The establishment and expansion of Grand Teton National Park in the 1920s 
instigated more local controversy and congressional turmoil than any project the Park 
Service had undertaken until that time. Mather and Albright had long hoped to extend 
Yellowstone National Park to the south in order to include the awesome Teton Range and 
the adjacent valley, Jackson Hole, which was an important winter range for elk. Congress 
established a Grand Teton National Park in 1929, but with limited boundaries that 
protected only the mountains themselves, not the more valuable -and potentially 
developable -land of Jackson Hole. Since 1927 John D. Rockefeller, Jr., had 
collaborated covertly with Albright to finance the acquisition of much of the private land 
in the area. In 1930 Rockefeller's involvement was made public knowledge as he 
revealed his intent to donate what would eventually be more than 33,000 acres in order to 
extend Grand Teton National Park. Local residents and the Wyoming congressional 
139 Anthony Netboy, "Crisis in Our Parks," American Forests 61, no. 5 (May 1955): 24 -27, 46 -47. A 
transcript of Wirth's February 1954 statement to the House Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations is in 
Box 12, Conrad L. Wirth Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre. In addition to 
these arguments, Wirth also narrated a slide show of decrepit and overcrowded facilities in the parks. 
140 Wirth, Park, Politics, and the People, 242. 
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delegation reacted angrily to the subterfuge involved in the land acquisitions. The 
legislation necessary for the federal government to accept the gift became politically 
impossible. After two sets of congressional hearings and a decade of bitter dispute, the 
matter was only resolved in 1943 when Franklin Roosevelt made the controversial 
decision to declare the area a National Monument, thereby making it possible to accept 
Rockefeller's gift without congressional action. The national park extension only 
occurred in 1950, after most of the controversy had finally subsided. The complete 
development of the park, in other words, would only be accomplished once Mission 66 
made funds available.141 
In the meantime, Rockefeller continued his involvement in the planning and 
development of the expanded national park by forming a new concessioner, the Grand 
Teton Lodge and Transportation Company, as a subsidiary of his private non -profit 
organization, Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc. The non -profit concessioner planned a $6- 
million lodge complex as part of what Rockefeller hoped would be a "pilot project" for 
postwar park development. Gilbert Stanley Underwood, the architect of the Ahwahnee 
and other prewar national park lodges, designed the new hotel and cabin complex, which 
Rockefeller personally sited on the shore of Jackson Lake, on a small plateau with 
sweeping views of the Teton Range. The elegant lodge, redolent of an earlier era of 
national park tourism, in some ways recalled the architect's prewar masterpieces. After 
entering the building under a massive porte cochère at ground level, visitors ascended a 
short flight of stairs to a spacious "lounge," more than two stories high, where they 
immediately encountered a wall of windows featuring the dramatic views of the Tetons, 
with a vast expanse of willow flats serving as a foreground. This entry sequence, and 
much of the underlying planning and spatial design of the hotel, suggested similar devices 
Underwood employed in his rustic lodges, such as the Ahwahnee or the Grand Canyon 
Lodge. But the novelty of the outward appearance of the Jackson Lake Lodge startled 
most observers. Underwood had worked extensively in concrete construction before, 
notably at the Ahwahnee. At that prewar hotel, however, the concrete had been formed 
and stained to resemble other materials, such as wood siding and beams. The concrete of 
the Jackson Lake Lodge was also given a wood texture and stained light brown; but in 
this case the "shadowood" plywood pattern impressed on the surface suggested the rough 
wooden moulds used in concrete construction rather than clapboard siding or timbers. 
141 Righter, Crucible for Conservation, 47 -65, 85 -102. 
84 
This handling of concrete reinforced the modernist inspiration of the building's massing, 
which Underwood conceived as an interlocking series of large rectangular boxes, topped 
by shed roofs. The massing directly expressed the functions and spaces of the interior 
volumes. Large horizontal bands of windows and the massive window wall of the main 
lounge further emphasized and confirmed the influence of contemporary American 
modernist architectural design (fig. 4).142 
Underwood had come out of retirement for this last major commission of his 
career. While he showed his mastery of a building type he had done so much to 
develop -the national park lodge -he also made a striking statement about how postwar 
park architecture could adopt contemporary structural design and construction 
technology. While the results were dramatic, the architect had not abandoned many of 
the basic qualities that had made his earlier work seem so appropriate in its settings. The 
spatial sequence entering the building, and the importance of views of the surrounding 
landscape in that sequence, were comparable to his other lodges, as were the earth tones 
and rough textures of the building materials. The success of the project, which like 
Underwood's earlier lodges soon was frequented by celebrities as well as the general 
public, helped make the lodge an important indicator of future directions park architecture 
might take. Conrad Wirth, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and Rockefeller's son, Laurance 
Rockefeller, all spoke at the Jackson Lake Lodge dedication, held in June 1955, as 
Mission 66 planning was in full swing. As a "pilot project," Underwood's updated 
approach to national park architecture had won their support. The architect had taken 
some of the contemporary trends of midcentury American modernism -the extensive use 
of concrete, large windows, flat rooflines, geometric massing -and adapted them to the 
purposes, program, and goals of postwar national park planning. The lodge was massive, 
for example, but it was also partially set into the earth, given shed roofs with low angles, 
and constructed in earth tone materials all of which helped make it less visually obtrusive 
in its setting. Above all, it was conceived around the view that its main windows 
showcased. The entire building served as a viewing platform, with outdoor terraces 
oriented to the view as well. Unmistakably modernist in its inspiration, the Jackson Lake 
Lodge revised traditional assumptions of what made architecture "appropriate" in the 
142 Paula S. Reed and Edith B. Wallace, "Jackson Lake Lodge, National Historic Landmark Nomination." 
This National Historic Landmark nomination form is available through the National Register of Historic 
Places, National Park Service, Washington, DC ( http:/ /www.cr.nps.gov /nhUdesignations /samples). The 
Jackson Lake Lodge was designated a National Historic Landmark in 2003, in part for its significance as an 
influential precedent of Modernist architectural design in the parks. 
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setting of a national park. For Underwood, Wirth, and the Rockefellers, the new lodge 
succeeded by increasing capacity for the enjoyment of park landscapes, while reducing 
the visual intrusion of the necessary facilities. The entire complex, including a large 
parking lot heavily planted with native trees that broke up and concealed its extent, 
minimized its architectural presence, while it maximized the program and services 
provided. 
Not everyone agreed that the new lodge indicated a positive direction for national 
park architecture. The Jackson Lake Lodge made passionate architectural critics out of 
many not previously known for their opinions on such matters. That August The New 
York Times reported on the "debate over national parks design" that the lodge had incited. 
"Those who bitterly deride the appearance of the...lodge," noted the reporter, "level their 
aesthetic barbs at the mammoth central structure chiefly because it does not look `rustic. "' 
Unmoved by the building's efficient handling of larger numbers of tourists, or by its 
minimal visual presence (it was mostly hidden from viewpoints elsewhere in the park), 
critics were outraged because the lodge did not look more like the Old Faithful Inn in 
nearby Yellowstone (fig. 5), or like other classic examples of rustic park architecture that 
they insisted were more effective in "blending with the scenery." Part of their concern 
stemmed from indications that the lodge would serve as a design precedent for the still 
secret "10 -year program" Wirth obliquely mentioned in his remarks at the dedication 
ceremony. Such a program apparently would mean more contemporary architecture that 
completely redefined what it meant to "harmonize" with the unique settings of the 
national parks.143 
Criticism of modernist design in national parks, like criticism of modernism in the 
United States generally, was already an established trend in 1955. It was the "purists" 
who first voiced concerns specifically about the appearance of postwar park architecture. 
National Parks Association board member Martin Litton, who wrote on the deterioration 
of Yosemite Valley in 1952, also derided plans for a $2.5 million redevelopment of the 
"rustic, somewhat dilapidated" Yosemite Lodge. He suggested the new lodge would 
consist of "government- approved modern structures that stand out like a sore thumb." 144 
His fellow board member, Devereux Butcher, went much further in his denunciation of 
the new architectural trend. His 1952 article, "For a Return to Harmony in Park 
143 Jack Goodman, "Controversy Over Lodge in the West," The New York Times, Sunday, August 7, 1955. 
144 Martin Litton, "Yosemite's Beauty Fast Disappearing," National Parks Magazine 26, no. 111 (October 
1952): 164 -168). 
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Architecture," expressed outrage at the idea that the "gray, weathered Paradise Inn" at 
Mount Rainier, for example, might be replaced by a "typical businessman's hotel building 
like those in so many small towns -red brick, five to eight stories, flat roof, glass and 
iron marquee over front door." Butcher had been the executive director of the National 
Parks Association from 1942 to 1950 and still edited the organization's magazine. A 
former architecture student and a trained artist and photographer, his 1952 article was an 
impassioned plea -one that he and others would repeat throughout the Mission 66 
period -for "an immediate return to the sound policies of park architecture that have 
prevailed these many years." The building that ignited his crusade was a dining room 
built in 1951 in the Skyland concessioner area of Shenandoah National Park. He felt the 
new building was designed "along modernistic lines...out of tune with all the rest of the 
park's beautiful architecture." A "picturesque and home -like" structure destroyed in a 
recent fire had been replaced by a new dining room with a flat roof and walls of almost 
floor to ceiling rectangular windows. Butcher was offended enough to undertake a 
national tour to observe other examples of recent construction. Although there was not 
much being built in parks at the time, there was enough for Butcher to ask, "Why has the 
Service abandoned its long- established policy of designing buildings that harmonize with 
their environment and with existing styles ?" A new maintenance building at Big Bend 
National Park, he claimed, resembled a factory, and residences in Saguaro, Zion, and 
Glacier were "ugly beyond words to describe" and "unsuitable" because they failed to 
achieve "harmonious" relationship to their sites. Prewar park architecture that 
exemplified such harmony often stood nearby as a silent rebuke to the newer 
construction. Other negative examples included a comfort station at Glacier with a flat 
roof, and the new museum/office building in the administrative area of Everglades.145 
Butcher's immediate suspicion was that the Park Service had "farmed out" the 
design work and that consulting architects, unfamiliar with national parks, had instigated 
the trend towards modernist materials and design. But Wirth, Vint, and their cadre of 
regional design staff and park superintendents very much retained their control over all 
planning and design in the parks. But by the 1940s, they had also begun to change Park 
Service design policies. Underwood's Jackson Lake Lodge was only the most 
spectacular result. The San Francisco architect Eldridge T. ( "Ted ") Spencer, consulting 
for the Yosemite concessioner, designed what were probably the first clearly modernist 
145 Devereux Butcher, "For a Return to Harmony in Park Architecture," National Parks Magazine 26, no. 
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buildings in a national park, a service station (1941) and employee residences (1942), 
using flat roofs, large windows, and no ornamentation (fig. 6).146 In 1949 Newton Drury 
approved Spencer's plan for a new Yosemite Lodge, also in a modernist idiom, although 
the design was changed and not built until later. There were other modest examples 
(including those cited by Butcher) of experiments in what was usually described as 
"contemporary" architecture, all of which at least tacitly met with the approval of regional 
directors, design staff, and Vint himself, who reviewed all design proposals in 
Washington. Butcher's critique of the new direction in park architecture struck a nerve, 
however, and was soon chorused by other "purists," including Drury, who insisted in 
1953 that he had never condoned the "modernistic structures...that were perpetrated on us 
by well -meaning but misguided architects" while he was director. He went on to express 
complete confidence, however, in his "good friend and colleague, Tom Vint," with whom 
he had never disagreed on "any matter involving design. "147 
Butcher and those who supported his point of view felt Park Service designers had 
lost their way and needed to be reminded of their architectural tradition. In his 1952 
article, Butcher went on to explain the principles of "harmonious" park architecture, 
presumably to officials such as Thomas Vint and Herbert Maier, who had developed the 
principles in the first place. Design, colour, and site were the factors Butcher suggested 
needed to be considered so that a building could be "fairly hidden by features of the 
landscape." More to the point, Butcher believed that "pioneers" and "Indians" had built 
structures of materials "close at hand," employing the simplest construction; therefore 
"their rugged architectural styles" were associated with "great open spaces." 
Furthermore, he explained, "we associate the Swiss chalet with evergreen forests and big 
mountains" and the "Indian adobe" with the landscape of the Southwest, while "Spanish 
might fit the Big Bend country." In the Appalachians, "the log cabin stands out in our 
minds as the original style." But "since we do not associate prefabricated building 
materials and modernistic styles with big open spaces," they created "inharmony in 
primitive landscapes." Butcher concluded with extensive quotations from architect 
Albert H. Good's 1935 Park Structures and Facilities, a Park Service catalogue of 
111 (October 1952): 150 -57; Miles, Guardians of the Parks, 132 -133, 162 -164. 
146 Spencer published the buildings in an architecture magazine (Pencil Points 23, 1942: 43 -46; The New 
Pencil Points 24, 1943: 70 -71). 
147 Newton B. Drury, letter to the editor, National Parks Magazine 27, no. 2 (January- March, 1953):39; See 
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Depression era design, which included a more nuanced "Apologia" for prewar rustic 
design.148 
Butcher's explanation of the appeal of prewar park development was simplistic 
but also accurate: the associations with pioneer and Native American cultures may have 
been mostly imaginary, but the architectural fantasy resonated with the public. Log and 
boulder construction in national parks bore little resemblance to any actual vernacular 
structures, but the architecture was never intended as a reconstruction of history as much 
as an invocation of mythic historical themes. Postwar modernist park architecture - 
epitomized in the Jackson Lake Lodge -often featured low profiles and horizontal 
massing, as well as materials with muted colours and rough textures that helped new 
buildings "blend in" visually with their surroundings. But the new park architecture also 
assiduously eliminated the (admittedly spurious) historical associations of the rustic era, 
replacing them with architectural surfaces swept clean of the delightful decorative 
elements that had been so essential to Underwood's own prewar architecture, as well as 
that of Mary Elizabeth Jane Colter, Maier, Vint, and others. While the Jackson Lake 
Lodge actually was a more muted and less elaborate visual presence than a park rustic 
lodge (at least one with the same capacity) would have been, stripped of a decorative 
façade evoking pseudo -vernacular construction and traditional historical narratives, it 
struck Butcher (and other critics) as harsh, industrial, "inharmonious," and "urban." 
As for the siting of buildings, Butcher erroneously described prewar park 
architecture as "fairly hidden by features of the landscape." National park rustic 
buildings had been, above all, picturesque architecture. They formed elements of overall 
landscape scenes and compositions. Far from being "hidden," Colter's Grand Canyon 
buildings, Underwood's Ahwahnee, Maier's park museums, or the park administration 
buildings designed by Vint all formed important compositional elements of perceived 
landscape scenes. Their complex, expensive, and usually non -structural façades of 
overscaled timber and stone, carefully detailed adobe, or labour intensive log construction 
were hardly intended to be unnoticed: they were powerful statements of both sober civic 
administration and vacation fantasy. They complemented and enabled an appreciation of 
place as picture. For many visitors such architectural imagery was a welcome and even 
necessary aspect of the aesthetic enjoyment of park scenery. For them, modernist 
148 Butcher quoted Harvard Graduate School of Design dean Joseph Hudnut -who did as much as anyone 
to bring architectural modernism to the United States -in support of his contention of the importance of 
associations in architecture. Butcher, "For a Return to Harmony in Park Architecture," 153 -154. 
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architecture was not appropriate above all because it conflicted with their aesthetic 
conception and appreciation of the surrounding landscape. Modernist architecture -at 
least as Underwood and others adapted it to the requirements of the Park Service -did in 
fact offer the best means of accommodating larger numbers while truly minimizing the 
visual presence of a building. But in the end the critics of the Jackson Lake Lodge were 
not really asking for less architectural presence; they wanted more. They missed the 
pseudo- vernacular associations and historical references -and the entire picturesque 
conception of park architecture -that enhanced their aesthetic enjoyment of national park 
landscapes. 
Mission 66 soon established the Park Service as an important architectural patron, 
willing to employ the most contemporary design ideas that leading professionals had to 
offer. In 1954 Conrad Wirth had famously rejected Frank Lloyd Wright as the architect 
for a new restaurant in Yosemite Valley. Wirth derided the proposal as a "mushroom - 
dome type of thing," and a "thing to see, instead of being for service. "149 The next year, 
however, he dedicated the Jackson Lake Lodge, and at the same time his own design 
offices were producing modernist designs some of which continued to startle and 
occasionally outrage at least some critics. In 1955, Park Service architects designed 
futuristic shade structures for Coquina Beach at the Cape Hatteras National Seashore (fig. 
7). The large metal louvers resembled a series of attached airplane wings, and attracted 
notice; the project was published in Progressive Architecture and won an American 
Institute of Architects (AIA) national award.l5° The local newspaper, however, reported 
that "until people get used to the modern trend," the structures were likely to "cause as 
much comment as three nude men on a Republican Convention program." At least some 
critics wondered why the Park Service had abandoned the "wattle and daub" 
reconstructions of nearby historic sites.151 
By 1957, as Mission 66 buildings started to appear in the parks, a debate of sorts 
occurred between the architectural profession, which generally strongly supported the 
new architecture, and other groups, including "purists" and sometimes local newspaper 
editors and reporters. Devereux Butcher grew increasingly incensed, deriding Welton 
Becket's concessioner buildings at Yellowstone's Canyon Village (fig. 8), for example, as 
149 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 11. 
150 "Award Citations," Progressive Architecture 37, no. 1 (January 1956): 92; "Bathing and Public 
Facilities," Progressive Architecture 39, no. 7 (July 1958): 88 -89. 
151 Dan Morrill, "Coquina Beach at Nags Head to Feature Modern Trend in Architectural Ideas," Virginian - 
Pilot, July 22, 1956. 
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"colossal and of freak design." He insisted that the Park Service was violating "national 
policy governing our national parks" by creating "conspicuous park structures." 
Returning to Jackson Lake Lodge, he now condemned it as "Alcatraz," and the "ugliest 
building in the park and monument system." Later that year Butcher was supported by 
the director of the National Wildlife Federation, Ernest Swift, who charged that Mission 
66 was "prostituting the scenic grandeurs of our national parks" by accommodating too 
many visitors in buildings like the Jackson Lake Lodge, which, he claimed, was "a 
concrete monstrosity built for that sub -species of Homo sapiens called the tourist." If 
John Steinbeck had needed source material in writing The Grapes of Wrath, Swift added, 
he "could have studied park visitors. "152 The virulent rhetoric often returned to the theme 
of "modernistic" design, which was associated with "overdevelopment" and inappropriate 
levels of use. There were simply too many people (and perhaps, for some critics, the 
wrong kind of people) using parks in ways the authors scorned. Modernist architecture - 
a potent symbol of Mission 66 policy and planning - manifested and facilitated the 
unconscionable trend. 
Authors in architectural trade magazines, however, expressed delight that the Park 
Service had abandoned "associative rusticity" in favour of "better and more imaginative 
architecture." In January 1957 Architectural Record published a long defence of Mission 
66 architectural design. "Architectural Record...undertakes a crusade," wrote author 
Emerson Goble, "...we are happy to join in the current campaign of 
improvement...known as Mission 66." Goble understood the essence of the criticism of 
Mission 66, noting that postwar "mass use" was "both the reason for Mission 66 and the 
cause of concern to the protectors of the purist persuasion." The Park Service wanted to 
expand the capacity of the parks, but not too much, and there was "a neat question as to 
where to draw the line." While some might feel that no buildings at all should be allowed 
in parks, most understood the necessity. According to Goble, Mission 66's detractors felt 
that "if we must have buildings, let's have good, safe, sentimental rustic stuff that 
everybody associates with scenery." But Goble saw the opportunity "for architects in the 
world's best building sites," to "add something to the nobility of nature in her most 
exalted moods." Citing new park concessioner projects, such as the Yosemite Lodge (fig. 
9, Spencer & Ambrose), the Canyon Lodge at Yellowstone (Welton Becket and 
Associates), the Colter Bay developed area at Grand Teton (Spencer & Ambrose), as well 
152 Devereux Butcher, "Sunshine and Blizzard," National Parks Magazine 31, no. 128 (January 1957): 24- 
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as the Quarry Visitor Center at Dinosaur National Monument (figs. 10, 11), Anshen and 
Allen), Goble hailed the "courage" of the Park Service in insisting that "man-made art is 
not necessarily sinful, [and] inspired architecture need not be egocentric or competitive" 
with the appreciation of scenery.153 
This vein of critical appreciation of Mission 66 architecture continued through the 
1960s and into the 1970s. In 1964 the architectural critic Wolf Von Eckardt concluded 
that "the Park Service dares to build well," commending the Wright Brothers Visitor 
Center (fig. 12, Mitchell and Giurgola), the Gettysburg Visitor Center and Cyclorama 
(figs. 13, 14, Richard Neutra), and Cabot and Benson's shade structures at Cape Hatteras 
as "outstanding contemporary buildings by outstanding modern architects." Von Eckardt 
felt that each deserved "an award for architectural excellence," something he insisted 
could rarely be said of government buildings. Quoting at length from a conversation with 
Cabot (now chief architect in Washington) Eckardt compared the Park Service favourably 
to the "dreary mediocrity of federal architecture. "154 In 1970 the AIA awarded a citation 
to the Park Service as an organization for its "continuing effort to provide excellent 
design at all levels in our national parks." The next year the AIA Journal featured a 
portfolio of Mission 66 architecture, including the Quarry, Wright Brothers buildings, as 
well as the Flamingo Visitor Center at Everglades National Park (figs. 15 -16, Harry L. 
Keck, Jr.), which had "serve[d] architecture well," and been the basis of the national 
award.155 
7.3 Park Service Adoption of Modernism 
There were strong parallels between trends in postwar park architecture and those 
in park planning. Just as prewar rustic villages could not be expanded to meet greater 
demand without unacceptable encroachment on park features, rustic architectural style (at 
least for Wirth, Underwood, and the Rockefellers) could not successfully accommodate 
the expanded capacity and programs of the postwar period. If postwar park buildings 
continued to be conceived as picturesque architecture, they would grow into a far larger 
visual presence than they had been. They would not remain compositional components of 
the landscape. They would dominate, not complete, scenes. The adapted modernism 
33; Ernest Swift, "Parks -or Resorts ?" National Parks Magazine 31, no. 131 (October 1957): 147 -148. 
153 Emerson Goble, "Architecture ( ?) for the National Parks," Architectural Record 121, no. 1 (January 
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154 Wolf Von Eckardt, "The Park Service Dares to Build Well," The Washington Post, March 29, 1964, G6. 
155 Robert E. Koehler, "Our Park Service Serves Architecture Well," AIA Journal 1 (January 1971): 18 -25. 
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Underwood supplied in 1955 accommodated increased, centralized programs more 
efficiently and economically. If decried as brutally utilitarian, such architecture 
nevertheless minimized its visual presence. Much of the extent of the facility was indeed 
"hidden" in a manner that rustic architecture had never been intended to accomplish. The 
Jackson Lake Lodge complex, for example, had 300 rooms in addition to restaurants and 
other facilities. The massive Old Faithful Inn opened in 1904 with 140 rooms. While the 
Jackson Lake complex sprawled its linear motel units over a larger area, the extent of the 
development was not immediately apparent and did not encroach visually on the 
surrounding landscape. The Old Faithful Inn may have been the most beloved of all 
national park lodges, but it was perched directly on the edge of rare thermal features and 
was hardly a "hidden" building. Underwood's new direction in the siting and design of 
park buildings logically complemented and implemented postwar park planning priorities. 
Critics such as Litton, Butcher, and Drury erred by failing to recognize that 
modernist architecture did not create the new and difficult realities of national park 
management, it responded to them. Attempts to recreate rustic design would not have 
been successful, because it was impossible to return to the prewar social, economic, and 
geographic contexts that had been the basis of that earlier idiom. At the very least, 
perpetuating a true rustic architecture in the postwar period would have required a 
reduction to prewar levels of visitation, at least if such development were to avoid 
growing into massive encroachments on park scenery. The public also demanded new 
levels of convenience and material comforts, a fact that a Park Service 1955 "Gallup 
survey" confirmed. And in a purely practical sense, true rustic architecture ended with 
the CCC: a massive national park development program could not be economically 
undertaken if it meant paying postwar prices for the work that had been previously done 
by an army of free labour. The end of the CCC, which Wirth had fought to avoid more 
than anyone, was the end of both the means and the aspirations of rustic park 
architecture.156 
The trend to modernist planning and architecture could no more be ignored in 
national parks than it could anywhere else in the United States. In the summer of 1956, 
as a large number of very noticeable park construction projects proceeded, the Mission 66 
program burst on the scene with considerable fanfare. From the beginning Mission 66 
also expressed a fully developed commitment to progressive, sometimes striking 
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modernist architectural design. Mission 66 architecture embodied the revised recreational 
planning policies that had been developed as the heart of the entire program. Wirth and 
Vint, in particular, had been the officials responsible for promoting and achieving rustic 
era design. They now embraced the new architecture because it expressed and enabled 
the new response they had devised to finally mitigate the conditions that had plagued 
them for the previous decade. For them, the resurrection of rustic design would have 
negated what they were trying to accomplish. It would embody prewar planning policies 
that had proven to be inadequate to new challenges. 
At the same time, the commitment to modernist architecture was hardly a radical 
or daring direction for the Park Service. In fact, it put the agency squarely in the 
mainstream of American design of the period. By the mid- 1950s, modernism had 
become the ubiquitous stylistic choice of corporations, government agencies, cultural 
institutions, housing developers, and retailers who together were remaking the American 
landscape. Corporate clients all over the world -from roadside restaurant chains to 
multinational businesses -embraced various strains of modernist architectural style. New 
postwar building technologies made construction more rapid, economical, and efficient. 
No builder could afford to ignore labour saving techniques such as the prefabrication of 
building elements, innovative uses of structural steel and concrete, curtain wall 
construction, and extensive applications of glass. These technologies had been developed 
in conjunction with modernist architecture, which exploited their potential. Quite apart 
from stylistic associations and iconographic meanings, modernist architecture was simply 
a more efficient way of producing buildings, especially large ones. America, and much 
of the world, had "gone modern" for many of the same reasons the Park Service had: 
more labour intensive, craft oriented construction was no longer economically 
competitive, and therefore for most clients- including government agencies -it was no 
longer an option. The armed forces in particular had preceded the Park Service in the 
adoption of modernism, for many related reasons. From the Wherry and Capehart ranch 
houses being built around army bases, to the vast new Air Force Academy designed by 
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill in Colorado Springs, the "government- approved modem 
structures" Martin Litton deplored in 1952 were in evidence everywhere by the mid - 
1950s. 
156 For the best summary of such aspirations, see Albert H. Good, Park and Recreation Structures (reprint 
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Another major reason the Park Service adopted modernist architectural design was 
the general adoption of the idiom by professional consultants and in -house Park Service 
designers. As Mission 66 moved from planning to construction, architects were rapidly 
set to work drawing up detailed designs. The work they produced simply reflected the 
current state and tendencies of their profession. This had always been the case; earlier 
rustic era building had also reflected the influence of contemporary architectural practice. 
But by the 1950s a different set of influences was at work. American architects had not 
been slow to capitalize on the trend to modernist design, and in fact had been its leading 
instigators. Many architectural historians have described how a group of prewar 
European architects inspired the next generation of American practitioners to transform 
their profession. The Austrian architect Richard Neutra opened his office in Los Angeles 
in 1925, and over the next forty years produced a series of highly influential modernist 
residential and institutional buildings, employing extensive window walls, flat roofs, 
column grid construction, and elimination of ornamental details. In 1932 Phillip Johnson 
and the architectural historian Henry- Russell Hitchcock organized an exhibition of 
modernist architectural drawings and models at the Museum of Modern Art in New York 
and in their catalogue described the International Style of architecture, exemplified in 
work mostly by Neutra, Le Corbusier, and other mostly European architects. According 
to Johnson and Hitchcock, the new style emphasized the composition of space rather than 
building mass, asymmetry in plan and elevation, and the organized repetition of 
individual building units. Ornamentation and historical references were completely 
eliminated, while new building technologies and materials were embraced. Architectural 
historian Leonardo Benevolo describes how during the Depression a group of "former 
masters of the Bauhaus" emigrated to the United States and soon found receptive students 
and builders for their architectural ideas. By 1937 the founder of that famous German 
design school, Walter Gropius, headed the architecture department at the newly organized 
Harvard Graduate School of Design, while the German architect Ludwig Mies Van der 
Rohe was in charge of the architecture department at the Illinois Institute of Technology. 
By 1940 other leading figures of European modernism were living, teaching, and building 
influential projects in the United States. Modernist icons such as Lovell House in Los 
Angeles (Neutra, 1929) and the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society Building (George 
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Howe & William Lescaze, 1932) indicated the progressive trend in both residential and 
commercial architecture.157 
By the late 1940s a generation of American professionals trained in the new 
approach had taken to the field. Architectural trade magazines were filled with examples 
of modernism in the United States, much of it more or less inspired by the International 
Style. The years immediately before Mission 66 were the apogee of the influence of 
modernism on American architectural practice. Architects and their clients favoured 
modernist architectural designs for both practical and ideological reasons. In New York, 
the United Nations Building (Wallace Harrison, et al., 1950) and the Lever House office 
tower (Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Gordon Bunschaft, 1952) manifested both 
government and corporate America's commitment to the new architectural expression. 
As architectural historian Sarah Allaback observes in her history of Mission 66 visitor 
centres, the influence of contemporary American architectural practice inevitably 
extended to national park architecture: "The forces at work -capitalism and a society 
obsessed with progress -were prevalent throughout the country; it was only a matter of 
time before they would enter the national parks. "158 For a generation that witnessed the 
irrational destruction and historicizing excesses of fascist regimes in Europe, modernism 
offered a means to rapidly rebuild the world along expressly rational lines, free of no 
longer desirable historical associations. Even before Mission 66 began, Park Service 
architects had already abandoned the imaginative allusions of rustic architecture in favour 
of a more technical and rationalized approach to building that, in the context of the 
national parks, could symbolize the more scientific and efficient park management that 
Mission 66 planning hoped to accomplish. 
Because the Mission 66 program also generated a sudden increase in the amount 
of work expected from the in -house design force, the agency expanded its use of private 
consulting design and engineering firms. The increased use of consultants influenced 
Mission 66 design, but Park Service architects and administrators had already set the 
policies and outlines that, in almost all cases, consultants were expected to follow. 
Allaback describes how even long time Park Service architects (some of whom had 
157 On the adoption of European Modernism in the United States, see Leonardo Benevolo, History of 
Modern Architecture [1960] 2 vols. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977), vol. 2, 629 -683; William H. Jordy, 
The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid - Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1972), 87 -164; Anthony Alofsin, The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and 
City Planning at Harvard (New York: Norton, 2002). 
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produced important rustic buildings in the 1930s) by the early 1950s had developed new 
approaches in response to postwar conditions. "We couldn't help but change," explained 
Park Service architect Cecil J. Doty, "I can't understand how anyone could think 
otherwise, how it could keep from changing." Allaback observes that this statement is "a 
key to understanding" the purpose of Mission 66 architecture, "which was not to design 
buildings for atmosphere, whimsy, or aesthetic pleasure, but for change: to meet the 
demands of an estimated eighty million visitors," and to do so in a reasonably efficient 
way, considering the availability of new building technologies and the higher costs of 
labour and materials.159 
As a Park Service architect, Doty was a particularly important figure in the 
development of postwar park architecture. His attitudes and background, however, were 
typical of many of the agency's designers. An Oklahoman, he graduated in architectural 
engineering at Oklahoma A & M (now Oklahoma State). In 1934 he went to work for 
Herbert Maier in the Park Service CCC state park program in Oklahoma City. Maier and 
Vint trained the young designer into the kind of specialist they needed, giving him images 
and plans of their own rustic park buildings as examples to emulate. Doty was an adept 
designer and a talented illustrator, responsible for one of the finest prewar national park 
buildings, the adobe Region III Headquarters in Santa Fe (1939). In 1940 Doty went to 
work in the Region IV headquarters in San Francisco, assisting regional architect Lyle E. 
Bennett, the designer of the Painted Desert Inn (1940) and other important rustic park 
buildings.16o By 1948, when Doty was promoted to regional architect for Region IV, his 
preliminary designs for buildings at Olympic, Joshua Tree, and other parks featured flat 
or shed roofs, reinforced concrete construction, and other clear signs that, as Allaback 
observes, "Doty and his Park Service colleagues were moving in a progressive direction." 
For his part, Doty later observed that "when the CCC and all that labour ended, getting 
stone was out of the question." Strict limitations on the cost of buildings imposed by 
Congress necessitated more economical building techniques. The influence of 
consultants also was a factor: Doty worked with the architect Eldridge Spencer on his 
158 Sarah Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers: The History of a Building Type (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2000), 10. 
159 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 12 -14. 
160 "Interview with Cecil J. Doty, Retired National Park Architect, March 10, 1985," conducted by Laura 
Soullière Harrison, transcript, p. 20, (Oklahoma State University Library); Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor 
Centers, 215 -221. The Region III Headquarters building in Santa Fe and the Painted Desert Inn in Petrified 
Forest National Park were designated National Historic Landmarks in 1987 for their significance in 
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modernist designs for Yosemite in 1941 and 1942.161 By the early 1950s Doty was at 
work on preliminary designs for the "public use" buildings at Grand Canyon and 
Carlsbad Caverns (figs. 17 -20). Their flat roofs, stark geometric massing, and 
contemporary materials confirmed that the architect's transition to modernist design was 
complete. Doty's story is instructive because Mission 66 architecture was, despite the 
involvement of consultants, controlled in- house, by Park Service designers. Doty's new 
approach to park architecture was influential on his colleagues, but it was consistent with 
their own contemporary work, as well. 
No extensive, official policy statement regarding the adoption of modernist design 
at the Park Service was ever made. During the New Deal, Thomas Vint and Herbert 
Maier had widely distributed plans and illustrations of appropriately rustic architecture, 
but Wirth made no comparably methodical efforts to standardize postwar park 
architecture. Following the Great Smoky Mountains conference, where he had been 
asked to issue an official policy on architectural design, he responded only with a brief 
statement: "Structures should be designed to reflect the character of the area while at the 
same time following up -to -date design standards. Park structures are to conform, to some 
extent, with the trend toward contemporary design and the use of materials and equipment 
accepted as standard by the building industry. However, restraint must be exercised in 
the design so that the structures will not be out of character with the area and so that the 
structures will be subordinated to their surroundings. "162 In January 1957, Wirth 
participated by phone in a WODC conference and verbally gave the following "guiding 
principles" for architectural design: "Whatever we do in the line of development in the 
Parks, it must fit the terrain and be inconspicuous; Durability is an important attribute; 
Sound planning is basic to economic results; Nothing should be built unless the need is 
already realized....Don't try to lead your profession in fancy design. 163 Architectural 
American architecture. See Laura Soullière Harrison, Architecture in the Parks: National Historic 
Landmark Theme Study (Washington, DC: 1987), 411 -424, 441 -450. 
161 "Interview with Cecil J. Doty, Retired National Park Architect, March 10, 1985," conducted by Laura 
Soullière Harrison, transcript, p. 21, (Oklahoma State University Library); Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor 
Centers, 221. 
162 Conrad L. Wirth, "Design of Structures," memorandum, February 13, 1956 (Box 6, Conrad L. Wirth 
Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). 
163 These statements were transcribed and distributed to WODC design staff. Conrad L. Wirth, "Excerpt 
From Telephone Conference Between the Director and Chief, WODC...January 9, 1957" (Box 7, Design & 
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design, in fact, was not a primary concern for Wirth. He felt that park development 
succeeded by "channeling" public use and therefore mitigating its impacts. In well 
planned examples, he wrote in 1958, the result would be the same "regardless of 
decorative colours used, or the style of architecture selected." These were "details," 
important "in their way." But "park resources [were] neither destroyed nor preserved 
merely by application of a paintbrush or by a choice of...architectural décor." The role of 
architecture in the parks was changing, as was architecture itself: "Construction and 
maintenance today are machine jobs," Wirth observed. There were advantages to new 
building technology that would help minimize cost and construction time, and therefore 
impacts on surrounding landscapes.164 
Compared to Wirth's long and detailed instructions on planning policy and 
process, however, his statements regarding architectural design were remarkably brief. 
The general sentiments Wirth expressed on appropriately "contemporary" design did not 
so much direct, as reflect, the gradual change among Park Service (and other) architects 
that had been underway since the late 1930s. The sudden burst of construction made 
possible by Mission 66 only made it seem as if there had been a sudden shift in design 
policy. Wirth, Vint, and others Park Service officials were fully aware and approved of 
what Doty and other architects were doing in the 1940s and early 1950s. Their official 
approval was confirmed by the fact that the work went forward. By the time architectural 
designs for Mission 66 were being finalized in 1956, adapted forms of "contemporary" 
architecture were already the accepted and desired style of architectural design in the 
national parks. Although there was occasional acknowledgement of critiques by 
Devereux Butcher and others, there was no more internal debate at the Park Service over 
the appropriateness of modernist architecture than there was over Wirth's fateful decision 
not to restrict access to popular parks.165 In fact the two important decisions were linked: 
if access by private automobile was to be allowed to grow unhindered to meet demand, a 
completely new approach to park architecture was as necessary as were new ideas for 
park planning. 
Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments, March 5, 6, 7, 1957, Washington, DC," (Yosemite 
National Park Archives). 
164 Conrad L. Wirth, "Mission 66 in the Headlines," National Parks Magazine 32, no. 132 (January 1958): 
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165 As was the case with the decision not to limit access to the parks, there were individual objections from 
superintendents and other Park Service officials to Wirth's policy to proceed, in this case, with modernist 
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Chapter 8: Initial Management Priorities and Pilot Studies 
8.1 Shifting Political Context 
Some of the first research questions considered for this thesis were both obvious 
and complex: Why did Mission 66 development look modern rather than rustic? What 
changes did this imply not only for architectural design policy at the agency, but for the 
basic theoretical framework for park master planning? These questions required an 
examination of the administrative history of Mission 66 as well as the political context of 
its inception. 
The relationship between the public and the national parks, and the public's 
expectations and perceptions of the Park Service, were shifting in the mid- 1950s, just as 
the geographical and demographic contexts of the parks were. Beginning in 1953, the 
political context in which the Park Service operated changed decisively. The Cold War, 
the Korean War, and other dramatic international events of the period had prevented 
national parks from becoming a central concern for the Truman administration. Truman 
showed little interest in conservation issues, in any case, and western dam construction 
seemed to be the only aspect of New Deal resource planning that Congress was willing to 
continue. But the new Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower brought its own 
political priorities to the Department of the Interior. Wirth was one of the few Interior 
agency heads to be retained in 1953, and he was described by new Secretary of the 
Interior James Douglas McKay as uniquely qualified, and as one of the officials who gave 
government service "the prestige it deserves. "166 But if McKay felt the Park Service's 
expertise and tradition put the directorship above partisan considerations, he nevertheless 
immediately appointed members of his staff to a "management study committee" to 
recommend a complete reorganization of the agency. McKay admitted that the parks 
were underfunded, but also believed that reorganizing the bureaucracy could "increase 
efficiency" and so alleviate some problems in the parks without substantial budget 
increases.167 
166 Yoder, "Twenty -Four Million Acres of Trouble," 80. 
167 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1953 Annual Report, 333 -336; Conrad L. Wirth, 
Memorandum to Washington Office and All Field Offices, July 27, 1954 (Box 12, Conrad L. Wirth 
Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). 
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In December his study committee recommended that the Park Service reduce the 
size of the Washington and regional offices, and decentralize authority for management 
decisions to park superintendents. By February Wirth had an approved plan for the 
Washington office that reduced it slightly in size, and by May he issued "delegation 
orders" describing the increased authority of the regional directors and park 
superintendents in making management decisions for the parks.168 But Wirth also used 
the reorganization to consolidate his own authority in the areas that mattered most to him. 
The most significant provisions of the 1954 reorganization reduced the number of design 
and construction staff and moved them out of the four regional offices and into two new 
"branch offices design and construction," soon known as the Western Office of Design 
and Construction (WODC), in San Francisco, and the Eastern Office of Design and 
Construction (EODC), in Philadelphia. This effectively returned the Park Service to its 
pre -1933 configuration of design offices; the entire reorganization, in fact, can be seen as 
part of a broader effort to dismantle bureaucracies (like the regionalized Park Service 
design offices) that had been created to serve the New Deal. But the idea of centralizing 
the design and construction staff of the Park Service apparently did not originate with 
McKay's study committee. According to Wirth, such a reorganization had been 
advocated for some time by Thomas Vint himself Vint remained the agency's "chief of 
design and construction" in Washington, and his position was greatly strengthened as he 
assumed supervision of regional design staff from the regional directors. The 1954 
organization recalled the "field offices" in San Francisco and Philadelphia that Vint had 
supervised (from San Francisco) before 1933.169 Sanford J. ( "Red ") Hill headed the new 
WODC in San Francisco, while Edward S. Zimmer was chief of the EODC in 
Philadelphia. Like Vint, both men were landscape architects and had long experience 
with the Park Service (as did so many of the agency's planners and designers of the 
period), and now answered directly to Wirth in Washington, through Vint rather than 
through the four regional directors (figs. 21- 23).17° If the 1954 reorganization purportedly 
168 Conrad L. Wirth, Memorandum to Washington Office and All Field Offices, July 27, 1954 (Box 12, 
Conrad L. Wirth Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). 
169 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1954 Annual Report, 335 -336; Wirth credits Vint with 
the idea of creating the Western and Eastern Offices of Design and Construction, which recalled the "field 
offices" Vint supervised in the pre -New Deal organization of the Park Service. Wirth, Parks, Politics, and 
the People, 292. 
170 Vernon L. Hammons, "A Brief Organizational History of the Office of Design and Construction, 
National Park Service, 1917 -1962," unpublished report (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 
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reduced bureaucracy, it also consolidated Vint's -and therefore Wirth's -direct control 
over every aspect of planning and design in the parks. Once again Wirth had shown his 
bureaucratic ability to thrive under potentially threatening circumstances. 
In hindsight, the 1954 management study and reorganization seemed to presage 
the introduction of Mission 66, which was proposed the following February.171 But 
Secretary McKay was attempting to improve bureaucratic efficiency throughout the 
Department of the Interior and was not preparing for budget increases; on the contrary, 
his stated goal in 1953 was to do more with the resources already available. The 
reorganization was part of a broader effort to restructure the entire executive branch early 
in Eisenhower's administration. Even though the formation of the WODC and EODC in 
1954 were crucial to the subsequent organization of Mission 66, they were established 
independently, almost a year before Wirth's initiative was conceived. 
But political attitudes toward increases in Park Service appropriations were about 
to shift, in any case. Following the truce in Korea, a postwar downturn in the economy 
soon provided new reasons for the Eisenhower administration to reconsider public works 
spending as a means of stabilizing the economy. Eisenhower greatly feared that a 
recession would be blamed on the Republicans, who in 1953 controlled Congress as well 
as the White House for the first time in two decades. There were other political reasons 
for the President to back a new parks initiative. Secretary of the Interior McKay, who 
advocated controversial policies such as bringing private power companies into 
partnership with public utilities, suffered from what historian Elmo Richardson describes 
as "foot in mouth affliction." A former automobile dealer and then governor of Oregon, 
McKay's bluntness exacerbated issues such as the Echo Park dam (which Eisenhower 
supported) and contributed to a general perception that the administration was a poor 
steward of natural resources. Soon derided by opponents on conservation issues as 
"Giveaway McKay," the secretary became a lightening rod and Eisenhower replaced him 
A. Tolson, Historic Listing of National Park Service Officials [1964], revised as 75th Anniversary Edition 
by Harold P. Danz (Denver: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1991), 19, 32, 37; "National 
and State Parks and Forests," Landscape Architecture 38, no. 4 (July 1948): 106 -107. 
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in 1956. But in the meantime, any initiative at the Park Service that would help improve 
the administration's conservation image would be increasingly useful in political terms.172 
Eisenhower, like Truman, had little personal interest in national parks, 
recreational planning, or resource conservation issues. In his memoirs, he describes his 
"very considerable ignorance" on park issues, and clearly his priorities for public works 
were more likely to be Interstate Highways, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and federal dam 
projects. But Eisenhower also suggests in his memoirs that he and Secretary McKay had 
instigated Mission 66 early in 1954, after Eisenhower received a letter from John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr. Rockefeller had just read DeVoto's Harper's column and agreed that the 
condition of the national parks was a "national tragedy." As a park advocate and 
benefactor, he wanted to know why something was not being done.173 Rockefeller's 
status as a major political supporter deserved a quick response. In a memorandum to 
Secretary McKay, Eisenhower wrote that he had "been getting communications from 
people who seem to be genuinely concerned with what they believe to be the deterioration 
of our national parks," and that McKay should "take a second look." Eisenhower then 
claims that the planning for what became Mission 66 began at that point, "early in 1954," 
after McKay and "his associates at the Department of the Interior began a survey" which 
led to the Mission 66 program.174 But in his description of these events, Eisenhower 
conflates his memory of the "management study" of the Park Service (which McKay had 
just completed in December 1953) and the proposal for Mission 66 that Wirth brought to 
McKay on his own in February of 1955. The two initiatives were not directly related. In 
his personal response to Rockefeller's letter at the time, Eisenhower only refers to 
McKay's recently completed study that would "permit more efficient use of existing 
manpower" at the Park Service. McKay's own response to the situation was to inform 
Rockefeller that a request for an additional $550,000 dollars for park maintenance had 
been approved by the Budget Bureau.175 More to the point, however, McKay also had a 
private meeting several days later with Rockefeller confidante, Horace Albright, who 
explained at least one specific point of concern: the delayed completion of the final 
172 Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 
1979), 33. 
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174 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953 -1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1963), 549 -550. 
175 Dwight D. Eisenhower to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., January 8, 1954; Douglas McKay to John D. 
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portion of the Colonial Parkway, running from the Williamsburg restoration to 
Jamestown, Virginia. McKay admitted to Albright that park construction money would 
actually be "considerably curtailed" under the administration's proposed budget for 1955; 
he assured him, nevertheless, that the parkway would get his "personal attention. "176 
Rockefeller was satisfied by the response he received from the administration (officially 
and through Albright) and apparently let the matter drop. Although Rockefeller would go 
on to participate in national park development of the 1950s through his philanthropy, 
neither he nor Eisenhower initiated Mission 66. Other than the very brief assertion in 
Eisenhower's memoirs, there are no other sources that contradict Wirth's own 
descriptions of the origins of the program. 
Between 1945 and 1955, the geographical, social, and political frameworks and 
assumptions for managing national parks had changed dramatically and permanently. As 
a Park Service chief planner since 1931 and director since 1951, Conrad Wirth 
understood these changes as well as anyone. Wirth's bureaucratic sense and timing had 
served him well in his career, and early in 1955 he had decided that a dramatic proposal 
for greatly increased park appropriations would finally be more favourably received than 
they had been over the previous ten years. As it was crafted by Wirth and his staff early 
in 1955, Mission 66 would be enthusiastically endorsed by the Eisenhower administration 
and approved by Congress, which was in fact in a mood to appropriate even more money 
more quickly than requested. 
Park Service officials such as Wirth and Vint understood the trends in American 
society and landscape following World War II primarily as a continuation of those that 
followed World War I; they both involved rapid increases in the numbers of people 
coming to national parks in automobiles, in the context of a rapidly growing and 
urbanizing (or "suburbanizing ") society. Their task in the 1950s, then, was to formulate 
as original, popular, and effective a vision for the park system as early Park Service 
professional staff had under Mather and Albright. Such a renewal would demand (as it 
had in the 19205) new architectural and landscape designs, an expansion of the number 
and variety of parks in the system, further professionalization and diversification of Park 
Service staff, and, above all, a reiteration of the "master planning" process that Vint had 
first devised over twenty years earlier. The ambitions Wirth and his staff would describe 
for Mission 66 would be for a reinvention of recreational planning, of the National Park 
16 Horace M. Albright to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., January 14, 1954, (Rockefeller Archives Centre, 
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Service, and to a degree of the park system itself, to meet a vastly expanded public 
demand in a context of rapid social and geographic change in the second half of the 
century. 
The changes in American society and geography during the postwar period were 
so profound that the national park system inevitably would have changed in response. 
The questions of who would set new policies, and what those policies would be intended 
to achieve, developed into a struggle after 1955, as old conservation alliances began to 
break down and new ones formed. Perhaps no one understood fully -not the Park 
Service, other federal officials, members of Congress, park concessioners, nor early 
environmentalists the degree to which the entire context of the modernizing American 
landscape was itself permanently changing, and therefore establishing new conditions, 
threats, and (hopefully) possibilities for the national park system. But in 1955, the 
principal question was simply: how would the National Park Service finally respond to 
the postwar park "dilemma "? In February of 1955 Conrad Wirth had an answer. 
8.2 Administrative Reorganization 
The creation of the Western Office of Design and Construction (WODC) and the 
Eastern Office of Design and Construction (EODC) in 1954 was essential to the 
subsequent proposal for Mission 66. The two offices answered directly to Washington 
and created a centralized administrative structure. The architects, landscape architects, 
engineers, and other professionals in the new offices had hardly settled in before Wirth 
proposed his ten -year modernization and expansion of the park system, now unofficially 
estimated to cost at least $700 million. In San Francisco, landscape architect Red Hill 
headed the office, with supervising architect Lyle E. Bennet, supervising engineer Percy 
E. Smith, and supervising landscape architect Robert G. Hall as his staff. In Philadelphia, 
Edward Zimmer had a staff of John B. ( "Bill ") Cabot, Robert P. White, and Harvey H. 
Cornell in the same positions, respectively. In Washington, Thomas Vint remained in his 
now strengthened role of chief of design and construction, with his long time deputy 
William G. ( "Bill ") Carnes serving as his chief landscape architect, as he had since 
1937.177 All of these men -and at the time the Park Service still discriminated against 
Pocantico Hills). 
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women designers -had long careers as Park Service professionals.l78 Most of them had 
worked for Wirth or Vint since the 1930s, when so many young landscape architects and 
architects had come to work for the agency. Because of the importance of planning and 
design within the Park Service throughout this period, many had also moved into 
administrative positions. Red Hill, Edward Zimmer, and Harvey Cornell, for example, 
had all been assistant regional directors in San Francisco, Richmond, and Santa Fe, 
respectively, before taking their assignments in the WODC and EODC.179 Wirth 
surrounded himself with experienced associates in Washington, as well. Agency 
historian Russ Olsen observes that Wirth's "cabinet" in Washington in the 1950s 
consisted mostly of people who had worked in his "CCC organization" during the 1930s, 
and that Mission 66 has often been characterized as "the completion of Mr. Wirth's CCC 
program for the Service that was interrupted by World War II. "180 
The whole tenor of Mission 66-a sudden mobilization to address a national 
crisis -must have recalled the spring of 1933, when many of the same people had rapidly 
implemented emergency spending programs. This is certainly how many of the 
employees and officials at the Park Service saw it at the time, and they described a similar 
sense of purpose and excitement. But in other ways, the spring of 1955 could not have 
differed more from that of 1933. A popular Republican president now watched over a 
rapidly expanding economy. For many Americans, twenty years of hard work and 
sacrifice were giving way to unprecedented material comfort and security, new houses, 
new cars, and growing families In these ways the period suggested the 1920s more than 
the 1930s, and Mission 66 reflected this difference. Congress might finally be in a mood 
to appropriate money for parks, for example, but no one was even intimating that the 
CCC should be revived. Without the CCC (or an equivalent) there could be no park 
planning or development of comparable breadth and ambition. The CCC put hundreds of 
thousands of young men to work building national, state, and municipal parks. Hundreds 
of leading professionals joined the effort in supervisory roles. Without the CCC and the 
rest of the New Deal, Mission 66 could never match what the Park Service accomplished 
178 Laura Wilson became the first woman to work as a landscape architect for the Park Service in 1957. 
Mission 66 helped break down some of the barriers for women in the agency, but only because the greatly 
increased amount of work led to more open positions. There was no official policy at the time to integrate 
women into the professional ranks, and in fact women faced significant obstacles at the Park Service, as 
they did in the design professions elsewhere. On the subject of women designers at the Park Service, see 
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in the 1930s. There would be no significant state park dimension to Mission 66, for 
example, nor partnerships with other federal agencies, other than existing relationships 
with the Bureau of Public Roads, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Army Corps of 
Engineers. Neither did the Park Service have the bureaucratic support of the National 
Resources Planning Board or other New Deal national planning efforts. The New Deal 
had mobilized the entire federal government in a coordinated campaign of conservation 
programs. In 1955 the Park Service would have to rely on its own human and fiscal 
resources for putting Mission 66 into the context of a national plan for the use of public 
lands. The agency's role in this regard continued to be defined by the 1936 Park, 
Parkway, and Recreational -Area Study Act. The overall Mission 66 program was never 
affirmed by new legislation that would have redefined mandates for the agency or 
endorsed the Mission 66 program specifically. 
8.3 Mission 66 Gets Underway 
In his memoirs, Wirth describes the specific ideas and events that precipitated the 
rapid organization of his Mission 66 proposal. His own account of events is actually 
based on a history written in 1958 by agency historian Roy E. Appleman, which was 
based in large part on interviews with Wirth in 1956 as well as Appleman's personal 
experience.181 According to Wirth (and Appleman), one weekend in February the 
director sat at his home in Maryland considering the reluctance of Congress to increase 
park appropriations since 1945. Congress had supported the Bureau of Public Roads, the 
Bureau of Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers with multi -year authorizations 
for hundreds of millions of dollars that allowed these agencies to efficiently complete 
massive public works. Capital expenditures for national parks, meanwhile, were 
inadequate and fluctuated from year to year, making it difficult to plan large projects over 
extended periods. Wirth struggled with how to present the redevelopment of the national 
park system to Congress on the same terms, as a national priority requiring a long term, 
180 Olsen, Organizational Structures of the National Park Service, 19. 
181 Roy E. Appleman, "A History of the National Park Service Mission 66 Program," unpublished report, 
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major commitment of funds rather than the minimal and uncertain appropriations that 
allowed only a "patch on patch" approach to modernizing park facilities.182 
Wirth does not mention Lucius Clay's interstate highway proposal that had been 
published and submitted to Congress a month earlier. But while asking himself what a 
member of Congress would "want to hear," he apparently experienced an epiphany: the 
modernization of the national park system could indeed be presented as a ten -year 
program, requiring extensive coordination and planning nationwide, and achieved within 
one overall budget estimate. Wirth would present Congress with a total figure and a 
schedule for the entire job. He could argue that long term, coordinated planning was 
necessary just as it was to build highways and dams -in order to let larger contracts, 
benefit from economies of scale, and minimize the overall disturbance to parks and 
visitors by completing the work quickly. The alternative was to limp along with annual 
appropriations that allowed only incremental, endless repairs to facilities that were not 
worth the investment, because they would never be adequate for the numbers of people 
trying to use them. 
This was the essence of "MISSION 66" (often all in capitals), a name Wirth 
hoped captured the urgency of the situation and evoked the wartime zeal of a "mission." 
Ten years was, he felt, the right balance between unacceptably short term planning, and 
going too far into the uncertainties of the future. Intensely aware of the tradition of his 
agency, Wirth also feared that under his administration the Park Service would fail to 
measure up to its own history. In the 1920s Mather and Albright had forged a powerful 
identity for the agency While developing a national park system that was admired all over 
the world. Thirty years later, Wirth knew that his Park Service was faced with 
challenges -and opportunities just as great. By timing Mission 66 to be completed in 
time for the fiftieth anniversary of the Park Service in 1966, he reminded himself and 
everyone else that living up to that legacy would require dedication, hard work, and 
equally successful responses to the new generation of problems besetting the park 
system. I83 
From the moment he was taken with his idea, Wirth moved with single minded 
alacrity. That Monday morning, February 8, when he called the regular "squad meeting" 
of his assistant directors, division chiefs, and other principal advisors, he announced that 
182 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 237 -239; Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 4- 
5. 
183 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 238 -239. 
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business as usual would end immediately in the Washington Office. A new working 
group would be formed to begin working on details and estimates for the ten -year 
program to modernize and expand the park system. The conference room they were 
meeting in, Room 3100 adjacent to the director's office (in the Interior Building in 
Washington), would be given over to the group, who would be relieved of all other duties. 
By the end of the meeting, the squad had agreed on the individuals to be assigned to this 
"working staff' (later described as the "working committee ") as well as the makeup of a 
"steering committee," made up mostly of the supervisors of those in the first group (fig. 
24). Wirth, as his choice of rooms for the project made clear, would maintain close 
control and daily participation in every aspect of the plan. A strong administrator known 
for his direct style, Wirth did not lightly tolerate perceived incompetence or lack of 
enthusiasm; he would personally assure his mission stayed on its demanding course.184 
The working committee, most of whom had not been present that morning, were 
quickly informed of their new assignments. Together with the steering committee and the 
assistant directors, they met in the same conference room with Wirth that afternoon. 
Wirth now expounded on his goals at length, and laid out the arguments for immediate 
action. Most of these must have been familiar to everyone in the room. The parks were 
being "loved to death" and the public and popular media had been calling for action for 
years. Budgets had stagnated at a level that had served 21 million visits annually, while 
in 1954 there had been 46 million visits recorded. The Park Service faced nothing less 
than "the destruction...of what it is charged with saving." The task was to "secure a 
reasonable protection of the parks and yet provide for increased public use in such a way 
as to not wear them out." Wirth charged the group to elaborate a "reasoned objective" for 
Mission 66, and to delineate a program to accomplish that objective. The solution "would 
not be in the books and in regulations" and might not be possible within the terms of 
existing legislation; but he wanted answers, regardless of what the group determined 
would be necessary to implement them. According to Roy Appleman, Wirth used the 
analogy of a poker game, suggesting that the Park Service had been "called." They 
needed to show their cards, and Wirth wanted it to be "a good hand." The Bureau of 
Public Roads had been planning since at least 1944 for its plan for a modern system of 
interstate highways. Wirth gave his working group eight months to have their proposal 
ready. He planned to present it at the General Service Conference of national park 
184 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 239; Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 7 -8. 
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superintendents scheduled for that September in Great Smoky Mountains National 
Park.18' 
Wirth successfully imbued his staff with enthusiasm for their task of rapidly 
assembling and analyzing data, cost estimates, policy guidelines, and other features of 
what would be, eight months later, the Mission 66 proposal. The working staff felt they 
were about to make history, and the excitement was infectious, quickly moving to park 
superintendents, field personnel, and eventually Interior officials and members of 
Congress. The two most important staff members working under Wirth during the eight - 
month effort were the chair of the steering committee, Lemuel A. ( "Lon ") Garrison, and 
the chairman of the working committee, Bill Carnes.186 Lon Garrison, a former ranger at 
Sequoia and Yosemite, and former superintendent of Hopewell Village and Big Bend, 
had just moved to Washington to take the new position of chief of the "conservation and 
protection branch," making him the agency's "chief ranger." Garrison's field background 
and personal style appealed to Wirth, who had brought him to Washington for other 
purposes, but now would rely on him as his most trusted lieutenant guiding the early 
stages of Mission 66. Garrison was only four years younger than Wirth, but in his 
memoirs suggests he aspired to play the role of Albright to Wirth's Mather, as together 
they worked to "dream up a contemporary National Park Service." After two years in 
Washington, Garrison felt the Mission 66 steering committee, by now renamed the 
"advisory committee," had done its work. Following in Albright's footsteps, he accepted 
the position of Yellowstone superintendent. But just as Albright had in the 1920s, he 
maintained close contact with the Washington Office, where he was considered a 
potential successor as director.187 
Garrison (fig. 25) was an interesting choice to head the Mission 66 steering 
committee, since as "chief ranger" he had impressive management experience, but little 
design or planning background. Most of the other members of the steering committee 
had counterparts whom they supervised on the working committee. The chairman of the 
working committee was Bill Carnes, whom Vint had supervised as his chief landscape 
architect since 1937. One might have expected Vint, as the chief of design and 
185 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 8 -10. 
186 The other members of the steering committee were: Thomas C. Vint, Harry Langley, John E. Doerr, 
Donald E. Lee, Keith Neilson, and Jackson Price. The other members of the working committee were 
Harold G. Smith, Robert M. Coates, Howard R. Stagner, Jack B. Dodd, Roy E. Appleman, and Raymond L. 
Freeman. Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 7. 
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construction, therefore to be the chairman of the steering committee. Mission 66 was, 
after all, mainly a design and construction program. The choice of Vint's protégé as the 
head of the working committee, on the one hand, did confirm Vint's continued influence. 
But on the other hand, Carnes's reassignment also deprived Vint of the services of his 
closest ally and associate, who had for decades handled the paperwork and bureaucratic 
functions Vint eschewed. Vint had always been a planner and designer more that a 
manager at heart, and depended on Carnes as an assistant. As the head of the Mission 66 
working committee, however, Carnes now assisted Wirth and Garrison, leaving Vint 
without his support. Vint remained in his position and exerted great influence on 
planning and design policy at this important time. Mission 66, however, was Conrad 
Wirth's program, and the director decided from the beginning not to put Vint in a position 
where he would share credit for the overall vision. Wirth later wrote that Carnes, because 
of his long association with Vint and his park planning methods, was "the logical 
chairman for the task force." Vint contributed, but less directly, as one of the steering 
committee members.188 
8.4 Initial Guiding Concepts 
By the end of the first week of planning Mission 66, the working committee 
prepared a memorandum signed by Wirth to be distributed throughout the Park Service. 
The "goal to which this Mission is directed," Wirth informed the field, was "nothing new; 
it was plainly stated in the Act of 1916 establishing the National Park Service." Those 
concepts were "as sound today as they were in 1916." Wirth decided that the essence of 
the problem was to "meet fully the responsibilities implicit in those concepts" and "to 
produce a comprehensive and integrated program of use and protection that is in harmony 
with the obligations of the National Park Service under the Act of 1916." All Park 
Service personnel were urged to send in "suggestions" directly to Lon Garrison, 
"particularly on the controversial subject of possible controls on overuse of park areas." 
The program was being initiated immediately, Wirth informed his employees, because of 
"the urgency of the project," and suggestions were to be sent in by March 10. The 
187 Lemuel A. Garrison, The Making of a Ranger: Forty Years With the National Parks (Salt Lake City: 
Howe Brothers, 1983), 256 -267. 
188 Conrad L. Wirth "The History and Concept of the Master Plan," n.d. [ca. 1975] (Box 28, Conrad L. 
Wirth Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). For Bill Carnes's ideas on master 
planning (which closely reiterate Vint's), see William G. Carnes, "Landscape Architecture in the National 
(cont.) 
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Mission 66 planners were charged with "the development of a dynamic program," he 
added, for the approval of Secretary McKay and the Bureau of the Budget and Congress 
in time to affect appropriations for fiscal year 1957.189 
Wirth's belief in the continued validity of the concepts in the 1916 legislation 
would remain the ideological bedrock of Mission 66 until Wirth's retirement in 1964. 
From the outset, the organizers of the Mission 66 program found their most fundamental 
justifications in existing prewar legislation and policy. The working committee spent its 
first weeks researching historical documents, including the 1872 Yellowstone Act, the 
1906 Antiquities Act, the 1916 National Park Service Act, the 1918 "Lane Letter," the 
1933 executive reorganization, the 1935 Historic Sites Act, and of course the 1936 Park, 
Parkway, and Recreational -Area Study Act.19° Wirth would repeatedly refer back to the 
1916 act that established the Park Service, in particular, as the fundamental mandate of 
Mission 66. Wirth felt secure in his interpretation of that legislation in part because of his 
close friendship and professional association with its author, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. 
"The fundamental purpose" of the parks, Olmsted wrote in 1916, was "to conserve the 
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the 
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired 
for the enjoyment of future generations. "191 This language clearly was influenced by the 
text of his father's 1865 Yosemite report, which stated that "the duty of preservation is 
the first," since "for the millions who are hereafter to benefit" preservation of the 
landscape was obviously necessary. "Next to this" duty, the elder Olmsted continued, "is 
that of... aiding to make... [Yosemite Valley] available as soon and as generally as may 
Park Service: Its Contribution to Preservation and Development," Landscape Architecture 41, no. 4 (July 
1951): 145 -150. 
189 "Informational Memorandum No. 1, Mission 66," February 18, 1955 (Box A8213, National Park Service 
History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). The seven Mission 66 informational memoranda released by 
Wirth between February 1955 and November 1956 amount to a manual for planning procedures. The 
documents are available at the National Park Service's Harper's Ferry Centre Archive, as well as the 
Yellowstone National Park Archives, and the Conrad L. Wirth Collection, American Heritage Centre, 
University of Wyoming. 
190 All of these documents are collected and described in Lary M. Dilsaver, ed., America's National Park 
System: The Critical Documents (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,.1994), 28 -52, 
135 -136. 
191 For the text of the act, see Dilsaver, ed., America's National Park System, 46-47. The "Organic Act" for 
the National Park Service was drafted with the participation of Representative William Kent (California), 
Robert Sterling Yard, J. Horace McFarland, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., Robert B. Marshall, and Horace 
M. Albright. Albright and McFarland both credited Olmsted with drafting this essential paragraph of the 
bill. See Carr, Wilderness by Design, 78 -79. 
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be economically practicable to those whom it is designed to benefit. "192 Wirth and 
Olmsted, Jr., both understood that the duty of preservation came first, since without it 
there would be nothing to enjoy. At the same time, landscape preservation was justified 
in terms of public enjoyment. Preservation without public enjoyment, as Olmsted, Jr., 
reminded Wirth in 1949, was not what public parks -at least those described and 
developed by the two men's fathers -were intended to achieve. 
The second most important policy document for Wirth was almost as old. In 1918 
Horace Albright drafted a letter for the signature of then Secretary of the Interior Franklin 
K. Lane describing policies and priorities for the new National Park Service. The essence 
of Albright's letter were in three points: first, the parks must be maintained "in an 
unimpaired form for the use of future generations" as well the present one; second, they 
were "set apart for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the people "; and third, 
that national, not local, interests must dictate all decisions concerning their management. 
Albright summarized management principles in a series of concise directives: to further 
the expansion and enjoyment of the park system, the letter advised, "You should 
diligently extend and use the splendid cooperation...among chambers of commerce, 
tourist bureaus, and automobile highway associations "; in planning additions to the 
system, "You should seek to find scenery of supreme and distinctive quality. "193 In 
March 1955, Wirth distributed the "Lane Letter" in another agency -wide informational 
memorandum. "With few exceptions," he wrote in the memorandum, the letter "could 
have been written yesterday. "194 Later critics would claim that the Mission 66 program 
moved too far away from earlier national park policy or tradition; in fact from the 
beginning the program was completely rooted in the Progressive Era ideology -and in 
even earlier Olmstedian theory -which had served the agency so well to that point. 
By the end of February, the Mission 66 working committee had asked every 
administrative department of the agency to submit a "recommended program" for their 
area of responsibility and was preparing surveys to be sent to every park in the system. 
192 For the text of the report, see Dilsaver, ed., America's National Park System, 12 -27. Key portions of the 
1865 report, which had been fragmented and all but lost, were nevertheless available to Olmsted, Jr., who 
began officially editing his father's papers at about the time he was writing the National Park Service 
legislation. We know he read and appreciated portions of the 1865 report because he quoted from them in a 
1914 article (Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., "Hetch -Hetchy," Landscape Architecture 4, no. 2, 37 -46). The 
complete report was reassembled from these fragments by the elder Olmsted's biographer, Laura Wood 
Roper, in 1952 (Landscape Architecture 43, no. 1, 14 -25). 
193 For the text of the letter, see Dilsaver, ed., America's National Park System, 48 -52. 
194 "Informational Memorandum, Statement of National Park Policy -1918," March 21 1955, (Box A8213, 
National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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Garrison and Carnes interviewed dozens of members of the Washington Office soliciting 
any and all opinions. Few experts outside the Park Service were consulted during these 
weeks. Within the agency, however, the planners suspended the usual protocols and 
requested employees at every level to address comments and suggestions directly to them. 
The lack of an official outreach to private conservation groups and park concessioners, in 
particular, would soon prove to be a major strategic error. But for the time being great 
enthusiasm was generated among Park Service office staff and field personnel, many of 
whom participated directly or indirectly to the effort. For his part, Wirth opened the door 
to his adjacent office many times a day, and maintained personal oversight of the entire 
endeavour.195 
On March 17 Wirth and his planners issued a second agency memorandum on 
Mission 66 "policies and procedures." It had been a busy month and the memorandum, 
with attachments, ran more than ten pages. The "steering committee and staff," Wirth 
announced, had three basic instructions for those who would be participating in Mission 
66 planning: "Disregard precedents....Be imaginative....[and] Bring up something 
effective in achieving the twin objectives of protection and optimum use." If Wirth 
venerated the documents that described the original mandate of his agency, he also 
announced that he would be completely open to finding new ways to achieve that 
mandate. "The lid is off," he declared, "only by giving full play to the imagination will 
we find solutions that will meet the problems of continuously increasing use of the parks 
by the American people." All Park Service personnel were again asked to participate and 
send in suggestions; some would be asked to come to Washington to give advice. 
The "policies and practices as they might apply to a park" described in an 
attachment to the memorandum were just as radical in their tone. The policies perhaps 
also surprise today, considering the subsequent reputation of Mission 66 for 
"overdevelopment." The first policy described, for example, was that travel to national 
parks "should not be actively encouraged," and that an "optimum visitor load" for both 
the present and future should be determined. Wirth and his planners then suggested four 
policies on "public use," all of which advocated the removal of development from within 
park boundaries, or at least from overcrowded and sensitive areas. They sought new 
strategies for relocating hotels and administrative facilities from "precious" areas -such 
195 "Informational Memorandum No. 1, Mission 66," February 18, 1955, (Box A8213, National Park 
Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 241 -243; 
Appleman, A History of the Mission 66 Program, 9 -18. 
114 
as the rims of scenic canyons or the edges of geyser basins -to less sensitive sites. They 
noted that concessioners had sited many of these buildings before the Park Service was 
established in 1916, and since then the agency had made only partial progress in 
relocating or mitigating the effects of such development. At Sequoia, for example, there 
was a moratorium on any more cabins in the Giant Forest, and at Yellowstone plans were 
underway to move the existing development away from the rim of the Grand Canyon of 
the Yellowstone. But because of increased public use, the parks were now at a turning 
point. Further expansion of older developed areas would cause far greater damage and 
overcrowding around major park attractions and destinations. An unambiguous new 
policy was required: "It is imperative that the Service establish a guiding policy for 
correcting such existing encroachments, and preventing others in the future." Although 
"in certain areas the Service is on record" regarding the necessity of moving development 
to "less `precious' and more advantageous locations," both "the Service and the 
concessioner continue to add developments in these locations to meet growing needs." In 
some cases even safety hazards from rock slides and floods had been ignored (for 
example at Yosemite and Mount Rainier), and developed areas had been expanded as 
managers were forced into "compromising with a bad situation" while trying to meet the 
needs of visitors. But the Mission 66 planners were in no mood for further compromise. 
"There must be a definite policy...of `getting out of the precious areas in the parks and on 
to the lesser areas,' both as to administrative facilities and visitor accommodations." 
What was more, "the eventual removal of overnight facilities from the parks, or from the 
most `precious' areas . therein, should be considered." Older lodge facilities, even such 
landmarks as the Old Faithful Inn and the Paradise Inn, might be demolished and replaced 
with lodging in less sensitive areas, or outside park boundaries altogether. Better roads 
and faster cars made it desirable, where practicable, to relocate and concentrate overnight 
and administrative facilities to new "town sites" outside parks. These new 
"communities" would include residential districts for park employees, who would 
therefore have to commute to work in the parks (although their families would have easier 
access to schools and other services). Finally, new plans for national parks would have to 
consider "completely revamping park transportation systems," particularly to increase the 
efficient use of buses.196 
196 "Informational Memorandum No. 2, Mission 66- Policies and Procedures," March 17, 1955, (Box 
A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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A tremendous amount of new development would be required to achieve the kinds 
of goals that the Mission 66 planners instructed regional staff and superintendents to 
consider. Their instructions also implied the demolition of many historic hotels and park 
structures of all types. New strategies -and a huge amount of money -would be needed 
to reduce the impacts of higher numbers of visitors. If the idea of allowing essentially 
unrestricted numbers of people to come and enjoy the parks were to survive, a new set of 
priorities would need to guide revised master plans for every unit in the system. A 
"questionnaire" directed to park superintendents was therefore also attached to the March 
17 memorandum. The Mission 66 planners wanted to know first "what problems exist or 
are anticipated regarding the protection of natural conditions or in regard to animal 
populations, plant associations, forestry management, historic or scientific values, etc. ?" 
They asked the superintendents to estimate "visitor volume" both present and projected 
for 1966. They wanted to know which management problems derived from 
"continuously increasing visitation," and how those problems impaired both "park 
values" and the "opportunity for proper park use by the public." Park managers were 
asked to assess and analyze their situations, using existing master plans as a starting point, 
but remembering that those plans "have been governed by existing laws, regulations, land 
holdings, or franchises more limiting in scope than is the study now in progress under 
Mission 66." "We must face the fact," Wirth continued, "that many park installations still 
in use are based on a stagecoach economy and travel patterns. "197 
From the very start, Wirth described Mission 66 as an initiative for developing 
completely revised park master plans that would respond to the social, technological, and 
geographical trends of postwar American society. Armed with only the most rudimentary 
estimates for the costs of modernizing the entire park system, Wirth was also preparing to 
go directly to Congress for what he already knew would be the $500 million to $1 billion 
cost of implementing the entire program. Mission 66 was conceived entirely "in house," 
by the Park Service, with very little significant participation by congressional staff, or by 
the agency's most vital private partners, conservation groups and park concessioners. 
Wirth and his staff obviously felt they could invent a new approach to administering the 
national park system without much outside help. They could argue, with some basis, that 
no one had as much experience in dealing with the conflicting agendas of concessioners, 
conservationists, and the diverse, always demanding public. While Wirth recognized the 
197 "Informational Memorandum No. 2, Mission 66- Policies and Procedures," March 17, 1955, (Box 
(cont.) 
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eventual need for "better understanding, cooperation, and support of local and national 
civic and conservation groups" (the only mention made of outside groups at this point), 
for now he would look to the expertise within his own ranks. 
8.5 Vint's Influence on Early Policy 
Early Mission 66 policy statements reflected the contemporary sentiments of the 
most experienced park planner of all, Thomas Vint. Still the active and revered director 
of design and construction, Vint had invented the "master planning" procedures that had 
been the heart of Park Service development policies since the 1920s. During his long 
career with the Park Service he had worked closely with Mather, Albright, and Olmsted, 
Jr., and he had personally trained (or "raised" as he sometimes put it) many of the senior 
planners and landscape architects in the agency.198 Vint and Wirth had a long and 
complex relationship. The two landscape architects were close friends, and they each had 
been given great responsibilities at the Park Service early in their careers. They held one 
another in high esteem and in many ways complemented one another. In the 1930s they 
had very separate roles in the Park Service, for example, with Wirth in charge of his state 
park CCC organization and Vint overseeing planning and design within the national 
parks. In the 1940s Vint had little to do with the "river basin studies" and recreation area 
plans that occupied Wirth. Both men were popular figures within the agency, but they 
had very different personalities. Vint was gregarious and informal in his approach to 
management, and he inspired tremendous loyalty and affection among his staff. Vint was 
a designer rather than .an administrator at heart (although Wirth nevertheless described 
him as "canny" in his bureaucratic style). When he and Wirth disagreed over particulars 
of a park master plan, Vint was reputed to agree to the changes, and then reverse them 
after Wirth left the room.199 Vint took great pride in his master plans, and he also knew 
his boss was busy with many other matters more pressing than such details. For his part, 
Wirth was a former military school cadet, who in college enjoyed football and fraternal 
organizations more than his design apprenticeship. A masterful bureaucrat, he oversaw 
A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
198 For Vint's life and the significance of his prewar work with the National Park Service, see Linda Flint 
McClelland, "Vint, Thomas Chalmers," in Charles A. Birnbaum and Robin Karson, eds., Pioneers of 
American Landscape Design (New York: McGraw -Hill, 2000), 413 -416; Can, Wilderness by Design, 189- 
195. 
199 Wirth much later acknowledged these observations in a conversation with Charles Peterson. Charles E. 
Peterson, "Memo for VINT File," January 9, 1981, (Thomas C. Vint Collection, Papers of Charles E. 
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every detail of park operations with organized rigor. He was known for his ability to 
control a meeting and to quickly dispatch with any perceived incompetence or other 
distraction. 
Wirth and Vint's professional relationship continued over three decades and was a 
productive partnership. They were always warm and friendly in their official duties, and 
they were even close friends; but there remained some measure of competition between 
them. They were both landscape architects with strong opinions on the details of 
planning and architectural design in the parks. In the 1930s their respective places in 
organizational charts -with separate responsibilities defined -apparently mitigated any 
tension between the older designer and the ambitious young administrator. As director, 
Wirth relied on Vint and enhanced his position through the 1954 reorganization of 
planning and design staff. In 1955, however, Wirth limited Vint's direct involvement in 
Mission 66, preferring to rely on younger men with whom he had less potentially 
competitive relationships. Considering Vint's reputation within the Park Service, it 
would have been difficult for Wirth to claim Mission 66 as his own if he had put Vint, not 
Garrison, in charge of the steering committee. 
The exact nature of Vint's early contributions to Mission 66 planning must be 
surmised. But with his trusted aide, Bill Carnes, heading the working committee, Vint 
clearly had a hand -directly or indirectly -in drafting the "policies and practices" issued 
in 1955. The idea of removing development to "gateway communities" outside parks, for 
example, had been advocated by Vint and members of his staff for more than ten years, 
ever since the postwar situation of the parks had begun to receive serious consideration. 
Vint understood that improved park roads, together with faster and more reliable cars, 
often eliminated the need for overnight accommodations in parks. Visitors could make a 
day trip, in many cases, leaving and returning home the same day. They could also stay 
in hotels and motels that were outside the parks, but within practical driving distance 
from main park destinations. 
In a memorandum to Newton Drury in 1945 on the subject of "development 
problems" at Yosemite, Vint insisted that it was time to "re- appraise" the agency's 
approach to planning and to "move some activities entirely out of the park." If Drury 
really wanted to reduce the presence of development on the floor of Yosemite Valley, 
Vint advised, the "convenience of the road system" that made it possible for so many 
people to visit the valley also made it possible to move housing, maintenance, and 
concessioner facilities out of the park altogether. Vint pointed out that a whole program 
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of development- including an expanded administration building, a new Yosemite Lodge, 
housing, and maintenance areas -was already considered necessary by the Park Service 
and the concessioner. In what became known at the time as the "Vint Plan," he suggested 
that none of the new buildings should be sited in Yosemite Valley itself, but be relocated 
to sites outside the park and to Big Meadows and Wawona, areas within the park but 
away from the crowded valley. 200 In 1947 Vint pressed his points to Drury, insisting that 
conditions at Yosemite were "as near to a clear slate" as would ever be likely to occur 
again, and that the "next step" would "determine the course to be followed for a long term 
of years." He knew that once a new commitment of capital investment was made, it 
would be many years -if ever -before they had a similar opportunity to reconceive the 
public's experience of Yosemite Valley. The Park Service could follow "Plan A" in the 
valley, he told Drury, and further expand and rebuild existing development, or it could 
follow what Vint called "Plan B," and build a new Yosemite Lodge in Wawona rather 
than in the valley, along with a new park administrative centre either in Wawona or 
Fresno. He knew these would not be "popular" ideas, but he also felt the time was 
drawing near when the Park Service would have to decide whether to further 
accommodate increasingly destructive compromises, or institute new planning policy that 
reflected the postwar social and geographic contexts of the national parks. "If you decide 
to rebuild Yosemite Lodge in the Valley," Vint warned Drury, "you will be following 
Plan A," and will continue to "drift in one direction, while hoping...to change to the 
other. "201 In 1949 Drury nevertheless approved building a new lodge in the valley, 
although a lack of construction funds delayed the project. Mission 66, however, soon 
revived these ruminations on park development policy for Vint and his colleagues. 
Similar scenarios were taking place in many other parks in the 1940s, but 
Yosemite Valley held great significance for Vint, as it did for many others concerned 
with national park preservation. Vint began his Park Service career at Yosemite in 1922, 
and remained particularly interested in the park while he headed the San Francisco 
200 In a contemporary memorandum on Kings Canyon National Park, Vint warned against any buildings at 
all in Kings Canyon, because once the agency followed the "same course as in the past," they would 
eventually "have a duplicate Yosemite problem in the Kings Canyon." Thomas C. Vint, "A Brief 
Discussion of Development Problems in Yosemite National Park," April 14, 1945; "A Brief Discussion of 
Development Problems in Sequoia -Kings Canyon National Parks," April 14, 1945 (Personal Papers of 
Newton B. Drury, Entry 19, RG 79, National Archives). 
toi Thomas C. Vint to Newton B. Drury, November 10, 1947, memorandum (Personal Papers of Newton B. 
Drury, Entry 19, RG 79, National Archives). Vint was supported in the particulars of suggestions for 
Yosemite in 1947 by park landscape architect, Alfred C. Kuehl, another professional recruited in the 1930s, 
who previously worked at Grand Canyon. 
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"Western Field Office" of design and construction staff between 1927 and 1933. Vint 
had always worked closely with the Yosemite National Park Board of Expert Advisors, 
formed in 1928 with Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., as its first chairman. While his ideas for 
removing development from the valley might have seemed radical to some in 1945, they 
were actually a reiteration of a much older vision for the valley, described by the elder 
Frederick Law Olmsted in 1865. Even then, Olmsted knew then that the number of 
visitors to the valley would "within a century" be in the "millions," and in his 1865 plan 
for the valley he therefore suggested minimal development: essentially a one -way loop 
road, trails, bathrooms, and campgrounds that would serve as the only overnight 
accommodations.202 Olmsted, Jr., had continued his father's interest in Yosemite, and as 
an influential member of the park's Board of Expert Advisors was an important supporter 
of Vint. Together they had considered such issues as the construction of the new 
Wawona Road (begun in 1930), and the proposed "ropeway" (or cable car) from the 
Happy Isles area of the valley to Glacier Point. While they considered road construction 
an appropriate and desirable modernization of the park landscape, they fought and 
defeated what they considered the visual intrusion of prominent "mechanical features" 
such as the ropeway.2 °3 
Through his own work and his association with Olmsted, Jr., Vint was long versed 
in the preservation issues of Yosemite Valley. In 1945 he was not only advancing a 
radical, postwar vision for the management of the valley, he also was asserting the 
priorities of the oldest national park plan of all: the elder Olmsted's 1865 plan. In March 
1955, Wirth, Garrison, and Carnes made Vint's postwar national park planning ideas the 
first policy framework for Mission 66. The new era of national park master planning was 
off to an optimistic start. 
By that time, the Mission 66 planners had decided to begin a new model master 
plan for a park selected to be representative of many issues and management 
considerations. That park would not be Yosemite, which was too complex and unique to 
effectively serve the purpose. Wirth decided instead to make Mount Rainier National 
202 For the complete text of the Yosemite report, see Victoria Post Ranney, Gerard J. Rauluk, and Carolyn 
F. Hoffman, eds., The California Frontier, 1863 -1865. The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted; Volume V. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). 488 -516. 
203 While Vint did not write many long reports or explanations of his professional practice, in 1930 he did 
write a detailed justification for denying the ropeway project at Yosemite, because he knew the decision 
would set a precedent for similar "mechanical features in all parks," which both he and Olmsted considered 
unacceptable visual intrusions. Thomas C. Vint, "Report on Yosemite Ropeway Application," November 
21, 1930, (Thomas C. Vint Collection, Papers of Charles E. Peterson). 
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Park the "pilot study" for Mission 66 planning. There were many reasons why Mount 
Rainier was the perfect vehicle to showcase their ideas for how each park should develop 
a new program of accelerated redevelopment or, as it was soon described, a "Mission 66 
prospectus." Larger parks had too many specific issues and interest groups to be 
instructive case studies. Mount Rainier was smaller and featured what the Mission 66 
working committee described as "reasonably difficult problems, many of which would be 
typical of park problems in general. "204 The park contained a range of resources, 
including glaciers, mountains, forests, rivers, and of course superb scenery. Managers at 
Mount Rainier were also contending with a range of issues related to public use, 
including road construction, winter sports, and the renewal of concession contracts. 
Mount Rainier was the park where Mather had first demonstrated the benefits of his 
monopolistic concessioner contracts in 1915. It was where Vint had first developed 
national park master planning in the late 1920s. As it had for Vint in the 1920s, Mount 
Rainier could again serve as a model park, in which a revised form of national park 
master planning the Mission 66 prospectus -could be demonstrated. 
8.6 Pilot Prospectus for Mount Rainier 
The condition of many of Mount Rainier's public facilities in 1955 could be seen 
as an indictment of the consequences of Park Service policies up to that point. Mather's 
organization of the Rainier National Park Company in 1915 had been held up as an 
example of how private concessioners could enhance the federal management of the 
parks. By 1946, however, Drury described a dismal situation, in which once admired 
rustic lodges, such as the Paradise Inn (1917), were now overcrowded and "obsolete. "205 
The Rainier National Park Company had suffered through the Depression, and after the 
war its stockholders refused to invest new capital to expand and modernize their facilities. 
In 1952 Congress bought out the company's interest in its buildings, and the Park Service 
contracted with them to run the hotels and restaurants. Many park administrators -even 
the conservative Albright-felt this type of arrangement would eventually be necessary in 
most parks, although in 1955 the publicly owned concession facilities at Mount Rainier 
were still the exception to the rule. But this was another reason the park would make an 
excellent demonstration project: Mission 66 planners would have a free hand in proposed 
dispositions of hotels and visitor facilities. 
204 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 18 -19. 
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In 1955 Mount Rainier was already in the vanguard of several acrimonious policy 
debates with significance for the park system as a whole. Since even before World War 
II, skiers, local businessmen, and elected officials had been pressing the Park Service to 
develop the Paradise Valley area of the park into a commercial ski resort, complete with 
year round accommodations and ski lifts. In 1946 Vint produced a plan illustrating what 
replacing the Paradise Inn with a hotel designed for year round use might entail: a $2 
million dollar, massive concrete building with basement parking, 100 rooms, dormitories, 
dining rooms, and enough capacity to serve crowds visiting Paradise only for the day, as 
well as those staying at the hotel. Vint also observed that the year round operation of 
such a hotel would still not break even, and would have to be subsidized by the 
government. While dutifully producing schematic designs for a year round resort, Vint 
actually opposed the whole idea. For both Vint and Wirth, the prospect of permanent 
chair lift structures up the slopes of Mount Rainier, in particular, made a ski resort 
development utterly unacceptable. These were precisely the kind of "mechanical 
features" that had been proposed at Yosemite Valley and elsewhere. Expanding the 
winter use of parks was considered desirable in part as a means to "spread" park use 
seasonally and reduce summer crowding, and limited ski operations had been developed 
elsewhere, notably at Badger Pass in Yosemite. But permanent ski lift towers on the 
slopes of Mount Rainier could not be countenanced. As historian Theodore Catton 
relates, by 1948 Vint had objected to Wirth in writing, and by 1953 Wirth expressed his 
opposition to Secretary of the Interior McKay, effectively threatening to resign. McKay 
backed his Park Service director and the ski resort at Paradise was defeated, although the 
pressure to maintain year round visitor use there remained.2o6 
The "pilot study" Wirth and his staff quickly assembled for Mount Rainier in 
1955 further demonstrated that they were in no mood to compromise on the issue. The 
park's superintendent, Preston P. Macy, came to Washington, DC, for a week in early 
April, and by April 11 the planners had what they considered the first complete Mission 
66 prospectus. The twenty -page report featured the agency's new arrowhead logo 
prominently, and was in 8 1/2 by 11 inch format (fig. 26). Several diagrams and schematic 
renderings of proposed facilities were interspersed with brief descriptions of policies and 
proposed development and a one -page estimate of costs. Prewar master plans, which had 
205 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1947 Annual Report, 320 -323. 
206 Theodore Catton, Wonderland: An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 413 -435. 
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been the result of years of effort not weeks, were typically thirty by forty inches and 
included detailed site plans, design renderings, and other studies at several scales. By 
comparison, the new prospectus was little more than an abbreviated summary; it 
described a radical plan of park redevelopment, nevertheless. 
The prospectus planners began by attempting to estimate how many park visits 
there would be by 1966. Almost 800,000 had been recorded in 1954, up from 35,000 in 
1917 when the Paradise Inn opened, and 200,000 in 1927 when Vint was devising the 
first master plan. The planners' projection that within ten years yearly travel would 
"exceed one million" was conservative.207 The implications of this rise in the number of 
park visitors, nevertheless, dominated all other considerations. In his forward to the 
prospectus, Wirth stated that, above all, "provision must be made to relieve impact on 
fragile areas by this ever increasing visitor use." Throughout the document the basic 
strategy for achieving this end was stated repeatedly: "Except for camping, Mount 
Rainier will be a day -use park....With modern means of transportation it is no longer 
necessary that visitors remain in the park overnight to enjoy its scenic attractions and 
inspirational values. Areas immediately outside the park are available for the full 
development of visitor housing by private enterprise." Not even "trailer villages" were to 
be provided, because these were "another form of overnight housing," rather than true 
camping, and so should also be relegated to neighbouring towns. "Headquarters 
facilities" and staff housing were also to be moved to "more advantageous locations 
outside the park. "208 The 1955 Mount Rainier prospectus, the new model for Mission 66 
planning, was following what Vint might have called "Plan B," business not as usual.209 
There were many implications for the conceptual transformation of national parks 
into strictly a day use and overnight camping destination. Eliminating park hotel 
concessions, for example, could only begin when existing contracts expired. Even then, 
concessioners could be expected to rally opposition, particularly in parks where their 
"possessory interest" had not already been purchased. This was a principal reason why 
Wirth conducted early Mission 66 planning within what he liked to call "the Park Service 
207 "1966 Prospectus, Mount Rainier National Park," cover memorandum dated June 9, 1955 (Entry Al -1, 
RG 79, National Archives). There were more than 1,700,000 visitors to Mount Rainier in 1966. 
208 In this case, the park landscape architect, Ernest A. Davidson, had been advocating the removal of 
administrative facilities from the park since at least 1943. Catton, Wonderland: An Administrative History 
of Mount Rainier National Park, 496. Davidson worked for Vint from 1926 until his death in 1944, mostly 
as the Mount Rainier landscape architect. Vint particularly appreciated not only his design work, but his 
preservations sensibilities as well. See Carr, Wilderness By Design, 231. 
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family," which is to say in secret, at least as far as outside groups and the general public 
were concerned. The Mount Rainier prospectus also emphasized the idea of encouraging 
"private enterprise to develop overnight visitor housing outside the park, by eliminating 
such facilities within the park." Wirth was looking to get his agency out of the hotel 
business altogether at Mount Rainier, and he hoped to win political support for the plan 
by implying that park concessions were suppressing economic opportunities in gateway 
communities. The 1955 prospectus called for operation of the Mount Rainier hotels at 
Longmire, Paradise, and Ohanapecosh to be discontinued at the expiration of their 
contracts. The buildings would presumably then be removed. The "lack of such 
competition within the park," the planners asserted, would "hasten the trend" they had 
already observed of new tourist development in nearby towns, and in this way meet the 
need for overnight accommodations. 
The Mount Rainier prospectus also delineated a program of redevelopment that 
would structure a new relationship between the park and its public. "Automobile 
campgrounds" would be removed from "fragile areas" at high elevations (the Paradise 
and Yakima Park areas), but new campgrounds at lower elevations would be built for 
significantly larger numbers of cars and campers. Day use areas (picnic grounds) would 
be retained, improved, and expanded in size and number. At Paradise and Cayuse Pass, 
Wirth would bow to the desire for winter access, but without any overnight facilities. 
"Ski tows" would be provided, but only of a type that could be completely removed in 
summer. The prospectus also featured a new system of "park interpretive centres," 
including a central "day -use building" at Paradise that would replace the Paradise Inn and 
the Paradise Lodge. Each "interpretive centre" would have a theme, for example "glacial 
geology, flower and animal life" at the Paradise centre. At Longmire, a "public use 
building with auditorium" would replace the hotel there and serve as the main contact 
point, "strategically located on roads leading to nearby overnight accommodations 
outside the park. "21° The Mission 66 prospectus for Mount Rainier acknowledged the 
changing social and geographic context of the park. Mount Rainier, like Rocky 
Mountain, Great Smoky Mountains, Shenandoah, and others, had always had large 
numbers of visitors on day trips who drove from relatively nearby cities. Interstate 
209 "1966 Prospectus, Mount Rainier National Park," cover memorandum dated June 9, 1955 (Entry Al -1, 
RG 79, National Archives). 
210 "1966 Prospectus, Mount Rainier National Park," cover memorandum dated June 9, 1955 (Entry Al -1, 
RG 79, National Archives). 
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highway construction, more people in cars, and "suburbanization" around Puget Sound 
cities guaranteed that this trend would only increase. 
In this initial planning effort, a basic premise of the entire Mission 66 program 
immediately emerged: the impact of larger number of visitors in cars could be absorbed 
without "impairment" of the parks if the patterns and types of public use were rearranged. 
Overnight lodge visitors, for example, needed to become day use visitors. In other cases, 
lodges and campgrounds only needed to be relocated and redesigned rather than removed 
from the park; but they definitely needed to be sited away from overcrowded "precious" 
areas. The "difficult problem" of eliminating overnight accommodations in parks also 
immediately arose as a central challenge. Wirth exhorted his planners to make bold 
changes, reminding them that he had recently (and temporarily, it turned out) decided not 
to provide overnight facilities in the master plan for Everglades National Park.211 Wirth 
and his planners knew that soon all national parks would become more like Mount 
Rainier, with greater numbers of more mobile, essentially day use visitors. They had 
already observed the increase in motels and other businesses outside the entrances of 
many parks, in what were now described as "gateway towns." As these towns grew, they 
would provide the shops, housing, schools, and other amenities that both staff and visitors 
once expected "park villages" to provide. 
The model Mission 66 prospectus differed profoundly from the earlier master 
plans Vint and his staff had devised for Mount Rainier and every other park in the 
system.212 Vint's master plans had responded to the need to control the extent of park 
development -especially of new park roads -in the 1920s, when the first great wave of 
automotive tourism had arrived at many national parks. The plans often involved 
redeveloping and expanding earlier concessioner areas, which in many cases had been 
first established in close proximity to principal park destinations, such as the geyser 
basins of Yellowstone or the south rim of the Grand Canyon. Concessioners of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had located their businesses as closely as possible 
to important features, and eventually built their most memorable hotels there. The park 
villages Vint and his staff designed in the 1920s and 1930s typically did not reject the 
locations of existing park developed areas, but attempted to mitigate their presence even 
211 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 20. 
212 Many of these master plans are conserved in the cartographic division of the National Archives in 
College Park, Maryland. For descriptions of the master planning process, see Thomas C. Vint, "National 
Park Service Master Plans," in Planning and Civic Comment (Washington, DC: American Planning and 
Civic Association, 1946). 
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while expanding them. But even in cases where the locations of developed areas were 
having known deleterious effects on a park (such as the overnight cabins in Sequoia's 
Giant Forest) Vint could rarely propose relocating the development altogether.213 
Concessioners during this era were important partners who invested large amounts of 
capital in park facilities. As long as Mather and Albright embraced the concessioner 
partnership, it made little sense to recommend removing their improvements. Many of 
the hotels and other buildings in question had also been built relatively recently, and 
returns on initial investments were still being made. 
By the late 1930s, however, Vint had grown increasingly dissatisfied with his own 
master planning policy. If ever larger numbers of visitors were to continue to be 
accommodated, the necessary expansions of park villages would make it impossible to 
prevent them from overrunning and destroying park landscapes.214 Those policies had 
effectively responded to a previous generation of challenges, but by the end of World 
War II Vint was advocating a very different approach. By the postwar period, hotels built 
thirty or forty years earlier now required major rehabilitation, and demolition could be 
considered a reasonable -even desirable- alternative. A window of opportunity was 
opening, and Vint knew there would not be another for decades. Only at this point in the 
cycle of concessioner capital investment could the overall pattern of park development be 
seriously reorganized. 
The Mission 66 prospectus for Mount Rainier did suggest the redevelopment of 
some of the same developed areas (such as Paradise and Longmire) that concessioners 
had established at the beginning of the century. The existing road corridors would also 
continue to determine the basic pattern of public access. But the new iteration of national 
park planning- Mission 66 -would feature faster roads, larger campgrounds, 
"interpretive centres," and enlarged gateway communities. This new arrangement would 
213 Yosemite Village was one early "park village" that replaced the old, more ramshackle town in Yosemite 
Valley; in this case, however, the new village was only removed to the other side of the Merced River, as 
part of the elimination of multiple concessioners to make way for Mather's chosen monopoly, the Yosemite 
Park and Curry Company. The proposed relocation of Yellowstone's Canyon Village in the late 1930s was 
another important exception; the new Canyon Village was delayed, however, and in fact would end up 
becoming the first substantial accomplishment of the Mission 66 program. 
214 Vint's convictions in this regard were subsequently proven correct in cases where prewar park villages 
were expanded to meet postwar demand. At Yosemite Village, for example, the prewar village plan kept 
most buildings (except the Ahwahnee and the Yosemite Lodge) out of the park's main viewsheds and 
historic views. Postwar expansions of village facilities, however, created significant visual intrusions and 
impacts. This observation was proved through research and analysis done by landscape architect John 
Reynolds and Park Service general management planning staff in the 1970s. See: National Park Service, 
Draft Environmental Statement: General Management Plan, Yosemite National Park, California 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978). 
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allow for the demolition of the overnight accommodations and other buildings in the park 
villages. In larger or more remote parks, where overnight accommodations would still be 
needed, new lodges would be redesigned and relocated in areas where they could be more 
concentrated and would not damage or encroach on park scenery. The Mission 66 vision 
for national park planning indicated a genuinely new approach to accommodating the 
public. But the pilot Mission 66 prospectus for Mount Rainier also culminated the 
process that the prewar master plans had begun: it was the final step in modernizing the 
frontcountry landscape to allow convenient and unrestricted automotive tourism, while 
purportedly avoiding the "impairment" of park scenery and wildlife. 
8.7 Other Pilot Prospectuses 
Out of the experience of creating the Mount Rainier prospectus, the Mission 66 
team developed a generalized procedure for how other Mission 66 prospectuses would 
update and transform national park master plans. The first task was to "determine and 
state the important park resources." Following this inventory, planners were told to "fix a 
road and trail system" that would allow visitors to "see, experience, and enjoy the values 
to be derived from" the "important park resources" described at the beginning of the 
document. In the great majority of cases, such road and trail corridors already existed, 
but might require realignment, extension, or abbreviation. Then they should "determine 
what visitor facilities, other than roads and trails," would be required in order to "provide 
a reasonable opportunity to enjoy the Park resources" and meet "administrative 
.requirements...in terms of protecting [the park's] resources and providing visitor 
services." Finally they were to decide what land acquisition (boundary expansions or 
inholdings) should be recommended.215 The very short prospectuses were to be based on 
an analysis of the park master plans that had preceded them; but they were not to be in 
any way restricted by those plans or the assumptions implicit in them. The pilot study for 
Mount Rainier made it clear that a new set of priorities were to be considered. It was an 
approach that retained much of the traditional ideology of the Park Service - access for 
public enjoyment-by radically altering the premises of how plans for that access and 
enjoyment should be made. 
At a Park Service meeting that April in Shenandoah National Park, the Mount 
Rainier prospectus and the rest of the Mission 66 program were presented for the first 
215 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 22. 
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time to the agency's four regional directors. Stripped of their regional design staff in 
1954 and left out of Mission 66 planning in 1955, the regional directors were bound to 
have questions. Wirth, Garrison, and Carnes, made a full presentation of Mission 66 
goals and policies and discussed the results of the questionnaires sent out to parks the 
previous month. While the regional directors expressed full support, they also asked that 
their offices be more fully informed and involved in plans. Garrison and Carnes went on 
the road that month to visit all four regional offices and the WODC and EODC to answer 
questions about the program and to meet with newly formed "Mission 66 committees" in 
each region. It was also agreed that further pilot studies should be done that would 
illustrate a "cross section" of management concerns and park types. Wirth and his 
planners chose six more parks: Yellowstone and Everglades national parks, Chaco 
Canyon and Fort Laramie national monuments, Shiloh National Military Park, and 
Adams National Historic Site. A seventh pilot study, for. Mesa Verde National Park, was 
later added, and in this case the prospectus was to be prepared entirely by Region III staff 
in Santa Fe. 
For the Mission 66 staff in Washington, work continued apace as the pilot study 
prospectuses were rapidly finished and further instructions were issued for regional 
offices and parks to prepare their own prospectuses for all the other parks in the system. 
On June 27, 1955, a third agency -wide informational memorandum reported on progress 
and gave a deadline. The Mount Rainier prospectus was considered "completed," and the 
other pilots were well advanced. "Additional precepts" for Mission 66 planning, and 
brochures filled with "pertinent facts" for the public were being written and designed. 
The goal remained to have the entire program outlined by that September. To accomplish 
this, Wirth insisted a Mission 66 prospectus would be "made by, or for, each area...not 
later than July 20."216 Parks with adequate staff would prepare them themselves. Others 
would rely on regional, WODC, and EODC staff. The "studies" were to begin 
immediately and submitted to Washington and the appropriate regional and design offices 
for review. Any comments from the regions had to be made in writing by July 31, or the 
Mission 66 staff in Washington would assume the prospectuses had been approved. 
Other instructions indicated the general prospectus outline. In a "narrative plan for 
protection, development, interpretation, and operation," superintendents were expected to 
make a statement of their park's "significance," inventory their "problems," record public 
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use "patterns," and outline ideal interpretive, development, and operating plans. 
Superintendents were not to be limited by any "development requirements" their plans 
might incur, but they were to always remember foremost the "necessity of preserving 
park values" that might be destroyed by too much development. Once the prospectuses 
were approved, the Washington and regional offices were to coordinate the preparation of 
rough budget estimates. 
A document titled "Principles Guiding Pilot Studies" was distributed as an 
attachment to the memorandum. The new principles indicated a change in emphasis from 
the initial planning guidelines distributed three months earlier. The first principle listed 
now was to secure "greater participation of private enterprise," especially for providing 
overnight accommodations. Presumably this referred to private development in gateway 
towns, in addition to new concessioner investments in the parks. The second principle 
concerned "locating visitor accommodations" in attractive and accessible locations that 
would "not encroach on major park features," a policy that obviously implied only 
relocating, not removing, park concessions. There was no mention of specifically 
converting parks to day use only; but new facilities should be "geared to meet conditions 
imposed by modern means of transportation, and modem leisure time habits." The new 
principles also emphasized "spreading" park use seasonally, and from overcrowded areas 
to less visited ones. The principles also specifically cited the need for a "coordinated 
nation -wide recreation plan leading to a nation -wide system of recreation facilities," the 
first time the Mission 66 planners had suggested how their work might be coordinated 
with other federal and land management agencies. But they did not suggest new 
legislation would be necessary, referring instead to the "intent" of the 1936 Park, 
Parkway, and Recreational -Area Study Act. These "principles" issued in June were 
decidedly less radical in tone than the initial policies outlined in March. The reactions to 
Mission 66 had already begun to reshape the program, if still only subtly at this point.217 
The memorandum also included an indication of the considerable political 
excitement that Mission 66 had already generated in less than six months. "Word of the 
objectives and purposes of Mission 66 has reached high places," Wirth intoned, and "the 
Service has been asked to present the subject to the President and his Cabinet." Although 
216 Emphasis in original. "Informational Memorandum No. 3, Mission 66, Progress and Procedures," June 
27, 1955, (Box A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
217 "Informational Memorandum No. 3, Mission 66, Progress and Procedures," June 27, 1955, (Box 
A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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Wirth did not know it at the time, Maxwell M. Rabb, Eisenhower's Secretary to the 
Cabinet, had come up with the idea of a cabinet presentation on the subject of national 
parks after reading an editorial, "We've Been Starving Our National Parks," in The 
Saturday Evening Post that February. 218 Rabb's assistant, Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., was 
taken with the idea and volunteered to work with Interior officials to arrange it. Patterson 
contacted Secretary McKay, and by May the Mission 66 staff began preparations for the 
meeting, which (after several postponements) finally occurred the following January.219 
Rabb's interest in national parks probably resulted from the steady barrage of negative 
press that was taking place, not any knowledge of the Mission 66 plans.22° But whatever 
the reasons for it, after only six months of planning the Park Service was asked to present 
its program directly to Eisenhower. Not since Roosevelt's involvement in the CCC had a 
chief executive potentially been so directly interested in Park Service operations. Wirth's 
bureaucratic facility, it seemed, was working again, putting his agency back into the 
forefront of federal recreational planning. 
The rapid excitement Wirth had generated also attracted interest -and concerns- 
from other groups. In the same June memorandum in which he reported Eisenhower's 
request, Wirth also warned that "rumours unfounded in fact... in connection with Mission 
66" had come to his attention. These were harmless, he insisted, as long as they remained 
"confined to the Service family." But clearly they had not. Park concessioners and the 
residents of gateway towns, in particular, were susceptible to "misunderstandings arising 
out of rumours." Conservation groups were also already concerned about a program that 
they knew nothing about, except that it would have enormous impacts on the parks. 
Wirth then offered some arguments for assuaging these concerns. "We must not look 
upon the Mission 66 program merely as a convenient vehicle through which to secure 
maximum park developments in a minimum of time," he insisted. Each park would be 
considered individually. In some cases new developments would be "curtailed sharply," 
but in others they would not; in some parks "concessioners facilities [would] be 
removed," but in other cases they would be "recommended for considerable 
expansion. /,221 Although these qualifications could hardly be described as backtracking in 
218 The Saturday Evening Post, "We've Been Starving Our National Parks," The Saturday Evening Post 
227, no. 33 (February 12, 1955): 10. 
219 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 65 -66. 
220 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 252. 
221 "Informational Memorandum No. 3, Mission 66, Progress and Procedures," June '?7, 1955, (Box 
A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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a program that still had not even been officially launched, they reinforced the less radical 
tone of the revised "principles" that were attached to the memorandum. 
Rumours of the type that concerned Wirth were inevitable, though, since the Park 
Service had offered a compelling vision at this point, but no specifics at all, at least not to 
anyone outside the "family." The director had been as indefatigable as his staff, 
travelling, speaking, and publishing on Park Service activities and priorities. In a number 
of public speeches and articles, Wirth described a "broad study" that was underway, but 
did not go into detail. One reason was clear: even with the great speed at which new 
plans were drawn up, specific -and controversial -examples of just what the new 
program would mean for individual parks were not available, or at least were not ready to 
be presented. Wirth also did not yet use the term "Mission 66" in speeches or published 
articles. Apparently the mission was to be a secret one until its official unveiling in 
September at Great Smoky Mountains National Park.222 While many undoubtedly knew 
something important was happening, the secrecy and speed with which Mission 66 was 
being assembled enhanced interest both in government and among the press. But in some 
quarters it also spawned resentment. Wirth was succeeding with the Eisenhower 
administration, but vital partners, including conservation groups and park concessioners, 
already realized that Mission 66 was indeed being planned like a top- secret wartime 
mission, without any participation from them or the public. 
Wirth maintained close relationships with certain interest groups, however, a fact 
which may have further alienated wilderness advocates at the Sierra Club, the National 
Parks Association, and the Wilderness Society. Automobile clubs and oil companies, for 
example, had obvious interests in automotive tourism, and as Congress prepared to 
increase highway spending, they helped Wirth secure a share of federal -aid highway 
appropriations specifically for park roads. The American Automobile Association (AAA) 
helped secure a $67 million authorization for national park road and parkway construction 
as part of the Federal Highway Act signed in May 1954. The authorization was spread 
over the next three years, and as a result Congress made a $23 million park highway 
222 For examples of speeches in which Wirth hints at, but does not use the term, "Mission 66," see "Parks, 
Their Planning, and Some of Their Problems," given at the Annual Recreation Conference at the University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst, March 11, 1955; "An Adequate Park System for 300 Million People," given at 
the National Citizens Planning Conference on Parks and Open Spaces in Washington, DC, May 24, 1955; 
"The Landscape Architect in National Park Work," given in Detroit to the American Society of Landscape 
Architects in June 1955, and later published in Landscape Architecture 46, no. 1 (October 1955): 13 -18. 
All the above and other speeches by Wirth are in Box 4 of the Conrad L. Wirth Collection, American 
Heritage Centre, University of Wyoming. 
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appropriation in 1955. Although limited to road and parkway construction, the amount 
doubled the total Park Service's construction budget for fiscal year 1956 and presaged the 
greater increases that would be made under Mission 66 the next year.223 
Wirth knew how effective the AAA and other allies could be on Capitol Hill, and 
he worked closely with AAA executive vice president Russell E. Singer, and Michael 
Frome, the group's public relations director at the time. Already in December 1953 the 
AAA hosted a private dinner at the Metropolitan Club at which Wirth presented a 
brochure, National Park System - Present and Future, that included the kind of statistics 
and policy analysis that would become the basis of Mission 66. The dinner was attended 
by Secretary of the Interior McKay, Laurance S. Rockefeller, National Geographic editor 
Melville Bell Grosvenor, and several influential members of Congress, including Gerald 
P. Nye of South Dakota and Burton K. Wheeler of Montana. The evening recalled the 
many dinners Mather had held in the 1920s at the Cosmos Club in order to enlist and 
develop park support. In this case, however, it was the AAA organizing the effort, which 
it followed up with another event in December 1954, themed as an "American Pioneer 
Dinner," and held in another downtown hote1.224 Again the AAA hosted McKay, Wirth, 
and other officials, to participate in a "new evaluation of the role of the parks in the 
pattern of our national life." Singer asked Wirth to give a presentation to "show the parks 
in their proper perspective and to bring the discussion into focus." Wirth responded with 
a thorough presentation of statistics, images, and proposed policy initiatives, in a series of 
charts, graphs, and photographs. The material presented to the AAA and certain members 
of Congress at these private dinners indicated the basic justifications and organization of 
what Wirth would soon describe as Mission 66.225 There are no records of similar 
presentations to conservation groups in late 1954 or early 1955. At the time, perhaps, the 
political influence of the AAA made their friendship and support more valuable to Wirth 
in his dealings with a Congress that, at that point, had shown little willingness to fund any 
aspect of park improvements except park road construction. 
223 Conrad L. Wirth to Russell E. Singer, June 30, 1955 (Box 25, Conrad L. Wirth Collection, American 
Heritage Centre, University of Wyoming); Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1954 Annual 
Report, 339 -340; Rettie, Our National Park System, 251. 
224 Michael Frome, Greenspeak: Fifty Years of Environmental Muckraking and Advocacy (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 2002), 15. 
225 Russell E. Singer to Conrad L. Wirth, December 1, 1954; Conrad L. Wirth, "The National Park System 
Present and Future," presentation text, (Box A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers 
Ferry Center); Conrad L. Wirth to Russell E. Singer, June 30, 1955 (Box 25, Conrad L. Wirth Collection, 
American Heritage Centre, University of Wyoming). 
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The Mission 66 planners assembling their program during 1955, however, did so 
independently, even secretly by today's standards, and no evidence suggests that the 
AAA or any private corporation directly influenced the preparation of prospectuses and 
policies any more than conservation groups did. The Mission 66 planners did employ at 
least one scientific survey of public opinion. In the spring of 1955 the Jackson Hole 
Preserve, Inc., (a group funded by the Rockefeller family) agreed to pay for a professional 
"survey of the public concerning the national parks," conducted by a Princeton, New 
Jersey market research firm. The survey was conducted that summer and published in 
December. The results further reinforced already strong convictions among Park Service 
planning staff about the general direction of the Mission 66 program. Among the more 
than 1,700 members of the public who filled out the ten -page "Gallup survey," the three 
most common complaints about the parks concerned overcrowding, lack of overnight 
facilities, and lack of restaurants and other concessions. Among people who had visited 
parks between 1951 and 1955, about 70% reported their visit lasted one day or less, 50% 
were day trippers or had spent the night far from the park, and 20% spent the night in 
nearby gateway towns. Of the 30% that spent the night in a park, when asked what type 
of accommodations they would prefer almost 80% said motel or tourist cabin. Only 8% 
preferred hotels, while 14% wanted a campground.226 They were virtually all travelling 
by car, and their preferences for park accommodations, like their travel arrangements in 
general, seemed to be determined mostly by considerations of expense and convenience. 
While the survey was underway, Mission 66 staff also received the various 
"questionnaires" and requests for comments that had been sent out tò park 
superintendents that spring. Extensive "interviews" had also been conducted with chosen 
park managers. The working staff considered and summarized all of the concerns and 
opinions described.227 
Of the eight pilot studies underway, two incited no controversy. At the Adams 
National Historical Site in Quincy, Massachusetts, Regional Director Daniel J. Tobin, 
Hodge Hanson of the EODC, and the Mission 66 steering committee reviewed and 
accepted the working staff's prospectus for the park with no changes. Wilhelmina Harris, 
the site's superintendent, was not present at the meeting, but presumably agreed with the 
226 Audience Research, Inc., "A Survey of the Public Concerning National Parks," unpublished report, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1955, (National Park Service Technical Information Centre); Appleman, "A History 
of the Mission 66 Program," 55 -57; Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 244 -249. 
227 Appleman includes a ten -page summary of the concerns of Park Service managers and staff. Appleman, 
"A History of the Mission 66 Program," 22 -32. 
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basic outline of the prospectus since it did not contradict the principles she already 
espoused. In 1962 she described these goals as keeping "the house and grounds looking 
as if the Adamses had just stepped out. Modern intrusions and development facilities will 
be located on additional acquired property so as to leave the original gift of land and 
intact buildings [made in 1946] with their authentic flavor....As long as this is continued, 
`living history' will be felt." The site's exceptional integrity needed to be "preserved 
inviolate," and adjacent small parcels of land should be acquired as the postwar 
"megalopolis" of Boston encroached. The planners easily reached a consensus with 
Harris and others interested in the management of the property that had housed four 
generations of the illustrious Adams family between 1787 and 1927. The plans for Shiloh 
National Military Park in Tennessee also were quickly resolved. Superintendent Ira B. 
Lykes and regional staff quickly agreed with the Mission 66 staff on the proposed outline 
of management for the Civil War battlefield and cemetery.228 
In other cases, strong willed park superintendents forced the Mission 66 planners 
to reverse course that summer. At Fort Laramie National Monument (later redesignated a 
National Historic Site) in Wyoming, Superintendent David L. Hieb and Regional 
Landscape Architect Harvey P. Benson came to Washington to argue that the master plan 
they had developed should not be replaced by the new Mission 66 prospectus. In this 
case the working staff had attempted to simplify and accelerate the development of the 
park by converting an existing barracks for visitor use rather than acquiring additional 
land to build a new facility on the other side of Laramie Creek. The superintendent 
reacted angrily, and won over the steering committee, including Vint. After "heated 
discussion," the working staff revised the prospectus to reflect the original master plan. 
In the discussions over plans for Chaco Canyon National Monument (later Chaco Culture 
National Historical Park) in New Mexico, Superintendent Glen D. Bean and Regional 
Landscape Architect Jerome C. Miller again took the working staff to task, demanding 
that the existing master plan be the basis of the new prospectus. In this case the original 
plan called for a road and visitor facilities on the canyon floor. The working staff 
suggested relocating both to the canyon rim where they would be less obtrusive, but 
would require visitors to hike down to the canyon floor for a closer look at the ruins. 
228 "Master Plan for the Preservation and Use of Adams National Historic Site," December 1962, (National 
Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); Katherine Lacy, Cultural Landscape Report: 
Adams National Historic Site (Brookline, Massachusetts: National Park Service, Olmsted Centre for 
Landscape Preservation, 1997), 63 -64; Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 50 -51. 
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Once again, however, the steering committee capitulated and the prospectus reverted to 
the earlier plan.229 
At Mesa Verde National Park in Colorado, the regional office in Santa Fe had 
apparently insisted that they would prepare the pilot prospectus themselves, bypassing the 
Mission 66 staff. Regional office staff in this case wanted to relocate the lodge, 
restaurant, headquarters, employee residences, and other facilities which since the 1920s 
had been centralized at Spruce Tree Point, near the site's most famous (and delicate) 
ruins. Since then the number of annual visitors had climbed to 42,000 in 1941 and to 
125,000 in 1952; they expected the latter figure would more than double by 1966. 
Regional office staff decided that Mission 66 offered the "impetus necessary" to reverse 
conditions that were "stifling visitor enjoyment and causing deterioration of the physical 
environment at Spruce Tree Point." Mission 66 working and steering committees were 
not able to agree with the regional staff on the overall strategy for redevelopment, and in 
1955 the Mesa Verde prospectus was "kept under continuing study." 
Appleman reported that the three remaining pilot prospectuses, for Yellowstone, 
Everglades, and Mount Rainier national parks, were "accepted," subject to revisions. 
This characterization proved to be inaccurate, considering the contentious debate that 
would continue around Mission 66 planning for all of these parks for years to come. But 
as Appleman conceded dryly in his 1958 history, the preparation of the first prospectuses 
in 1955 "showed all too clearly that it was not easy always to solve specific problems by 
the application of a fine -sounding principle. "230 
229 "Tentative 1966 Prospectus for Fort Laramie National Monument," June 22, 1955, (National Park 
Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); "Tentative Prospectus for Chaco Canyon National 
Monument," July 20, 1955; "Draft Mission 66 Prospectus for Chaco Canyon National Monument," August 
8, 1955, (National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); Appleman, "A History of the 
Mission 66 Program," 50 -53. 
230 He made the comment regarding Everglades National Park, specifically. Appleman, "A History of the 
Mission 66 Program," 49. 
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Chapter 9: Final Policies for Mission 66: "Our Heritage" 
9.1 Mission 66 "Precepts" 
Lon Garrison, the chairman of the steering committee, served as Wirth's most 
trusted lieutenant for the early planning of Mission 66. Thomas Vint of course had 
greater experience, and Vint's protégé and head of the working staff, Bill Carnes, was 
another landscape architect with decades of experience. But it was the former park 
superintendent and "chief ranger," Garrison, who led the Mission 66 staff in Washington 
and who became the most important early representative of the program, with the 
exception of Wirth himself. 
Garrison may not have had experience in design and construction, but he had 
credibility with park managers, and he helped cast Mission 66 policy in terms that 
resonated with field personnel. Since at least March Garrison had been drafting the 
"Guiding Precepts of Mission 66." The precepts reflected the views and contributions of 
many, but ultimately only Wirth had greater influence on the articulation of the ideas 
presented. The precepts reiterated the basic themes of Park Service policy that informed 
the entire Mission 66 project: "Visitor enjoyment" of parks was the "best means of 
protecting them against exploitation or encroachment "; visitors must be "channeled to 
avoid overuse" and deterioration in certain areas; "channeling use" in this way required 
"proper development." Mission 66 would therefore be a "use and development program" 
that would achieve the "preservation objectives of the Service. "231 
By August the "precepts" had reached a final form and became the first section of 
the "MISSION 66 Report" drafted in September for presentation at the Great Smokies 
conference. Additional "discussion sections" elaborated the precepts. "All visitors 
desiring to enter a national park," the planners had agreed, "may do so," whether by 
private vehicles, "drive- yourself' rentals, or permitted tour buses. "Limitations on 
numbers are not to be considered except for certain...ruins or buildings which...require 
limits." In his draft, Garrison even crossed out "limits" and replaced the word with 
"restrictions." Wirth and his planners, who reexamined almost every aspect of national 
231 "Steering Committee Precepts for Staff Guidance," unsigned draft [Garrison], March 1955, (Box A8213, 
National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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park operations at this time, never seriously discussed options for imposing limits on the 
numbers of people entering national parks. 
The question of limiting the number of park visitors had been raised by field staff, 
however, including then superintendent of Sequoia Kings Canyon, Eivend T. Scoyen.232 
Garrison therefore addressed the matter -and quickly dismissed it -in the draft Mission 
66 "precepts," as well as in subsequent published articles. Garrison, along with Wirth, 
Vint, Carnes, and probably almost all of the Mission 66 planners, strongly believed that 
expanded use of the parks could occur without impairing them. Success would require 
reconceptualizing how parks should function as public places, and redeveloping them 
accordingly. Making parks into day use destinations, for example, could be achieved 
with wider roads, larger parking lots, and expanded "visitor use centres" to provide ample 
interpretive displays, bathrooms, and administrative areas for larger numbers of people. 
Limiting public access to parks would therefore not be necessary. It would have also 
betrayed fundamental principles of what national parks, as public parks, were intended to 
achieve. But while visitors would not be turned away, neither would they be "guaranteed 
overnight or meal facilities" in every park. The new iteration of the national park idea 
was intended to save the parks as truly public parks, even under the greatly increased 
pressures of the postwar era.233 
Other wide ranging "discussions" were recorded by Garrison as the policy of the 
Mission 66 program matured that August. The "interpretive presentation" of a park or 
historic site should "take full advantage of the actual scene, object, or structure as the 
interpretive exhibit." This implied the location of roads, trails, and "visitor use centres" 
near the historic landscapes and natural features that were to be interpreted by the Park 
Service and enjoyed by the public. On the other hand, where concession hotels 
encroached on natural or historic scenes, they would be removed and replaced by 
businesses outside the park, or by new concessions sited in less sensitive areas. At parks 
where "public accommodations in the immediate vicinity" of the park were available or 
could be developed, hotels within park boundaries would eventually be demolished, 
depending on the limitations of existing concession contracts. When overnight 
accommodations were considered necessary in a park, because of remoteness and public 
232 Eivend T. Scoyen to Lemuel A. Garrison, March 8, 1955, (Box A8213, National Park Service History 
Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
233 Lemuel A. Garrison, "Guiding Precepts Mission 66," draft memorandum, August 29, 1955, (Box A8213, 
National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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"travel patterns" within parks, "competition in providing concession facilities" would be 
encouraged by seeking new concessioners, and sometimes multiple concessioners. Park 
Service administrative and maintenance buildings would be relocated according to the 
same priorities, removing them from parks wherever it was deemed practicable.234 
Wirth and Garrison described Mission 66 that summer in terms that seriously 
revised the logistical model Mather and Albright had created for how national parks 
should function. A new planning archetype was taking shape, one that responded to 
postwar travel patterns and social trends. Writing for magazines such as American 
Forests, and National Park Magazine, Wirth and Garrison raised the curtain on Mission 
66 that August, describing it as an accomplished fact: "MISSION 66 has been organized 
in the National Park Service offices," Garrison announced, "to produce a comprehensive 
and integrated program of uses and preservation that will harmonize with the Service's 
obligations under the Act of 1916." He went on to summarize the Mission 66 "precepts," 
addressing at more length the question of visitor restrictions, particularly for the readers 
of National Parks Magazine: "One of the common suggestions in the MISSION 66 study 
is that quotas should be established to limit the number of people who may visit an area. 
Many of the historical areas are self -limiting; but it is the opinion of the committee and 
the staff of MISSION 66 that, in the great natural areas, quotas are not necessary at this 
time. Rather, modern traffic handling methods and proper development to achieve 
protection and interpretation will enable most existing visitor locations to accommodate 
the crowds anticipated in 1966." Wirth described his program in historical terms, 
"supporting the ideals and the vision of the pioneers of the national park movement," 
through an "intensive study of all the problems facing the National Park Service - 
protection, staffing, interpretation, use, development, financing, needed legislation, forest 
protection, fire." He and his staff had developed "experimental precepts to guide 
themselves and park staff in the certain pilot studies to test the validity of their new 
thinking." Wirth rejected the idea of "rationing park use" as well: "The principle that is 
guiding the MISSION 66 Committee and Staff is that the parks belong to the people, and 
they have a right to use them" (emphasis in original). Redevelopment, and the "spread" 
of visitor use both geographically and seasonally, would make it possible.23' 
234 Lemuel A. Garrison, "Guiding Precepts Mission 66," draft memorandum, August 29, 1955, (Box 
A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
235 Lemuel A. Garrison, "Mission 66," National Parks Magazine 29, no. 122 (July- September 1955): 107- 
108; Conrad L. Wirth, "Mission 66," American Forests 61, no. 8 (August 1955): 16 -17. 
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As word of the still mysterious Mission 66 program reached those outside the 
Park Service, concerns and questions immediately surfaced. C. Edward Graves of the 
National Parks Association responded to a presentation by Wirth that August by 
denouncing Mission 66 as a "secret effort to develop a body of policies on a bureaucratic 
basis without participation by the public." He doubted that the Park Service would be 
flexible enough "to be altered by the impact of public opinion," now that such advice was 
finally being sought. Wirth responded with a repeat of his manifesto, which Graves had 
already heard him present personally to National Parks Association board members. 
Wirth added curtly that since the program was about to be presented to the Bureau of the 
Budget and Congress, "the details contained in it cannot be made public." Sounding all 
too officious, he informed Graves that his agency was not waiting for the "approval or 
disapproval" of "friends of the parks outside the Service." Although "the course of action 
to be followed" would be "affected considerably by public opinion," decisions affecting 
the park system "must rest with those specifically charged with responsibility." A similar 
response also soon went out to the president of the Sierra Club, Alexander Hildebrand, 
who also expressed concerns about "secrecy" in a series of letters requesting detailed 
information on plans for the Sierran parks. Wirth needlessly offended the Sierra Club and 
other conservation groups by refusing to bring them into the planning process. 
Negotiations with both Congress and park concessioners certainly did require some 
confidentiality, but the good will of the conservationists probably could have been won at 
the time with even perfunctory consideration. Wirth responded to them with none of the 
solicitation and warmth he showed other allies, such as the AAA. Suspicion of secrecy 
soon hardened into an adversarial conviction that Wirth and his staff intended to retain 
absolute authority over Mission 66 plans and would not share details until all significant 
decisions had been made. A struggle over who had the right to participate in national 
park planning began as soon as Mission 66 became public knowledge.236 
Wirth was understandably preoccupied, at the time, with the intense pressure he 
had put on himself and his staff to be ready to present Mission 66 at the Public Services 
Conference held at Great Smoky Mountains National Park from September 19 to 24. By 
this time Mission 66 completely engaged Park Service staff all over the country, affecting 
236 C. Edward Graves to Conrad L. Wirth, September 10, 1955; Conrad L. Wirth to C. Edward Graves, 
October 31, 1955; Conrad L. Wirth to Alexander Hildebrand, November 7, 1955; Alexander Hildebrand to 
Conrad L. Wirth, November 22, 1955, (Box A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers 
Ferry Center). 
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their daily activities and duties as well as the entire institutional culture of the agency. 
Wirth had demanded that his Washington staff, with extensive help from regional and 
park staff, complete the eight pilot prospectuses, finalize the written "principles guiding 
the study," and draft any legislation considered necessary. He also asked for an "all - 
inclusive statement and budget" of the program in the form of a "brief, popular -style 
book," filled with charts, tables, and photographs, for distribution to the press, public, and 
members of Congress. The details of the program would be assembled in a longer report 
with chapters on every aspect of the initiative, which was intended to serve as the "bible" 
that would guide the program over the next ten years. "Everyone on the Staff felt that the 
Director had given a pretty heavy assignment," Appleman reported; but there was more. 
In addition to preparing for the September conference, Wirth also asked that the entire 
program, including draft prospectuses and budget estimates for most of the 194 parks and 
historic sites of the park system, be in a completed form by the end of the year in order to 
be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for approval in December.237 With approval 
from that office, the appropriations process could begin early in 1956, making it possible 
for Congress to act by the end June, in time to launch Mission 66 at the beginning of 
fiscal year 1957 (July 1, 1956). Not only would the overall costs of the program need to 
be estimated, but they would need to be broken down into annual appropriations requests 
covering the next ten years 238 
Wirth and his staff presented their work on September 20. The conference of 
about 200 superintendents and other officials was dominated by an extended discussion of 
the Mission 66 program. The mystery surrounding the details of the program, and 
perhaps word of Eisenhower's personal interest in it, also made the conference a major 
public relations event. Papers from all over the country covered the story. The Mission 
66 staff managed to have ready an illustrated booklet, "The National Park System," and a 
longer "MISSION 66 Report," still in draft form and without the budget estimates (figs. 
27, 28).239 All the pilot prospectuses were "complete" (if hardly completely settled), 
except for Yellowstone, where negotiations with the concessioner William Nichols had 
237 Mission 66 planners counted 180 units of the park system in 1955; Dwight Rettie's recent study suggests 
there were 194. The discrepancy is apparently the result of how certain "affiliated areas" and national 
cemeteries were and are counted. Rettie's figures are used here for the sake of consistency. Rettie, Our 
National Park System, 252 -253. 
238 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 250 -251; Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 58- 
63. 
239 "The National Park System," National Park Service brochure, n.d. [1955]; "MISSION 66 Report," 
unpublished report, September 1955, (National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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taken a sudden turn that August.240 The staff also prepared Wirth's presentation, which 
described the full scope of Mission 66 and emphasized arguments intended to support 
huge budget requests soon to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress. 
Garrison and Carnes made a more technical presentation of the details contained in the 
draft "MISSION 66 Report," including the final "precepts." They also "set up shop" in 
an adjoining room where superintendents could be briefed individually by Mission 66 
staff.241 
Wirth began his keynote speech by quoting statistics from the AAA and the 
National Association of Travel Organizations on the postwar phenomenon of travel to 
national parks: 48 million people visited parks in 1954, and at Yellowstone alone they 
spent $20 million in and near the park. "Pleasure travel is big business today," Wirth 
observed, and in "preserving and properly using the National Parks we are perpetuating a 
saleable commodity," one that contributed enormously to both big and small businesses 
all over the country. Then Wirth expressed his own version of the "unique paradox" of 
national park management: "To the extent we preserve them...and use them for their own 
inherent, noncommercial, human values, to that same degree do they contribute their part 
to the economic life of the nation." Parks were the one natural resource, in other words, 
that could boost modern progress only if it were not "used," in the traditional sense of 
logging, grazing, dam construction, or private resort development. But use by tourists -if 
done within the context of "proper" park development -could go on indefinitely without 
unacceptable "impairment" or loss. But it was time for the federal government to 
understand the economics of the situation, and make appropriate investments in this 
"important factor in the national economy." Low appropriations had made the Park 
Service incapable of protecting "irreplaceable features," and visitor enjoyment was 
suffering as well. "Masses of people" left the parks after visiting "with curiosity 
unsatisfied and enjoyment and appreciation incomplete -all because we do not have the 
facilities nor the personnel to help them know and comprehend what it is they see." 
Wirth emphasized the economic importance of the parks, and then implied that good 
business practices, if nothing else, demanded an investment before the tangible and 
intangible benefits of the park system were lost forever. He reiterated Progressive Era 
justifications for federal park making in a way that Stephen Mather would have admired, 
240 Lemuel A. Garrison to Edmund B. Rogers, August 6, 1955, (Box A -247, Yellowstone National Park 
Archives). 
241 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 62. 
141 
and added an indictment of budget policies that now threatened to destroy the parks and 
their very considerable economic and social dividends.242 
Wirth refrained from giving the details of proposed budgets, but the broad scope 
and policy of the program was delineated. The draft "MISSION 66 Report," which 
would be the basis of the report presented to Eisenhower and Congress the following 
January, described much more than a "development program." In addition to chapters on 
road, trail, concessions, housing, and other forms of capital development, the report 
outlined increased "operating needs" that would have to be met to run the modernized 
park system. While acknowledging that "personnel needs will not increase in direct 
proportion to increase in visitation," because of more efficient facilities and interpretive 
displays, the planners still estimated a 10% increase in "employee man- years" would be 
required for each of the ten years of Mission 66. Park staff engaged in a wide range of 
"management, protection, and interpretation" would also need to be expanded. This 
meant permanent increases in annual operating costs, not just a ten -year construction 
program. 
Park interpretation -the educational displays, materials and presentations that 
rangers made available in every park - received a particular emphasis in the report. The 
planners wanted new audio -visual media, such as slide shows and films, to assist in the 
overwhelming task of interpreting the significance of parks to thousands of visitors. The 
number of publications available was also to be increased systematically, with brochures 
and booklets written for specific age groups as well as for the general public. Museum 
and scientific collections required new facilities and trained persoimel, and the Historic 
Sites Survey and Historic American Buildings Survey, both inactive since 1941, would 
resume with Mission 66 funding. The need for agency personnel development and 
training were still being studied, but a "comprehensive training plan" was proposed as 
part of the program. "Area Investigations" of potential additions to the park system and 
"Comprehensive Boundary and Scientific Studies" for every park would contribute to a 
"National Park System Plan," that would make recommendations to "round out" the park 
system and make sure it represented a full range of "significant major types of areas," 
including "scenic, scientific, historic, seashore, etc." Existing "River Basin Studies" and 
242 "Public Services," agenda, September 20, 1955 (Box 6, Conrad L. Wirth Collection, University of 
Wyoming, American Heritage Centre); "Statement by Conrad L. Wirth, Public Services Conference," 
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Centre). 
142 
"Reservoir Recreation Area Planning" would continue and increase, as would 
"Archaeological Survey and Salvage" associated with them. Mission 66 would not 
merely physically redevelop the parks themselves; it would expand the national park 
system and return the Park Service to something that at least suggested its New Deal size 
and functions.243 
The setting of the September conference was particularly appropriate. Mission 66 
planners often cited Great Smoky Mountains as an example of how a day use -only 
national park could work. Authorized in 1926, Great Smoky Mountains was the most 
heavily visited park in the system, but it had never had overnight accommodations other 
than campgrounds. Gateway communities, especially Gatlinburg, Tennessee, provided 
all the motels, shops, and restaurants the travelling public desired. Mission 66 plans for 
the park called for road improvements and "visitor use centres," but no new motel 
concessions were deemed necessary. The Public Services Conference, in fact, was not 
actually held in the park, but in conference facilities in nearby Gatlinburg. 
The press coverage of the September conference included stories in The New York 
Times and many other papers. The Washington Post editorialized that "Congress ought to 
give a sympathetic ear" to the Mission 66 proposal. Papers from Eugene, to Salt Lake 
City, to Baltimore echoed the positive response, and Secretary of the Interior McKay 
gave his assurance that the administration would support Mission 66.244 Eisenhower, 
however, suffered a heart attack on September 23, while the Park Service conference was 
ongoing. The president, who had yet to give his official approval, remained convalescing 
in Denver for seven weeks. Already postponéd for scheduling reasons, the cabinet 
presentation was now delayed at least until his return. The Mission 66 staff was busier 
than ever that fall, nervously preparing final budget figures for Congress, as well as the 
presentation for Eisenhower. Anticipating a positive reception in Congress, Wirth asked 
the Bureau of the Budget to approve sending a request for increased appropriations that 
fall, which would have launched Mission 66 within fiscal year 1956. The Bureau of the 
243 "Statement by Conrad 1. Wirth, Public Services Conference," September 20, 1955 (Box 4, Conrad L. 
Wirth Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). 
244 Sydney Gruson, "U.S. Park Service Plans Expansion," The New York Times, September 20, 1955; 
"Mission 66," editorial, The Washington Post, October 17, 1955; "Digest of Newspaper Comment," 
November 9, 1955 (National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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Budget demurred, however, insisting that Eisenhower first be given time to personally 
review the details of the program.245 
9.2 "Our Heritage" 
By the end of the year, Wirth and his staff had accomplished a major bureaucratic 
and planning feat: the individual park prospectuses and other information and 
recommendations from the field all had been assembled and digested in Washington into 
a complete, ten -year Mission 66 proposal, dated January 1956. Reviewed and approved 
by McKay, the report included a complete annual budget breakdown, with $66 million 
proposed for fiscal year 1957 and annual increases building to $83 million in 1966. The 
total cost to the federal government, not including concessioner investments, would be 
$787 million over ten years. Only about $475 million of that total was for construction; 
the rest was for "management and protection" and "maintenance and rehabilitation" that 
the agency would need to do anyway. Mission 66 was not presented as a separate 
construction budget initiative, in other words, but as an overall increase in the agency's 
combined (operations and construction) annual budget. In fact it amounted to roughly 
doubling the agency's average combined annual appropriations. The agency's budget's 
never returned to previous levels; as presented in 1956, Mission 66 entailed a permanent 
expansion of the park system, park staff, and all the activities of the Park Service.246 
The report offered the most lucid summary of Mission 66 that would be made, and 
served as the "bible" that Wirth envisioned. It identified the trends, needs, and 
expectations that the planners had identified thoroughly over the previous eleven months. 
According to the plan, the increase from 50 million to 80 million annual visits by 1966 
could be accommodated. Day use visits by automobile would become the ever more 
dominant means of experiencing most parks. The "precepts" guiding the new program 
were largely unchanged: preservation and increased use would be accomplished together 
through redevelopment according to new policies. A slightly revised "8 -point program" 
245 Sydney Gruson, "M'Kay Reassures U.S. Park Experts," The New York Times, September 25, 1955; 
Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 252. 
246 In 1955 the combined agency budget had been less than $33 million; with federal highway money the 
1956 total was raised to almost $49 million. In presenting the cost of Mission 66 in his final report, Wirth 
took the proposed 1957 budget of about $66 million (assumed to be a normal or "base" budget), multiplied 
by ten, and subtracted from the $787 million estimated total for the 10 -year program. The difference, he 
suggested was the actual increase, or true cost, of Mission 66. The $787 million figure ended up being used 
anyway despite this effort to minimize the apparent cost. "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and 
Development of the National Park System for Human Use," January 1956, unpublished report, (National 
Park Service, Denver Service Center Library). 
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described the basic policies of Mission 66. Overnight accommodations would be 
expanded through "greater participation of private enterprise," meaning concessioner 
investments in the parks, or private businesses outside park boundaries. New public 
facilities and interpretive services would "improve the protection of the parks through 
visitor cooperation." Operating funds would be increased and field staff would be 
expanded, and provided with housing. Inholdings would be acquired, and "the protection 
and preservation of wilderness areas within the national park system" would be 
accomplished "in ways that will leave them unimpaired. "247 This last (eighth) point had 
not appeared in earlier draft versions. Appleman reported that "the Director and the Staff 
felt that Point 8 was superfluous," but they added it to assuage "the fears of certain 
conservationists" following the Gatlinburg conference. "Wilderness protection had never 
been an issue in the staff discussions," explained Appleman, because Wirth and his staff 
believed that Mission 66 "guaranteed wilderness protection" already. The entire purpose 
of redeveloping the parks was to "channel" public use into less destructive patterns; in 
most cases, they felt, this would not involve significant encroachment on wilderness, and 
on the contrary would help preserve it. But after Gatlinburg, Wirth began to hold 
monthly meetings with representatives of conservation groups. "Point 8" was added as a 
result.248 
The final report did not contain the individual park prospectuses that had been so 
quickly prepared. Most of them were still under internal review and would not be 
released to the public until the following spring, or later in some cases. The larger part of 
the final Mission 66 report, in fact, did not address specific construction proposals at all; 
it put forward an overall vision and budget for "managing and operating the system." The 
report introduced (or at least institutionalized) a new vocabulary for describing national 
park planning. The word "park" was defined specifically as any area administered by the 
Park Service, and "resources" were the "physical assets - historical, archaeological, 
scenic, or scientific- contained in a park." Resources could be either "primary 
resources" or "secondary assets," and "in general, the primary resources were "the scenic 
features that distinguish an area." Park "values" were the benefits that accrued through 
247 "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and Development of the National Park System for Human 
Use," January 1956, unpublished report, (National Park Service, Denver Service Center Library). 
248 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 75 -76. David Brower describes a meeting with 
Wirth late in 1955 in which he and Howard Zahniser asked for a greater emphasis on the preservation of 
wilderness as "the primary value of the parks." David R. Brower, "`Mission 65' Is Proposed by Reviewer 
(cont.) 
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use of resources, and "park visitor experience" was the "sum total of the many things a 
visitor does, his impressions, new concepts, emotional reactions and responses." 
"Overuse" existed whenever a resource was destroyed or damaged "in excess of the 
ability to recover," for example if a "basic alteration of the ecology of an area" resulted. 
Overuse also was indicated when there was an "impairment of opportunity of appropriate 
visitor experience (overcrowding of caves, historic houses, etc.) "249 
The Mission 66 report indicated desired levels of staffing at the park level to 
achieve adequate "protection" and "interpretation" of park landscapes and resources. The 
"services" of rangers, naturalists, and historians were described as necessary to assure the 
vital distinction between merely using recreational parks (typically state or local parks) 
and "understanding national park values." For the first time the term "visitor center" was 
used consistently to describe the "hub of the park interpretive program," where "museum 
exhibits, dioramas, relief models, recorded slide talks, and other graphic devices" would 
"help visitors understand the meaning of the park and its features, and how best to 
protect, use, and appreciate them." Visitor centres, interpretive walks, audio- visual 
presentations, roadside exhibits, publications, park museums and collections all were 
described as coordinated and essential parts of the new national park experience- 
summarized as "enjoyment without impairment" -that Mission 66 would make possible. 
The Mission 66 report further (and somewhat repetitiously) outlined policies in another 
"program" of fourteen points, beginning unambiguously with the "preservation of park 
resources" as the "basic requirement underlying all park management." The second point 
reiterated that "substantial and appropriate use" of the parks was the best means to realize 
their "basic purpose," as stated in the 1916 Park Service legislation. "Adequate and 
appropriate developments" therefore were required for "public use and appreciation of 
any area, and for the prevention of over -use." Also, "an adequate information and 
interpretive service" was essential to "proper park experience. "250 
The report described the situation of park concessioners in detail, particularly 
using the example of Yellowstone. The planners still asserted that "the only justification 
for a concession operation within a park is to supply needed visitor services that cannot 
of Park Service's New Brochure on Wilderness," National Parks Magazine 32, no. 132 (January 1958): 3- 
6, 45 -47. 
249 Howard R. Stagner, "Mission 66 Definitions," draft memorandum, July 18, 1955 (Box A8213, National 
Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
250 "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and Development of the National Park System for Human 
Use," January 1956, unpublished report, (National Park Service, Denver Service Center Library). 
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be provided satisfactorily in any other way." They nevertheless called for new 
concession developments that would greatly expand the capacity of overnight 
accommodations in cases where they had determined they were needed. The stated 
reasons for such a determination were first the remoteness of certain park destinations, 
which were too far from gateway communities for easy access, and second the "travel 
patterns" of visitors, which apparently referred to public expectations for overnight 
accommodations near certain popular destinations. The independent "Gallup survey" had 
reinforced the planners' conviction that the public wanted motel type accommodations, 
not hotels. In twenty -six large parks in which overnight accommodations were 
considered necessary or desirable, the Mission 66 planners called for an increase in the 
total overnight lodging capacity from 23,797 to 58,797. This dramatic expansion was 
calculated to keep pace with the overall rise in visitation, as well as a predicted rise in the 
proportion of visitors seeking overnight accommodations, a ratio that the planners raised 
from 1 in 3.8, to 1 in 3. There was no explanation for this increase, except that it 
accurately predicted future demand on the part of the travelling public. The total cost of 
such an expansion in the concessioner "pillow count" in the park system would reach $62 
million, with concessioners to provide $39 million of the total. 
The proposed construction budgets in the final report also redressed an imbalance 
that Wirth and Garrison had repeatedly deplored. Because Congress had been willing to 
pass federal -aid highway legislation, 80% of park construction budgets during the 
postwar period (up until 1956) had been dedicated specifically to park roads. While road 
spending would be slightly increased under Mission 66, most of the increase in 
construction would be in "buildings of all types, sewer, water, electric, and other 
utilities," addressing a "serious shortage in other types of [non- highway] development." 
The report emphasized the lack of overnight accommodations and dining facilities as top 
public concerns, as their "Gallup survey" had indicated. "Interpretive services, the results 
of which are a measure of protection," fell short of what was required. Increased 
operations budgets were as necessary as new construction for a balanced program. 
"Concentration on building roads without providing facilities for those who use them, or 
developing a park fully without providing adequate operating resources, does not solve 
problems; it creates them." Wirth also wanted it known that Mission 66 was "not a 
program for the construction of extensive road mileage." New roads would be built 
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mostly in new parks; 90% of proposed road construction would consist of "reconstruction 
and realignment" of existing roads.251 
The planners also described a "modest program of scientific and historical 
investigations and studies" that would be necessary for the "management of park 
resources." Mission 66 would be later criticized for not including a major scientific 
research component in a program that was so ambitious in other ways. The report 
justified research only as necessary for interpretive programs and publications, and 
therefore related directly to park management and "protection." Wirth and his planners 
considered a program of pure scientific research beyond the agency's mandate and 
unjustified as a budget category; the Bureau of the Budget and Congress probably would 
have agreed. The fmal Mission 66 report did include proposals for "wildlife 
conservation," noting that "the maintenance of animal species in harmony with their 
environments is not simply a matter of `letting nature take its course, ' and that the 
"techniques of managing wildlife in the islands of wilderness represented by the park 
areas are only partly developed." Much research needed to be done, the authors noted, 
particularly on the ecology of "overabundant hoofed animals and the maintenance of their 
range areas, the safeguarding of rare and threatened species, the reintroduction of 
extirpated species, the control of exotic animals and plants," and other management 
problems. But if issues were identified, the remedies described were short and vague. 
"An adequate biological program" was to be achieved by "strengthening" existing staff 
and efforts, and through "cooperative research agreements," and where needed, Park 
Service studies to "supplement cooperative activities." A budget for such biological 
research, however, was unspecified and included in the "over -all management and 
protection programs" of Mission 66.252 When compared to the detailed $475 million 
construction budget, it is obvious that Mission 66 was devised by landscape architects and 
park interpreters, not scientists. The priorities of the program reflected the reality that the 
Park Service's legislative mandate was to protect parks while facilitating public use of 
them, not to function as a scientific research institute. Nevertheless a historic opportunity 
251 "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and Development of the National Park System for Human 
Use," January 1956, unpublished report, (National Park Service, Denver Service Center Library). 
252 "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and Development of the National Park System for Human 
Use," January 1956, unpublished report, (National Park Service, Denver Service Center Library). 
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to increase and emphasize the role of scientific research in the management of the parks 
was not so much lost, as never found.253 
One major component of Mission 66 remained to be described in the final report: 
every decision and feature of the program needed to be put into the context of a larger 
national plan for meeting the postwar demand for outdoor recreational facilities. If Wirth 
failed to provide such a plan, Mission 66 would truly be no more than a "development" 
program, not a "conservation" program, as the planners repeatedly asserted it was. If 
there were no effort to coordinate state park and national forest development with 
proposed national park plans, aspects of Mission 66, such as the development of new 
concessioner motel complexes at Yellowstone, could easily be perceived as 
"overdeveloping" national parks without adequate study of alternatives to satisfy the 
postwar appetite for outdoor recreation. The lack of a meaningful component of public 
participation in Mission 66 planning only intensified the potential perception that Park 
Service planners, even if they were the most experienced park makers of their day, had 
failed to transcend the insular culture of their own agency and put their plans into a 
broader context of recreational land use. Unless Mission 66 were part of a convincing 
and coordinated strategy for national recreational planning, such a rapid and ambitious 
development program could and would be characterized as misguided, and finally terribly 
destructive. 
Wirth, however, had made his most important professional contributions as a 
national recreational planner. Since 1942 his ambition had been to resume the project of 
national recreational planning through whatever agency or funding was available. The 
final Mission 66 plan therefore included extensive descriptions of "Nationwide 
Recreation Planning," a project that had been "dropped before World War II" but would 
be "reestablished" through Mission 66. Wirth quoted extensively from the 1936 Park, 
Parkway, and Recreational -Area Study Act, and he insisted that the act would suffice for 
the completion of a national plan that would be the context - ultimately the justification - 
for whatever he proposed under Mission 66. But the 1936 legislation was not really a 
strong basis for the Park Service to continue to function as the nation's recreational 
planning agency. Wirth recognized this, because since at least early in 1955 his staff had 
been drafting legislation that would have given the Park Service various new powers, for 
example to authorize federal loans to concessioners, establish a revolving fund to build 
253 On the failure of Mission 66 to adequately fund biological research, see Sellars, Preserving Nature in the 
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park housing, or to build new facilities on federal lands that were not designated 
parklands.254 Wirth had spent his career developing the Park Service as the nation's 
principal recreational planning agency, and he dearly wanted legislative authority to 
renew and expand that responsibility for the postwar era. But while Wirth had great 
success with appropriations subcommittees, he failed with the congressional legislative 
committees whose support he needed for such initiatives. "We prepared bills and they 
were introduced," he later wrote, "but try as we might, they were never called up for 
hearings. Consequently we did the best we could without them. "255 
In his memoirs, the director describes his dealings with Congress in some 
detail.256 As Mather and Albright had, Wirth personally presented and defended his 
agency's budget requests and any other proposed legislation in Congress. Throughout his 
career he was known for his close relationships with members of Congress and his skilful 
dealings with their staffs. His warm relationships with appropriations subcommittee 
chairmen, especially Michael J. Kirwan in the House and Carl Hayden in the Senate, 
made Wirth a powerful advocate in the mid- 1950s. But in the end the director was forced 
to accept political limitations on what Mission 66 could aspire to be. Mission 66 never 
received a new legislative mandate that would have recast the agency's recreational 
planning authority. Legislation of that type was simply out of Wirth's reach politically, 
even as he attained greatly increased park appropriations. Wirth and his planners went 
ahead anyway and believed that Mission 66 could be "carried out under existing 
legislation." Congress tacitly approved of the idea of a "ten -year program," but it did so 
only through the annual appropriations process. No other legislation authorized a tén- 
year total for Mission 66 spending or strengthened the Park Service's role as a national 
recreational planning agency. This would prove to be a relatively weak foundation for 
any claims Wirth could make for Mission 66 as a national plan for recreational land use. 
But in January of 1955, the political future of the Mission 66 program looked 
bright. Eisenhower had returned to Washington, and in his State of the Union address 
that month he found time to ask Congress to support a major national park budget 
initiative that his administration was about to submit. On January 27, Wirth, with 
National Parks, 168 -173. 
254 "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and Development of the National Park System for Human 
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Garrison, Carnes, and Howard R. Stagner (assistant director of the Mission 66 working 
staff) finally made their long postponed cabinet presentation. Eisenhower's reaction, at 
that point, hardly could have been in doubt. Nevertheless Wirth recalled that no 
presentation "made before the cabinet, or perhaps anywhere else...had ever received so 
much preparation." Wirth presented a carefully scripted, "sixteen- minute" slide talk, and 
showed a "three- minute colour movie." The images emphasized overcrowded national 
park frontcountry scenes, with a very brief summary of what Mission 66 was intended to 
accomplish. Eisenhower asked only one, rather good question: "Why was this request not 
made back in 1953 ?" McKay answered it, reminding the president that his own 
administration's budget policies, until recently, had not allowed major new spending 
proposals for national parks. Indeed, as recently as 1954 McKay reorganized the Park 
Service with the stated intention of addressing problems solely by "increasing efficiency." 
But the time was now right. Wirth's alacrity in bringing a fully elaborated program to 
Eisenhower as quickly as possible, once the tide had turned, validated his political 
instincts.257 
Eisenhower gladly endorsed the program, but he had agreed in advance to write 
letters to Congress supporting only the 1957 annual budget request of $66 million, not the 
ten -year, $787 million figure. Mission 66 would be subject to the annual appropriations 
process and judged annually on its merits; there would be no separate authorizing 
legislation, as there soon would be for the Interstate Highway Act. Eisenhower officially 
endorsed the program, but if he or his administration officials subsequently felt the money 
was not well spent, that endorsement would simply evaporate. Samuel Dodd, an official 
at the Bureau of the Budget who had been a principal supporter of Mission 66, later gave 
the Park Service some direct advice on how to assure continued budgetary support: make 
sure that Mission 66 resulted in public facilities - buildings, road improvements, and 
other public services -as advertised. If the money were diverted to other purposes, even 
well justified ones, the Bureau of the Budget and Congress would conclude that Mission 
66 was merely building up a bureaucracy, or that it was a pretext for spending for other 
purposes. In either case, the increased level of funding would immediately be at risk in 
the next annual appropriation.258 
257 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 254; Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 63 -70; 
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On February 8, exactly one year after Wirth first presented Mission 66 to his staff 
at a Monday morning staff meeting, the Department of the Interior and the AAA jointly 
sponsored an elaborate dinner in the basement dining room of the Interior Building (fig. 
29). Like the smaller 1954 dinner hosted by the AAA, the event was again themed as an 
"American Pioneer Dinner." The state parks department of South Dakota provided the 
main course of elk and bison meat for the 350 guests. According to The New York Times, 
the evening was "the kick -off in a drive to win implementation" of the Mission 66 
program as Congress began the fiscal year 1957 appropriations process. Among the 
guests were sixty members of Congress, various Interior and other administration 
officials, and Horace Albright and the rest of the board of the American Civic and 
Planning Association. Other attendees included the leaders of numerous outdoor 
recreation and conservation groups, heads of state parks departments, and representatives 
of travel and tourism organizations. The photographer Ansel Adams provided prints of 
Yosemite views for the guests. But at least some "purists," including Devereux Butcher 
of the National Parks Association, were intentionally not invited.259 American 
Automobile Association Vice President Russell Singer served as "toastmaster," and spoke 
extensively about how he and his group had been "giving serious attention to the 
problems of the national parks," which could not be addressed just through increased 
appropriations, but also required reconsidering "the basic concept of these public lands," 
as represented by Mission 66. Wirth gave the slide and film presentation of his program, 
and also distributed copies of a new and expanded edition of the Mission 66 illustrated 
booklet aimed at a general audience. The bóoklet had been rewritten and redesigned by 
an outside public relations firm, all privately paid for along with the printing cost by 
unidentified "friends of the National Park Service." The full colour cover (a design 
suggested by Wirth himself) depicted the Liberty Bell, with the superimposed image of a 
man, woman, and two children. With professional illustrations and graphics, and a far 
snappier editorial voice, Our Heritage, A Plan for Its Protection and Use: "MISSION 66" 
was a powerful piece of promotional literature (fig. 30). The ideas and much of the text, 
however, were drawn from the earlier draft document, the final Mission 66 report, 
Wirth's Gatlinburg speech, and other Mission 66 reports and memoranda. The "8- point 
259 Frome, Greenspeak, 16. 
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plan" and the annualized $787 million budget were included, as were the guiding 
"precepts," in a final section on "how the plan was developed. "260 
Wirth also arranged for the Walt Disney company to provide a short film for the 
occasion, "Adventure in the National Parks," which was a compilation of excerpts from 
"The Living Desert" and "The Vanishing Prairie" (from the True -Life Adventure Series), 
two short movies that had been filmed in national parks. Wirth had genuine respect for 
Disney and for his company's nature films, which at the time were being broadcast as a 
part of Disney's evening television show. He even hoped that Disney himself would 
endorse Mission 66 in the film's introduction, since he was already doing so much to 
popularize the parks.261 The number of corporate sponsors, connections, and 
representatives at the 1956 American Pioneer Dinner illustrated Wirth's close relationship 
to tourist, automotive, and other private business interests. Since Stephen Mather's day, 
Park Service directors had formed alliances with leading business groups and local 
"boosters" who helped convince members of Congress to support park legislation and 
appropriations. In the business friendly climate of the Eisenhower years, Wirth cultivated 
this traditional convergence of interests and formed close friendships not only with the 
AAA, but with individual state automobile associations and oil companies. Phillips 
Petroleum, for example, soon paid for an informational brochure on Mission 66 and also 
issued a road map series highlighting the national park system. Sinclair Oil featured 
national parks in a series of print advertisements (figs. 31,32). 262 The centre spread image 
in Our Heritage (a full colour photograph of Jackson Hole and the Teton Range) was 
donated by Standard Oil of California. While there was nothing new or unethical about 
such donations and friendships, there is also no doubt that another special interest 
group -the conservation organizations -felt that they had lacked similar levels of access, 
and that their points of view had not significantly influenced Mission 66 planning. 
9.3 Appropriations 
Rapid success in Congress followed on the heels of the American Pioneer Dinner. 
The Eisenhower administration submitted a $66 million Park Service appropriation 
260Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 91 -94; William M. Blair, "Saving the. Parks," The 
New York Times, February 12, 1956; "Pioneer Dinner Launches Mission 66," National Parks Magazine 30, 
no. 125 (April 1956): 59 -60; National Park Service, Our Heritage, A Plan for Its Protection and Use: 
"MISSION 66" (Washington, DC: National Park Service, 1956). 
261 Conrad L. Wirth to Ben Sharpsteen, December 29, 1955 (Box 25, Conrad L. Wirth Collection, 
University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). 
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request to the Senate in February. The Appropriations Committee not only approved it 
but increased it to $68 million; the House approved the action before the end of the 
month. In fact members of Congress in both the House and the Senate had been 
following the progress of Mission 66 for some time, and a few members had begun to act 
on their own to secure funding. The House Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations not 
only approved the 1957 request, they agreed to a supplemental $17 million request that 
was made available immediately as part of fiscal year 1956.263 Congress, it seemed, had 
rediscovered the national parks. Total Park Service budgets over the text ten years would 
exceed $1 billion. By this measure, even critics of Mission 66 would have to 
acknowledge its success. Mission 66 introduced a new level of congressional support for 
the park system, one that has been maintained ever since 264 
The Department of the Interior gave Wirth its Citation for Distinguished Service 
that March, and over the coming year many who participated in Mission 66 planning 
would receive similar recognition. But even though Wirth and his planners had 
convinced Congress to begin a new era of park modernization, many of the details for 
what this would mean to individual parks had not yet been decided. Mission 66 
prospectuses for every park in the system had been submitted from the field by the end of 
1955, but preparations for the cabinet meeting and American Pioneer Dinner had delayed 
the review, revision, and final approval of the documents. As was the case with the pilot 
prospectuses, many of these plans involved heated debate and careful negotiation. In 
January 1956 Wirth had begun meeting with the Mission 66 staff in a series of Saturday 
and Sunday meetings dedicated to the review of the draft prospectuses sent in by 
superintendents all over the country. By March the review had been completed, as it 
needed to be since Mission 66 construction projects would begin that July with the new 
fiscal year. At that time, Wirth reminded his field staff that Mission 66 had "definitely 
gone beyond the stage of justification" and was "now in the action stage." 
Superintendents with concessioners in their parks were told to ask them to prepare plans 
262 Depai turent of the Interior, 1956 Annual Report, 303. 
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for how they intended to meet the investment responsibilities described for them in the 
prospectuses.265 Through the rest of 1956, the Washington Office was kept busy issuing 
press releases that accompanied the public "briefs," or summaries, of the Mission 66 
prospectuses for every park. New revisions of the prospectuses in many cases were 
released over the coming years. But to a remarkable degree, Mission 66 planning for 
both Park Service and concessioner facilities was completed in 1956, although in most 
cases the details of architectural and landscape design were still to be elaborated.266 
The administrative structure of the Park Service also began returning to normal as 
the initial planning of Mission 66 ended. Communications between the field staff and 
Washington once again had to be routed through the regional directors by March. In 
February, acting on a plan devised by Garrison, Wirth replaced the Mission 66 working 
staff with a smaller, permanent Mission 66 staff, still headed by Carnes, assisted by 
Howard Stagner. Garrison oversaw a similar reduction and institutionalization of the 
steering committee, which became the Mission 66 Advisory Committee and which he 
continued to chair for the time being. The advisory committee was intended to have a 
rotating membership with increased representation from regional offices and parks. 
Thomas Vint still served on it, and now was joined by one of his oldest colleagues, the 
architect Herbert Maier, who at the time was the assistant director of Region IV. Other 
members included superintendents, and design professionals from the WODC and the 
EODC. Garrison himself, perhaps sensing that the most important challenges now 
awaited in the field, replaced Edmund Rogers as superintendent of Yellowstone in 
November 1956.267 
Mission 66 was about to become a reality in scores of national parks. Though the 
program had been planned largely without public participation, by now it was essential to 
convince the public -not to mention concessioners, conservation groups, and everyone 
else concerned with conditions in the parks -that the huge disruptions and extensive 
construction activity they were about to witness all made up a "conservation" not a 
265 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 91; Between October 1955 and November 1956, 
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"development" program. Wirth knew that public relations would now be paramount to 
continued political success. Public interpretive programs and brochures describing 
Mission 66 were quickly prepared, and Wirth himself oversaw the drafting of a scripted 
slide show, with recorded narration by him and other officials, to be made available in 
every park. The presentation was repeatedly revised and carefully planned down to the 
last image projected. The scripted slide show became a principal means of conveying the 
purposes and desired image of Mission 66 to park visitors 268 The priority of almost all 
the public information prepared at the time was to present Mission 66 as a "conservation" 
effort. One of the earliest drafts of a public brochure, "Mission 66: Questions and 
Answers," answered the first question it posed, "What is MISSION 66 ?" with the answer: 
"MISSION 66 is a conservation program for the national park system" (emphasis in 
original). Park redevelopment was "simply one of the means by which `enjoyment - 
without- impairment "' could be accomplished, the text continued. Other means included 
educating visitors to cause less damage, and spreading "visitor load" geographically and 
seasonally. Mission 66 was not just a "construction program," but a "comprehensive 
program" that would provide "facilities and adequate staffing to permit proper protection, 
interpretation, maintenance, and administration. "269 A long struggle over the public 
image of Mission 66 had already begun. 
Within the Park Service, Wirth worked hard to establish new traditions that would 
define the agency's identity for the next generation of its employees. The new 
Arrowhead logo figured prominently everywhere, including on redesigned uniforms. 
Wirth also wanted to create holidays and celebrations specific to the Park Service. 
"Three permanent dates" were to be observed "with suitable ceremonies in each area of 
the system" in order to commemorate the agency's history. Campfire Day (September 
19) recognized the 1870 campfire in Yellowstone around which the "national park idea" 
was supposed to have been first suggested. Each park was to have a celebration cantered 
around a campfire. Founders Day (August 25) marked the 1916 creation of the Park 
Service and is the only one of the three that continues to be observed by agency staff on a 
268 Several versions of the slide show, sets of numbered slides, and at least one of the audio tapes are 
conserved in the National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center. 
269 National Park Service, "Mission 66: Questions and Answers," n.d. [1956], (National Park Service 
History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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regular basis (mostly in the Washington office). Establishment Day was to be celebrated 
by individual parks on the dates of their establishment.270 
With the planning of Mission 66 completed, however, the reality of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of construction would soon determine exactly what Mission 66 was or 
was not. And what it was, above all, was a redefinition of how national parks would 
function as public places. The scores of Mission 66 prospectuses eventually prepared 
represented a new generation of park master planning, and a very different methodology 
for how that master planning was performed. Thomas Vint had described earlier, prewar 
Park Service master plans as "the counterpart of the city plan; everyone wants to get in 
the act, [and] the procedure calls for how they get in and out. "271 But Vint had not 
developed the Mission 66 prospectus, nor the methodology of Mission 66 planning 
Mission 66 prospectuses had been prepared in a manner more analogous to other public 
works projects of the 1950s, including the Interstate Highway program. No one (except 
arguably the AAA) had really gotten "in the act" at all. Mission 66 was a product of the 
planning culture of its day, and differed from prewar national park master plans that had 
reflected town and regional planning practices of that era. If prewar national park master 
planning had not included true public participation (in a more recent sense of that term), it 
was at least a longer and more deliberate process in which concessioners, mountaineering 
clubs, and local business interests all had more significant opportunities to influence 
decisions. Mission 66 demanded efficiency, speed, and apparently extreme discretion. 
Inspired by the multiple year funding awarded to highway and dam construction agencies, 
Mission 66 had to some degree imitated their technocratic approach to planning public 
works, an approach that was an antithesis of the consensus among conflicting interests 
that prewar park master plans had tried to achieve.272 
Another reality would soon be inescapable as Mission 66 put its physical imprint 
on the national park system. Thomas Vint's "Plan B "- removing overnight 
accommodations and administrative facilities from popular national park areas and 
converting those areas to day use only -may have inspired early articulations of Mission 
66 policy, but it required removing the remnants of "Plan A" to succeed. Without the 
removal of older facilities, adding new developed areas, even if they were in less 
270 Conrad L. Wirth to All National Park Service Personnel, January 3, 1956 (Box A8213, National Park 
Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); Department of the Interior, 1956 Annual Report, 302. 
271 Herbert Evison, Interview with Thomas Vint, 1960, transcript, p. 10, (Thomas C. Vint Collection, Papers 
of Charles E. Peterson). 
272 For more on prewar Park Service master planning, see Carr, Wilderness by Design. 
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"sensitive" areas, did not solve the problem of overcrowding and encroachment on 
popular park attractions. And often nothing can be more difficult than removing any kind 
of public facility from a public park. Almost any building or service located in an 
important public landscape, once it has accumulated a group of users and economic 
interests, develops a constituency that opposes its removal. Because of the nature of 
congressional politics in rural areas (and the power of congressional subcommittees over 
Park Service budgets and operations), even small interest groups could prevent the 
removal of favourite facilities from a national park. "Plan B," when combined with the 
perpetuation rather than the elimination of "Plan A," would add up to a lot of park 
development. 
The Mission 66 prospectus nevertheless embodied a new idea for how national 
parks should be managed. This new idea of national park planning acknowledged 
postwar trends, such as the rise in population, encroaching low density urbanization, new 
levels of automobile ownership, and the increased accessibility to parks created by 
federal -aid highway construction. Mission 66 concessioner developed areas, visitor 
centres, administrative areas, and housing subdivisions all reflected the influence of 
contemporary trends in American planning and design, from shopping centres to ranch 
houses. The overall tenor of Mission 66, like that of contemporary Interstate Highway 
and urban renewal programs, was imbued with the "new spirit" of mid -century 
modernism: old and haphazard developments would be replaced through more rationally 
conceived construction, serving larger numbers more efficiently. At the same time, Wirth 
and his planners took great pains to establish that although this was a new kind of national 
park planning, it was nevertheless grounded in the ideology and legislation of the early 
twentieth century. Again there was a parallel to a similar continuity in contemporary 
American housing and highway planning. Mission 66 illustrated the conceptual links 
between Progressive Era ideology and postwar modernist planning in the United States, 
generally. 
As practiced by Wirth, Park Service professionals, and soon a large number of 
their consulting architects, Mission 66 embodied a peculiarly American form of mid - 
twentieth- century design: Mission 66 created a modernist national park. But while 
modernist architectural and planning ideas shaped Mission 66, this formal adoption did 
not imply a break with essentially Olmstedian justifications and goals for public park 
development. The assumption of modernist forms and design strategies, but not the more 
radical theory or intentions associated with its European precedents, typified postwar 
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American modernism. Corporate America did not intend its new suburban headquarters 
to be seen as endorsements of European socialism, and modernist shopping centres 
became the very temples of capitalist consumerism. 
American modernist design adapted and evolved into a wide variety of responses 
to postwar social and geographic change. The Mission 66 park was one of those 
adaptations.273 The story of Mission 66 as it moved from conceptual planning to physical 
development would in fact be the story of the limits of modernism in American national 
park planning. Reactions to the program, as it was actually built, would be particularly 
rich indicators of public attitudes towards modernism and its perceived association with 
the destruction of historical "landmarks" and natural "wilderness." Mission 66 soon 
incited deeply felt responses to the results of modernist planning and architecture, 
generally, both within and beyond park boundaries. 
273 The term "modernist" is used throughout this study to refer to works of design influenced by twentieth - 
century architects and fine artists associated with modern, or modernist, movements. "Modernization" is 
used to refer to the application of technology and capital in the transformation of land in the modern 
historical era. Modem landscapes, in other words, are the products of modernization (including 
urbanization, mechanization of agriculture, industrialization, etc.); modernist landscapes are discreet works 
of twentieth -century design. 
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Chapter 10: Case Studies 
10.1 Yosemite 
In this chapter the administrative history of Mission 66 as described thus far is 
complemented by a series of examples intended to provide concrete instances of the 
results of Mission 66 in several significant cases. The thesis methodology emphasized 
site visits, and case studies therefore structured a significant portion of the research. 
These case studies are presented not as responses to individual research questions as 
much as vital illustrations of the policies and theory being described, and as instances and 
examples that clarify and illustrate the overall conclusions of the thesis. 
The subject of preservation -and when it may be considered successful or not- 
permeated all aspects of planning and ultimately criticism of Mission 66. Preservation of 
nature has never been a passive act, and it has often been a creative and controversial 
process marked by unintended consequences. Nowhere has this been more true than in 
Yosemite Valley, a landscape that is a unique record of Euro- American experiments in 
the preservation of a "natural" landscape. Tourists and artists began to arrive in Yosemite 
in the 1850s and images of the valley's scenery quickly created a sensation. Hidden in 
the remote Sierra Nevada, the landscape was considered the awesome essence of 
untrammelled, uncontrived nature. But of course people had managed, used, and 
occupied the landscape of Yosemite Valley for thousands of years. Several tribal groups 
burned the valley floor periodically, creating a landscape of open oak woodlands 
interspersed with meadows, productive for both forage crops (mainly acorns) and game. 
If left on its own, much of the valley might have been a mature coniferous forest rather 
than the "parklike" scene of meadows and oak groves that greeted tourists when they 
began to arrive. Although images of Yosemite Valley soon were the heart of an 
American ideal of nature, the landscape was actually an aboriginal countryside as 
managed, in its way, as the fields and farms of New England.274 
274 See Robert Gibbens and Harold Heady, The Influence of Modern Man on the Vegetation of Yosemite 
Valley (California Agricultural Experiment Station Extension Service, Manual #36, 1964); M. Kathleen 
Anderson, "Southern Sierra Miwok Plant Resource Management of the Yosemite Region: A Study of the 
Biological, Ecological, and Cultural Bases for Indian Plant Gathering, Field Horticulture, and 
Anthropogenic Impacts on Sierra Vegetation." Unpublished report (Yosemite National Park, 1989); Alfred 
Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 58 -62; Land 
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In 1864, the federal government granted Yosemite Valley to the state of 
California, with the stipulation that it remain forever open to the public for "public use, 
resort, and recreation." Fees generated by concessions were to be applied to the 
"preservation and improvement" of the landscape, the two concepts clearly being seen as 
complementary aspects of creating what Frederick Law Olmsted described in 1865 as 
"the noblest park or pleasure ground in the world. "275 Intent on preserving the "natural" 
scene, the state authorized Yosemite Commission prevented tribal groups from burning 
off woody vegetation (considered a merely destructive practice) and otherwise largely 
prevented traditional access and uses of the land.276 To provide for their guests and 
livestock, hotel concessioners planted meadows in hay and established orchards and 
vegetable gardens. Agriculture, as well as the construction of roads and buildings, 
required improving the drainage of wet meadows, and drier soils soon further encouraged 
the growth of ponderosa pines and other woody growth in formerly open areas. 
By the 1880s, the valley was in fact rapidly becoming a forest, and park managers 
and concessioners were cutting and pruning vegetation extensively to maintain the 
original, "natural" open meadows. Other observers, however, were horrified to see tree 
stumps, slash, or other byproducts of the work being undertaken. They felt that 
maintaining natural conditions surely precluded such active interference. The publication 
of George Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature (1864, second edition 1874), the success of J. 
Sterling Morton's suggestion for Arbour Day celebrations in the 1870s, and the 
establishment of the American Forestry Association in 1875, among other events and 
publications, all indicated a growing awareness for the need of some kind of protection 
for the rapidly disappearing trees of North America.277 Surely the trees of Yosemite 
Valley itself would be spared the fate being suffered by so many of the continent's 
forests. 
By 1888, Frederick Law Olmsted (the author of the 1865 set of recommendations 
for the management of the valley) was drawn into the controversy.278 Robert Underwood 
and Community Associates, Yosemite Valley: Cultural Landscape Report. 2 vols. (Denver: Depai Bilent of 
the Interior, National Park Service, 1994); Thomas C. Blackburn and Kat Anderson, eds., Before the 
Wilderness: Environmental Management by Native Californians (Menlo Park, CA: Ballena Press, 1993). 
275 For the text of the Yosemite Grant legislation, see Dilsaver, America's National Park System, 11; also 
see Huth, "Yosemite." 
276 Mark David Spence, "Dispossessing the Wilderness: Yosemite Indians and the National Park Ideal, 
1864 -1930," Pacific Historical Review 65 (February 1996), 27 -59. 
277 Huth, Nature and the American, 168 -177. 
278 That year Olmsted provided a statement to The San Francisco Examiner, suggesting that agriculture in 
the valley should be restricted to the areas already under production and that remaining natural meadows 
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Johnson, a friend of Olmsted's and the editor of Century magazine, was particularly 
outraged by the evidence of tree removal at Yosemite and offered to bring the landscape 
architect back to California to make an assessment of the situation. Olmsted declined, 
citing other obligations; but his own ambivalence on the subject may have been another 
reason not to make the long journey from Brookline. Johnson and other national park 
advocates objected to almost any management of the Yosemite landscape. Olmsted 
agreed that the indiscriminate removal of young trees and shrubs would be a "calamity," 
but he also felt that the removal of trees in some cases would be justified. Olmsted issued 
a public letter in 1890 on "Governmental Preservation of Natural Scenery," in which he 
reiterated that the "development and exhibition" of Yosemite scenery must be devised 
with "artistic refinement" if the landscape were to be preserved.279 For Olmsted, artistic 
intervention (in this case, the removal of certain trees) was required for the preservation 
of "natural" landscape conditions. He believed that subtle manipulation of the scenery 
would not make it less natural (at least not by his understanding of that word), and that 
inaction was the same as inappropriate action, in that it would ultimately result in the loss 
of Yosemite's unique landscape character.280 
The negative effects of concessioner development in Yosemite Valley had also 
been condemned as early as the 1870s. The valley's remote location made transporting 
supplies expensive, and in order to serve their clientele early hotel operators drained, 
ploughed, and planted many of the valley's meadows. To protect their buildings they 
took steps to control flooding and suppress fires on the valley floor. Olmsted had 
foreseen how destructive such homesteading would be to the landscape and therefore 
urged the construction of an improved road all the way to the steamboat docks at 
Stockton. If transportation costs were lowered in this way, both tourists and supplies 
should be "preserved." This meant that some tree cutting should be permitted, as long as it was under the 
supervision of someone with an artistic sensibility. Charles E. Beveridge, "Introduction to the Landscape 
Design Reports," in The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted: Volume V, The California Frontier, 1863 -1865, 
Victoria Post Ranney, ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 467. In 1889, Olmsted 
(with J. B. Harrison) wrote a short discourse on the "use of the axe" in municipal parks, vigorously 
defending necessary thinning and other forestry practices in parks, although pointing out that "the 
management of a large park is an art," and indiscriminate or insensitive tree cutting could be more 
disastrous than no cutting at all. Frederick Law Olmsted and J. B. Harrison, "The Use of the Axe," [1888] 
reprinted in Landscape Architecture 3, no. 4 (July 1913): 145 -152. 
279 The letter never received wide circulation, but it was distributed within the Park Service. in 1941 by the 
architect Herbert Maier, who at the time was the Region IV (western) Acting Director. "Region IV 
Circular," January 15, 1941, RG 79, Entry 37, Box 149, National Archives, Washington, DC. 
280 Despite decades of sporadic clearing of vegetation, by 1942 the acreage of open meadows in the valley 
had been reduced by half. See Land and Community Associates, Cultural Landscape Report, figure Y -26. 
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could be brought in and out cheaply, making it less necessary to cultivate the valley floor 
or to build elaborate overnight accommodations. Visiting Yosemite would also be more 
affordable for all. But Olmsted's report was suppressed by the park's first board of (state) 
commissioners, in part because it would have precluded potentially lucrative 
opportunities to build the hotels and other establishments that soon made Yosemite 
Valley a small resort town in the nineteenth century. 
The larger Yosemite National Park was created around Yosemite Valley in 1890, 
and in 1906 the valley itself reverted to federal jurisdiction and became part of the 
national park. But the valley remained by far the principal attraction, and with the advent 
of automotive tourism complaints of overcrowding within its narrow confines became 
chronic. Stephen Mather's interest in the national park system, in fact, was first sparked 
by the scandalous conditions he found while visiting Yosemite Valley. The early policies 
he shaped for the Park Service attempted to correct the situation by reorganizing 
concession interests, by using concessioner capital to build the Ahwahnee and the 
Yosemite Lodge, and by planning a new Yosemite Village to replace the ramshackle "Old 
Village." The "All- Year" highway from the gateway town of El Portal into the valley 
was completed in 1926. The Park Service facilitated early automotive tourism, in other 
words, but also hopefully ameliorated its negative effects through planned developments 
that helped control how and where people drove, camped, hiked, swam, and enjoyed the 
scenery. This was what Thomas Vint described in the 1940s as "Plan A." But conditions 
of overcrowding in Yosemite Valley now promised to become impossible (fig. 33). Like 
Yellowstone, Yosemite was expected to record two million visits by 1966. But at 
Yellowstone those visitors would be spread over the hundreds of miles of roads and 
several major destination areas. At Yosemite, 95% of them were headed directly to the 
east end of the valley. For Vint, a radical change was in order, and he attempted to infuse 
Mission 66 with that new and controversial attitude. The inspiration for what became 
known as the "Vint Plan" (or "Plan B "), captured the true essence of Olmsted's 1865 
report: make the valley a camping and day use destination, and rely on improved roads to 
get people and supplies in and out efficiently. Public access should not be restricted, and 
would not need to be, because the correct development plan would make it possible for 
millions to enjoy the landscape without destroying it. 
Since the 1970s, such active management has again often been considered antithetical to maintaining 
"natural" conditions in the valley, although prescribed burning has been reintroduced in limited areas. 
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Park planning at Yosemite, however, has always involved many interest groups 
and many points of view. The Yosemite Park and Curry Company, for example, wielded 
great influence through its director, Donald B. Tressider, who in 1943 had stepped down 
to become president of Stanford University. Yosemite was also unique in that since 1928 
it had its own Board of Expert Advisors (usually called simply the Advisory Board) made 
up of leading conservationists with tremendous experience. Over the years the three - 
member group included Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., the architect and developer Duncan 
McDuffie, the geologist John P. Buwalda, and long time Sierra Club official William E. 
Colby. In August 1945, Drury challenged the Advisory Board to consider Vint's 
proposal to remove development from the valley. But in 1946 the Advisory Board 
reported that although it was "wholly in sympathy with the purposes of the Vint Plan," 
they could not endorse it. The valley was the "heart of the park" and the primary 
destination for almost all visitors. Removing the lodge and other public facilities seemed 
"too great a sacrifice to make." By 1947 the Advisory Board was involved in discussions 
of not whether the Yosemite Lodge should be rebuilt, but where in the valley and how 
large the new lodge should be.281 
In the spring of 1949, although Vint's master plan still called for the relocation of 
overnight accommodations, Drury approved designs for the reconstruction of the 
Yosemite Lodge in Yosemite Valley. The Yosemite concessioner was anxious to expand, 
and general manager Hilmer Oehlmann asked architect Eldridge Spencer to continue 
revising plans for a new lodge. Spencer and his wife, the designer Jeannette Spencer, 
already had long association with Yosemite. Jeannette Spencer had worked with Ansel 
Adams in the late 1920s designing the first Bracebridge pageants at the Ahwahnee. In the 
1940s, she redesigned these seasonal celebrations and her husband oversaw the 
conversion of the Ahwahnee from naval hospital back to hotel. While the park's Mission 
66 prospectus was still being prepared, Eldridge Spencer's plans for the new lodge (on 
the same site as the old lodge) were already complete. At that point, Oehlmann moved 
quickly to secure over $1 million in bank financing and received approval to begin 
construction. The new Yosemite Lodge (fig. 9) opened in time for the 1956 season. Like 
the Canyon Lodge in Yellowstone, it featured a central service building with associated 
groups of motel units. Spencer designed a series of four low buildings with redwood 
281 At the time the Advisory Board consisted of Colby, Buwalda, and Duncan McDuffie. Minutes of the 
Yosemite National Park Board of Expert Advisors, August 24 -30, 1946; August 23 -29, 1947; n.d. [August, 
1949] (Yosemite National Park Archives). Also see Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness, 189 -192. 
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sheathing, connected by covered walkways. Projecting eaves, large windows, and few 
ornamental details gave the complex a "contemporary" look. Some of the older cabins 
were retained in the new complex, and other motel units were later added, more than 
doubling the concessioner's investment. Since it was a redevelopment of an existing 
lodge (and remained close to the visitor facilities of Yosemite Village), it did not require 
extensive construction for utilities, roads, or other new services.282 
Eldridge Spencer is best known today for his extensive work for the Yosemite 
concessioner, particularly during Mission 66. Wirth and other Park Service officials 
admired Spencer's work, and in 1956 Rockefeller's Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc., hired 
him to lay out the Colter Bay development in Grand Teton National Park, a concession 
cabin and camping area that was intended to complement the services at the Jackson Lake 
Lodge.283 Guided by Mission 66 plans, Yosemite concessioners also made significant 
investments to redevelop Yosemite Village at this time. In 1958 Degnan's store moved 
into a dramatic A -frame structure in the centre of the village, and a "merchandise centre" 
(including a market, clothing store, restaurant, and barber shop) was completed in the 
winter of 1959 (fig.34). Designed by Spencer, the building cost the Yosemite Park and 
Curry Company over $800,000. Spencer also designed staff residences, a large 
warehouse, and other buildings. By the spring of 1959, the redevelopment of Yosemite 
Village allowed the Park Service to finish the demolition the Old Village (on the other 
side of the Merced River), which had been a goal since the first new village plans were 
devised in 1914. That May, Wirth, Spencer, the park concessioner, and others celebrated 
the opening of the merchandise centre, which was the centrepiece of the expanded 
Yosemite Village. In 1967 Spencer designed a large visitor centre for the Park Service, 
completing the transformation of the area.284 
Concessioner developments were only a small part of Mission 66, but they had 
great impact on public perceptions of the program during its first years. For early critics 
of Mission 66, the construction of "motel- type" lodges confirmed their fears that the Park 
Service had made too many compromises -or perhaps had never been on the right track 
282 Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness, 187; Shirley Sargent, Yosemite's Innkeepers: The Story of a 
Great Park and Its Chief Concessionaires (Yosemite, California: Ponderosa Press, 2000), 134, 148. 
283 The Colter Bay development eventually included a visitor centre, cafeteria, stores, trailer camping area, 
and eighty -five cabins (a number of which had been moved from other locations in the park). Colter Bay 
had its own detractors, who deplored its visible lakeshore location and its facilities for power boat access to 
Jackson Lake. 
284 Conrad L. Wirth to Eldridge T. Spencer, April 18, 1958 (Box 7, Personal Papers of Conrad L. Wirth, RG 
79, National Archives); Sargent, Yosemite's Innkeepers, 146 -148. 
165 
at all -in facing the challenges presented by postwar automotive tourism. At Yosemite 
(as well as Yellowstone) a new and expanded park lodge was the first substantial 
construction project begun under Mission 66. 
The redevelopment of the Yosemite Lodge and Yosemite Village created exactly 
the kind of "drift" towards overdevelopment that Vint feared, but aspects of the 1945 
"Vint Plan" for the valley survived and were incorporated into the park's Mission 66 
prospectus. Just as Mission 66 planning got underway, the Park Service had acquired 972 
acres at the western entrance to the park, including the small former mining settlement of 
El Portal. Describing the acquisition as "a dream come true," the prospectus called for a 
major relocation of valley administrative offices, staff residences, and maintenance 
buildings to a new "operating base" to be located there. Many Park Service families had 
lived in El Portal for years, but the area was now to be expanded into a "model 
community" with all necessary services. The development of El Portal would allow one 
of the primary goals described in the draft prospectus: to "move facilities out of Yosemite 
Valley...leaving only those facilities which are necessary and essential." Early drafts of 
the prospectus had a particularly preservationist tone. The first objective cited was the 
"freezing of developments...not to exceed their present capacity." Final (1957) versions 
of the prospectus specified that "all accommodations for visitors and related services shall 
be limited to designated areas" and would not be allowed to sprawl beyond the 
established footprint of development. The Park Service and its concessioners could no 
longer "continue to build, construct and develop operating facilities on the Valley floor 
without seriously impairing and ultimately destroying" the unique landscape.285 
These injunctions to freeze development obviously did not pertain to the 
redevelopment of the Yosemite Lodge and Yosemite Village, projects already underway 
thanks to concessioner capital. But even if the valley's "pillow count" (including 
campgrounds) remained at about 4,500, the prospectus acknowledged that the valley's 
day capacity would need to be expanded. "An adequate road and trail system; adequate 
facilities for the comfort and welfare of the visitor; and effective presentation and 
interpretation of the diversified resources of Yosemite" were all considered necessary to 
handle the anticipated influx. For its part the Park Service planned to spend over $22 
million for road improvements, campgrounds, and other facilities throughout the park. 
285 "Yosemite Valley and Mission 66," draft prospectus, n.d. (National Park Service, Harpers Ferry Center); 
"Mission 66 for Yosemite National Park," prospectus, July 9, 1957 (National Park Service, Harpers Ferry 
Center). 
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To alleviate crowding in the valley, alternative destinations would be expanded. "Trailer 
courts" were planned for El Portal and Wawona. A "pioneer interpretive and information 
centre" was developed at Wawona, involving the relocation of historic structures from 
different areas of the park into a "pioneer village." The number of campsites inside the 
valley was to remain at 2,500, but outside the valley campgrounds would be tripled to 
2,400 sites. The potential of redirecting visitors to the Yosemite high country, along the 
Tioga Road corridor, was of particular interest. The White Wolf Lodge area was to be 
expanded, enhancing it as an alternative overnight destination. Soon there were plans for 
an enlarged campground and visitor centre at Tuolumne Meadows, as well, further 
relieving visitor pressure on the valley. "Perhaps no other area in the National Park 
System... [was] confronted with more difficult and complex problems" as Yosemite, the 
prospectus planners noted. "The preservation and protection of the incomparable 
Yosemite Valley" was the foremost and most difficult problem of a11.286 
10.2 Yellowstone 
Mission 66 construction was funded mainly, but not exclusively, by greatly 
enhanced appropriations. Many national park concession contracts renegotiated under 
Mission 66 also required concessioners to make large capital investments. Between 1956 
and 1966 park concessioners invested $33 million in new overnight accommodations, 
restaurants, and park stores, which was about $14 million less than called for in the 1956 
Mission 66 final report. Concessioner investments had greater impacts than the figures 
suggest, however, because they resulted in some of the highest profile, earliest Mission 66 
construction projects. Concessioners hired their own architects and could initiate work 
quickly once they secured financing. Their facilities also were heavily used by the public 
and strongly affected early perceptions of Mission 66. And almost all overnight 
accommodations the "motel type" park lodges that quickly became controversial -were 
built through the investment of private capital. But the economics and business models 
for park concessioning changed rapidly in the postwar period. Park concessions had 
always been a vital factor in American national park management, and the changing 
relationship between the privately run hotels, restaurants, and other service in the parks 
and the Park Service influenced Mission 66 from its inception. 
286 "Mission 66 for Yosemite National Park," prospectus, July 9, 1957 (National Park Service, Harpers 
Ferry Center). 
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As passenger rail service to parks ended, railroad companies lost interest in 
financing concession companies. At the same time, massive investments were needed, at 
least if concessioners were to continue in anything like their traditional role. Patterns of 
travel and recreation now were dominated by automotive tourism at a greatly increased 
scale. The situation seemed to require replacing older hotels, which had been built for 
railroad and early automotive tourism, with "motel- type" park lodges, which would more 
efficiently serve larger numbers of tourists (and their cars) and provide the "modern 
conveniences" the public demanded. Under these pressures, many concessions that had 
originally been family businesses or railroad subsidiaries began to reorganize or sell out, 
often to larger businesses that specialized in hotel and restaurant management. In 1954 
the Santa Fe Railroad abandoned its businesses on the south rim of the Grand Canyon, for 
example, donating many of its utility buildings to the government and selling its interest 
in El Tovar and the Bright Angel Lodge to the reorganized Fred Harvey Company. The 
Yosemite Park and Curry Company went through a series of management changes in the 
1940s and 1950s, and the Great Northern Railroad sold out at Glacier National Park in 
1960. Political and financial difficulties with the concession system persisted throughout 
Mission 66. After 1956, Congress required its own review and approval of all park 
concession contracts involving gross annual incomes over $100,000. Banks, which 
replaced railroad companies as a source of capital to finance improvements, were 
cautious about making loans secured only by possessory interest. In 1960 the Park 
Service prepared legislation that would have provided federal mortgage guarantees for 
concessioners, and the next year suggested the creation of a special federal fund to 
finance development directly. Neither scheme was enacted. Congress again conducted 
investigations into the concession system in 1962, and that year the Outdoor Recreation 
Resources Review Commission recommended continuing the system of private 
construction and ownership "where feasible." In 1965 Congress passed the Concession 
Policy Act, which finally gave legislative recognition to possessory interest and the 
preferential renewal of contracts.287 Once these rights were assured, banks more readily 
loaned money against the future earning potential of contracts. But at least some 
287 A. C. Stratton to Conrad L. Wirth, "Concessioners' Mortgage Guarantees," memorandum, April 18, 
1960 (Box 5, Personal Papers of Conrad L. Wirth, RG 79, National Archives); Hummel, Stealing the 
National Parks, 182, 185, 192; Barringer, Selling Yellowstone, 180; Outdoor Recreation Resources Review 
Commission, Outdoor Recreation for America: A Report to the President and to Congress by the Outdoor 
Recreation Resources Review Commission (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 164. 
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concessioners had difficulties securing loans to meet their investment obligations under 
Mission 66. 
In 1953, 173 national park concessions grossed $32 million. Total concessioner 
assets were reported at $60 million in 1957.288 When Wirth and his policy makers began 
Mission 66 planning, they never seriously considered abandoning the park concession 
system, despite its inherent problems. Such an effort would have been unlikely to 
succeed at a time when concessioners had just organized to protect their interests. The 
Eisenhower administration also sought to expand the role of the private sector, not 
eliminate it. But the Mission 66 policy memoranda and the "pilot prospectus" developed 
for Mount Rainier implied radical change for park concessions, nevertheless. Converting 
parks from overnight destinations to day use parks suggested many older park hotels 
would be bought out and demolished as contracts expired. In cases where visitors could 
easily find accommodations outside park boundaries, there would be no need for park 
lodges. The 1956 Mission 66 report stated that overnight concession services would be 
provided "only in those areas where required for proper and appropriate park experience, 
and where those services cannot be furnished satisfactorily in neighbouring 
communities. "289 This goal conflicted directly with the interests of concessioners, for 
whom overnight stays were often considered desirable and even necessary aspects of their 
business models. Motel rooms made greater profits than stores, restaurants, and snack 
bars. Overnight accommodations also assured longer visits, which in turn increased 
business for these other services. The public also had expectations of not just visiting 
parks, but staying overnight at or near favourite park destinations. 
The political influence and contractual rights of park concessioners, combined 
often with the expectations of park visitors, made it difficult to remove overnight 
accommodations in many parks. In June of 1955, Wirth had already begun to modify the 
tone of Mission 66 policy in this regard. The first of the "principles" distributed that 
month to guide the preparation of pilot prospectuses was to assure "greater participation 
of private enterprise." In part, this meant that demand for visitor services would be met 
by private businesses outside park boundaries; but it also was an assurance that new 
concessioner investments would be a major feature of Mission 66. The second principle 
listed in the memorandum stated that the relocation of overnight facilities away from 
2ß8 Everhart, The National Park Service, 119; Ise, National Park Policy, 615. 
289 "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and Development of the National Park System for Human 
Use," January 1956, unpublished report, (National Park Service, Denver Service Center Library). 
169 
"major park features" would be required in many cases. This policy stopped far short of 
suggesting that all hotels be removed from parks. Every situation would be considered 
"on its own merits," and while in some cases overnight concessions might indeed be 
removed, in others they would merely be relocated, and in fact "recommended for 
considerable expansion. "29° 
The June 1955 "principles" not only reflected the political realities of dealing with 
the park concession system, but were also influenced by events already underway as 
Mission 66 was being planned. At Yellowstone, in particular, negotiations over the 
critical and expansive role of the park's concessioner would affect the future of the entire 
Mission 66 program. Since at least 1948, the year Yellowstone broke the one -million 
visitor mark, Park Service officials had plans for a complete modernization of the park 
roads and overnight facilities. But neither Congress nor the embattled concessioner, 
William Nichols, could be convinced to make such investments at the time. Negotiations 
at Yellowstone reached a critical point in the spring of 1955, just as Mission 66 planning 
got underway. With the Yellowstone Park Company's twenty -year contract set to expire 
at the end of the year, Wirth and the park's staff clearly hoped that Nichols would soon be 
replaced, possibly by several new concessioners, more willing to invest. 
The situation at Yellowstone illustrated the already longstanding difficulties of 
trying to cope with vastly increased numbers of visitors at a time when neither Congress 
nor park concessioners were willing to invest in new development. In 1948 one million 
visitors came to the park, up from 20,000 in 1920. The increase consisted almost entirely 
of people in their own cars, who set their own agendas at hotels and campgrounds, and 
who increasingly found their own accommodations in towns outside park entrances. In 
1948 Drury reported that "new development" was needed throughout the park system, but 
especially at Yellowstone. He claimed that the Old Faithful area was at "the saturation 
point" and the facilities at the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone were "obsolete." He 
proposed two new developed areas, West Thumb and Canyon Village, to be financed by 
combined concessioner and government funds. Drury backed the expansion of the Lake 
and Fishing Bridge areas and proposed a three million -dollar "administration -museum 
building" for Mammoth Hot Springs. To make the Grand Loop road system adequate for 
projected traffic volumes, he estimated a thirteen million -dollar road modernization 
290 "Informational Memorandum No. 3, Mission 66, Progress and Procedures," Jun' 27, 1955, (Box A8213, 
National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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program would be required.291 But Drury knew none of this would happen. In 1948 park 
concessioners were battling the Department of the Interior over the terms of new 
contracts and, for the time being, avoiding any new investments. Congress was 
preoccupied with the reconstruction of Europe and political turmoil in Asia. In contrast 
to a $20 million redevelopment program just for Yellowstone, construction in the entire 
park system totalled under $1 million that year. 
The oldest and, at the time, largest national park, Yellowstone had always been 
the showcase of Park Service policies. But by the early 1950s the condition of visitor 
services -and the long delay in addressing them -were a national scandal. Wirth had 
begun to reform and centralize concession management when he became director in 1951, 
and he attempted to convince the Yellowstone Park Company to invest millions of dollars 
in new development as part of a contract renegotiation. But he and the concessioner, 
William M. Nichols (the son -in -law of the company's founder, Harry W. Child) could not 
reach an agreement on the terms of such investments. Nichols business situation had 
become more difficult in the 1940s. Railroad companies that in the past had made loans 
to the concessioner were now in the process of reducing and terminating passenger rail 
service to Yellowstone. The companies no longer had any reason to finance visitor 
accommodations, and regular banks balked at the notion of making large loans secured 
only by hotels that, because of their locations, technically had their titles vested in the 
United States. Under the circumstances, Nichols was searching (unsuccessfully) for a 
buyer for his family's business. Nichols was in his seventies, worried about the future of 
his family's business, and in no mood to sink any remaining assets into new 
construction.292 
As the situation deteriorated, a group of Wyoming businessmen and elected 
officials organized an effort buy and assume control of the Yellowstone Park Company, 
effectively asserting state control over this critical aspect of the federal park's 
management. On February 14, 1955, just a week after Wirth initiated Mission 66 
planning, the Wyoming Legislature passed a bill that would have authorized the state's 
acquisition of the Yellowstone concessions. Although such an action would have 
seriously undermined the Park Service's jurisdiction, there was no official response from 
Wirth or from the Department of the Interior; the proposal quickly sank under the weight 
291 Depaituient of the Interior, National Park Service, 1948 Annual Report, 320 -321. 
292 Aubrey L. Haines, The Yellowstone Story. 2 vols. (Boulder: Yellowstone Library and Museum 
Association in cooperation with Colorado Associated University Press, 1977), vol. 2, 372. 
171 
of inherent legal and procedural difficulties, in any case. But the situation no doubt 
contributed to the "crisis" Wirth perceived that February, adding to the urgency with 
which Mission 66 was planned, particularly for Yellowstone.293 
At about the time Mission 66 planning began, Wirth also organized a separate 
"working group" on the "concessioner needs" for Yellowstone. The Yellowstone Park 
Company's twenty -year contract was set to expire at the end of 1955, and Wirth 
anticipated the opportunity to require major capital investments as part of any new 
contract, whether with Nichols or a new concessioner. Headed by a special assistant, 
Phillip F. King, the concessions group included Yellowstone Superintendent Edmund B. 
Rogers, Park Landscape Architect Frank E. Mattson, Chief Ranger Otto M. Brown, and 
Chief Naturalist David de L. Condon. Their week -long meeting also involved members 
of the recently formed Mission 66 committees. The group debated the most basic 
assumptions about how Yellowstone should function as a public park. Should overnight 
accommodations in the park be continued, and if so under one or several concession 
contracts? Should increased demand instead be met by private businesses outside the 
park? Should older hotels in the park be "abandoned and removed" and replaced by 
"motel type" lodgings in less sensitive areas ?294 
The concessions group met while the Mission 66 planners were drafting their first 
policy statements; the two discussions overlapped and, judging by the results, influenced 
one another (figs. 35 -38). The Yellowstone group concluded that there was still a need 
for several developed areas with accommodations within the park, and in fact they 
recommended greatly expanding overnight visitor capacity, from roughly 8,000 to 
14,000. But they added that this expansion should never be exceeded, and that thereafter 
surrounding towns should meet any further demand for lodging. No new hotels should be 
built in the park since the public had shown a "decided preference for motel type 
accommodations." The new motels would be financed by issuing "prospectuses" that 
would invite private applicants to build and operate lodges in several areas of the park, 
293 Haines, The Yellowstone Story, vol. 2, 373; Mark Daniel Barringer, Selling Yellowstone: Capitalism and 
the Construction of Nature (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 117 -119. 
294 The group also included head of Yellowstone concessions management, Benjamin F. Dickson, and a 
young Park Service lawyer named George B. Hartzog, Jr. "Determination of National Park Service 
Objectives in its Concessioner Contracts at Yellowstone for the Next Twenty Years," n.d. [handwritten 
date, "Feb. 55 "] (Entry Al, Box 16, RG 79, National Archives). The group's recommendations were 
written up in a slightly different version in a memorandum by park staff to Wirth that April. See Mary 
Shivers Culpin, "For the Benefit and Enjoyment of the People, " A History of Concession Development in 
Yellowstone National Park, 1872 -1966 ( National Park Service: Yellowstone Centre for Resources, YCR- 
CR- 2003- 01,Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming, 2003), 105 -107. 
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preferably under separate concession contracts, with limited rights of preferential 
renewal.295 
The concession plan specified that the Lake- Fishing Bridge area was to be 
enlarged, but that the boat docks were to be moved to a new development at nearby 
Bridge Bay. Bridge Bay would also include a new lodge. At West Thumb, landscape 
architect Mattson had advocated since at least 1946 relocating development that 
encroached on the geyser basin, and with Vint's help and support, planned a new visitor 
complex about a mile to the south, to be called Thumbay (later Grant Village).296 At Old 
Faithful, the Old Faithful Inn and the roads around it would be razed, again to eliminate 
the "encroachment upon thermal features," and a new and expanded developed area to be 
sited nearby was to be named Wonderland (later Firehole Village) and be sited near 
Mallard Lake. The Mammoth Hot Springs area was to have its overnight capacity 
reduced "with the objective of the [nearby] town of Gardiner taking up the slack." At the 
Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone, again the existing lodge and cabins would be 
demolished replaced by a new Canyon Village sited farther away from the canyon rim. 
The new village, which had first been planned in 1935, was a priority for Park Service 
planners because it could accommodate increased numbers without encroaching further 
on the rim of the canyon, where visitors traditionally enjoyed some of the most dramatic 
scenery in the park.297 
Throughout Yellowstone, the concession planning group recommended expanding 
park overnight accommodations and visitor services by demolishing old hotels and tourist 
cabins and replacing them with larger developments farther away from geysers, important 
vistas, and other "sensitive areas." While the group recommended building several 
extensive new motel complexes, they also emphasized that these plans represented the 
ultimate development of the park. If demand for overnight accommodations continued to 
grow, motels outside park boundaries would have to meet it. The overall pattern of use of 
the park, represented by the Grand Loop road system, should remain and be modernized, 
295 The use of the term "prospectus" in this case may have suggested the term "Mission 66 prospectus" 
subsequently used for all Mission 66 development plans. Earlier the concessioner Nichols had also used the 
term to describe his own development proposals. "Determination of National Park Service Objectives in its 
Concessioner Contracts at Yellowstone for the Next Twenty Years," n.d. [handwritten date, "Feb. 55 "] 
(Entry Al, Box 16, RG 79, National Archives). 
296 Robin Smith, "The History of Grant Village," unpublished report, 1988 (Vertical Files, Yellowstone 
National Park Archives), 18. 
297 "Determination of National Park Service Objectives in its Concessioner Contracts at Yellowstone for the 
Next Twenty Years," n.d. [handwritten date, "Feb. 55 "] (Entry Al, Box 16, RG 79, National Archives). 
Also see Culpin, For the Benefit and Enjoyment of the People, 107 -116. 
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but not expanded. These priorities mirrored the fundamental tenets of Mission 66, which 
were being drafted at the time. From the beginning, the success or failure of the overall 
Mission 66 was linked to the fate of the new Yellowstone concession contracts and park 
redevelopment program. Under these circumstances, Yellowstone served as a flagship of 
Mission 66 planning, design, and policy.298 
In April 1955, Superintendent Rogers and his staff were in Washington for a 
week -long discussion on the Mission 66 pilot prospectus for their park. Again there was 
a consensus that popular and sensitive destinations, especially Old Faithful and the 
Mammoth Hot Springs, were being overwhelmed. The Mission 66 committee agreed 
with the general ideas of the concession working group -which reflected the emerging 
philosophy of Mission 66 generally -that older developed areas should in many cases be 
demolished and replaced by more expansive facilities sited in less "sensitive" areas, or 
outside the park altogether. The initial prospectus resembled the recommendation of the 
concession group (although a minority of Mission 66 staff also wanted more development 
removed from Fishing Bridge because of the area's ecological significance). Most of the 
staff felt camping facilities and day use areas should be greatly expanded, but they did not 
want "trailer courts" in the park, although they acknowledged that a maximum of one 
would need to be provided somewhere. They acknowledged an earlier study on the 
benefits of moving park headquarters out of the park to the nearby town of Gardiner, but 
the park staff and superintendent nevertheless insisted that park administration remain at 
Mammoth. The steering committee requested an inventory of tourist accommodations, 
campgrounds, and other recreation areas within 100 miles of Yellowstone's entrances. 
There was also a general sentiment expressed that the park concessioner should be 
replaced.299 
298 "Determination of National Park Service Objectives in its Concessioner Contracts at Yellowstone for the 
Next Twenty Years," n.d. [handwritten date, "Feb. 55 "] (Entry Al, Box 16, RG 79, National Archives). 
This planning document states emphatically that while overnight capacity should be increased to "about 
14,000 people," in the future any additional need for accommodations should be "absorbed...in 
communities adjacent to the park." Later Yellowstone prospectuses were consistent with this 
recommendation. 
299 Edmund B. Rogers to Conrad L. Wirth, "MISSION 66, First Submission Prospectus," memorandum, 
November 10, 1955 (Entry Al, Box 16, RG 79, National Archives); "Mission 66 Prospectus," 1957 
(National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 
Program," 37 -45. A 1945 report claimed that half a million dollars could be saved annually without loss of 
efficiency by moving park headquarters out of the park to Gardiner. Fred T. Johnston to Edmund B. 
Rogers, memorandum, January 9, 1945; "Mission 66, Recreation Inventories," May 6, 1955, (Box A8213, 
National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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As Yellowstone historian Aubrey L. Haines observes, Nichols was "in a mood to 
sell out" in 1955 but had not found a buyer. But now he needed to renew his contract if 
his family's franchise were to remain saleable, and the terms of any new contract would 
mean becoming a full, if reluctant, partner in the implementation of Mission 66.300 That 
August, Nichols secured a large bank loan and hired Welton Becket and Associates of 
Los Angeles to assemble proposals for three developed areas with motel complexes and 
other services. The proposed developments followed the outline of the draft Mission 66 
prospectus for the park, which in turn were reflected in preliminary site designs from the 
park's master plan. A new developed area named Canyon Village would replace the 
Canyon Hotel, a massive wooden structure that encroached on the rim of the Grand 
Canyon of the Yellowstone. Thumbay (renamed Grant Village in 1956 for Ulysses S. 
Grant) would enlarge and replace facilities considered too close to the West Thumb 
geyser basin. Bridge Bay was planned for an area near the Lake Hotel, again in order to 
expand capacity and allow the removal of some older development, in this case in the 
Fishing Bridge and Lake areas.301 As Wirth prepared to unveil Mission 66 at the Smoky 
Mountains conference that September, the Yellowstone concessioner and his architect 
presented plans and received preliminary approval to proceed. That spring, Nichols 
signed a new a twenty -year contract based on an initial commitment of $3.5 million to 
develop Canyon Village with 500 motel units, employee dormitories, and a lodge 
building that housed a cafeteria, restaurant, and other services. On June 25, 1956, just 
days before the new fiscal year initiated the first official (government) spending on 
Mission 66 construction, Canyon Village became the first Mission 66 project to break 
ground. It was scheduled on a "fast track" to be opened the following summer. Indeed, 
the Park Service had already completed site preparation, including roads and utilities, and 
the contractor was working off site on prefabricated motel units (figs. 39, 40). 
Wirth made the Canyon Village groundbreaking ceremony the first of many 
celebrations of Mission 66 progress. He also used the event to publicize the final version 
of the Mission 66 prospectus for Yellowstone, which had been delayed pending the 
300 Haines, The Yellowstone Story, vol. 2, 375 -376. The concessioner's reluctance to enter into his 
investment obligations was expressed, for example, in a long letter to the park superintendent that June, 
shortly after the new contract had been signed. W. M. Nichols to Edmund B. Rogers, June 15, 1956 (Box 
A248, Yellowstone National Park Archives). 
301 By 1957 Wirth and Garrison had backed away from the other initially proposed development, "Firehole 
Village," that would have replaced the inn and lodge at Old Faithful. "Draft Mission 66 Prospectus Brief," 
August 28, 1957 (Mission 66 Prospectus Files, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry 
Center). 
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results of negotiations with Nichols. In anticipation of two million annual visits by 1966 
(the actual figure would be only slightly higher), the 1956 prospectus called for $17.5 
million in government spending and a total concessioner investment of $13.5 million over 
ten years. After Lon Garrison took over as Yellowstone superintendent the next year, the 
estimates were revised upwards to $55 million and $15 million, respectively. The 
prospectus also "anticipated" an increase in the park's operations budget from $1.5 
million to $2.2 million over the same period. On the government side, the number of 
campground sites would be increased from 490 to 1,420, serving up to 6,000 campers at a 
time. Relocated and enlarged, the new campgrounds would feature amphitheatres, 
coordinated interpretive displays and activities, and modern comfort stations, and utilities. 
Several "rental trailer courts" would finally be built, despite the misgivings of Park 
Service staff. The Grand Loop road system would not be extended (neither would it be 
significantly curtailed), but it would be widened and modernized everywhere. Many 
bridges were to be replaced, and some sections of roadway were to be relocated away 
from sensitive areas, such as Old Faithful and the shore of Yellowstone Lake. Several 
new visitor centres (including one at Canyon Village) and entrance stations would be 
built, and interpretive displays, trails, and signage would be erected in every developed 
area. Parking and roadside areas would be expanded, and some fifty new picnic areas 
were planned. Staffing would be increased, and the critical dearth of park housing would 
be addressed. Maintenance and shop buildings would be funded, and sewerage, 
powerlines, and other utilities would be constructed throughout the park. 
On the concessioner side, the total capacity for overnight accommodations in the 
park would rise from about 8,000 to about 14,000, beginning with the motel complex at 
Canyon Village. Garrison pointed out that visitors needed to stay in the park "at least a 
week" to fully appreciate it, therefore overnight accommodations in the park were still 
considered necessary. If they were still required, then they would also have to be 
expanded, just like the other facilities in the park, to serve the roughly twice as many 
visitors expected in 1966. But the new park "lodges" would not be "fancy hotels," such 
as the Old Faithful Inn. The public wanted motels that were "simple, but as comfortable 
and convenient as possible." They were not be attractions in themselves but a "means to 
an end" that would not compete with -or encroach on the natural wonders of the park. 
The existing hotels would "remain during their useful life," but then they would be 
demolished along with their associated roads and development as new motels were 
completed. Stores, gas stations, and other commercial buildings would complement the 
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motels. "Cafeterias, lunch counters, and coffee shop services" would be provided instead 
of expensive restaurants. All of this would be done, Wirth promised in his remarks at the 
groundbreaking, "without intrusion upon the sacred areas of scenic beauty and natural 
wonders, or the wilderness appeal of this vast area. In fact, the greatest contribution 
MISSION 66 will make to Yellowstone is the restoration, insofar as possible, of the 
natural setting in these [older hotel] areas. "302 
The Yellowstone prospectus described an entirely new "development pattern," for 
the park, one that had been conceived around the reality of high volume, middle class 
automotive tourism, and the decision that overnight accommodations were still necessary 
within park boundaries. Canyon Village became the first example of "motel- type" 
concessioner lodgings planned as part of an entirely new, Mission 66 developed area. 
The project had been on the boards, however, for at least twenty years. Park Service 
officials had long considered the Canyon Hotel and the structures near it to be egregious 
intrusions on some of the most treasured scenery in the park. The developed area 
included the massive hotel itself (1911), but also a store, cafeteria, campgrounds, horse 
corrals, and dozens of cabins, all clustered on both sides of the Grand Canyon 
immediately around the best points for viewing the spectacular Upper and Lower falls of 
the Yellowstone. Park staff, working with Vint's office, had made the removal of the 
Canyon Hotel and the development around it part of their master plans since 1935. At 
that time they suggested developing a new park village nearby that could provide services 
in a less conspicuous way. The basic concept was comparable to the plans made ten 
years earlier for replacing the "Old Village" in Yosemite Valley with the new Yosemité 
Village. But in the early 1920s, when Vint helped then chief landscape architect Daniel 
R. Hull plan Yosemite Village, they chose the new site, in part, because of its 
commanding views of Yosemite Falls and other famous features. The new Yosemite 
Village "harmonized" by being a picturesque element of the stunning landscape scenes 
around it in the heart of the valley.303 Ten years later at Yellowstone, Vint and the 
Sot "MISSION 66 PROGRAM FOR YELLOWSTONE...," press release, June 24, 1956 (Box A248, 
Yellowstone National Park Archives); "Address by Conrad L. Wirth...Canyon Village," prepared remarks, 
June 25, 1956 (Box 6, Conrad L. Wirth Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre); 
"Draft Mission 66 Prospectus Brief," March 21, 1957 (Mission 66 Prospectus Files, National Park Service 
History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); "Draft Mission 66 Prospectus Brief," August 28, 1957 (Mission 
66 Prospectus Files, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
303 It is also true that by keeping the new Yosemite Village in a relatively compact form in the east end of 
the valley, views of the west end of the valley (including those from Inspiration and Discovery points) 
remained unaffected. The site selected for the new village also did not encroach or the historic scenic 
views of the valley, as shown by later park planners through their analysis of nineteenth and early 
(cont.) 
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Yellowstone staff again sought to replace "poorly planned" development with a new park 
village. But in this case the plans indicated a growing concern for more complete 
protection of park scenery, a change typical of Vint's attitudes by the late 1930s. The site 
for the new Canyon Village had no significant views, but it did have the virtue of being 
completely screened by stands of lodgepole pine. The awesome and "sensitive" scenery 
of the canyon could therefore be restored, at least visually, to "natural" conditions. 
Park Service regional staff, together with park landscape architect Frank Matson, 
devised the plans for Canyon Village, which Wirth and Vint (as always) reviewed in 
detail. The development was located about a mile away from the rim of the canyon, at an 
important crossroads. In Yellowstone's Grand Loop road system, a single transverse road 
connected the geyser basins on the west side of the loop to the canyon area on the east 
side. Canyon Village was planned around the intersection ( "Canyon Crossing ") on the 
east side. In postwar versions of the proposed plan, the intersection itself divided the 
developed area into functional zones: central parking and motel complex, campgrounds, 
and Park Service maintenance. A gas station was sited directly at the intersection, which 
also featured turning lanes in all directions. By the early 1950s, the central plaza was 
described in master plan drawings as the "parking lot," with a new lodge and other public 
buildings forming a horseshoe around three sides of it.3o4 Park village planning was 
gradually transforming into a more efficient, automobile oriented form. While it had 
clearly developed from earlier park village design, the need to efficiently accommodate 
larger numbers of cars, larger campgrounds, and up to 500 motel units led to a more 
decentralized, sprawling plan. Every aspect of the development was predicated on the 
universal and pervasive use of automobiles. 
In its location, scale, layout, and functionality, the early 1950s Park Service design 
for the Canyon Village began to resemble a contemporary shopping centre complex. It 
did so mainly in order to channel and efficiently serve large numbers of automotive 
tourists in one, strategic location, and therefore minimize their impact on scenery. The 
subsequent choice of a proven shopping centre designer as the consulting architect for the 
twentieth- century paintings and photographs (see the "Historic Viewpoint Analysis" of the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement, General Management Plan, Yosemite National Park, Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1978, 102 -106). But the central public buildings of Yosemite Village were 
intended to be seen in the context of their extraordinary setting. The major public space ( "plaza ") of the 
village was surrounded by the rustic façades of the museum, administration, and other buildings, with 
dramatic views of Yosemite Falls, Sentinel Rock, Half Dome, and other features of the surrounding cliff 
walls in the background. 
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project, however, indicated how the Yellowstone Park Company (and perhaps the Los 
Angeles bank lending millions of dollars) perceived the economic potential of the 
situation. Welton Becket was a pioneer in the design of postwar retail complexes in 
California. The Stonestown Shopping Centre in San Francisco was an early and 
influential success for his office in 1949, and subsequently he planned many similar 
projects based on the model of "stores clustered around a central mall." 305 At Canyon 
Village, Becket designed the central lodge building with a massive, shingled roof with 
eaves that extended down, beyond the extensively glazed walls. Dramatic "glu -lam" roof 
beams extended beyond the eaves all the way down to concrete anchors set in the ground, 
forming a covered arcade around the exterior of the building. The prefabricated motel 
units, laid out along access drives behind the lodge, were assembled in attached, radial 
clusters. Of inexpensive construction with rectangular plans and flat roofs, the motel 
units were unexceptional, but convenient, and equipped with modern utilities. Two other 
park concessioners who invested in Canyon Village also hired Becket to design their 
buildings, the Hamilton Store and the Haynes Photographic Shop. Becket used the same 
materials and pitched roofs in these buildings as in the lodge, creating a unified visual 
theme. All the larger buildings of the complex featured high ceilings and extensive, open 
floor space. The buildings featured little or no ornamental detail, and were similarly 
economical in their construction, which consisted of "slump block" precast concrete 
units, stone veneer over concrete, and wood framing and sheathing. The massive, 
asymmetrically pitched roofs, and unusually shaped, large windows (especially in the 
gable ends of buildings) gave Canyon Village a "contemporary" look. In 1958 the Park 
Service built a new visitor centre in a complementary style, directly across the plaza from 
the lodge at the main public entrance to the horseshoe plaza.306 
The Park Service completed site improvements at Canyon Village with a broad 
sidewalk connecting the main buildings, and with long islands planted with naturalized 
groups of native trees and shrubs in the parking lot. The planted islands separated and 
screened individual parking corridors, breaking up and concealing the lot's full extent. 
s°" "Canyon Regional Plan," 1952 Yellowstone National Park Master Plan, (Yellowstone National Park 
Archives). 
soy Becket was also well known by the 1950s for large office and hotel buildings for corporate clients, 
including the Hilton Hotel chain. His office was on its way to becoming one of the largest in the country. 
See Welton Becket, "Shopping Centre Traffic Problems," Traffic Quarterly 9 (April 1955): 162 -172; 
William Ducley Hunt, Jr., Total Design: Architecture of Welton Becket and Associates (New York: 
McGraw -Hill Book Company, 1972). 
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Park Service landscape architects also laid out an extensive campground, already opened 
in the summer of 1956, which Wirth was able to point to at the groundbreaking ceremony 
as an indication of things to come elsewhere in the park. Sewers, water and electric lines, 
roads, and lighting all were completed by Park Service contractors as the concessioner's 
builders went to work. The entire complex was, Wirth remarked hopefully at that time, a 
demonstration of "the ability of private capital to work in harmonious cooperation with 
the Federal Government to provide for the betterment of the parks." Indeed, with the 
concessioner supposedly committed to shouldering a significant portion of the cost of 
modernizing Yellowstone, Wirth had reason to feel the Canyon Village groundbreaking 
was a major success. Newspapers from San Francisco to Denver picked up on the 
enthusiasm of the day, impressed by the extent of the commitment of private capital, as 
well as the breadth and ambition of the redevelopment plans for the nation's oldest 
national park (figs. 41- 45).3° 
But if the Canyon Village ground breaking launched the construction phase of 
Mission 66 optimistically, the subsequent construction and operation of the Canyon 
Lodge ran into trouble from the start. Nichols had secured bank funding and hired an 
eminent architectural firm, but his Yellowstone Park Company, a family directed business 
that had been in the park since 1891, proved incapable of supervising construction on 
such a large project. By the end of the summer, bank financing had to be increased to $5 
million because of cost overruns. That fall Nichols stepped down as the head of the 
Yellowstone Park Company in favour of his son, and the company board was reorganized 
to include non -family members. The next summer the official opening of the lodge was 
delayed from July 1 until August 31, the very end of the season. During the summer of 
1958, Canyon Village was finally operational (if not entirely completed), but still had 
problems filling its capacity of motel rooms and making a profit. Demolition on the old 
Canyon Hotel began in 1959, in part to encourage the public to stay at the new Canyon 
Lodge instead. But the cost of the motel complex, as well operational difficulties with 
running it, pushed the Yellowstone Park Company to the verge of bankruptcy. In 1959 
the board was reorganized again, and now included a representative of the Los Angeles 
306 See Lon Johnson, "Determination of Eligibility, Canyon Village (Horseshoe Plaza) Historic District," 
unpublished report, 2000 (Yellowstone National Park Archives). 
307 "Address by Conrad L. Wirth...Canyon Village," prepared remarks, June 25, 1956 (Box 6, Conrad L. 
Wirth Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre); "$31 Million 10 -Year Yellowstone 
Project Set," The Denver Post, Monday, June 25, 1956; "U.S. Reveals Program for Yellowstone," The San 
Francisco Chronicle, June 27, 1956. 
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bankers worried about a default on their loan.308 Continued financial and management 
woes at the Yellowstone Park Company made full participation in subsequent Mission 66 
plans impossible. 
In the fall of 1956 Lon Garrison replaced Edmund Rogers as superintendent of 
Yellowstone, indicating the importance Wirth placed on making progress there. Despite 
the Yellowstone Park Company's obvious difficulties, Wirth and Garrison tried to press 
on with the Mission 66 concession plans for the park, perhaps believing that the company 
could build its way out its dilemma. The next motel complex in the prospectus was Grant 
Village, which Frank Matson had first suggested in 1946 to replace the tourist cabins, 
store, campground, and other facilities located directly on the edge of the West Thumb 
geyser basin (figs. 46 -48). Early 1950s master plans show the proposed "West Thumb 
Lakeshore" development about two and a half miles south of the geyser basin, and 
resembling Canyon Village in general layout. After becoming part of the Mission 66 
prospectus, clearing and grading of the site began in 1956. But further preparations were 
delayed as efforts were concentrated on Canyon Village. The prospectus suggested that 
the now renamed Grant Village would eventually be even larger than Canyon Village, 
with 900 motel units and lodge services, such as cafeteria, coffee shop, and a gas station. 
In addition, the Park Service would build another extensive campground, a trailer court, 
employee housing, and a lakeshore marina for the growing numbers of boaters 
demanding access to Yellowstone Lake. But the Yellowstone Park Company, struggling 
to pay off the debt incurred at Canyon Village, could not (or would not) secure the 
millions of dollars of financing that would be required to develop Grant Village. Further 
site preparations and development paid for by the Park Service did get underway in 1961, 
and the campground and other public facilities were officially opened in the summer of 
1963. Other buildings, including employee housing, a gas station, and a marina services 
building were soon added. The motel complex at Grant Village, however, would 
continue to be mired in controversy throughout Mission 66, and in fact for decades 
following. While the Park Service put millions of Mission 66 dollars "into the ground" at 
Grant Village, preparing the site with roads, utilities, a marina, campground, and visitor 
centre, the concessioner resisted making any investment. In 1966 the Nichols family 
finally managed to sell their remaining interest in their franchise, but the corporation that 
308 Barringer, Selling Yellowstone, 132 -150. 
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bought them out also avoided making any major capital investment at Grant Village (or 
elsewhere in the park).309 
In the meantime, most of the Mission 66 program for Yellowstone that did not 
involve concessioners went ahead as planned. But the situations both at Canyon Village 
and Grant Village indicated a broader problem with concessioner construction under 
Mission 66. The entire business of park concessioning had changed, and the 
collaborative relationship that had existed between the Park Service and private 
entrepreneurs had broken down. The Yellowstone Park Company was effectively 
bankrupted by the enormous strain of making such a large investment at Canyon Village, 
and the company simply could not cope with the new scale and type of business 
operations it had undertaken. Mission 66 only exacerbated an already deteriorating 
situation; the inherent problems with the park concession system went back at least to the 
1940s. But Wirth and his planners erred by continuing a concession system that was in 
need of reform. Once again, Mission 66 proceeded within the political limitations of its 
day, without comprehensive new federal legislation that would have addressed 
fundamental problems. Reform only came later, in this case with the Concession Policy 
Act of 1965, and then finally with the federal purchase of the Yellowstone concessioner's 
possessory interest in 1979.31° 
But there was another, more profound problem with Mission 66 concessioner 
planning, and this involved how and when overnight accommodations were made part of 
park prospectuses. The final 1956 Mission 66 report confirmed a fundamental precept of 
309 The controversies around Yellowstone concessions continued long after Mission 66 ended. It was not 
until 1979 that Congress finally did what it probably should have done thirty years earlier and purchased the 
possessory interest of the Yellowstone Park Company. The Park Service then prepared to use public funds 
to finally build a Grant Village motel complex, to be operated by a new concessioner on a contract basis. 
By that time, however, merchants and motel owners in the rapidly growing town of West Yellowstone 
denounced what they perceived as government sponsored competition. In 1981 Secretary of the Interior 
James Watt responded and stopped construction. Building resumed shortly thereafter, but Grant Village 
remained far smaller than originally planned. By the time the first 200 motel units opened in 1984, it was 
difficult to see the entire episode as anything but a long and destructive fiasco. For accounts of later 
concessioner woes at Yellowstone, see Richard A. Bartlett, Yellowstone: A Wilderness Besieged (Tucson: 
The University of Arizona Press, 1985), 365 -379; Barringer, Selling Yellowstone, 141 -144; Haines, The 
Yellowstone Story, vol. 2, 375 -379; Robin Smith, "The History of Grant Village," unpublished report, 1988 
(Vertical Files, Yellowstone National Park Archives). 
310 The Concessioner Policy Act of 1965 gave legislative sanction to the preferential rights of renewal and 
possessory interest, and therefore gave banks a more secure basis for making large loans to concessioners. 
The purchase of the Yellowstone Park Company's possessory interest in 1979 allowed the government to 
own, improve, and expand facilities directly, rather than attempt to coerce a private partner to invest. Since 
the 1970s, numerous concession companies throughout the park system have been consolidated by 
corporations specializing in "guest services," operating franchises on a contractual basis. Concession 
facilities themselves, however, remain a patchwork of full federal ownership and concessioner ownership 
(possessory interest). 
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prospectus planning: where possible, gateway towns, not park concessioners, should 
provide overnight accommodations. But the final report also stated that out of thirty 
large parks that together had an overnight capacity of 25,750, only four would have their 
lodgings phased out, since apparently only they were "favourably located to permit 
private enterprise to provide accommodations outside." In the other twenty -six, not only 
would overnight concessions remain, they also would be expanded in anticipation of the 
80 million visitors expected in 1966. An overly simple formula was then used to 
determine future market demand. The existing ratio of overnight to day use visitors in the 
twenty -six large parks with overnight concessions was about 1:3.8. But since "a greater 
proportion of all visitors would use lodgings if more were available," the ration of 1:3 
was considered "more satisfactory." In the twenty -six parks, Mission 66 called for an 
increase in total overnight capacity from 23,797 to 58,797; in Yellowstone the figure rose 
from 8,417 to 13,891.3" 
This very limited analysis was used as the basis for investing both private and 
public funds in new "motel- type" park lodges. At Yellowstone and Yosemite, these 
lodges were among the earliest Mission 66 projects, and they made considerable public 
impressions. But the construction of massive motel complexes contradicted an original, 
central goal of Mission 66: to reduce the impacts of larger numbers of visitors by 
redeveloping parks more as day use destinations. Mission 66 planners had observed the 
growth of motels and other services in gateway towns, and they understood how 
improved highways would increase visitor mobility. Nevertheless Mission 66 concession 
planning did not make a bold break from prewar policy. Instead it proposed greatly 
expanding the established concession system. 
In the end, this expansion did not take place. Later market studies indicated that, 
at least at Yellowstone, in some cases such ambitions were not even supported by sound 
business plans. While visits to the park had doubled between 1940 and 1959, the 
Yellowstone Park Company found that the percentage of visitors staying in hotels and 
cabins dropped by half, from 84% to 42 %, during the same period.312 The economics of 
park concessions -and of automotive tourism generally -had permanently changed. 
Park visitors had more options and mobility than ever before. While Wirth and Garrison 
311 "Mission 66: To Provide Adequate Protection and Development of the National Park System for Human 
Use," January 1956, unpublished report, (National Park Service, Denver Service Center Library). 
312 Robin Smith, "The History of Grant Village," unpublished report, 1988 (Vertical Files, Yellowstone 
National Park Archives). 
183 
pressured the Yellowstone Park Company to build more motel units, the concessioner 
could not even profitably fill the reduced number of Canyon Village rooms already built. 
As was the case in other parks, remote location and high elevation combined to create 
high construction costs and short seasons. Competitors in gateway towns, such as West 
Yellowstone, could offer lower prices and more luxurious conveniences. They also had 
lower construction costs, longer seasons, and full title to their property for mortgage 
purposes. Older park hotels of course had the advantage of being in the park and -since 
they encroached directly on its wonders --they could offer the attraction of Yellowstone 
itself. But the less intrusive Canyon Lodge could not; it was sited away from "sensitive" 
scenery. The Yellowstone motel complexes were planned merely as "a means to an end," 
intended to be convenient, but otherwise unexceptional. As historian Mark Barringer 
observes, under Mission 66 the Yellowstone Park Company "stopped selling the park, 
their most valuable asset, and began selling motel rooms and cafeteria meals. And they 
lost the ability to make themselves part of the Yellowstone experience. "313 
National park hotels had never been a "means to an end." They embodied 
vacation fantasy and the appeal of mythic historical themes, and they were indeed part of 
the "Yellowstone experience." Welton Becket's Canyon Lodge, a masterful adaptation of 
modernist architectural design, served its functions efficiently. But it could not hope to 
"harmonize," specifically in this sense, because it was stripped of associative 
ornamentation and was purposefully located to avoid becoming a compositional element 
of park scenery. By protecting the scenery, in other words, Wirth and Vint had assured 
that the new concession areas would never be accepted as part of it, at least not the way 
an earlier generation of hotels had. Mission 66 park development, which was planned in 
more remote areas to minimize its impact on park landscapes, ironically was criticized by 
"purists" for not being more part of those landscapes: for not "harmonizing." Devereux 
Butcher, in particular, blamed the modernist idiom of the architecture. But the 
increasingly alienated relationship of architecture to the surrounding landscape -arguably 
a central characteristic of modernist landscape design and planning -had far more 
influence on the perception of Canyon Village than the style or details of the structures 
themselves. 
In any case, the Mission 66 goal of increasing the "pillow count" in Yellowstone 
to 14,000 never came close to being realized. The park's overnight capacity remained 
313 Barringer, Selling Yellowstone, 179. 
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close to what it had been: 8,700 in 1964, for example, and about 9,000 in 1972.314 Other 
concession developments in other parks also provided the "motel- type" lodges the Park 
Service felt people wanted. In 1963, however, systemwide overnight concessioner 
capacity still stood at about 27,000. As at Yellowstone, Mission 66 concessioner 
developments did little more than replace older hotel rooms, in most cases.315 Mission 66 
did not substantially increase the total capacity of overnight facilities in the parks, despite 
considerable efforts to do so. But why did Wirth and his planners try to expand 
concessioner accommodations to the extent they did? Barringer, the most trenchant 
recent critic of Mission 66, insists that a blind adherence to agency "tradition" prevented 
them from embracing alternative approaches, such as limiting and eventually reducing 
lodging in Yellowstone.316 But "traditional" Park Service planners, above all Vint, had 
argued for years that the agency should at all costs avoid the problems of "Plan A," 
typified by situations such as the Canyon Hotel and the Yosemite Lodge. Mission 66 
planning had begun by making observations and gathering data that would have 
supported the policies Vint and others put forward. The only tradition Wirth, Vint, and 
their colleagues truly venerated was the conviction that parks were to be preserved for 
public enjoyment. At least in 1955, neither Wirth nor Vint believed that public 
enjoyment necessitated overnight lodgings, which increasingly were available outside 
parks. The landscape architects at the Park Service were in fact very willing to pursue 
alternative strategies, as long as they allowed continued "enjoyment without impairment," 
and this spirit imbued the initial Mission 66 effort. 
The realities of congressional and local politics in the 1950s, however, also 
influenced Mission 66 concession policy in its final form. This was the situation at 
Everglades National Park in 1955, for example, when both the new concessioner and 
much of the public objected to Mission 66 plans that included a restaurant and marina, but 
not a park lodge. Wirth held his ground, even when the concessioner halved the amount 
he was willing to invest. He reversed his decision, however, when he was attacked not 
only by local elected officials, business leaders, and newspaper editors, but also by both 
Florida senators and the local congressman, all of whom who demanded that the 
314 Haines, The Yellowstone Story, vol. 2, 383. Today there are around 2,238 rooms and cabins in 
Yellowstone (this figure is not a "pillow count "). Camping has been expanded above the original suggested 
Mission 66 level to about 2,200 sites. 
315 "Mission 66 Progress Report," October 1963 (National Park Service, Denver Service Center, Technical 
Information Centre), 13. 
316 See Barringer, Selling Yellowstone, 130 -131. 
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Everglades plan provide for a national park experience "comparable" to that of other 
national parks. Wirth could not resist that kind of pressure, at least not if he hoped to be 
successful with appropriations committees. And Wirth was, above all, skilled in 
congressional politics. He shaped Mission 66- including its concessioner policies -to 
reverse fifteen years of congressional indifference. In this sense his policies succeeded. 
But it was not Park Service "tradition," as much as the demands of the public, the 
influence and rights of concessioners, and the power of federal and local elected officials 
that perpetuated the national park concession system in the postwar period. 
10.3 Everglades 
If the staff of Yellowstone and the Mission 66 planners agreed on a basic 
philosophy for the pilot prospectus for that park, the prospectus for Everglades National 
Park generated more dissent. Many Park Service officials believed Everglades to be the 
first true "wilderness park." In the 1934 legislation authorizing the park, Congress 
specifically mandated that the park be "permanently preserved as a wilderness" and 
prohibited any development that would "interfere with the preservation intact of the 
unique flora and fauna and the essentially primitive conditions now prevailing. "317 The 
National Audubon Society and other conservation groups had already struggled for 
decades to preserve the Everglades as a unique and invaluable habitat, and they remained 
intensely involved in the fate of the park project. Land acquisitions were finally 
completed by the state of Florida in 1947. The park's first superintendent, Daniel B. 
Beard, ran the park on a shoestring for the next seven years, relying on the existing 
Ingraham Highway to provide access to the main visitor areas at Royal Palms, Coot Bay, 
and Flamingo. Several small concessions offered snack bar and tour boat services, but 
the highway often became impassable, and even public restrooms were lacking. 
Conservationists, as well as local chambers of commerce and other Florida state 
officials and members of Congress, eagerly awaited plans and funding for the 
development of the new national park. In the spring of 1953 Superintendent Beard 
travelled to Washington to consult with Vint, Wirth, and other staff on plans for 
Flamingo. But no major appropriations were made, and Beard was kept busy with 
317 Mission 66 documents and even press releases quoted the legislation, which Wirth characterized as a 
"positive injunction." See for example "Improving Visitor Uses of Everglades National Park," May 10, 
1956, (Entry Al, Box 5, RG 79, National Archives). 
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property transfers, boundary expansions, and dealing with oil company efforts to expand 
into the park. Park headquarters were housed in rented space in nearby Homestead.31 s 
As was the case at Yellowstone, events at Everglades had reached a critical point 
just as Mission 66 was organizing. In October 1954 Secretary of the Interior McKay 
invited proposals from concessioners interested in building and operating a marina, motel, 
gas station, employee housing, stores, and other services at Flamingo. The contract 
required a private investment of at least $500,000, and the Park Service had already 
begun its contribution by making road improvements and dredging the future boat slips at 
the "chosen development site. "319 But while a concessioner was selected, the program for 
Flamingo continued to develop as the contract was negotiated. Following initial 
discussions with his Mission 66 committees that February, Wirth ordered a "special use 
study" which was conducted in the park. By March Wirth had decided not to include 
overnight accommodations in the Flamingo development. He somewhat proudly 
exhorted his Mission 66 planners to make similarly difficult moves away from precedent 
at other parks.320 Conservation groups, including the Audubon Society and the American 
Nature Association, had contacted Wirth and made clear their opposition to a "resort" at 
Flamingo, implying that the 1954 program involved too much development. The initial 
organization of Mission 66 that February also had convinced Wirth to heed Thomas 
Vint's advice and avoid "Plan A" at the Everglades. Given a clean slate, Wirth later 
explained, his agency intended to avoid a situation in which a small development in a 
sensitive area would grow to an unacceptable size as demand increased. He also pointed 
out that there was no shortage of motels nearby in Florida City and Homestead. 
Overnight accommodations would also "constitute unnecessary intrusion into the natural 
scene" at Flamingo, and take up too much of the very limited high ground in the park. 
Just as important, the elimination of the motel would "obviate the danger of the Flamingo 
development becoming just another Florida resort area....Everglades National Park 
318 "Superintendent's Monthly Narrative Report," May 1953, (Everglades National Park Collections 
Management Centre). 
319 "Proposals Sought for Construction and Operation of Visitor Facilities in Everglades National Park," 
press release, October 14, 1954, (National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); 
"Superintendent's Monthly Narrative Report," April 1954; June 1955 (Everglades National Park 
Collections Management Centre). 
320 Appleman, "A History of the Mission 66 Program," 20. 
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should not emulate or compete with those uses, but should stand as a distinctive feature 
itself "321 
That July Superintendent Beard returned to Washington to work on the 
Everglades prospectus with Mission 66 planners. The pilot prospectus they drafted 
contained no mention of any overnight accommodations and emphasized that the park 
was primarily a "biological area" and a "wilderness preserve." Interpretation, not 
recreation, was "requisite to the enjoyment and appreciation of the Everglades scene," 
and therefore the extent of development should be determined by the needs of the 
interpretive mission, not by recreation. In practice at Flamingo, this meant a "Public Use 
building" for visitor information, a restaurant, gas station, and even a marina (already 
under construction), but no motel. The plan characterized Everglades as a new kind of 
park, set aside for biological not scenic values, precariously set on the "very threshold of 
a major metropolitan area" that was sprawling rapidly. The prospectus emphasized the 
scientific mission of the park, and even suggested that the wildfire control policy should 
be based on "sound ecological facts" that might sometimes require that fire "be 
considered as part of the natural course of events, like hurricane." Superintendent Beard, 
a Park Service field biologist since the 1930s and an Everglades researcher in his own 
right, helped give the prospectus its unprecedented ecological emphasis.322 
But when the new concessioner, Robert Knight of the Everglades Park Company, 
realized overnight accommodations would not be part of the Flamingo development, he 
immediately scaled back his interest. He felt that as a day use area, Flamingo could not 
generate profits warranting the investment originally described. The terms of the contract 
were still under negotiation, and Knight made it clear that unless he was allowed to build 
a motel he would not bear the cost of the large "Public Use" building the Park Service 
also wanted. Local officials and important park supporters also wondered why overnight 
accommodations, which were part of the 1954 proposal, had been removed in the Mission 
66 prospectus. At an October 1955 meeting in John D. Pennekamp's office at the Miami 
Herald, Wirth defended his decision to Florida's governor, congressional delegation, and 
321 Eivend T. Scoyen to Wesley A. D'Ewart, "Concession Facilities, Everglades National Park," 
memorandum, April 3, 1956; Conrad L. Wirth, "Improving Visitor Uses of Everglades National Park," May 
10, 1956 (Entry Al, Box 5, RG 79, National Archives). 
322 "Prospectus, Mission 66, Objectives for Everglades National Park for 1966 and Beyond," draft, July 15, 
1955, (National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). The prospectus also originally 
stated that park headquarters would be outside the park in Homestead or Florida City, a decision that was 
later reversed after the superintendent and regional director argued in favour of the Parachute Key location 
near the park entrance. 
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other local officials.323 The Park Service director insisted that overnight accommodations 
would not be part of the "initial development plan" at Everglades, although he did allow 
that they "could be provided later if deemed essential by the Service." Knight agreed to 
the contract terms that fall, which now required he invest only $250,000 in the overall 
development.324 
That spring, however, the protest against Wirth's decision at Everglades became 
more organized and imposing. The Miami -Dade Chamber of Commerce addressed 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior Wesley D'Ewart directly, complaining that the draft 
prospectus was "a violation of the understanding of the people of this county... when they 
urged their state government to contribute...one million acres to the creation of the 
Everglades park....The understanding was...that everything necessary would be done to 
make the Park a tourist attraction." The Miami Herald editorialized that Everglades 
deserved to be developed in a manner comparable to other parks in the system, which 
meant including the overnight accommodations that had been included in the "original 
plans," but then "cancelled abruptly, without reason. "325 Wirth still supported his 
superintendent and planners, issuing a strong statement and a press release arguing that a 
motel was unnecessary and inappropriate and reminding his critics that his agency was 
spending $5 million on other development in the park, building a new road to Flamingo, 
picnic areas, interpretive centres, and the other features of a day use park. But the 
"preservation of the scenic and scientific values of the Everglades while making them 
accessible to more and more visitors," he also admitted, "presents one of the most 
challenging problems in our MISSION 66 program." Within a year Wirth acceded to 
political pressure and agreed to a motel at Flamingo with sixty units and a swimming pool 
(figs. 15, 16, 49).326 
323 "Superintendent's Monthly Narrative Report," October 1955; January 1956, (Everglades National Park 
Collections Management Centre). 
324 In the end, the Park Service paid more than half the cost of the $350,000 Public Use building. Daniel B. 
Beard to Edward Zimmerman, "Mission 66 in Relation to Concession Planning," memorandum, July 21, 
1955 (Entry Al, Box 5, RG 79, National Archives); "Proposed Contract for Operation of Visitor Facilities 
in Everglades... Submitted to Congress for Review," press release, September 21, 1955, (National Park 
Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
325 Alfred Canel to Wesley A. D'Ewart, April 26, 1956 (Entry Al, Box 5, RG 79, National Archives); 
"Why Discriminate Against Everglades ?," editorial, The Miami Herald, Tuesday, May 22, 1956. 
326 Conrad L. Wirth, "Improving Visitor Uses of Everglades National Park," May 10, 1956; "Mission 66 
Improvement Program is Announced for Everglades," press release, May 20, 1956 (Entry Al, Box 5, RG 
79, National Archives); Herbert Maier to Lemuel Garrison, "Report to the Regional Director on the 
Everglades Meeting," memorandum, April 15, 1957 (Box A8213, National Park Service History Collection, 
Harpers Ferry Center). 
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Chapter 11: Mission 66 Architecture 
11.1 The "Visitor Center" 
How did Mission 66 affect the way the visiting public perceived and 
appreciated the nature and history it sought to enjoy? What are the continuing influences 
of Mission 66 -the program's philosophy as well as its built legacy today? Perhaps no 
single feature of Mission 66 planning and design has had greater influence than the park 
visitor centre, which has become a ubiquitous feature of public and protected landscapes 
all over the world. As the most conspicuous feature of modernist architectural design in 
many parks, the visitor centre had enormous symbolic and aesthetic impact. Mission 66 
was not merely a development program, nor did it produce only buildings. Architectural 
design, however, informed and embodied many of the program's most important 
initiatives, and the essential character of Mission 66 is perhaps most readily accessible 
through an analysis of the program's architecture. 
Modernist park architecture, like the new planning goals of the Mission 66 
prospectus, was vital to the implementation and success of Mission 66. But it was not the 
International Style, or any other style, that primarily interested Wirth, Vint, and their 
planners; it was the increased functionality and efficiency that could be achieved through 
modernist design, materials, and building technologies. They did not adopt modernism as 
a style as much as they invented a distinctly modernist building type -the visitor centre - 
and then used it extensively to implement their revised park planning ideas. A number of 
architects, landscape architects, historians, and interpreters contributed to the 
development of the visitor centre. Like many modernist projects, the new buildings 
resulted from interdisciplinary cooperation and an increased emphasis on objective, 
efficient solutions to planning problems. The organization of the WODC and the EODC 
in 1954 brought Park Service designers, engineers, and historians together in their own 
offices in San Francisco and Philadelphia, independent of the regional administrative 
offices. In Washington, Thomas Vint remained overall chief of design and construction, 
assisted by chief landscape architect Bill Carnes and chief architect Dick Sutton. In San 
Francisco, Sanford Hill headed the WODC, with Robert G. Hall as supervising landscape 
architect and Lyle Bennet as supervising architect. The EODC was headed by Edward 
Zimmer, with Harvey H. Cornell and John B. ( "Bill ") Cabot in the same respective roles. 
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By 1960, Mission 66 had swelled the professional ranks in these two design offices to 
several hundred in -house landscape architects, architects, and administrative employees. 
Almost without exception, these managers were long time Park Service employees who, 
regardless of where they received academic training, received their most formative 
professional experience working in state and national parks during the New Dea1.327 
It was in the offices of the WODC and the EODC between 1954 and 1957 that the 
idea of the visitor centre was elaborated as the successor to park museum and 
administration buildings. Versions of visitor centres in the early 1950s were first 
described as "administrative -museum," "public service," or "public use" buildings, 
reflecting the struggle to resolve complex, combined building programs. In February 
1956, as initial plans for Mission 66 reached completion, Wirth issued a memorandum 
insisting that the term "visitor center" be used consistently. Wirth's terminology helps 
clarify the relationship of this new building type to contemporary trends in planning and 
architecture, particularly shopping centre design. Visitor centres were predicated on the 
same assumptions as contemporary shopping centres: large numbers of customers would 
be arriving by private car, and both they and their vehicles needed to be efficiently 
handled as they shifted from the automotive realm to a strictly pedestrian environment, 
where they could conveniently find all services clustered together. In early designs for 
"public use buildings" at Carlsbad Caverns (1953) and Grand Canyon (1954), WODC 
architects (especially Cecil Doty) attempted to combine many of the functions of an entire 
park village into a single large building, described in one case as "a one -stop service 
unit." Park Service offices and interpretive display areas, bathrooms, as well as 
information desks, auditoriums, and generous lobbies were all combined in efficient, 
indoor sequences of spaces that were linked together in plan by a diagrammatic 
conception of "visitor flow. "328 Most of these spaces related to functions previously 
handled in separate park buildings, such as museums, comfort stations, and administration 
buildings; but new audio -visual media and larger numbers of visitors also required larger 
(even multiple) auditoriums and spacious lobbies that could receive and organize floods 
of arriving visitors. The new buildings were planned in conjunction with extensive 
parking lots and new or realigned park roads. Congestion was to be avoided above all. 
327 Hammons, "A Brief Organizational History of the Office of Design and Construction," 3; "Interview 
with A. Clark Stratton," March 1, 1962, conducted by S. Herbert Evison, transcript, p. 2, (National Park 
Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
328 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 17 -21. 
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"Circulation must be a continuous process of motion," for both vehicles and pedestrians, 
as Welton Becket advised for shopping centre design (at the time he was also designing 
the Canyon Village Lodge complex at Yellowstone).329 The world of "one -stop 
shopping" took shape as the Park Service developed the visitor centre, and for many of 
the same reasons. In fact, at a design conference in 1958, architect Lyle Bennett 
complained about the term "visitor center" because the public confused the new and 
"unusual, specialized facility" with shopping centres, a far more familiar phenomenon for 
most park visitors at that time.33° 
The visitor centre was more than an adaptation of the park museum idea. It was, 
as Victor Gruen characterized the shopping centre, a new building type. The concept and 
planning process for visitor centres grew out of essentially modernist principles. As the 
"hub" and "focal point" of a park, the visitor centre provided a control point, and a centre 
for arrival, orientation, and park interpretation intended to provide virtually all park 
visitors with a desired level of service. The new centres offered a full range of facilities, 
and were strategically sited to intercept the flow of automobiles into and through a park. 
Visitors were more numerous and mobile than ever, often staying in motels outside park 
boundaries and visiting parks on automotive day trips. The visitor centre was intended to 
assure that even under these circumstances, basic orientation, services, and core 
interpretive messages would be delivered. Otherwise the crowds of visitors might simply 
drive through the park without ever appreciating the significance of the scenery, history, 
or other park resources, while perhaps resenting potential negative aspects of their 
experience, including traffic congestion and overcrowded facilities. "Visitor flow" was 
the overwhelming reality of architectural design as well as park planning. And just as 
Gruen had civic aspirations for his "shopping towns," Vint insisted that the visitor centre 
would be the new "city hall" of a park: a central and public space that served as a 
common feature of every visit, and as a fixture of the daily pattern of life of the people 
who lived and worked there.331 
New visitor centres were high on the list of the majority of the prospectuses 
drafted by park superintendents and Mission 66 planners. The 1956 final Mission 66 
329 Welton Becket, "Shopping Centre Traffic Problems," Traffic Quarterly 9 (April 1955):. 162 -172. 
330 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 18. 
331 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Visitor Center Planning: Notes on Discussions 
Held in EODC November 18 -22, 1957, and WODC February 4 -6, 1958, unpublished report , n.d. [1958], 
(National Park Service Denver Service Center Library); Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 222; Barry 
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report insisted that "one of the most pressing needs for each [park] area is the visitor 
center." Wirth was particularly convinced that the idea would serve the park system 
wel1.332 Before Mission 66, superintendents submitted proposals for new buildings or 
other facilities through a Proposed Construction Project (PCP), which detailed the need 
and program for a new building. The PCP was passed on to the regional office where it 
was developed into a schematic plan with cost estimates. The regional director then 
prioritized the proposal for funding. The project might go into design development at that 
point, and eventually be finalized in construction drawings and sent out to bid once 
funding had been secured. The entire process was usually in- house, especially at the 
preliminary stages of design, although consulting architects and engineers might be used 
to produce final design drawings. After 1954, PCPs were sent directly to the WODC and 
EODC, although regional directors still prioritized construction budgets for their regions. 
The initiation of Mission 66 further changed the process by asking superintendents to 
assemble their wish lists of PCPs as Mission 66 prospectuses. The regional office 
remained involved, but only through their participation drafting and reviewing the 
prospectuses. In Washington, Wirth, Vint, and the Mission 66 planners already directly 
supervised the WODC and EODC, and now assumed much of the responsibility for 
prioritizing construction budgets, as well. This assured a certain level of consistency in 
the priorities established for park construction. A new visitor centre, for example, 
became a high priority for a majority of parks.333 
With the 1956 appropriations secured, WODC and EODC staff anticipated at least 
ten funded visitor centre PCPs per year for the next decade. In addition to preliminary 
designs, the first set of projects would require immediate design development and 
construction drawings in order to assemble contracts and bid projects out to construction 
contractors that spring. Mission 66 called for increased levels of staffing for the Park 
Service, generally, including the design offices. But the agency did not expect to handle 
Mackintosh, Interpretation in the National Park Service (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 
National Park Service, 1986), 49 -51. 
332 At the opening of one of the first visitor centres in 1957, at Yorktown (Colonial National Historical 
Park), Wirth's prepared remarks included the phrase, "Throughout the Nation, 170 ( ?) National Park Visitor 
centers are either under construction, in the final stages of planning, or firmly fixed in our comprehensive 
program." There were 195 units in the park system at the time. Wirth scratched out the questionable 
number, however, and wrote in "more than 100" by hand. A collection of Wirth's speeches, including 
many prepared remarks for visitor centre dedications, are conserved at the American Heritage Centre, 
Conrad L. Wirth Collection, Box 7. 
333 "Interview with Cecil J. Doty," conducted by Jacilee Wray, February 26, 1990, transcript, p. 3 -4, 
(catalogue number GRCA 52220, Grand Canyon National Park Archive); Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor 
Centers, 26. 
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all the new design work with in -house forces, as it had for the influx of work during the 
New Deal. The need for architectural and engineering services was seen as a temporary 
demand, and there was no need to relieve high unemployment as there had been in the 
1930s. The situation was closer to that of the 1920s, when the Park Service had 
employed architectural consultants, including Myron Hunt, Gilbert Stanley Underwood, 
and Herbert Maier, to design many larger rustic park buildings of that era. Also, during 
the postwar period any construction project estimated to cost more than $200,000 came 
under the supervision of the General Services Administration (GSA), a separate federal 
agency that took agency preliminary designs and contracted out for design development, 
construction drawings, and construction supervision. Two of the first visitor centre 
projects handled by the EODC, the Yorktown and Jamestown visitor centres (1957) at 
Colonial National Historical Park, cost more than $300,000 apiece and so were 
supervised by the GSA. The Philadelphia architects Gilboy, Bellante, and Clauss 
developed the preliminary PCP and designed buildings with red brick veneer (a 
concession to the historical setting), but that otherwise suggested contemporary American 
institutional architecture, with large geometric volumes, open plans, large windows, and 
roof terraces. Park Service officials were unhappy with the results, perhaps for 
administrative as much as aesthetic reasons. After 1957, special approval was sought and 
usually received to keep even those projects costing more than $200,000 under Park 
Service supervision. The great majority of new visitor centres, in any case, cost less than 
that amount.334 
Other projects, such as comfort stations (bathrooms), or other small, utilitarian 
structures were given standardized plans rather than new designs. Housing had its own 
imposed cost limitations per unit, necessitating a level of standardization as well, 
although with flexibility for local conditions and materials. Visitor centres and park 
administration buildings, however, always required unique designs. Landscape architects 
and interpretive planners, both in the WODC and EODC and in individual parks, took the 
schematic idea for the project and worked it into the overall development context of the 
park's Mission 66 prospectus. The new visitor centre was sited, integrated with the park 
road and trail systems, and planned as part of the overall interpretive strategy for the park. 
Often "secondary" visitor centres, smaller roadside structures or signs, and short "nature 
walks" near areas of particular interest composed complementary features of the overall 
334 "Interview with A. Clark Stratton," conducted by S. Herbert Evison, March 1, 1962, transcript p. 2 -3, 
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interpretive plan. The landscape architects usually established the footprints of a 
proposed visitor centres and even designed parking lots, paths, and outdoor amphitheatres 
that exploited the views of scenery, historic scenes, or other "park resources" in the 
surrounding landscape. At that point, the architects and engineers (who sometimes never 
saw the visitor centre site) would finish the set of "preliminaries" by developing 
schematic designs for the building itself including rough cost estimates. 
Cecil Doty did much of the preliminary visitor centre design early in the Mission 
66 program, and contributed greatly to the development of this building type. Vint had 
already promoted Doty to the unusual post of "regional designer" in 1952, freeing him 
from the administrative duties of a regional architect and allowing him to concentrate 
solely on design. As the principal architectural designer of the WODC, Doty provided 
many preliminary design schemes, and in some cases developed those designs much 
further.335 Allaback documents a total of 110 national park visitor centre projects and 
sixteen "additions" to existing buildings with construction contracts let between 1956 and 
1966. She also lists 54 preliminary visitor centre design projects done by Doty while at 
the WODC during those years. Not all of Doty's preliminary design projects were built, 
and many others were significantly altered by other architects as they moved to final 
design and construction drawings. But Doty's contribution to Mission 66 visitor design 
in the mid- 1950s, particularly at the initial, conceptual stage of design, was extremely 
significant. Wirth and Vint relied on Doty, not unlike they had in the 1930s on Doty's 
mentor, Herbert Maier, to provide architectural expressions of park planning goals that 
influenced not only buildings in the western parks, but by example visitor centres. 
throughout the national park system. But as the principal WODC designer, Doty also 
remained involved in project work, and never rose from that level into the managerial 
ranks, as Wirth, Vint, Maier, and many other Park Service landscape architects and 
architects had.336 
(National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
335 "Interview with Cecil J. Doty," conducted by S. Herbert Evison, October 26, 1962, transcript, p. 4, 
(National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); "Interview with Cecil J. Doty," 
conducted by Jacilee Wray, February 26, 1990, transcript, p. 4, ( catalogue number GRCA 52220, Grand 
Canyon National Park Archive); U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Visitor Center 
Planning, 45. 
336 Conrad Wirth gives a total of 114 new visitor centres during Mission 66. Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the 
People, 270. The exact definition of what constitutes a new visitor centre (as opposed to an addition or a 
remodelling) makes it difficult to specify an exact number. Allaback's totals reflect what she could confirm 
through project records at the Technical Information Centre, National Park Service, Denver Service Center. 
See Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 255 -265. 
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There was no single designer in the EODC that played the same role as Doty in 
the WODC, although supervising architect John Cabot did exercise great influence on 
visitor centre design both in his region and throughout the park system. Cabot later 
replaced Dick Sutton as the agency's chief architect in Washington, and in both capacities 
he established standards and procedures for the planning and design of visitor centres 
throughout the Mission 66 period. Like Doty, Cabot stressed the use of "spatial 
relationship diagrams," and "traffic flow diagrams" as starting points for preliminary 
design. For Cabot, the "freedom of expression in architecture during this postwar period" 
(modernism) could not be ignored. He intended to make sure that the Park Service hired 
the best possible consultants, since "the cheapest investment is to hire the very finest 
design talent available. "337 After the first season of Mission 66 construction, Cabot 
travelled the country, reporting that new park buildings appeared "very refreshing 
designwise when viewed in comparison with the other [rustic] units in their immediate 
environment," but that the details of construction had not always been "given sufficient 
thought. "338 Construction contracts had been rushed, in some cases, with inadequately 
developed construction drawings, leading to shoddy or badly conceived workmanship. 
By 1957 Cabot sought a larger role for consulting architects, who increasingly would take 
preliminary Park Service designs and develop them into fully articulated, thoughtfully 
detailed construction contracts. The in -house design offices simply could not produce all 
the necessary construction documents. The consultants that Cabot helped select were 
progressive, modernist designers, including some who were, or went on to become, 
leading figures in American architecture, such as Richard Neutra and Romaldo Giurgola. 
The role of the consultant varied according to the project. In some cases they did little 
more than produce construction drawings for developed designs; in others, particularly 
the larger, higher profile cases, they were asked to develop the entire design. Even in 
these cases, however, the consulting architects were given the site, program, and even the 
orientation and footprint for the new building, as determined by the Park Service 
landscape architects and interpretive planners.339 
By the fall of 1957, the end of the second construction season of Mission 66, only 
three visitor centres were completed: the two at Colonial National Historical Park and one 
337 John B. Cabot, "Creative Park Architecture," Park Practice Guideline. Department of the Interior, 
National Park Service (July 1963): 53 -55. 
338 John B. Cabot, "Notes Gathered Travelling," October 12, 1956, memorandum (Box 29, RG 79, National 
Archives, Mid -Atlantic Region). 
339 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 24 -33. 
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at the south rim of the Grand Canyon, all of which had been initiated before Mission 66. 
But others were already in construction, at Everglades, Carlsbad Caverns, Olympic, 
Yellowstone, and Dinosaur, and approximately ten additional projects per year were 
anticipated. The staffs of the WODC and EODC decided to conduct a thorough review of 
their work to that point and compare their experiences. Five days of meetings were held 
in Philadelphia that November, followed by three more days that February in San 
Francisco. The next month Washington chief of interpretation Ronald F. Lee and chief 
architect Dick Sutton issued a joint memorandum on visitor centre planning and design, 
with attached notes on the discussions held as well as individual papers prepared by chief 
naturalist John E. Doerr, and architects Bennet, Cabot, and Doty. The interpreters and 
architects emphasized the need for close cooperation "right from the early stages of 
planning" in order to adequately serve the rapidly developing requirements for museum 
exhibits, interpretive displays, auditoriums, and office and storage space in the new 
buildings. Ronald Lee, who had been the chief instigator of the meetings, wanted more 
organization in the preparation of the "museum prospectuses" that determined the basic 
building program prior to the preliminary design stage. "Supplemental museum 
prospectuses" were called for by both WODC and EODC to better elaborate the 
considerable and obviously growing needs of curators and park interpreters.34o 
Some of the early problems identified included the desire of museum curators for 
spaces with few or no windows to protect objects from daylight, while architects and 
exhibition designers preferred sunny spaces with views of surrounding landscapes. The 
designers were also worried by the observation that at Grand Canyon, Colonial, and soon 
elsewhere, lobbies, bathrooms, information counters, and exhibit spaces all potentially 
became clogged with people waiting in lines, or simply "back- tracking" rather than 
following a "circle" route through the facility. Inadequate space for the sale of 
publications, poorly located pay phones or water fountains, or an inefficient floor plan all 
could impede "flow" and drastically undermine the efficiency of the building. For the 
Park Service architects, the answer was "openness" in plan, including spacious entrance 
lobbies with high ceilings and large windows. Such spaces often typified modernist 
architecture, which employed steel and reinforced concrete construction that could span 
large uninterrupted areas with few vertical supports or load bearing walls. Such 
340 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Visitor Center Planning, 1 -5; Ralph H. Lewis, 
Museum Curatorship in the National Park Service, 1904 -1982 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Interior, National Park Service, 1993), 150. 
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construction enabled visual connections through large windows or window walls to 
outdoor spaces (often terraces) and surrounding views, which was another typical 
characteristic of modernist design that naturally fit the programmatic and functional needs 
of the visitor centre. Cabot recommended "openness of space and openness of plan," and 
suggested that outdoor spaces (which were less expensive to build) could be integrated 
with indoor spaces to accommodate even greater anticipated "visitor load." Views were 
to be "exploited," whether from the lobby, from roof terraces, or from outdoor terraces 
and amphitheatres directly incorporated into the circulation plan. Above all, Bennett, 
Cabot, and Doty all agreed that "circulation [was] ...the `backbone' of any plan and 
should guide the visitor and help him make decisions." Cabot and Doty both provided 
numerous examples of conceptual "visitor sequence" and "visitor flow" diagrams, that 
generated the design of ground level floor plans, and that integrated indoor and outdoor 
spaces.'41 
The visitor centre adapted modernist ideas of architectural composition to the 
programmatic and functional purposes of national parks. The integration of indoor and 
outdoor space in a (usually) one -level, public building evoked the pavilions of Mies van 
der Rohe; the flow diagrams developed by Cabot and Doty recalled Le Corbusier's use of 
architectural procession (a dramatic sequence of spaces and views) to organize the 
experience created by a building. As developed by the Park Service in the mid- 1950s, the 
visitor centre became a viewing platform, in which views from interior spaces, roof 
terraces, and adjacent outdoor terraces or amphitheatres were calculated as a flowing, 
sequential experience. They were buildings to see from, not to be seen. In this sense they 
reversed the premise of prewar park museum design. Those rustic buildings were meant 
to be seen: they were sited to form elements of pictorial landscape compositions 
experienced by visitors moving through and around a park village. Great effort and 
expense went into the design of elaborate façades that evoked Swiss chalets, "pioneer" 
construction, or "Indian" culture. But the outward stylistic or aesthetic appearance of the 
Mission 66 visitor centre -as long as it was minimal and did not visually contrast with its 
surroundings or call too much attention to itself -was almost inconsequential. The 
removal of most ornamentation and historical allusion was another aspect of modernism 
that fit the purpose of the new buildings perfectly. They were not meant to have a 
powerful presence themselves, but to recede visually, even as they facilitated the 
341 See U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Visitor Center Planning, 1 -20, 45-48; Lewis, 
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appreciation of park landscapes and resources by larger numbers of people. The 
architecture, ideally, should be nearly transparent: a composition of functional, 
overlapping spaces and outward views, not of structural mass and decorative façades. 
The best Mission 66 visitor centres achieved this appropriate adaptation of 
contemporary modernist ideas to the goals espoused by Park Service landscape architects 
and interpreters for the redevelopment of national parks (fig. 50). Many successful 
examples were less expensive, smaller buildings. Cecil Doty's Zion (1957) and 
Montezuma Castle visitor centres (1958) typify an unpretentious, functional approach to 
architecture that met pressing needs for visitor and administrative functions with dignified 
efficiency and minimal visual intrusion on the landscape. At Zion, for example (figs. 51- 
56), from the public (front) side, the visitor centre appears to be a low, horizontal, earth 
tone structure. The building is sited on a slope, however, so that two stories of 
maintenance and administrative space could be incorporated on the back of the building, 
where they were unseen by most visitors. The building provided tremendous utility - 
office space and an attached maintenance yard -while the public experience was one of a 
light and spacious pavilion and terrace, with views of surrounding geological features. 
Sound architectural planning not only facilitated efficient "visitor flow" in the public 
areas of the building, it also enabled the visitor centre to serve greatly enlarged 
administrative, maintenance, and curatorial programs while minimizing the overall 
architectural presence of the building. The public experienced the visitor centre as a 
minimal, light filled pavilion, oriented to the surrounding landscape, without being aware 
of much of the real work the building was doing.342 
While examples such as Zion were designed entirely in- house, with consultants 
producing only the working drawings, other visitor centres were true collaborations. The 
Flamingo Visitor Center at Everglades (1957), for example, was partly funded by the new 
restaurant and motel concessioner, who hired his own architect, Harry L. Keck, Jr., of 
Coral Gables. Doty (working in this case well outside his region) had earlier assisted 
Cabot and his EODC staff in preliminary designs for the building, and Vint had been 
closely involved, visiting the site several times and approving its location and conceptual 
design. Keck's office produced the final design and working drawings. Set high on 
columns (to avoid flooding during storm surges), and featuring a ramped entrance, 
concrete construction, horizontal bands of windows, and plain geometrical massing, the 
Museum Curatorship, 151. 
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building evoked Le Corbusier and other modernists (figs. 15, 16). But again the 
architecture was not intended as merely a stylistic reference. The elevated structure 
contained far more program than it suggested, including office space at the ground level 
under the visitor centre. Visitors entered by a ramp directly to the elevated level, where 
an unusual juxtaposition of airy public spaces -a restaurant and a visitor centre connected 
by an open bridge -made the entire experience one of a raised viewing terrace oriented to 
Florida Bay. From the surrounding landscape, views of the bay were framed by the 
elevated bridge /terrace and the juxtaposed building masses, reinforcing the impression of 
an open pavilion, and somewhat belying the presence of a large restaurant and 
administrative complex. 
The collaboration that produced this result was typical of many visitor centre 
projects. In other instances, particularly in the case of larger and more expensive 
buildings, architectural consultants were given greater responsibilities. Even in these 
situations, however, the private architects developed their designs after being given the 
"preliminaries" that established site, orientation, program, and surrounding landscape 
development. The Quarry Visitor Center at Dinosaur National Monument (1958), for 
example, was based on a preliminary concept developed by Doty and WODC colleagues 
(figs. 10, 11). A remarkable bed of dinosaur fossils, discovered in 1909, was to be 
exposed, left in situ, and covered by a shed to protect it and provide public access and 
services. Put in the hands of consulting architects S. Robert Anshen, William S. Allen, 
and Robert Hein in 1957, the building took on dramatic lines and became one of the 
unqualified aesthetic successes of Mission 66. Just a year earlier, the firm of Anshen and 
Allen had designed the Sedona Chapel in Arizona, a dramatic and widely published 
building that incorporated the striking rock formations on which it was sited. The project 
probably helped the firm secure the Dinosaur commission, which also demanded a unique 
union with its geological setting. At Dinosaur, the architects suggested a series of steel 
trusses that carried an asymmetrical vee- shaped roof over the exposed bed of fossils. 
While Park. Service museum curators had originally suggested limiting natural light in the 
enclosure, the walls in Anshen and Allen's approved design were completely glazed in a 
rectangular grid of windows. Public services, offices, and interpretive space were located 
in a massive, two -story concrete cylinder that contrasted to the light, angular shed 
structure attached to it. A sweeping entrance ramp led directly to the second level, and 
342 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 228 -246. 
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from there onto a viewing terrace (within the shed) that gave a stunning view down on the 
expanse of partially exposed fossils. An active paleontological laboratory was housed 
beneath the terrace, at the ground level of the shed extending behind the cylinder of the 
visitor centre. The building opened in the spring of 1958 to a positive reception among 
Park Service officials, architectural critics, and scientists, who appreciated the in situ 
interpretation of the resources as well as the active laboratory that was interpreted for the 
public.343 
For Wirth, the successful development of Dinosaur was a priority for Mission 66. 
The positive critical assessment and clear architectural merit of the building rejoined the 
critics who objected to modernist design in national park settings. The building's 
minimalist aesthetic indeed "harmonized" with the forbidding landscape of northeastern 
Utah, and its frank expression of construction technology seemed appropriate in a facility 
dedicated to scientific research as well as public enjoyment. This was also the park that 
preservationists had rallied to protect from the Echo Park Dam; the final victory in that 
controversy had just been achieved in 1956. Although the new visitor centre was far from 
the Echo Park area, it nevertheless countered the claim that the park was unused by the 
public. 
Mission 66 made it possible to fund substantial improvements at Dinosaur -and 
many other less known parks and monuments with lower numbers of visitors - really for 
the first time. Historian Hal Rothman points out that the Park Service did not give the 
same level of attention or funding to most national monuments, for example, as it did to 
more heavily visited and more famous landscape parks elsewhere in the system.344 
National monuments, set aside by presidential decree not by congressional legislation, 
often preserved smaller areas and archaeological ruins that, at least initially, were of more 
interest to scientists and "pot hunters" than they were to the general public. The New 
Deal began to address the imbalance, providing development funds for sites such as 
Bandelier and White Sands national monuments in New Mexico (for which Bennett 
designed park administration buildings).345 The magnitude of Mission 66, however, and 
the outstanding need for visitor facilities in many smaller parks, brought an 
343 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 19 -60. The Quarry Visitor Center was designated a National 
Historic Landmark in 2001 for its significance in American architecture. 
3"A See Hal Rothman, America's National Monuments: The Politics of Preservation (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, by arrangement with the University of Illinois Press, 1989). 
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unprecedented level of consistency to all the units of the national park system. By the 
end of Mission 66, even the most remote parks enjoyed basic utilities, a visitor centre, 
maintenance yard, and standard housing for employees. This suite of basic facilities - 
above all the visitor centre - became the sine qua non of a functional unit of the national 
park system. Without a visitor centre, it seemed, no park could be expected to adequately 
preserve and interpret its resources, and a series of the buildings were considered 
necessary at larger parks. New visitor centres represented not only consistent standards 
for the convenience of visitors and staff, but also a standard of administration in every 
park. The construction of visitor centres was linked to the expansion and training of staff 
to work in them, as well as the use of slide and movie projectors and other technological 
means of more efficiently interpreting a park to its public. 
Wirth and his staff of planners, and the scores of park superintendents who drafted 
Mission 66 prospectuses, made the visitor centre the architectural and functional 
centrepiece of their reinvented National Park Service. More than 100 were planned, and 
by 1959 thirty -five were opened, with many more under construction. By 1964 seventy - 
two were opened, and by 1966 there were ninety -five, with sixteen more let to contractors 
and under construction, for a total of 111 (at least by one agency count).346 That year 
there were 254 units in the park system. In price they ranged from less than $100,000 
(for example, Montezuma Castle, Hopewell Culture, Fredericksburg), to less than 
$200,000 (Arches, Canyon de Chelly, Eielson, Fort Sumter, Saratoga), to less than 
$400,000 (Sequoia and Kings Canyon, Colorado National Monument, Antietam, Rock 
Creek Park), to more than $400,000. In 1963 this last group included the Gettysburg 
Cyclorama and the Death Valley visitor centres (both around $500,000), and the $7.5 
million Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Visitor Center in St. Louis. In 1966 the 
$2 million Paradise (Henry M. Jackson Memorial) Visitor Center at Mount Rainier 
345 The complex of park buildings at Bandelier National Monument was designated a National Historic 
Landmark district in 1987 for its significance in American architecture. Harrison, Architecture in the 
Parks, 355 -382. 
346 According to a 1973 Park Service account, six Mission 66 visitor centres opened in calendar year 1957, 
ten in 1958, nineteen in 1959, seven in 1960, five in 1961, eleven in 1962, eleven in 1963, nine in 1964, ten 
in 1965, and seven in 1966. Sixteen more had contracts let (gone to construction) before 1966 and opened 
between 1967 and 1969, for a total of 111. "Visitor Centers Completed Under Mission 66," memorandum, 
n.d. [1973], (Box A8213, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). Sarah Allaback 
lists 110, confirmed through the records of the National Park Service Technical Information Centre, Denver 
Service Center, with locations and attributions. Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 255 -262. The final 
Mission 66 "Progress Report" in 1966 listed only 100 "new" visitor centres, probably indicating a 
discrepancy between new buildings and projects involving substantial additions and alterations to existing 
buildings. U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, "Mission 66 Progress Report, March 
1966" (National Park Service Technical Information Centre, Denver). 
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joined this group as another very atypical project, in this case the result of an elaborate 
attempt to settle twenty years of controversy over hotels and winter use at Paradise. Of 
the ninety -nine visitor centres completed or "programmed" through fiscal year 1963, 
thirty-three were less than $100,000, forty -three less than $200,000, twenty less than 
$400,000, and only three more than $400,000.347 Some visitor centres involved the 
conversion or expansion of older buildings, but the great majority were new construction 
and established the functional centre of a revised strategy for how a park received and 
served visitors. The ubiquity of the new building type indicated the great faith national 
park planners and architects placed in the philosophical and practical approaches Mission 
66 represented. Considering the subsequent adoption of visitor centre buildings by park 
agencies of all types all over the world, the new building type must be considered one of 
the most influential public land management strategies ever devised. 
At least in professional and critical circles, Mission 66 endowed the Park Service 
with the highest reputation for architectural patronage that the agency has ever enjoyed. 
To a great degree this reputation was based not as much on the typical visitor centres 
designed by in -house forces, as much as it was on a few exceptional examples by well 
known consulting architects. The firm of Anshen and Allen, for example, in part because 
of its early critical success with the Sedona Chapel and the Quarry Visitor Center, went 
on to design Eichler homes and other residences, schools, hospitals, and institutions in 
California and all over the country. The critical success of the Wright Brothers National 
Memorial Visitor Center, which opened in North Carolina in 1960, similarly helped 
launch the Philadelphia firm of Mitchell /Giurgola (fig. 12). Cabot recruited Ehrman 
Mitchell and Romaldo Giurgola shortly after they left the office of Gilboy, Bellante, and 
Clauss (the designers of the Yorktown and Jamestown visitor centres) to start their own 
firm. The architects went on to become major figures in the profession, with an 
international practice that won the AIA national award in 1976. Giurgola served as the 
chair of Columbia University's architecture school and won the AIA Gold Medal in 1982. 
Even Frank Lloyd Wright's firm, Taliesen Associated Architects, made a contribution to 
Mission 66, although five years after its founder had died. The Beaver Meadows Visitor 
347 "Analysis Visitor Centers Mission 66," memorandum, n.d. [1963], (Box A8123. National Park Service 
History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). All figures are the original, unadjusted costs. 
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Center in Rocky Mountain National Park, which opened in 1967, indeed proved that great 
design could find appropriate uses and expression in a national park (fig. 57).348 
The most renowned architect to work as a consultant to Mission 66 was Richard 
Neutra, one of the original figures of the International Style, who with his partner Robert 
Alexander was asked in 1958 to design two very different park projects. Mission 66 was 
under particular pressure to address Civil War battlefield parks because of the centennial 
commemorations being planned for the 1960s. No celebrations loomed larger than those 
planned for the Gettysburg National Military Park, the site of the war's greatest battle and 
Lincoln's famous address in 1863. President Eisenhower also happened to own a home 
and planned to retire in Gettysburg. Planning for a new museum to house a large 
nineteenth -century "cyclorama" painting of the battle had begun in the 1940s. Civil War 
historians, park managers, EODC planners and interpreters, and the Park Service 
Washington Office all agreed that the Ziegler's Grove area of the battlefield the view 
point from which the huge, circular painting had been made -was a powerful location 
from which to interpret the history of the battle and use the cyclorama painting most 
effectively. Given this location and the necessity of housing the painting, Neutra and 
Alexander's building took the form of a large, featureless concrete cylinder and a long, 
low wing extending from it (figs. 13, 14). Dedicated in 1962, the minimalist, geometric 
abstraction of the building, its overall low massing set partially in the trees, and its 
sensitive use of fieldstone masonry were intended to harmonize its visual presence in 
what was an extremely sensitive location in the middle of the battlefield. The procession 
through the building allowed visitors to experience the painting, and then to emerge onto 
a roof terrace and view the actual battlefield from the same point of reference. Critics 
such as Von Eckardt praised the quality and sensitivity of the design. For the Park 
Service, the collaboration with a world renowned architect on such an important public 
building marked a high point in the entire Mission 66 architectural design effort.349 
The second Neutra and Alexander project for the Park Service was the Painted 
Desert Community, a combined visitor centre, residential area, and maintenance facility 
in the Petrified Forest National Park in Arizona. In this case the architects produced the 
most unusual and atypical national park architecture of the entire-era. Sited in a remote 
348 The Quarry, Wright Brothers, and Beaver Meadows visitor centres were all designated National Historic 
Landmarks in 2001 for their significance in American architecture. See Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor 
Centers. 
349 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 95 -144. 
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desert with a hostile climate, the new community was designed in a compact geometric 
layout, featuring row houses and apartments all directly attached to the visitor centre and 
maintenance buildings in one large complex. The public buildings and apartments 
together defined a central, sheltered courtyard. The private gardens of the rowhouses 
were separated by masonry walls, which with other walls in the complex were intended to 
block the desert wind. The Painted Desert Community was true International Style 
architecture, with unadorned rectangular massing, large featureless façades, and 
horizontal windows set in long bands. The dense little community sited in the vast, open 
desert offered a complete contrast to typical ranch house subdivisions of the period. The 
entire project was a remarkable departure for the WODC and the entire Park Service, and 
indicated the degree to which the agency was committed by the mid -1950s to employing 
the most progressive architectural ideas that the profession had to offer. At least for 
Wirth and Vint, there were indications that in this case they felt the experiment had not 
been entirely successful, and that Neutra had not been receptive to suggested changes. 
The design won a Progressive Architecture award in 1959, however, and the Park Service 
allowed construction on the exceptional and essentially unchanged plan to proceed the 
next year.35° 
The locations of Mission 66 visitor centres were carefully considered. Ronald Lee 
and Dick Sutton outlined different strategies in their joint 1958 notes on visitor centre 
design, as did Daniel Beard (the former Everglades superintendent) who succeeded 
Ronald Lee as the chief of the Division of Interpretation in 1960.351 For interpreters, 
architects, and landscape architects (the last group usually being responsible for siting 
buildings) the importance of the views from the visitor centres was always stressed. 
Beard in fact criticized the Grand Canyon Visitor Center because it was "too far removed 
(1/3 mile) from the Canyon rim," and so failed to stimulate visitors to investigate the 
canyon's natural history and ask good questions of the visitor centre staff. This emphasis 
put interpreters at odds with the intent of Vint's "Plan B," which suggested that visitor 
facilities should be relocated away from "sensitive" areas, such as the rim of the Grand 
Canyon. Lee and Beard both praised visitor centres that afforded "a good view of park 
features," such as those at Yorktown and Hopewell Village. The large visitor centre 
350 Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers, 145 -180. 
351 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Visitor Center Planning: Notes on Discussions 
Held in EODC November 18 -22, 1957, and WODC February 4 -6, 1958, unpublished report , n.d. [1958], 
(National Park Service Denver Service Center Library); Daniel B. Beard, "Report on Visitor Centers," 
January 29, 1960 (National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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window at Hopewell Village, for example, was "in itself a fine exhibit." The outdoor or 
roof terraces at visitor centres such as Gettysburg were ideal for interpreters to conduct 
their programs, allowing visitors to observe the battlefield or other attraction directly in 
front of them, with supporting interpretive displays and visitor services nearby. 
Experienced interpreters knew that more distantly placed visitor centres - regardless of 
how artful the museum exhibits might be -could not compete with the power of 
interpreting a site while looking directly at the landscape being discussed. 
Architect John Cabot described three specific strategies for visitor centre 
locations, which more or less echoed what Lee and Beard suggested: at park entrances; 
"en route" along a major park road or intersection; and at a "terminus" or major 
destination within the park.352 In larger parks there were often several visitor centres at 
different entrances and destinations. There was a tension between the desire to remove 
visitor centres from the "sacred" or "sensitive" areas (where older visitor services had 
congregated), and wanting to maintain the interpretive strength offered by proximity. At 
Yellowstone, for example, the Canyon Village and Grant Village developments replaced 
visitor services considered too close to scenic views and thermal features. But at Old 
Faithful, a new visitor centre was built with a direct view of the famous geyser. In 
smaller historic parks, however, where the role of the interpretation was considered even 
more vital (and in which typically there was only one visitor centre), the building was 
often located to provide an expansive view of the park landscape. This often meant the 
visitor centre was near or directly in the "historic scene" being interpreted. Since historic 
sites were considered more difficult for the public to appreciate, they were also often the 
subjects of more elaborate interpretative plans. Reconstructions, "living history" 
reenactments, and other means were sometimes promoted under Mission 66 to "bring 
history alive." At Fort Davis in Texas, a partial reconstruction of a barracks served as 
visitor centre, and at Fort Union in New Mexico (and other similar sites) the visitor centre 
was designed in a historically inspired idiom and placed immediately adjacent to the 
archaeological ruins. In historical parks, in particular, interpretation was given priority 
over concerns for maintaining more absolute integrity of the setting. 
Many preservationists, historians, and archaeologists would eventually deplore the 
locations of some Mission 66 visitor centres, especially those located at "terminus" sites, 
352 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Visitor Center Planning: Notes on Discussions 
Held in EODC November 18 -22, 1957, and WODC February 4 -6, 1958, unpublished report , n.d. [1958], 
(National Park Service Denver Service Center Library). 
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which came to be seen as encroachments on delicate natural features and historic scenes. 
If the Gettysburg Cyclorama was a flagship of the Mission 66 program, it also became a 
symbol of what many came to see as a willingness to value interpretation and visitor 
experience above the stewardship of park landscapes and archaeological resources. 
Historian Robert M. Utley, for example, who served as chief historian from 1964 to 1971, 
remarked in 1985 that "we weren't very conscious in those days of how we might be 
interfering with the preservation of the resources," noting that the Fort Union visitor 
centre was put "practically right in the middle of the fort." Recalling Roy Appleman, he 
remembered that "his interest was primarily in interpretation," and that he "believed in 
putting the visitor center right on top of the resource." At Chaco Canyon and elsewhere, 
Appleman "always argued that you had to see virtually everything from the visitor 
center." In 1985, echoing a general sentiment at the time, Utley concluded that such 
priorities were "outdated now. "353 But such reconsideration of policy on the part of Park 
Service historians and other staff came mostly after Mission 66, and especially in the 
1980s, when modernist architecture was also being negatively reevaluated. During 
Mission 66, the architecture and siting of visitor centres -and the general emphasis on 
interpretation -was widely approved both within the agency and by others. And it should 
be noted that many Mission 66 visitor centres are not necessarily "on the resource," at all, 
but are near park entrances (sometimes on land outside the park and acquired for the 
purpose), within park administrative areas, or in other locations where visitors could be 
efficiently intercepted and oriented while minimizing the encroachment on "sensitive" 
areas. 
11.2 Administration Buildings 
As a category of development, visitor centres were the most important single 
category of Mission 66 architectural construction. The new building type was at the heart 
of revised planning goals and policies for the park system, and the proliferation of the 
carefully designed new buildings symbolized the entire program. "Administration 
buildings" also continued to be built, although they rarely had the same importance that 
prewar administration buildings originally had. At Grand Canyon and Mount Rainier, for 
example, prewar rustic administration buildings designed by Thomas Vint and his staff of 
353 Richard W. Sellars and Melody Webb, "An Interview with Robert M. Utley on the History of Historic 
Preservation in the National Park Service, 1947 -1980," September 24, 1985- December 27, 1985, 
transcript (National Park Service, Denver Service Center, Technical Information Centre). 
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landscape architects were sited directly on the village "plazas," where they imbued these 
central public spaces with the sense and identity of the civic administration of the park. A 
few Mission 66 administration buildings, such as the Ash Mountain Administration 
Building (Cecil Doty, WODC, and Walter Wagner & Partners, 1962) in Sequoia and 
Kings Canyon National Parks, had similar importance. In these cases, as at Ash 
Mountain, the building might feature interpretive displays and a "public contact" area, 
comparable to the information desks of prewar examples. More often, however, new 
visitor centres combined administrative functions with the park museum idea, replacing 
the need for either of the older building types. 
New "administrative areas" built outside park boundaries to replace the old 
administration and maintenance buildings in prewar park villages were a more 
noteworthy example of Mission 66 development for this purpose. The El Portal 
administrative complex outside Yosemite, and the Tahoma Woods area outside Mount 
Rainier, for example, were intended to replace the administrative and maintenance 
functions in Yosemite and Longmire villages, respectively. At El Portal, the Mission 66 
administration and residential area was later expanded, and now includes a large office 
and maintenance complex, additional residences, and an elementary school. The Tahoma 
Woods administrative and residential area has also grown. In both cases, however, the 
prewar rustic villages that were to be replaced were never demolished. The 
overwhelming need for maintenance and administrative space, and perhaps the reluctance 
of park staff to leave their picturesque park villages, resulted in having two administrative 
areas in these parks. On the other hand, at least the older villages did not grow to 
accommodate greatly increased maintenance and administrative needs. If this was only a 
partial victory for Vint's "Plan B," these and other Mission 66 administrative areas 
outside parks established vital precedents for removing development from parks. These 
precedents have had great influence on how new park administration and maintenance 
facilities have been sited ever since. 
At Olympic National Park, the intense controversies over timber management and 
wilderness preservation produced a distinctive approach for developing a national park 
administrative area. When the park was established in 1938, Secretary of the Interior 
Ickes and his assistant Irving Brant met with the new park's superintendent, Preston 
Macy, and other Park Service staff to determine "controlling development policies" for 
the park. This exceptional meeting indicated the degree to which controversies at 
Olympic held Ickes's and Brant's attention. The small group determined quickly (Ickes 
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was there only one day) that the new Olympic headquarters should be built outside the 
park boundaries, that existing roads were sufficient to provide "reasonable access," and 
that no overnight accommodations would be necessary since nearby towns could provide 
them. In 1940 a new administration building and superintendent's residence were built in 
the nearby town of Port Angeles.354 This was an early instance of what Vint would later 
call "Plan B" master planning, but it had its own origins and inspiration. The U.S. Forest 
Service, which had administered the former Mount Olympus National Monument since 
1909, had always placed its administration buildings in nearby communities rather than in 
the forests themselves, demonstrating the closer ties between national forest management 
and local economies and communities. The precedent of Forest Service examples 
influenced the decision to build in Port Angeles. The new building also showed an 
interesting stylistic transition. Constructed mainly of wood, it nevertheless featured 
modernist design details and spatial composition, and perhaps more than any other single 
building demonstrated the gradual transition between rustic and modernist park 
architecture. 
Of the 257 "administrative and service buildings" built through Mission 66, the 
variety is considerable, from near visitor centres that function as park headquarters, to 
small modular buildings serving as office space. Mission 66 administration buildings 
were also often sited directly adjacent to maintenance yards, which were utilitarian areas 
usually defined by linear arrangements of sheds or garages defining a central work area. 
The yards themselves were not functionally different from the utility areas built as part of 
rustic villages before the war; the buildings were now likely to be built of concrete block, 
or metal siding, the economical construction materials that characterized most new 
buildings of these types in the park system (or anywhere else) during the postwar period. 
Wirth also counted 218 new "utility buildings" built through Mission 66, a 
category that included storage buildings and workshops as well as structures that housed 
equipment for the extensive utility lines and other basic services being modernized, or 
provided for the first time, in many parks.355 Administrative, service, and utility 
buildings all had either very limited public access or no public function at all. This was 
another reason that in many cases standardized plans were considered acceptable. Most 
354 "Statement of Controlling Development Policies," n.d. (Olympic National Park Archives); Irving Brant, 
Adventures in Conservation With Franklin D. Roosevelt (Flagstaff, Arizona: Northland Publishing Co., 
1988), 117; Guy Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History (Seattle: National Park 
Service, 1990), 92. 
355 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 266 -267. 
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examples of all of these building types, in any case, did not benefit from the level of 
design attention and detail that public facilities -the visitor centres -were likely to 
receive. 
11.3 Park Housing 
Perhaps the most appreciated category of Mission 66 architectural design from the 
park staff point of view was employee housing: 743 single family and semi- detached 
houses were built, as well as 496 apartment units. The new subdivisions were typically 
located near new visitor centres and administrative areas, or they became expansions on 
existing prewar bungalow -type residential areas. 
An important survey regarding housing preferences among park staff and their 
families was also available to the Mission 66 staff. At the 1952 park superintendents' 
conference held in Glacier National Park, a group of wives of Park Service employees 
formed the National Park Service Women's Organization. The women specifically 
wished to address the substandard housing conditions that prevailed in many national 
park residential areas. Herma Albertson Baggley, who as a Yellowstone ranger in 1931 
had been the first woman to achieve permanent naturalist status in the Park Service, was 
elected national chair of the new organization. Married to the superintendent of Lake 
Mead National Recreation Area, Baggley, like so many of her colleagues, knew first hand 
how inadequate staff housing could make it impossible to maintain good morale or retain 
qualified staff. As head of the Women's Organization, she organized a systematic survey 
of existing housing data, which was gathered over the next year by women in almost 
every park with housing. In 1953 the organization submitted a report to Wirth that 
indicated that 10% of the agency's field employees were living in tents, and 24% were in 
one -bedroom houses or apartments. Of the latter group, 60% of the units were below "the 
standard of surrounding communities" in terms of size, basic utilities, and construction 
quality. Of the 40% lucky enough to be in a two or three- bedroom house or apartment, 
more than 40% were in housing considered substandard by these measures. The majority 
of park housing had been built in the 1920s or by the CCC in the 1930s and sometimes 
lacked modern utilities, including even electricity and running water. The remainder of 
the housing stock consisted of dormitories, which housed 60% of seasonal employees, 
and a few "trailers," which Baggley did not encourage as a replacement for "fixed 
housing." Baggley added that the statistics presented a "conservative" estimate of the 
problem; many Park Service women were proud of managing under difficult 
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circumstances and wanted to avoid any appearance of complaining.356 But at a time when 
many Americans were moving into their own ranch houses with attached garages, 
washing machines, and other conveniences, park staff and their families, not unlike 
military personnel who were facing a similar crisis, were trapped in housing that 
represented an earlier set of expectations for the material setting of family life. 
Wirth encouraged Baggley and the other women in her organization and 
instructed Vint to collaborate with them to produce model house plans that would meet 
modern social requirements for park families. These requirements were also indicated in 
Baggley's 1953 survey. Of the women surveyed, 94% preferred "individual buildings" 
to multi -unit buildings, citing play space for children and privacy as considerations. 
There was more diversity of opinion regarding whether "standard plans" for new two and 
three- bedroom houses should be adopted over custom designs. But 76% favoured 
standard plans, as long as adequate variations in construction and insulation reflected 
regional climates. Standard plans provided some stability for women who moved their 
families so frequently, since they could be reasonably sure of what to expect at their next 
posting. At a minimum they could know that their furniture and other belongings would 
fit in their next residence. Attached garages were favoured by 86 %, and space for storage 
in a basement or utility room was a priority for 95 %. Opinions were more evenly split on 
some details, such as the desirability of picture windows, plaster walls, and basements. In 
their recommendations for Park Service housing design, Baggley reported that the women 
agreed that "architectural design should complement the area in which it is built," 
apparently despite standardized floor plans. No one was asking for any "luxuries," but 
"all expressed a desire for space," since cramped conditions exacerbated all other 
inadequacies. They wanted larger houses, and they wanted them sited on larger lots, 
farther apart from one another.357 
Baggley described the needs and aspirations of women managing households in 
sometimes remote and isolated settings. They were asking for nothing more than to join 
the rest of the nation in terms of what was considered standard housing: the two or three - 
bedroom, single -family detached home. It was hardly surprising that in 1955 Wirth and 
Vint endorsed standard plans for two and three- bedroom ranch houses, a type that 
356 Herma A. Baggley, "Report of the National Park Service Housing Survey, unpublished report, 1953, 
(National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center); Kaufman, National Parks and the 
Woman's Voice, 113 -115. 
357 Herma A. Baggley, "Report of the National Park Service Housing Survey," unpublished report, 1953, 
(National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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featured many of the architectural and site amenities Baggley had described.358 The ranch 
house, probably more than any other type, symbolized a standard of material life that was 
consistent with what park staff and their families could see in "surrounding 
communities." Using a familiar building type also assured that local contractors could be 
found at reasonable cost, and that contemporary building materials and technology -from 
slab concrete foundations to manufactured windows -could be effectively employed. 
The ranch was also flexible: plans could be easily flipped into "right- handed" and "left - 
handed" versions, and garages, entry portals, and other extras could be added. Different 
rooflines and siding materials could be applied to reflect local conditions and availability. 
By 1955, Wirth and Vint had concurred with the National Park Service Women's 
Organization on the basic outline for residential development in the parks. Over the next 
ten years the standard plans for park residences would be improved, altered, and reissued 
several times; but the basic standard would remain the single -family ranch house, built by 
local contractors who would be given some latitude on construction materials and 
techniques to reflect economical building methods appropriate to different climates and 
regions of the country. 
Planning for Mission 66 park housing preceded Mission 66 and depended on the 
suggestions of Baggley and the National Park Service Women's Organization. In 
addition to single family units, other types of housing included dormitories and 
"housekeeping cabins." In some cases older housing reverted to "seasonal" use (usually 
of a lower standard) as new year -round housing became available. Many projects 
involved remodelling prewar "cottages," or adding bathrooms and modernizing existing 
housing. In some situations, such as at Dinosaur and Petrified Forest, the architects 
designing visitor centres were also asked to design associated park housing. There were 
other exceptional cases that required "special design." But in general, single family 
detached housing -soon known as the "Mission 66 ranch" -built through the use of 
standard (or "stock ") plans, became the ubiquitous symbol of the effort to provide decent 
housing for Park Service families (figs. 58 -60). The 1956 Mission 66 plan announced the 
goal of building 1,000 units of park housing in the next five (not ten) years, at an average 
cost of $18,000. This large an effort, together with congressional cost limitations, 
required the use of standardized plans. Even using consultants, the Park Service could 
358 Wirth Parks, Politics, and the People, 244. 
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not hope to provide so many individual residential designs.359 But despite the use of 
standardization (or perhaps because of it) Mission 66 raised the material standard and 
setting for family life in the parks to a level comparable to what most of the rest of the 
country was beginning to enjoy in the 1950s. 
As was the case with the Capehart and Wherry housing built by the U.S. Army, 
federal standards and rules, whether specified by Congress in legislation or through 
policy at the Bureau of the Budget, circumscribed certain limits on Park Service housing 
construction. The Bureau of the Budget issued "design standards," for example, limiting 
two- bedroom residences to 1,080 square feet and three -bedroom houses to 1, 260 square 
feet. Cost per unit was raised during the Mission 66 period to $20,000, but this was still a 
difficult figure to meet, especially in remote areas with high construction costs 360 Within 
these limits, however, architect John Cabot in particular wanted to assure that the Park 
Service developed the best possible standard designs. With dozens of units funded for 
immediate construction in the spring of 1956, Cabot expressed concerns about the quality 
of the standard plans that had been quickly assembled following the regional directors 
meeting in Washington in February 1956. Park housing had been a principal subject 
during a week of detailed discussions and presentations. Cabot felt the resulting 1956 
plans reflected "eastern city thinking," and suggested "mass produced developments 
surrounded by streets and sidewalks. "361 Park housing also remained the specific concern 
of the National Park Service Women's Organization. Wirth continued to support the 
organization's role advising on park housing, and this became their most important 
contribution to Mission 66. In response to Cabot's concerns, Herma Baggley reiterated 
the conclusions that she had submitted to Vint three years earlier. Park Service women 
would accept and even welcome standard plans, she again pointed out, because standard 
plans assured at least decent housing even in remote areas and brought an element of 
consistency to a lifestyle that demanded frequent moves. Standard plans did not have to 
mean that exterior sheathing, construction materials, or even rooflines all had to be the 
same everywhere, however, since local conditions and available materials required 
flexibility if houses were to fit in with local landscapes and regional climates. Baggley 
359 The final and official decision to use "stock" housing plans in Mission 66 was at the Regional Directors 
Conference in February 1956. John B. Cabot, "The Design of Park Service Houses," October 19, 1956, 
memorandum (Box 29, RG 79, National Archives, Mid -Atlantic Region, Philadelphia). 
36° U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, "Standard Plans for Employee Housing," 1957, 
unpublished report (National Park Service Technical Information Centre, Denver). 
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again reported that Park Service women were willing to put up with rough conditions and 
"primitive" construction, but advised that they would like to see more storage space, 
separate entrance areas ( "mud rooms "), larger kitchens, and more bedrooms.362 Since the 
Park Service continued to discriminate against women professionals in its design offices 
(a policy that was only beginning to change in the 1950s), the influence of the Women's 
Organization on the design of Mission 66 housing is particularly notable.363 
That fall Cabot issued his own memorandum on "the design of Park Service 
houses," in which he described the shortcomings of the housing that was being planned 
and built in the parks at that time. He was anxious to build on the work of Baggley and 
the Women's Organization and felt their recommendations had not yet been incorporated. 
Cabot cited the 1956 Women's Congress on Housing (organized that spring by the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency) as another opportunity to involve the women who 
lived and worked at home in the revision of house plans. The Women's Congress had 
recommended a size of at least 1,200 to 1,500 square feet, three bedrooms, one and one 
half bathrooms, a living room, a family room, a kitchen with eating space, and "as great 
an area of closet and storage space as can be contrived," according to Cabot. The 
architect did not seem to be concerned with the architectural style of new housing as 
much as meeting these minimum material standards, within federal limitations, through 
efficient design. He urged that Park Service housing plans at the very least needed to 
meet contemporary expectations, especially among women, for a modern standard of 
living. He went on to state the "basic fundamentals" of successful housing, whether built 
by the federal government or not: space should be enclosed to separate rest and quiet 
areas from daily activity areas, for example, and both indoor and outdoor storage should 
meet long -term and daily needs. "We have another duty," he reminded his colleagues, 
"besides the mass production of houses...to eliminate the distress of no housing at all," 
and that was to build houses that would meet the demands and expectations of occupants 
for the next forty years. He then requested that existing "stock plans" be "held in 
abeyance" while the WODC and the EODC developed designs that would be 
"architecturally up to date with current national thinking." The two offices could 
361 John Cabot to Supervising Architect, WODC, March 27, 1956, (Box 29, RG 79, Regional Archives, 
Philadelphia, PA). 
362 George F. Baggley to John B. Cabot, October 16, 1956 (Box 29, RG 79, National Archives, Mid - 
Atlantic Region, Philadelphia). Baggley was writing on behalf of his wife, Herma. Also see Kaufiman, 
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"collaborate to work out plans solving actual conditions throughout the Country and, if 
possible, arrive at plans and designs that solve many varied conditions of climate and 
topography." Cabot believed that Park Service employees were "part of the large 
American family" and deserved housing that met contemporary national standards at the 
very least. The question of architectural style, however, went unmentioned in the 1956 
memorandum. An assumption was made that park housing would necessarily be 
comparable in materials, construction, and general appearance to the vast majority of 
housing being so rapidly constructed at the time by builders all over the country.364 
Cabot's efforts resulted in a set of revised "Standard Plans for Employee 
Housing" issued in time for the 1957 construction season. Included were five variations 
on a three -bedroom ranch, and six for a two- bedroom, as well as designs for a multiple 
unit, an apartment building, and a dormitory. The house variations included split -level 
floor plans and houses with and without basements. No variations on the plans were to be 
allowed, except for the locations of porches and garages and other "minor changes." 
"Left hand" and "right hand" (reversed) versions of the plans were used as well. All 
construction was assumed to be "frame wall," but the choice of sheathing was left open 
depending on local availability and construction practices. All units were to have a 
minimum level of material conveniences, including modern stoves and refrigerators, 
linoleum floors in kitchens and bathrooms, central heating, and connections for washers 
and driers. Superintendents were to pick preferred plans and submit them to their 
regional directors.365 
In 1958 Wirth observed that "so far we have taken between 200 and 250 park 
service families out of rundown, outmoded -well, shacks is the right word and put 
them in new houses and apartments more suited to the dignity of the job they are 
performing so ably." The next year the National Park Service Women's Organization 
again undertook a housing survey, this time under the direction of Inger Garrison, the 
wife of then Yellowstone superintendent Lon Garrison. By February 1959, Garrison 
observed, 368 new housing units for permanent employees had been built. This put the 
program on schedule to complete 1,000 units in ten years (not the hoped for five), 
although the total need was now estimated at almost 1,500 units. The tenor of the 107 
364 John B. Cabot, "The Design of Park Service Houses," October 19, 1956 (RG 79, Box 29, National 
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survey responses that Garrison tabulated was very positive. About half reported that 
Mission 66 housing had been built in their parks. In general that half responded 
positively at a ratio of about five to one to questions such as, "Have the plans been 
adequate for site placement....number of bedrooms....number of bathrooms....eating 
space....traffic flow ?" The general appearance of the houses were considered "fitting for 
the location and the Park" by a majority of twenty -five to three. The aesthetic, or style, of 
the houses was either widely approved or simply not a subject of comment; the major 
complaint was that nearly flat roofs of the typical ranch were not appropriate in snow 
country. The respondents continued to show a strong preference for individual houses 
over multiple units, noting the need for privacy after working long days with fellow park 
staff who were also often neighbours. The three -bedroom ranch was widely preferred, as 
was an additional dining area in the kitchen. The 1959 survey of park housing 
preferences continued to show a strong consistency with the desires and expectations of 
Americans, generally, during the 1950s, as well as approval of Mission 66 housing 
policies.366 
In February 1960, the 1957 standard plans were revised in an attempt to provide 
more space and amenities, still within the $20,000 per unit limit. Five types were now 
offered: three- bedroom standard, four -bedroom standard, two -bedroom duplex (attached 
side by side), three- bedroom "superintendent" (slightly larger), and four -bedroom 
superintendent. The floor plans showed improvement in circulation and organization, 
with more storage, and a more defined entrance area, in addition to a slight increase (200 
square feet) in overall size. Garages were now always attached (they had been detached 
in some of the 1957 plans). Two -bedroom houses were replaced by the two- bedroom 
duplex, consisting of two identical house plans (one reversed) linked by adjacent carports. 
Standard plans now included front elevation sketches, although the choice of siding 
remained open. The 1959 Women's Organization survey affected the new plans, which 
now featured entry vestibules with closets, extra storage, and a dining area adjacent the 
kitchen, as well as a garage with storage.367 The standard plans served as the basis for 
quickly developing working drawings that necessarily were adapted to an individual 
building site. By the end of 1963, the process was further standardized with additional 
366 Inger Garrison, "Report of National Park Service Housing Survey," 1959, unpublished report, (National 
Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
367 E. T. Scoyen, "New Standard Plans for Permanent Employee Housing," February 17, 1960, (National 
Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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standard plans designed specifically for hillsides. New standard plans approved in 1964 
closely resembled the 1960 ranch houses, although the average number of square feet of 
living space was reduced, reverting closer to the original 1957 size. By this time, the 
three- bedroom, approximately 1,200 square foot ranch with attached carport had become 
a ubiquitous standard.368 
In terms of staff morale and the efficient administration of parks, Mission 66 
addressed what had been a serious crisis caused by the dearth of staff housing. Housing, 
however, had no public function, and in fact was rarely ever seen by visitors. Park 
Service architects and the National Park Service Women's Organization felt that the 
overall appearance and construction of housing should be "appropriate" in its setting, but 
almost universally felt that the use of standard plans would not prevent this result. Local 
builders were expected to use the materials and construction techniques that were 
consistent with other examples, regionally. If housing were "built of materials and styled 
to become a part of the individual area," as Baggley put it in her 1953 report, it would be 
appropriate in its park setting. The challenge was perceived more as one of providing an 
adequate material standard of living within cost limitations. This demanded efficient 
floor plans, modern construction techniques and materials, and the provision of utilities 
and other amenities. Other categories of Mission 66 architecture that also made use of 
standardized plans, to a greater or lesser degree, include comfort stations (bathrooms), of 
which 584 were built, as well as other campground structures. Thirty -nine entrance 
stations were built and often required individual design; but simple ranger kiosks and 
roadside interpretive structures could be produced from typical plans by the hundreds.369 
11.4 Concessioner Lodges 
As had always been the case, park concessioners hired their own architects to help 
plan and then build their visitor facilities. Park Service officials had the right to approve 
of the designs, and in fact had a tradition of working closely with concession architects to 
develop proposals that were true collaborations of private and public sector capital and 
design expertise. Concessioner architecture nevertheless differed from other types of 
park building. Concessions served the public, but could only do so if they continued to 
make a profit, and this reality affected programming and design. Concession capital 
368 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, "Standard Plans for Employee Housing," 1957, 
unpublished report (National Park Service Technical Information Centre, Denver). 
369 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 267. 
217 
augmented public spending during Mission 66, but did not reach the same level of 
importance that it had during the Mather era. While Wirth exhorted his concessioners to 
invest millions, the business of national park concessioning had changed dramatically 
since the 1930s, and managing park concessions became one of the most problematic 
aspects of Mission 66. But some of the earliest and most high profile Mission 66 
projects, such as the Canyon Lodge in Yellowstone and the Yosemite Lodge, were 
developed by concessioners and their architectural consultants. Concessioner architects 
such as Gilbert Stanley Underwood, Welton Becket, and Eldridge Spencer therefore 
contributed to the overall image of Mission 66 program to a degree that exceeded the 
relatively small amount of private investment -about $33 million -that augmented the 
overall $1 billion of federal park spending between 1956 and 1966. 
The Park Service relied on concessioner development at Yosemite, as at other 
parks, to quickly implement key components of Mission 66 construction. In general, 
concessioner development in Yosemite proceeded with few of the problems being 
experienced at Yellowstone. At Mount Rushmore, Glacier, and Shenandoah, 
concessioners also built or expanded employee dormitories, public cafeterias, and other 
service buildings by 1957, apparently with relatively few problems. The controversial 
Flamingo development at Everglades was completed that year, and new motel units 
opened at Glacier, as well. At Mount Rainier, the still contentious decision not to build 
new overnight accommodations at Paradise continued to be what Wirth described as the 
"major exception" to the "almost universally favorable" public reaction to Mission 66 that 
year. Much of the public response Wirth so hopefully characterized in this way was to 
construction projects that had been quickly undertaken by park concessioners.37° 
Other Mission 66 concessioner lodges included new complexes built at Grand 
Canyon, Big Bend, and Glacier Bay national parks. On the south rim of the Grand 
Canyon, where Cecil Doty and other WODC architects designed one of the earliest 
examples of a visitor centre, the Fred Harvey Company developed a new motel complex 
nearby, which also opened in 1957. Ninety -six motel units and a small central office 
building (replaced in 1972 by a larger lodge building) were sited along a loop road. 
Together with a vast campground and "trailer village" opened a few years later, the 
visitor centre and lodge complex made up a new developed area, Mather Village (later 
370 Department of the Interior, 1956 Annual Report, 301; Department of the Interior, 1957 Annual Report, 
310, 344. 
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called the Mather Business Zone), just east of the historic village of Grand Canyon.371 
Plans for shifting new visitor facilities to the east, away from the existing village -and 
away from the "sensitive" canyon rim -had been part of the park's master plan since at 
least 1950. The master plan also called for a relocation of the main automotive entrance 
to area, so that visitors approached from the east not the south. This realignment was 
completed in 1954. The master plan became the basis for the park's prospectus in 1956 
(the year that park visitation reached the one million mark) and construction continued 
throughout Mission 66 period, and in fact through the 1970s. By 1973, the "shopping 
plaza" between the visitor centre and the Yavapai Lodge was enlarged, completing what 
park historian Amanda Zeman documents as the park's "Mission 66 Village." Originally 
conceived in 1956 more along the lines of Canyon Village, the enlarged commercial area 
included a general store (1971), bank (1972), post office (1972), and several other 
buildings set around a large and uninterrupted parking lot.372 By the 1970s, however, it 
would have been difficult not to compare the Mather Business Zone with many other 
shopping plazas springing up across the country. 
At both Big Bend and Glacier Bay national parks, relatively remote locations and 
low numbers of visitors resulted in less commercial concessioner lodges. Big Bend 
National Park was established in 1944 and initial development was minimal, although the 
CCC built park roads and a camp in the Chisos Basin while the area was still under state 
jurisdiction. Located in one of the most remote regions of the country, commercial 
possibilities for a concessioner were limited. Beginning in 1945 Ickes's non -profit 
concessioner, National Park Concessions, Inc., provided overnight accommodations in 
the Chisos Basin, supplementing remaining CCC buildings with government surplus 
cabins. Beginning in 1950 the Park Service established an administrative area in the 
Panther Junction area by building staff residences and a maintenance area. But little else 
was done, and even the official dedication of the park was delayed until 1955. Soon 
thereafter, Mission 66 called for $14 million in improvements at Big Bend, resulting in 
the first comprehensive scheme of development for the park. Over the next ten years, the 
Park Service built a new visitor centre, staff residences, and other facilities at Panther 
371 Department of the Interior, 1959 Annual Report, 328. 
372 The extensive Mission 66 construction at the south rim of Grand Canyon National Park also included the 
Albright Training Centre complex, the Shrine of the Ages, a new maintenance area, a high school, a clinic, 
many residences, and significant road and utility development. For a full account see Amanda Zeman, 
"Grand Canyon Village Mission 66 Planning Effort: National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property 
Nomination Form," 2003, unpublished report, Grand Canyon National Park. 
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Junction, as well as secondary developed areas, roads, and utilities throughout the park. 
In 1966, the concessioner completed the new Chisos Mountains Lodge in the Chisos 
Basin (figs. 61 -66), where the 5,000 -foot elevation provided an island of cool moisture in 
the vast surrounding desert. The complex of modernist lodge building and surrounding 
motel units had an overnight capacity of 150. With an average of 80,000 visitors year in 
the 1950s, and only 164,000 visits recorded in 1966, Big Bend never had the same visitor 
pressure (or the resulting controversies) of other big western parks. The Chisos 
Mountains Lodge, even after a later expansion, remains one of the best examples of the 
understated, efficient character Mission 66 planners hoped such "motel- type" lodgings 
could have.373 
At Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve, accessible only by boat and plane, 
plans for a park lodge went back at least to 1945. But again, the commercial potential for 
a concessioner was limited. Mission 66 built residences, local roads, and maintenance 
and administrative buildings in the Bartlett Cove area (near the Gustavus airport), but 
lodge construction was delayed. In 1960 the Park Service invited potential concessioners 
to invest $150,000 in a lodge building, but none felt it was worth the risk. In 1964 
Congress appropriated funds to pay for the construction of the Glacier Bay Lodge directly 
(the only example of public funding used to build overnight accommodations under 
Mission 66), and a private concessioner was then contracted to operate the lodge. In 
many ways this was a more desirable scenario, since it removed the complications of 
possessory interest, bank loans, and the necessity of returning profits on investments. 
Seattle architect John M. Morse, who had recently designed the Sitka National Historic 
Site Visitor Center, was hired to design what became perhaps the most striking of the 
Mission 66 national park lodges (figs. 67 -69). Again the complex consisted of a central 
service building and surrounding motel units. In this case, the surrounding rooms were 
connected by boardwalks that laced through the trees of the existing forest, helped 
preserve the site, and kept visitors dry in the exceptionally wet climate. The lodge 
building itself featured a massive, pitched shingle roof, and a large dining room with 
views across the cove to distant glaciers and mountains. The asymmetrical pitch of the 
roof (reminiscent of the outline of the Canyon Lodge in Yellowstone) cantilevered over 
an outdoor deck. Together with large windows, patterned wood sheathing, and period 
373 John Jameson, The Story of Big Bend National Park (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 75 -81; 
Ross A. Maxwell, Big Bend Country: A History of Big Bend National Park (Big Bend National Park, 
Texas: Big Bend Natural History Association, 1985), 69 -75. 
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light fixtures and furniture, the Glacier Bay Lodge was a complete statement of modernist 
rusticity. More than any other Mission 66 lodge, it has retained the intended postwar 
aesthetic of Park Service architecture.374 
Overnight concessioner lodges in national parks, however, in many cases raised 
the question of why such accommodations were not, as initially suggested by Mission 66 
planners themselves, increasingly unnecessary and undesirable. While at truly remote 
locations, such as Big Bend and Glacier Bay, no alternative was likely to be available, 
this was less and less the case at Yellowstone, Everglades, Grand Canyon, Yosemite, and 
other parks. When concessioner construction was combined with the improvement of 
park roads, the expansion of campgrounds, new visitor centres, stores, and restaurants, it 
perhaps followed that as Mission 66 proceeded, more and more people saw the entire 
effort as a construction, not a conservation, program. As the economics of automotive 
tourism reached new heights in the postwar period, some critics felt Mission 66 had given 
the tourist industry everything it could have asked for, all in the name of public 
"enjoyment." 
To some degree, the idea of a "Mission 66 Village" that included concessioner 
accommodations contradicted some of the basic goals of the Mission 66 program. The 
prewar park village embodied that era's master planning strategy for dealing with what 
were then lower levels of automotive tourism. Postwar levels of use, everyone agreed, 
demanded new approaches. The business of park concessioning had changed, and the 
necessity for overnight accommodations in many parks was, arguably, disappearing. The 
Mission 66 modernist park -with its improved roads, expanded campgrounds, visitor 
centres, and roadside interpretation -offered a means of allowing higher levels of 
automotive tourism without, hopefully, sacrificing park resources. But the entire idea 
was undermined if "Plan B" did not replace "Plan A," but instead was combined with it. 
In hindsight, perhaps Mission 66 never should have been in the concession 
business. In fact Wirth may have had no choice; the inherent compromises and 
intractable politics of the national park concessioner system, while exacerbated by 
Mission 66, were not created by it. In any case, compared to other aspects of the 
program, concessioner lodging was not a particularly large or significant category of 
374 Bonnie S. Houston, "Determination of Eligibility, Glacier Bay Lodge Complex," draft, unpublished 
report, National Park Service, 2005; Theodore Calton, Land Reborn: A History of Administration and 
Visitor Use in Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve, government report, National Park Service, 1995, 
264 -283. 
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development. In the end there were just not that many new "motel- type" lodges built, 
compared, for example, to visitor centres, campgrounds, picnic areas, maintenance yards, 
or staff residences. But the expansion of the concessioner system struck against the heart 
of what Mission 66, at least in its most idealistic form, was intended to achieve. Mission 
66 concessioner developments also resulted in some of the worst examples of what critics 
described as "overdevelopment." 
It is also worth considering, however, that the alternative to providing overnight 
accommodations in parks soon showed evidence of another, possibly even more 
destructive set of problems. At Great Smoky Mountains and Rocky Mountain national 
parks, for example, where overnight accommodations were not built, the gateway towns 
of Gatlinburg and Estes Park grew into resorts anyway, limited only by the few land use 
regulations that local governments imposed. The development of West Yellowstone into 
a regional tourism centre makes Canyon Village, today, seem quaint. The fiercely 
debated sixty -unit motel at Flamingo, similarly, seems innocuous enough compared to the 
general trends of urbanization in South Florida since then. Perhaps the greatest 
shortcoming of Mission 66 planning was that it failed to anticipate what regional 
economic development -especially the growth of gateway towns -would mean to the 
integrity of the national parks themselves in the long run. Where overnight 
accommodations were kept out, the result was simply more development pressure 
immediately outside the parks. National parks, as national attractions, generated 
economic activity in surrounding towns and counties; but Mission 66 planning usually 
stopped at park boundaries. While boundary expansións and the acquisition of private 
inholdings were often recommended and implemented, Park Service planners never 
anticipated that the future health of the park system would depend on engaging local 
communities as active partners in preserving larger ecosystems and regional scenic 
character. The concession system, and the whole problem of how and where postwar 
levels of automotive tourists would find lodgings, needed to be completely reconsidered 
on a regional basis. But it would have been asking a lot of Wirth and his planners to do 
so in the political and social climate of the 1950s. Such regional planning remains an 
elusive goal even today. 
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Chapter 12: Preservation and Interpretation 
12.1 Park Making as Historic Preservation 
Conrad Wirth and his planning and design staff conceived of the visitor centre as 
the "hub" and "city hall" of a park. The dozens of modernist buildings that appeared in 
the first years of Mission 66 symbolized and facilitated the goals of the entire effort, and 
they were the single most significant architectural product of Mission 66. But what made 
the visitor centre a new building type were its new programs and purposes as much as 
innovative floor plans and construction. The development of interpretive programs and 
training under Mission 66 was therefore as much part of the program's design effort as 
was architecture or landscape architecture. The emphasis on interpretation and 
preservation and the expansion of professional capabilities and activities in these fields 
also made Mission 66 the most important federal historic preservation effort between the 
Historic Sites Act of 1935 and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Mission 
66 historic preservation must be examined in order to establish a comprehensive historical 
context for assessing the program today. 
For landscape architects like Wirth and Vint, historic preservation remained 
closely linked to scenic preservation. Under Mission 66, planning for the preservation of 
scenery and history remained parts of one larger project: national park making. "National 
parks and monuments fall into two groups," Vint explained in 1946, "natural and 
historical." In the former, the primary purpose was "to preserve and protect one of the 
great works of nature." In the latter, it was "to preserve and protect the scene at one of 
the great moments of our national history -to stop the clock and hold the scene of the 
moment in history that makes the area important." Whether in the case of scenic or 
historic preservation, providing for public access and enjoyment remained essential: "The 
development scheme [master plan] has to do with providing the facilities to permit the 
people to see and enjoy these areas," Vint maintained. "It is constantly working on the 
compromise that determines how far these facilities will intrude into the scenes that are to 
be preserved, as nearly as possible, as nature or history has left them to us. "375 
375 Thomas C. Vint, "National Park Service Master Plans," Planning and Civic Comment (April, 1946). 
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For Vint and the Park Service, preserving landscapes was a shared approach for 
both scenic and historic places. In either case, roads, visitor centres, and other facilities 
made it possible for visitors to appreciate either natural scenery or historic scenes. In the 
process the place was preserved through its transformation into a public park. In the late 
1920s Vint successfully made the case to Albright that this transformation should be 
controlled by a unified aesthetic conception -the "master plan "-that controlled and 
limited the extent of development.376 When becoming director in 1929, Albright held two 
important goals for his agency: to expand into the management of historic sites, and to 
control all park development through the enforcement of master plans. These goals were 
linked, since the effectiveness of the Park Service as a historic preservation agency was 
achieved through the development of master plans for "national historical parks." Vint 
oversaw the development of the first such historical parks, including Colonial (Virginia), 
Salem Maritime (Massachusetts), and Hopewell Village (Pennsylvania). In 1933 
Franklin Roosevelt transferred more than forty battlefields and other historic sites and 
monuments from various other agencies to the Park Service, an executive order that 
Albright had personally sought as a means of balancing the park system functionally, and 
regionally as well, since many historic sites were in the East.377 
Until this point, the "house museum" had been the most typical means of 
preserving history in the United States. Even the Williamsburg Restoration (a private 
undertaking funded by the John D. Rockefeller, Jr.) could be seen as a vast assemblage of 
individual house and garden reconstructions.378 The national historical park, however, 
preserved entire landscapes through their transformation and improvement as public 
parks. Colonial National Historical Park, for example, consisted mainly of an automotive 
parkway across the peninsula between the York and James rivers in Virginia. The 
376 This essentially Olmstedian theory continued to guide Vint and other officials during Mission 66. 
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., in particular, had influenced Park Service historical park planning. His 1929 
state park plan for California became a procedural blueprint for planning a park system that included both 
scenic and historic landscapes. See Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., Report of State Park Survey of California 
(Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1929). 
37 Since the 1906 Antiquities Act, Congress had acted to preserve a number of archaeological sites in the 
West as national monuments, some of which came under the care of the Park Service when it was created. 
Albright began acquiring historic sites in the East beginning in 1930 with George Washington's birthplace 
in Virginia. The Park Service became the leading federal historic preservation agency, however, only after 
Roosevelt's 1933 executive order. See Foresta, America's National Parks, 129 -145; Mackintosh, Shaping 
the System, 24 -43. 
378 Many of these gardens, such as the grounds of the Governor's Palace, were designed by Arthur A. 
Shurcliff, a preeminent historical landscape architect of his day, who typified the academic interest in 
colonial garden research and design. See Elizabeth Hope Cushing, "Shurcliff, Arthur Asahel (Shurtleff), in 
Birnbaum and Karson, eds., Pioneers of American Landscape Design, 351 -356. 
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parkway connected national park properties at Yorktown and Jamestown, and passed 
through the Williamsburg Restoration. While numerous historians, restoration architects, 
and other officials contributed to the overall concept of Colonial National Historical Park, 
it was the landscape design itself -a parkway -that provided the physical context and 
continuity between the three, somewhat unrelated historic sites. As Vint stated in the 
"Outline of Development" of 1933, the parkway would make the park a "single, 
coherent" entity, and would "transcend mere considerations of transportation... [and] 
contribute to the commemorative purposes of the monument. "379 The resulting landscape 
was in no sense a reconstruction of a Colonial era road corridor. Park Service landscape 
architects and engineers designed a modern automotive parkway in the manner that had 
been developed by landscape architects in Westchester County and elsewhere during the 
previous decade. As at the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway (which was underway in 
1928), the Colonial project combined advanced roadway design with "appropriate" 
design details, in this case brick veneers over the concrete of the overpass bridges and 
culvert headwalls. The result was an entirely new landscape -a historical park -that 
combined new landscape design (the parkway) with the historic house reconstructions, 
archaeological excavations, and other "restorations" taking place at various sites along the 
corridor.380 The Blue Ridge Parkway became the ultimate example of this type of park 
project by showcasing scenes of restored agricultural landscapes and vernacular 
architecture along a 469 -mile route through Virginia and North Carolina. One of the 
great works of landscape architecture in the twentieth century, it is also one of the most 
ambitious historic preservation projects ever undertaken. Begun through the New Deal, 
the massive Blue Ridge project was later greatly advanced through Mission 66 funding. 
The development of national historical parks owed more to the techniques of 
scenic preservation (park making) than to historic house restoration or garden 
reconstruction. Depression era historical parks and parkways might feature a landscape 
379 Quoted in Historic American Engineering Record (HAER), "Colonial National Historical Park Roads 
and Bridges, HAER No. VA- 115," Michael G. Bennett, project historian (unpublished government report, 
1995), 21. 
380 For the mutual influence between historic preservation and parkway design, see Timothy Davis, "Mount 
Vernon Memorial Highway and the Evolution of the American Parkway" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas 
at Austin, 1997); Timothy Davis, "Mount Vernon Memorial Highway: Changing Conceptions of an 
American Commemorative Landscape," in Joachim Wolschke -Bulmahn, ed., Places of Commemoration: 
Search for Identity and Landscape Design (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001), 123 -177; Timothy 
Davis, "`A Pleasing Illusion of Unspoiled Countryside': The American Parkway and the Problematics of an 
Institutional Vernacular," in Constructing Image, Identity, and Place: Perspectives in Vernacular 
Architecture IX, Kenneth Breisch and Kim Hoagland, eds. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
2003), 228 -46. 
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restoration, a house museum, or a battlefield, but they did so in the context of a new 
designed landscape, calculated to present a series of what Vint described as "historic 
scenes" to the public. For Vint, these individual historic scenes could be best preserved 
by "stopping the clock" at a particular date of maximum significance. This would prove 
to be a problematic concept, since few landscapes (as opposed, perhaps, to individual 
buildings) had such discreet dates of significance. Neither were living, growing 
landscapes easily "stopped" in time.381 During Mission 66, however, new historical parks 
continued established historic preservation practice at the Park Service. Mission 66 
eventually funded dozens of important historical park developments of increased variety 
and scope, many of which had been begun before World War II. 
In St. Louis, for example, preparation of the site for the Jefferson National 
Expansion Memorial began in the 1930s. Municipal leaders had been proposing the 
"revitalization" of the city's historic but decaying riverfront district for decades. Most of 
these plans called for the demolition of scores of nineteenth -century commercial 
buildings and warehouses, followed by the development of housing, municipal parking, 
or some kind of public park in their place. In an era before federal urban renewal 
programs, however, "slum clearance" at this scale was difficult for municipalities to 
achieve on their own. Local politicians and civic reformers saw their chance to secure 
federal assistance in 1933, and conceived of a plan for a "national memorial" dedicated to 
the "men who made possible the western territorial expansion of the United States," 
including Thomas Jefferson, Lewis and Clark, and anonymous "hunters, trappers, 
frontiersmen, and pioneers." The memorial was to be designed and administered by the 
Park Service in partnership with local officials, and would become the means of securing 
federal funding for the acquisition of the dilapidated riverfront. The intended effects were 
to remove "blight," to replace it with an improved memorial park landscape, and to attract 
new private investment in nearby downtown business districts. Under the powers of the 
1935 Historic Sites Act, Roosevelt declared "Old St. Louis" the first "national historic 
site." At that point, WPA and PWA dollars were used to fund the complete destruction of 
381 Just as early wilderness advocates questioned national park development in the 1930s, some 
contemporary historians wondered whether the new historical parks of that era did not restrict the 
educational usefulness of historic sites as much as preserve them. See Foresta, America's National Parks, 
130. Recent critics have pointed out that freezing a landscape is not only a practical impossibility, it serves 
as a justification for the removal of later, often significant, landscape features and limits the interpretive 
potential of a site to a single narrative directly associated with the chosen scene or historical moment. This 
has been particularly the case in battlefield parks. See Martha Temkin, "Freeze- Frame, September 17, 
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the entire area. When Park Service architect Charles Peterson arrived in 1936, he was 
reduced to little more than researching and documenting structures as quickly as possible 
in advance of their demolition. Drury supported the St. Louis memorial plans, against the 
advice of Peterson and other Park Service staff, and by 1942 all but three buildings of 
"Old St. Louis" had been razed.382 
In 1937 Park Service landscape architects designed a memorial landscape for the 
riverfront, consisting of a formal mall parallel to the riverfront levee terminated at either 
end with neoclassical museum buildings. The central cross axis was marked by an 
obelisk aligned with the city's Old Courthouse building, which was not demolished. But 
the St. Louis politicians and advocates of the memorial project had grander aspirations for 
their memorial, and in 1945 they announced a national design competition. More than 
170 entries were prepared, many by the leading modernist architects of the day, including 
Walter Gropius, Charles and Ray Eames, and Louis Kahn. Richard Neutra served on the 
jury selecting the winner. In 1948 Eero Saarinen's dramatic concept for a slender, 630 - 
foot high arch -a literal "Gateway to the West" -was selected. In the form of an 
inverted catenary curve constructed with stainless steel, the soaring arch became a 
modernist icon.383 The Park Service now was in the position of managing a national 
historical park as unique as the distinctive arch itself Forty blocks of historic downtown 
St. Louis had been demolished and replaced by a huge stainless steel monument 
surrounded by a park designed by Saarinen's frequent collaborator, landscape architect 
Dan Kiley (figs. 70, 71). The modernist landscape commemorated the history of 
westward expansion, while the original historic structures and landscape features 
associated with that history were completely erased. 
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial had been the inspiration of local 
advocates who had been searching for the means to redevelop their riverfront since the 
Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904. The Park Service became involved as a result of 
Roosevelt's direct political interests; the agency never controlled the overall concept for 
the memorial and did not select the 1948 competition winner. In Philadelphia, however, 
the Park Service was drawn into another revitalization of a historic downtown, and in this 
1862: A Preservation Battle at Antietam National Battlefield Park," in Paul A. Shackel, ed., Myth, Memory, 
and the American Landscape (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 123 -140. 
382 Regina M. Bellavia, Cultural Landscape Report for Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, St. Louis, 
Missouri (Omaha: Government Printing Office, 1996), 11 -25. 
383 The St. Louis Arch, completed in 1965, was designated a National Historic Landmark in 1987 for its 
significance in American architecture. Harrison, Architecture in the Parks, 471 -482. 
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case the agency had more comprehensive involvement. Independence Hall and a cluster 
of other eighteenth -century buildings still existed in downtown Philadelphia, surrounded 
by 200 years of urban growth. Local civic leaders again sought to improve economic 
conditions and attract private developers to the declining core of the city by demolishing a 
considerable portion of it. Independence Hall had been the subject of pioneering 
preservation efforts since the nineteenth century, however, and the destruction of this 
national shrine and other historic buildings nearby was not contemplated. Instead local 
advocates envisioned preserving and restoring the eighteenth -century buildings, while 
removing only the nineteenth and early twentieth- century structures around them. New 
parks and open spaces would replace the more recent buildings, creating what was felt to 
be a more appropriate and historical setting. By the 1920s proposals had been made to 
demolish three blocks of buildings immediately to the north of Independence Hall in 
order to create a monumental vista. In the 1930s the New Deal and the Historic Sites Act 
seemed to offer opportunities to implement ambitious local plans, and by the end of the 
decade Park Service planners were studying the feasibility of establishing a national 
historical park.384 
Agency officials, especially chief historian Ronald Lee, were supportive of the 
establishment of a national park and worked in close partnership with Philadelphia's 
municipal government, businesspeople, and preservation advocates. In an exception to 
his wartime policy to suspend such designations, Roosevelt established the national 
historic site in 1943. In 1946 Park Service planning quickly regained momentum. The 
next year architect Charles Peterson was reassigned to Philadelphia, joined by agency 
historian Roy Appleman, to research and document the area to be affected. In 1948 the 
Philadelphia National Shrines Commission, a coalition of local business interests, 
preservationists, and municipal officials, made a report to Congress recommending the 
creation of a national park. Their plan called for extensive demolitions of nineteenth and 
twentieth -century buildings, and featured a second open vista, or mall (this one extending 
east from Independence Hall) as well as other open spaces around the older buildings to 
be preserved. Congress established Independence National Historical Park that year, and 
in 1949 authorized almost $4 million to fund the condemnation and demolition of 
buildings to create the new park landscape.385 In this case, however, Lee and other Park 
384 Constance M. Greiff, Independence: The Creation of a National Park (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 29 -52. 
385 Greiff, Independence, 40 -69. 
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Service officials had successfully offered legislative amendments that gave their agency 
more control over the planning and operation of the new park. As historian Constance 
Greiff observes, "they wanted to assure that the errors that had been committed at other 
sites," notably George Washington's birthplace and St. Louis, "did not recur in 
Philadelphia. "386 
Over the next decade, Ronald Lee in particular maintained close oversight of the 
planning for what was widely considered the nation's most significant historic shrine. 
But the process necessarily involved extensive collaboration with Philadelphia 
preservationists and city planners who were actively involved in other aspects of the 
urban renewal effort. In the early 1950s, for example, city and state government funded 
the demolition of the three blocks of buildings north of Independence Hall to create 
Independence Mall, which finally created the desired straight, open vista back to the 
historic building. At the same time Charles Peterson was devising plans for 
Independence Hall and the historic buildings and areas immediately to the east. With the 
state funded demolitions underway and his experience in St. Louis still fresh in mind, 
Peterson pointed out some basic problems with the existing approach to historical park 
design. The purpose of the new national park had been defined as interpreting and 
preserving buildings associated with eighteenth -century American history, and so the 
"period of significance" ended in 1800. The park's boundaries also included significant 
works of nineteenth- century American architecture, however, that would now be 
demolished to create open spaces to the east of Independence Hall. Peterson felt many of 
these buildings were worthy of preservation, and in any case another formal mall creating 
a second vista back to Independence Hall would be out of character with the dense pattern 
of streets and buildings that had always surrounded the building. But in 1953 Wirth, Lee, 
and Vint came to Philadelphia, and in a conference with Peterson and local officials they 
reconfirmed the period of significance of 1774 -1800. Following the Park Service 
reorganization of 1954, EODC chief Edward Zimmer and chief architect John Cabot also 
supervised Peterson's master planning effort. 
With Mission 66 funding available in 1956, much of the demolition for the 
national park proceeded over the next year, although further progress stalled over 
questions regarding the design of the new open spaces (figs. 72, 73). Independence 
National Historical Park nevertheless became a an emblem of Mission 66: the brochure 
386 Greiff, Independence, 65. 
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introducing Mission 66 to the public in 1958 ( "Our Heritage ") featured a "typical" 
American family superimposed over an image of the Liberty Bell. Finally in 1960 
another Park Service conference was held in Philadelphia during which the details of the 
master plan were finalized. Lee, now the Park Service regional director in the Northeast, 
approved a compromise plan that retained some of the more intimate spaces of the 
original urban street pattern, even after many nineteenth -century structures had been 
removed. The restored eighteenth -century buildings were still presented in a new park 
landscape, but that landscape did not feature a formal, open ma11.387 
12.2 Other Aspects of Historic Preservation 
The involvement of Park Service historians, landscape architects, and planners in 
major urban renewal projects of the postwar era characterized much of Mission 66 
historic preservation. The Housing Act of 1956, coming the same year as the Interstate 
Highway Act and the launching of Mission 66, funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars 
from the federal government to states and municipalities engaged in urban renewal. At 
the Park Service, Lee in particular saw both the positive and negative potential of these 
programs. Lee was another Park Service official shaped by his New Deal experiences. 
He was pursuing his Ph.D. in history at the University of Minnesota in 1933 when he and 
a group of other graduate students received offers to go to work for the newly organized 
CCC. Lee worked as a historian for the CCC camp in Shiloh National Military Park, and 
in 1934 transferred to Washington to assist chief historian Verne E. Chatelain with the 
details of the Historic Sites Act legislation. In 1935 he began working directly for Wirth 
as the chief historian of Wirth's CCC state park program, and while still in his twenties 
Lee was in charge of a major historical research and education program. Lee became the 
Park Service's chief historian in 1938, and following service in World War II he returned 
to Washington and quickly became involved in planning Independence National 
Historical Park. He also was an early organizer and instigator of the 1949 legislation 
establishing the National Trust for Historic Preservation. In the Park Service 
reorganization of 1954, Lee became chief of the newly created Division of Interpretation, 
a position that would be of great significance in Mission 66 planning (although he did not 
serve on the Mission 66 steering committee in 1955). Lee then moved to Philadelphia to 
serve as Park Service regional director from 1960 until his retirement in 1966. As 
387 Greiff, Independence, 96 -112. 
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important as his agency positions were, however, Lee also developed a network of private 
preservation advocates and pioneered new partnerships throughout his career, as 
exemplified by his work at Independence. He also headed the Park Service special task 
force on legislation beginning in 1961 and, through the many organizations and activities 
in which he participated, he was instrumental in developing the programs and policies 
that influenced the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.388 
For Ronald Lee, urban renewal programs of the 1950s represented both a grave 
threat and also an opportunity that could not be ignored. Shortly after becoming regional 
director in the Northeast in 1960, he outlined his hopes for an extensive program of 
historic preservation and urban park planning in a long memorandum on "Mission 66 in 
relation to historic preservation, open spaces, and urban renewal." Since 1949 Congress 
had made millions available for the demolition and redevelopment of American cities, 
Lee noted, and hundreds of millions more were on the way as cities and states lobbied for 
federal assistance. Unfortunately "sweeping programs of slum clearance" could 
"carelessly or ignorantly destroy important landmarks and valuable examples of historic 
architecture." There had already been "mounting protests" against such actions in New 
York's Greenwich Village and elsewhere. Indeed by 1960 the destruction caused by 
urban renewal and urban highway construction had inspired editorial boards and 
preservation advocates all over the country to criticize the federally sponsored destruction 
of historic "landmarks." Lee went on to identify a corresponding need for "open space" 
preservation that was "as urgent as historic preservation" in urban renewal programs; but 
federal officials had not yet adequately addressed either concern. 
Neither the Park Service nor the National Trust were in good positions to deal 
with the enormous threat to American cities that the federal government had created. The 
Historic Sites Act, for example, authorized the acquisition of nationally significant 
landmarks, but that option remained very limited, expensive, and slow to implement. 
Some critics suggested that the Park Service was too preoccupied with its own properties 
(and with implementing Mission 66) to effectively organize a response to the national 
crisis.389 Lee pointed out, however, that the Park Service already had major involvement 
388 Papers of Ronald F. Lee, biography, National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center. 
Hosmer documents Lee's career extensively. See Charles B. Hosmer, Jr., Preservation Comes of Age: 
From Williamsburg to the National Trust, 1926 -1949.2 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1981). 
389 See James A. Glass, The Beginnings of a National Historic Preservation Program, 1957 to 1959 
(Nashville, Tennessee: American Association for State and Local History, 1990), 3 -15. Glass points out 
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in urban renewal plans not only in St. Louis and Philadelphia, but New York, Boston, and 
Washington, as well. Philadelphia, Baltimore, and numerous other cities had also sought 
Park Service "advisory assistance on open space in metropolitan areas," which the 
agency's recreational planners were able to provide in a very limited fashion through 
provisions of the 1954 Housing Act. For Lee, this expansion into urban planning by the 
Park Service was justified in order to achieve the "preservation of historic monuments 
and natural landscape in urban areas where such cultural resources have enormous value, 
yet may be easily lost in vast programs of urban expansion. "39° If the results were 
limited, they were also significant. Under Mission 66, Park Service participation in the 
New York City Shrines Advisory Board led to new or redesignated parks at Federal Hall, 
Grant's Tomb, Hamilton Grange, and Ellis Island, where Lee helped plan an "American 
Museum of Immigration." Similar participation with the Boston National Historic Sites 
Commission resulted in the eventual designation of Boston National Historical Park and 
Minuteman National Historical Park. In his 1960 memorandum, Lee suggested that the 
Park Service's "contributions to historic preservation and open space protection in urban 
areas" were becoming "a complementary program to wilderness preservation," and that 
this was a desirable direction in which the agency should grow. "The perpetuation of 
nationally recognized historic and cultural values of cities is a worthy objective for the 
National Park Service," he reasoned, "since it would broaden the "cultural basis" of the 
agency and make it "more fully national." It would also provide a "service to a 
tremendous portion of America's population which may never be privileged to visit a 
western national park. "391 
In 1959 Lee oversaw the publication of a large brochure on the Park Service's 
"nationwide historical program," titled That the Past Shall Live (fig. 74). It was intended 
to be a companion to another Mission 66 public relations booklet published two years 
earlier, The National Park Wilderness. In Wirth's introduction (probably drafted by Lee) 
he reminded readers that "more than two- thirds of the areas" in the national park system 
were cultural sites, and the Park Service not only managed parks, but was also "the 
Wirth's reluctance to involve his agency in any inventory of historic sites of local or state significance, 
since they would not qualify as eventual additions to the national park system. 
39° Ronald F. Lee, "The National Park Service and MISSION 66 in Relation to Historic Preservation, Open 
Spaces, and Urban Renewal," July 28, 1960, (Binder VII, National Park Service History Collection, 
Harpers Ferry Center). 
391 Ronald F. Lee, "The National Park Service and MISSION 66 in Relation to Historic Preservation, 
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primary Federal agency charged...with the preservation of America's historic sites and 
buildings." Setting a tone that captured the spirit of Lee's collaborative efforts, he 
observed that historic preservation "must be a cooperative local, State, and national 
effort....State historical societies, State park departments, and a host of State and local 
preservation groups" were collaborating with the Park Service and the National Trust 
"toward the common goal. "392 Lee was moving the Park Service into a national role in 
postwar historic preservation planning, even as the agency was losing its leadership in 
national recreational planning. He was doing it through collaborative partnerships, 
advocacy of new legislation, and ambitious historical park projects that tapped into 
congressional interest in urban renewal. Not all his recommendations were immediately 
acted upon, but his urban national park initiative suggested features of what future 
Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall's was beginning to describe as the "New 
Conservation." Much of the impetus for the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 
as well as the urban national park programs of the 1970s, had roots in the experience of 
Mission 66 projects such as Independence National Historical Park. 
12.3 Mission 66 Interpretation 
Mission 66 historic preservation, however, was not limited to large urban projects. 
The postwar period also saw widespread growth and refinement of park education and 
orientation programs, which Park Service officials now always described as park 
"interpretation." Mission 66 became the means of standardizing and implementing 
educational programs throughout the park system, particularly at scores of smaller 
historical sites and archaeological monuments that had not yet been fully developed. The 
ubiquitous Mission 66 visitor centres were the most tangible evidence of the provision of 
a new standard level of visitor programs. The development of standard practices and 
professional training in park education and orientation was just as important: with the 
new buildings they established the basis for how the significance of national park areas 
was presented to the public. New methods and media for representing and conveying 
cultural significance also created meanings and institutionalized management priorities. 
Historical Program of the National Park Service Under MISSION 66," September 14, 1960, (Binder VII, 
National Park Service History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
392 U.S. Depaitinent of the Interior, National Park Service, That the Past Shall Live [1959] (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, n.d.). 
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The interpretation of a site helped define its significance for visitors and park managers 
alike, and became a fundamental part of the process of preservation. 
The word "interpretation" used roughly in this sense had a long history, but by the 
late 1930s Park Service rangers and historians began to use it consistently to describe 
their goal of presenting enough scientific and historical context for park visitors to better 
appreciate the landscapes they saw. While interpretative programs were essentially 
educational programs, Mission 66 officials used the term to convey their own, perhaps 
somewhat revised intentions for park education. Earlier educational programs, which 
operated out of park museums, often gave broader instruction on themes of natural and 
cultural history. Mission 66 interpretative programs were intended specifically to convey 
the spirit and significance of an individual site to diverse groups of people trying to 
appreciate it. 
By the late 1940s Park Service officials were already pursuing a number of 
strategies to reinvent the vocabulary and image of their educational activities. In 1941 the 
Branch of Research and Information became the Branch of Interpretation, and 
"interpretation" subsequently became the widespread replacement for "education." By 
the early 1950s the functions of old park "museums" were being programmed into the 
new "public use" and "public service" buildings, soon called "visitor centers." . The new 
language reflected and was contemporary to the increasingly modernist idiom of park 
architecture. Park Service uniforms were also completely redesigned in 1947, doing 
away with the high boots, riding breeches, and closely fitting tunic of a more equestrian 
era, in favour of shoes, trousers, and a looser, belted jacket. The new uniforms were 
styled after World War II military issue, just as earlier versions had suggested World War 
I era uniforms; the familiar round Stetson campaign hat, however, was retained.393 In 
1949 Drury organized an in -house competition for a new agency logo, as well. The 
winning effort (by landscape architect Dudley C. Bayliss) was never used, but Wirth did 
not let the matter drop. Upon becoming director in 1951 he adopted a new design by 
Herbert Maier for what became the familiar arrowhead logo. Used thereafter on 
publications, uniforms, signs, and buildings, the arrowhead became closely identified 
with Mission 66 and a powerful image of agency identity in general. In 1965 the 
arrowhead logo was patented.394 
393 Workman, National Park Service Uniforms: The Developing Years, 25 -30. 
394 R. Bryce Workman, National Park Service Uniforms: Badges and Insignia, 1894 -1991 (Harpers Ferry, 
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Interpretation in the 1950s, however, was differentiated by more than the new 
look and image of interpretive staff and facilities. When the reorganization of 1954 
created a new Division of Interpretation under Lee, this function was once again on the 
highest organizational level, parallel with Vint's Division of Design and Construction.395 
This had been a specific recommendation in the 1953 report that preceded the 
reorganization, and Wirth fully supported the goal of creating a "unified interpretive 
organization" by combining "natural history, history, museum, and information" 
offices.396 Interpretation had become increasingly important for a number of reasons. 
The development of national historical parks had been an area of great growth since the 
1930s, and obviously these parks required historical research and educational programs 
both to plan and operate them. The historians in Lee's division collaborated with the 
planners and landscape architects in Vint's division and did the research necessary for 
historical park master planning. They also designed interpretive programs and provided 
the content for museum exhibits and interpretive displays. Lee also pointed out that as 
the national park system grew older, interpretation grew more important, generally. 
Many national parks were entering what he called an "interpretive stage," meaning that 
much of the work of acquiring, planning, and developing them was being completed. 
Even if parks still required modernization and expansion of facilities, the basic footprint 
of roads and other development had been decided. But the importance of operating and 
managing parks -above all interpreting them to the public-continued to increase. 
Describing the mandate for parks as they entered this "mature phase," Lee quoted Aldo 
Leopold, who suggested the essential task was to "improve the quality of park use." For 
Lee, "a boring interpretive program" made for a "low quality public use. "397 
Wirth shared Lee's conviction that improving and expanding the interpretation of 
the park system to the public should be a central goal of Mission 66. As Mather and 
Albright had in the 1920s, the director believed that the special, national significance of 
the park system needed to be carefully conveyed by his agency through programs, 
displays, and above all through individual interpreters. Wirth made interpretation the 
Maier prepared the prototype for the arrowhead logo and presented it at the Park Service conference held at 
Yosemite in the fall of 1950. It was adopted by widespread approval at the conference and then officially 
approved by Drury. Conrad L Wirth to George B. Hartzog, Jr., June 5, 1968 (Box 33, Conrad L. Wirth 
Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). 
395 Olsen, Organizational Structures of the National Park Service, 77. 
396 Conrad L. Wirth, "Objectives for Service Program of Interpretation in 1954," February 16, 1954 (Box 
12, Conrad L. Wirth Collection, University of Wyoming, American Heritage Centre). 
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single most important programmatic aspect of his postwar development campaign. 
Mission 66 did not sponsor major original historical research, nor did it initiate new 
scientific or ecological perspectives on the management of park resources; but it did 
provide more than 100 visitor centres and myriad other facilities specifically designed 
around the needs of park interpretation. Wirth, Lee, and most of the planners and 
superintendents participating in Mission 66 planning all agreed that developing ranger 
programs, brochures, and audio -visual presentations, and building roadside displays, 
amphitheatres, nature trails, and visitor centres would assure that park visitors found 
enjoyment and inspiration in their experiences of national park landscapes and historic 
sites. Mission 66 was planned not only to avoid the physical damage larger crowds 
caused, but to assure that as few people as possible failed to experience and fully 
appreciate the special significance of every park in the system. 
Interpretation was a particular concern for Wirth and Lee during the years 
immediately before Mission 66. Between 1953 and 1955 they published four 
instructional brochures for interpreters: Talks, Conducted Trips, Campfire Programs, and 
Information Please. The first two were written by Howard Stagner, who after 1957 
became chief of the Branch of Natural History in Lee's Division of Interpretation. The 
short booklets offered mainly practical advice on the conduct of park programs.398 But 
Wirth also had frank and direct intentions for how interpretation could be used to as an 
"offensive weapon in preventing intrusion and adverse use of areas." In a 1953 
memorandum (which Lee and other staff, such as chief naturalist John E. Doerr, probably 
drafted) Wirth outlined new goals for interpretation that related directly to those soon 
formulated for Mission 66 itself. Interpretation, the memorandum stated, should serve 
both parts of the agency's mandate: it should enhance enjoyment by providing 
information, but it should also protect from impairment by encouraging better 
appreciation of park resources and a more sympathetic understanding of the threats to 
them. Interpretation should "point out specific ways in which the visitor should 
participate, to his own greater benefit, in proper park use and conservation." Harm was 
done out of ignorance, Wirth insisted, and rules were violated mainly because the need 
for them was not adequately explained. "Lessons in park use and conservation," 
397 Ronald F. Lee, "Comments on the Role of Interpretation in the National Park Service," February 16, 
1961 (Personal Papers of Conrad L. Wirth, Box 22, RG 79, National Archives). 
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generally, could be drawn from specific instances and situations in a given park. If 
"threats to park integrity" were explained to visitors, they would be more likely to abide 
by restrictions, such as staying on trails and off of delicate meadows. The "conservation 
interpretation objective" was simple: "give the visitor a personal knowledge of park and 
monument values, such as an awareness of park principles and values, and...an awareness 
of his own responsibility" so that "he may take intelligent action, whether it concerns his 
own behaviour in the parks, or... after he leaves. "399 
After becoming a division chief in 1954, Lee was able to use his position to help 
give Mission 66 its emphasis on interpretive facilities and programs. He continued to 
identify the goals of interpretation with those of Mission 66 itself. "The extent to which 
public use...can safely increase during the next ten years without adversely affecting the 
preservation" of the parks, he wrote in 1955, "is directly dependent upon an effective 
program of information and interpretation." If the vast and changing public understood 
and appreciated the parks, they would "enjoy and use them wisely" and help protect them. 
Providing "information stations, publications, exhibits, campfire talks, conducted trips, 
roadside displays, audio -visual presentations, and other means" could improve the 
"mental attitude, appreciation, and understanding of the visitor." Two "twin" initiatives, 
"equally essential to accomplish MISSION 66," therefore were necessary: "planned 
physical development, and park interpretation for wise use." Lee was concerned that the 
postwar public's "higher education levels" and exposure to more sophisticated media 
(especially television) challenged park interpreters to revise their methods and standards. 
Americans were also increasingly diverse and "city- bred," creating a greater imperative to 
instruct them in appropriate and safe behaviour in wilderness areas.40° Lee also expressed 
concern over the fate of what had become, in some parks, extensive collections of 
historical, archaeological, and ethnographic artefacts. Most parks had never had the 
personnel or facilities to adequately catalogue and store, much less properly display, their 
collections. There was an overwhelming need to develop "specialized technical 
treatment...to preserve these collections" as part of Mission 66.4°1 
399 Mackintosh reprints the entire memorandum in an appendix. Mackintosh, Interpretation in the National 
Park Service, 105 -111. 
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Wirth and Lee also strongly believed that increased "automation" and new 
technologies would be needed to meet the challenge of providing standard levels of 
interpretive programs throughout the park system (fig. 75). Increased staffing was vital 
as well and was a planned aspect of Mission 66. But considering the demands being 
placed on the Park Service, even if Congress made the requested increases in the number 
of employees, other strategies would still be needed to handle the anticipated levels of 
visitors. Although nothing could replace personal contact with a ranger or interpreter, 
there simply never again would be enough of them in proportion to visitors to rely on 
personal interactions as the primary means of interpretation. Already in 1952 Lee began 
an audio-visual training program for interpreters, and the Jamestown and Yorktown 
visitor centres in Colonial National Historical Park were the first to feature auditoriums 
with projection rooms for showing interpretive films (a practice that had already begun in 
nearby Williamsburg).402 In 1955 he began "experimental" use of "audio -visual 
devices...to supplement the personal interpretive services" in a selected group of parks. 
By 1956 he was asking EODC chief Edward Zimmer to make sure that all preliminary 
planning for visitor centres be coordinated with the Division of Interpretation to assure 
that the new facilities met the requirements of film and slide projectors.403 By the next 
year "self guiding tour systems" were available at a number of Civil War battlefields, and 
professionally printed "self- guidance publications" were replacing mimeographed 
handouts in many parks. At Yosemite, Great Smoky Mountains, and other parks, "self - 
guiding trails" were developed 404 "Visitor- activated" interpretive devices (recoded 
interpretive talks) were designed, and by the early 1960s ninety parks featured "audio 
stations" and automatic movie or slide programs. Automatic audio or audio -visual 
presentations became standard features of new visitor centres, alleviating the enormous 
task of giving thousands of visitors a basic introduction and orientation to a park.405 
By the mid- 1950s, national park interpretation also found its most eloquent 
literary voice, the journalist, novelist, and playwright Freeman Tilden. Wirth was 
particularly taken by Tilden's reflections on the national parks and their significance, 
beginning with The National Parks: What They Mean to You and Me (1951). Wirth 
arranged in 1953 to have Freeman's next book, The Fifth Essence, published through a 
402 Lewis, Museum Curatorship, 145; Mackintosh, Interpretation in the National Park Service, 85. 
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private donation and distributed to all parks and field offices.406 The "fifth essence" 
Tilden describes was the spirit of a place that the interpreter sought to evoke and convey 
to an audience. In 1955 the Park Service secured another private grant to support 
Tilden's "reappraisal of the basic principles which underlie the program of natural and 
historical interpretation. "407 Over the next year Tilden toured the park system observing 
programs and working as an interpreter. Ronald Lee oversaw the project, which 
culminated in 1957 with Tilden's next book, Interpreting Our Heritage, which became 
essential text for national park interpreters during Mission 66 and afterwards. In it Tilden 
further clarified the activity of interpretation -conveying the significance of a place to a 
diverse group of visitors -as opposed to conducting a class or lecturing on a broad theme. 
He established "six principles," including injunctions to "relate what is being displayed or 
described to something within the personality or experience of the visitor," and to 
"present a whole body, not a part." The "chief aim" of interpretation, for Tilden, was 
"not instruction, but provocation." If Wirth and Lee fashioned bureaucratic and 
functional tools for park interpreters, Tilden vividly described the inspirational spirit of 
their work. 
12.4 Training for Interpreters 
Tourism to historic sites grew enormously during the 1950s, an era that became 
known for veneration of American "heritage." Park Service training and interpretive 
programs supported and responded to the popular trend.408 Training a new generation of 
national park interpreters was a priority for Mission 66, and in 1956 Wirth instructed Lee 
to draw up plans for the operation of two "National Park Service schools" for the 
instruction of park staff In 1957 an agency task force identified a critical need for 
training "all uniformed employees (park rangers, naturalists, historians and 
archaeologists)" and suggested a basic curriculum. A new National Park Service 
Training Centre was established in Yosemite Valley that year, under the direction of 
Frank Kowski, who since 1951 had headed agency training programs from 
Washington.409 Kowski's new program effectively reactivated Harold Bryant's Yosemite 
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school that had operated from 1925 to 1953. The training centre marked the first 
comprehensive attempt by the Park Service to train its incoming uniformed employees, 
all of whom were to spend three months there "as soon as practicable after their 
appointment." This was not considered an adequate or permanent solution, however, and 
a larger, more comprehensive training centre was already being planned.41° Mission 66 
provided the funds for a new training facility at Grand Canyon National Park, which was 
completed in 1963. Named for Horace Albright, the new Grand Canyon complex 
featured classrooms, offices, a library, and apartments for students. The next year, an 
eastern counterpart opened on the campus of Storer College in Harpers Ferry, a 
historically African American institution that had closed in 1955. The eastern training 
centre, dedicated to Stephen Mather, was housed in rehabilitated college buildings. 
Together the Albright and Mather training centres institutionalized the methods and 
intentions of natural and historical park interpretation as developed under Wirth, Lee, 
Tilden, and Kowski. For Wirth, the establishment of permanent institutions to train the 
next generation of Park Service interpreters and "stewards of our heritage" fulfilled one 
of his highest priorities for Mission 66.411 
Even under Mission 66, however, getting substantial funding for personnel 
training apparently proved difficult, especially during the first half of Mission 66. 
Congress proved resistant to hiring adequate interpretive staff at all. By 1959 Park 
Service personnel assembled for a conference in Williamsburg unanimously agreed that 
"lack of sufficient personnel" remained the "most serious deficiency in NPS 
interpretation. "412 Mission 66 failed during its early years to meet goals for increasing 
staff, in general. In 1960 "cumulative staffing increases amounted to a only a little more 
than half the number of additions scheduled during the first four years of MISSION 66," 
according to a training manual being developed in Lee's division that year.413 John Doerr 
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reported similar difficulties that year, noting that "interpretive services" in his natural 
history programs were up 54 %, but that most of that increase "was attributable to self - 
guiding facilities" such as the "A -V cabinets" installed in thirty-seven visitor centres 
since 1956. "A -V presentations," "self- guided tours and trails," and "wayside interpretive 
devices" made up 67% of "interpretive contacts" in 1959; 22% of contacts were at 
information desks and only 11% of contacts were "of the personal type" (ranger talks). 
Interpretive staffing "lagged seriously" and because of the need to staff visitor centres and 
deal with a 22% rise in visitation over the previous three years, in 1960 Doerr considered 
the personnel shortage "more acute now than in 1956." While a 372% increase in 
"naturalist personnel" had been called for under Mission 66, only a 7% increase had been 
realized.414 
Doerr's complaints did not stop there, and probably reflected similar sentiments 
among natural historians and scientists both inside and outside the Park Service. 
Although he felt that Mission 66 had initially acknowledged the importance of sponsoring 
"research in natural history," no funds at all had been appropriated for this purpose before 
1958, and only $28,000 annually had been funded for the subsequent two years. Doerr 
understood the political reality of the situation, suggesting that new legislation 
"comparable to the Antiquities Act and Historic Sites Act" would be needed to give the 
Park Service the mandate and budget to undertake "necessary" and "urgently needed" 
research. From "alpine wilderness ecology," to "Florida bay marine life," to "siltation 
studies" in Mammoth Cave, ongoing in -house research projects were not adequately 
funded. Outside agencies, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. 
Geological Survey were doing most of the research in parks, along with university and 
private non -profit partners. But Doerr felt strongly that "it will be necessary to expand 
biologist staffing" in regional offices and parks so that the Park Service could identify its 
own research needs, initiate projects, and coordinate research by outside entities.415 
Mission 66 obviously was planned and run by specialists in park design and 
interpretation who had their own expertise and priorities. But Doerr was probably correct 
in observation that new legislation would probably be needed if Congress were to see the 
Park Service no longer as primarily a park development and management agency, but also 
414 "Condensation of Visitor Services, Natural History Program," October 17, 1960 (National Park Service 
History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
415 "Condensation of Visitor Services, Natural History Program," October 17, 1960 (National Park Service 
History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center). 
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as a scientific research organization. Wirth could have been an effective advocate for 
new legislation, since he was well known for his relationships with members of Congress 
and his ability to secure appropriations. He had gained that reputation, though, by 
sensing and working within the political limitations of his time. Mission 66 exploited the 
willingness of Congress to fund construction projects; eventually it even succeeded in 
establishing professional training centres and some increases in staffing. Wirth probably 
felt that Congress would not approve major funding for Park Service scientific research, 
just as the lawmakers were unlikely to accept the new legislative mandate for national 
recreational planning authority. Under Mission 66, the Park Service did not fund 
scientific research, and in fact barely mentioned at all. Organizationally it fell under Lee 
in the Division of Interpretation. Wirth and Lee accepted the need for park naturalists to 
know and contribute to natural history as part of their interpretive duties, but the little 
research funded by the agency rarely extended beyond the studies needed to enhance 
interpretive programs. The idea of scientific ecological research guiding fundamental 
agency management policies and decisions remained unrealized and even undiscussed. 
Even critics in the late 1950s, however, agreed that if new research remained 
unfunded, at least the construction of visitor centres and other interpretive facilities had 
proceeded efficiently. Park Service architects at the WODC and EODC had responded to 
the changing needs of interpreters and museum exhibit designers. Ronald Lee actively 
helped negotiate the exchange of ideas between interpreters and architects by organizing 
the two conferences that brought his division's personnel first to the EODC in 1957, and 
then to the WODC in 1958. The results of these conferences were, as noted previously, a 
reassessment of the entire visitor centre concept in response to the programming 
requirements of park interpreters. Audio -visual and other "automatic devices" were seen 
as one answer to the dearth of interpretive staff, and architects accommodated them in the 
new buildings. Exhibit designers reconceived the purpose and context of their displays, 
which now typically made up one part of the larger, more diverse functional 
programming of the visitor centres. Museum staff (also in Lee's Division of 
Interpretation) no longer designed exhibits as comprehensive, illustrated narratives, as 
much as effective, concise orientations to specific parks. As national park historian Barry 
Mackintosh observes, older park museums "were viewed as supplemental to the visitor 
experience," but "visitor centers- multiple use facilities emphasizing orientation -were 
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seen as integral to it.i416 The change was analogous to the difference that officials 
attempted to define between "education" and "interpretation." The visitor centre and its 
exhibits were vehicles of the latter. Modernist design expressed the same shift in purpose 
and program. 
A number of commemorative anniversary dates also shaped Mission 66 historic 
preservation and interpretation. The visitor centres at Jamestown and Yorktown, for 
example, had been completed because of funding made available in time for the 350t1í 
anniversary of the British settlement of Virginia. The Abraham Lincoln sesquicentennial 
was observed in 1957, and the Theodore Roosevelt centennial the next year, followed by 
numerous other anniversaries. Civil War battlefields were of particular interest during 
Mission 66 because of the events and commemorations being planned for the centennial 
celebrations of that conflict. At many Civil War battlefields, the basic development and 
interpretation of the landscape had changed little since the late nineteenth century. Wirth 
and his Mission 66 planners intended to have every Civil War site ready for the increased 
attention and visitation they could expect in the coming decade. Planned improvements 
often included the acquisition of abutting land, as well as the construction of new visitor 
centres and roads. A former general was in the Whitehouse, and Congress was in a mood 
to commemorate the nation's bloodiest war, creating a Civil War Centennial Commission 
in 1957. In their first report, the commissioners cited the goals of Mission 66, which they 
felt would "dovetail with the objectives of the Centennial." Between 1961 and 1965, 
local, state, and national commemorative events were held in forty states. At many of the 
most critical sites of the war, including Gettysburg, Antietam, Harpers Ferry, 
Chancellorsville, Appomattox, and others, Mission 66 visitor centres opened in time for 
centennial observances. At Harpers Ferry and Ford's Theatre in Washington, extensive 
historic structure restorations were begun. Four new Civil War parks were acquired, and 
3,000 acres were added to the more than thirty national parks that related to the 
conflict.417 
416 Mackintosh, Interpretation in the National Park Service, 45 -54; Lewis, Museum Curatorship, 150 -156. 
417 
U.S. Civil War Centennial Commission, Guide to the Observance of the Centennial of the Civil War 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959); "Mission 66: To Make Your Civil War Tour 
Memorable," Civil War Times 3, no. 3 (June 1961): 12 -14; U.S. Civil War Centennial Commission, The 
Civil War Centennial: A Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968). 
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12.5 Precedents for a National Register 
The development of national historical parks and historic sites that were or 
became, part of the national park system obviously dominated much of the Mission 66 
historic preservation effort. The historian James Glass asserts that "during Wirth's tenure 
the Park Service operated an inward -looking preservation program...that enhanced its 
own historical monuments and parks," but failed to provide the leadership needed to curb 
the excesses of federal highway construction and urban renewal.418 But there were 
Mission 66 preservation initiatives of consequence that involved historic resources 
outside the national park system. Vint, for example, grew increasingly interested in 
historic preservation later in his career. When Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman 
awarded him his department's Distinguished Service Award in 1952, Vint was cited for 
three achievements: the "inter- bureau agreement" with the Bureau of Public Roads in 
1925; developing the "master plan idea" in the late 1920s; and organizing the Historic 
American Buildings Survey (HABS) in the 1930s.419 HABS was discontinued in 1942, 
but under Mission 66 Vint arranged to reactivate HABS, which continued to be 
administered by his close friend and protégé, Charles Peterson.420 Lee was also able to 
continue the Historic Sites Survey (which had been begun in 1936 under the provisions of 
the Historic Sites Act) briefly in 1946, although budget limitations in the late 1940s 
precluded progress or expansion. Lee then reactivated and expanded the survey in 1957 
using Mission 66 funding. In the interim he reconceived the program to become a 
centralized inventory of all nationally significant historical sites, not just those that might 
be potential additions to the park system as had been the case originally. The distinction 
was an important one because it gave the Park Service responsibility for a national 
register of historic properties that were (and were intended to remain) outside the park 
system. In 1960 Lee succeeded in classifying these historically significant properties as 
"Registered National Historic Landmarks," and the Historic Sites Survey became the 
National Historic Landmarks Program, still under the authority of the Historic Sites Act. 
There were no federal legal protections for National Historic Landmarks, but the 
418 Glass, The Beginnings of a New National Historic Preservation Program, 6. 
419 Oscar L. Chapman, "Citation for Distinguished Service, Thomas C. Vint," Papers of Charles E. 
Peterson. 
420 Charles E. Peterson, "HABS -In and Out of Philadelphia," in Richard Webster, ed., Philadelphia 
Preserved: Catalogue of the Historic American Buildings Survey, xxi-xlvi (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1976). 
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designations and accompanying bronze plaques became a means of identifying threatened 
landmarks anywhere in the country, assisting local preservation efforts, and generating a 
national inventory of sites that merited protection.421 
The Historic American Buildings Survey and the National Historic Landmarks 
Program required not only documenting and researching historic buildings and sites, but 
also building a federal preservation organization and a national network of preservation 
partners. These two Mission 66 programs established the precedent of a federal list of 
significant historic resources and, despite their limitations, they maintained the Park 
Service's position as the nation's historic preservation agency. Mission 66 also created 
numerous opportunities for architects specializing in the documentation, preservation, and 
reuse of historic buildings. Historical "restorations and reconstructions" were a major 
category of Mission 66 activity at scores of national historical parks and monuments, 
from Philadelphia to Casa Grande. New standards and procedures for the restoration of 
historic buildings were established, and dozens of architects gained experience that led to 
the increased professionalization of "historical architecture" as a discipline (fig. 76). 
Like Mission 66 itself, however, all of these preservation activities proceeded on 
the basis of New Deal legislation, in this case mainly the 1935 Historic Sites Act. Lee's 
strategy was analogous to Wirth's decision to use the Park, Parkway, and Recreational - 
Area Study Act of 1936 as the authority for Mission 66 recreational planning. In both 
cases, very capable New Deal bureaucrats used the legislative tools they knew well to 
frame the renewed programs and activities of Mission 66. In both cases, critics outside 
the Park Service continued to point out the need for new legislation that would restructure 
and broaden federal efforts in these fields. While Wirth was openly antagonistic to 1960s 
legislation such as the 1963 Outdoor Recreation Act and the 1964 Wilderness Act, Lee 
cultivated private sector preservationists and supported the efforts that led to the 1966 
National Historic Preservation Act. Wirth also opposed the early versions of that 
preservation legislation, however, since they implied that the Park Service would have to 
take responsibility for inventorying and monitoring historic resources that were only of 
state or local (not national) significance.422 But largely as a result of Lee's efforts, the 
1966 act placed the administration of a new National Register of Historic Places within 
the National Park Service. The Park Service retained leadership and administration of 
421 Barry Mackintosh, "The Historic Sites Survey and the National Historic Landmarks Program: A 
History," unpublished report (National Park Service, Washington, DC, 1985), 27-41. 
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federal historic preservation programs, while in 1962 the agency was divested of similar 
authority for federal recreational planning in favour of the new Bureau of Outdoor 
Recreation. 
Despite the controversial siting of some visitor centres and the perhaps "inward - 
looking" nature of its historic preservation program, Mission 66 advanced federal historic 
preservation at a crucial time when other federal agencies and Congress were engaged in 
massive destruction of historic buildings and landscapes. Mission 66 incubated the 
professional disciplines of interpretation and historical architecture, and greatly advanced 
staff professionalization generally through the Albright and Mather training centres. 
Wirth counted 458 historic buildings "reconstructed and rehabilitated" under Mission 66 
at a cost of more than $15 million. The projects varied from a Danish colonial sugar 
plantation on the island of Saint John, to the Custis -Lee Mansion in Virginia, to Fort 
Davis in Texas. But the numbers only hint at the influence of projects, such as those in 
St. Louis and Philadelphia, that initiated later Park Service urban open space and historic 
preservation initiatives in Boston, New York, San Francisco, and other cities.423 The 
invention of the Mission 66 visitor centre and its integral interpretive programming was 
perhaps the most pervasive preservation concept of all, and has characterized efforts to 
orient and serve visitors not only by land management agencies, but by institutions of all 
types, ever since. Mission 66 today most often evokes a physical legacy of facility 
development, but the program's less tangible achievements in historic preservation policy 
and the practice of interpretation may in the end prove to have been more critical in the 
history of park management. 
423 Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, 267. 
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